Intelligence Policy Political Factors That Term Paper

  • Length: 10 pages
  • Sources: 9
  • Subject: Psychology
  • Type: Term Paper
  • Paper: #65240524

Excerpt from Term Paper :

The necessity to safeguard intelligence information from parochialism and political pressures will be a strong argument in promoting a centralized and strong capability. This is contrary to leaving decisions that affect critical intelligence related concerns solely to the makers of policy. Centralization of policymaking process faces the politicization risk that stems from the department of DCI. It is only the Congress, the President, and Senior National Security Officials who can assist in protecting against politicization. However, the also do have the potential of politicizing any intelligence. Contrary to business in this scenario, the customer is not always on the right end. Analysis should be decentralized based on concerns that have minimal or no impact on the analysis in question (Halchin & Kaisser, 2010).

American intelligence community can safeguard itself against political pressures by following a competitive analysis regarding controversial issues. Safeguarding from politicization is a fundamental function for the President and the Congress's Foreign Intelligence Board. In this regard, it is necessary to consider reconstituting the PFIAB and ensure it is responsible to the President and the Congress. Perhaps it is of utmost importance for the leaders of the intelligence community to foster the culture of speaking the truth to the leadership (Yoshihara & Holmes, 2012).

In addition, the leadership is required to defend all who face criticisms for discharging their responsibilities. Arguably, irrelevance has been viewed as an enormous challenge for analysts than politicization. The analysis of intelligence rarely favors itself through policy makers who tend to be inevitably inundated and busy as they have exceedingly more demands on their attention and time, which they can possibly fulfill (Salinas, Samuel & White, 2012). Intelligence professionals are required to draw attention on their services and goods, hence market their products and concepts. This has been particularly factual in any case of intelligence related or early warning development that has the possibility of resulting in measurable impacts for vital interests. Personalized memorandums, phone calls, and meetings are all required in all sufficiently critical scenarios. Individual analysts would gain incentives if relevant policy makers and consumers were allowed to participate in personal evaluation of intelligence analysis. This would lead to an underlined effort in intelligence creation (Reed & Dumper, 2012).

Groupthink or mindset is another factor affecting the American intelligence community. This should be avoided at any cost, with no exception to the CIA and intelligence agencies and organizations. These institutions have the possibility of falling into the trap of not conducting effective interrogations affecting subsequent analysis. It is necessary for the intelligence community should be encouraged to conduct redundant and competitive analysis. Historically and currently, the U.S. spends less than ten percent on intelligence analysis. This is the cheapest dimension of the U.S. intelligence department. A certain level of duplication should have been encouraged, as it is useful. It is possible for the U.S. To invest more on the area of analysis because any minor errors can orchestrate major adverse impacts (Halchin & Kaisser, 2010).

Another aspect of the merit mention of analysis is striking a balance between long-term estimates and current intelligence. For decades the intelligence community, particularly the CIA emphasized on the culture that favored the latter. However, it information appears to have minimized importance in analysis of broad trends and long terms familiar subjects. In addition, government analysts tend to have no meaning because unlike their counterparts in private and academia sectors, they are not effective (Kaisser, F2010). Moreover, busy policy makers have not found any relevance in most estimates. They tend to emphasize on focusing on the immediate. Therefore, these are suggests that the government should work on reducing the emphasis directed on such estimates (Salinas, Samuel & White, 2012).

Finally, long-term estimates end up being produced. To some extent, they must be concise, generated by professionals and sources ought to justify conclusions that would be presented as academic findings. In case of group projects, the participants ought to sharpen and acknowledge differences among them prominently. Though it is of great value to pin point an area of consensus, it is of utmost importance to highlight areas generating dispute. Therefore, this would encourage all agencies to attain an agreed conclusion representing more of a common denominator (Tocqueville, Mansfield, & Winthrop, 2002).

Security and civil liberty

There is a paradox in how civil liberties reconcile to the national security. Acts of terror have been thriving in the democratic freedom. The freedom of expression, movement, and association has been enjoying a liberal democratic environment. These liberties are conducive to the execution and planning of activities of gross violence meant to destroy or destabilize the national structures, as well as advance specific ideologies. Innumerable theories illustrate the challenge of juxtaposing national security and civil liberties, whereby there is less evidence of a delicate balance than favoring to erode civil liberties in responding to perceived crisis (Salinas, Samuel & White, 2012).

When suspects are detained for years without being charged coupled by extensive incursions of privacy for intangible enemies view ordinary citizens as a necessity for nations that entangled in war. However, as much as the terror enemies would be intangible, so do the frontline contours. Accordingly, nations that are involved in terror wars run the risk of ending up in a long-term emergency state on their own land. In addition, the attacks of terror are potential threats to the fundamental freedoms and rights characterizing democracy. Human rights and civil liberties are the founding blocks of societies; however, they are vulnerable to be destroyed by terror threats. Terrorist groups can achieve the greatest success of persuading democratic nations to abandon their democratic values (Tocqueville, Mansfield, & Winthrop, 2002).

Convincingly, it can be argued that if the privacy and civil liberties of citizens are sacrificed, it results in citizens who are less free but more insecure. This amounts to the destruction of freedom to defend the same freedom. Legislations such as the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act has enormous surveillance measures, whose provisions allows trafficking of internet usage, accessing financial, education and business records. The Act is perceived to be among the U.S. legal mechanisms enacted to eliminate impediments, which civil liberties pose to investigations. It permits the monitoring and interceptions of communication records, communities, and searches without issuing notice. The U.S. is largely exercising these powers without imposing warrants (Tocqueville, Mansfield, & Winthrop, 2002).

Until recently, the government relied on public emergency that threaten the life of the state introduced a delegation. The provisions of the American Human Rights Convention protect personal liberty. The recent U.S. Security Act and the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2010 have supported this. Under these provisions, the government has demonstrated its support towards detention of immigrants incase their presence in the country proves to be a threat to the state security. This is made worse if it is established that the individuals are terror suspects. If the U.S. maintains a strong national security, it would promote civil liberties against known and unknown risks. This is a vital and paramount responsibility of the federal government (Svendsen, 2012).

When intelligence is effectively collected, it is likely to meet the rights and expectations of Americans. Such programs of intelligence assist in securing out civil liberties from people seeking to harm them. If these programs work effectively, they have the possibility of protecting the security and civil liberties of U.S. citizens. For instance, the deployment of military tribunals in case of terrorism is a perfect example. The application of tribunals in America dates back from the American revolutionary war. This has often been perceived as providing fundamental support for flexible military operations, particularly contrasted to the customary options. Currently, tribunals are serving a surplus function as a boundary between the lawful compromises and civil justice system (United States, 2010).


It is evident that America has attained commendable counterproductive decisions. While the state has imprisoned individuals conspiring with terror enemies during war, the internment of foreign nationals due to the ethnicity in time of war has been perceived as highly destructive and unconstitutional of liberty. In addition, it was counterproductive to divert attention and resources, which cost valuable workforce that cause direct harm on the political system of America. This makes the state less safe (Salinas, Samuel & White, 2012) and (Yoshihara & Holmes, 2012). The U.S. has received notable abomination claims of passing Acts that harm the U.S. political system (Halchin & Kaisser, 2010).

Additional reforms must be instituted in a case where the existing measures create more problems than it resolves and in course cause a weakness in the United States national security. The United States must continue investing significant resources if they need to have an important capability. However, available studies demonstrate that the U.S. has acquired valuable lessons from its mistakes. As early philosophers have argued, nations that surrender essential liberty at the expense of temporary safety do not deserve liberty or safety. This means that a nation that sacrifices liberty at the cost of security achieves none in the end.…

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