T&E Acquisition Process for the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)

The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is being developed by the Marine Corps and the Army to be the successor of the High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) that has been in service since 1985. The aim is to develop a family of future light tactical vehicles that can replace most of the HMMWV currently being used. The HMMWV was developed during the cold war and during this time there were no attacks aimed at vehicles. During this period, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other anti-vehicle explosive devices were never a concern when performing military planning. Attempts have been made to up-armor the HMMWV, but they have been less successful and vehicle survivability has now become one of the key emphasis of the military. There was a requirement to have the JLTV configured with a variable ride-height suspension, which is described as the ability for the vehicle to raise and lower the suspension for it to meet certain mission requirements (Osborn & John, 2010). The JLTV will comprise two variants a four-passenger Combat Tactical Vehicle (CTV) and a two-passenger Combat Support Vehicle. The idea behind JLTV is to have a more reliable, maintainable, all-terrain mobile, and equipped link to current and future tactical data nets. This program is an Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1D program. The Army bears all responsibility for developing the JLTV. JLTVs are designed to operate with high reliability in a wide variety of climates and terrain, which makes the vehicle more versatile and vital for the military.

Developmental Test & Evaluation

This stage comprises of materiel solutions analysis phase, technology maturation & risk reduction phase, and engineering, manufacturing & development phase. For the JLTV the analysis was already done and it had been identified there is a need for a vehicle that would transport soldiers safely. The current vehicle was deemed to be vulnerable to IED attacks and this jeopardized the safety of the soldiers being transported. Therefore, the JLTV had to be body proofed to withstand these attacks and other attacks aimed at vehicles. The JLTV program was approved in November 2006. The Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) directing the program to move from concept refinement phase to technology development was signed in December 2007. ADM is what allowed the program to be able to issue an RFP inviting bidders to the program. Having already determined the technology and risk reduction the vehicle had to overcome the military had enough information to include in the RFP. The vehicle had to be used in all-terrain to ensure there will not be a need to have different vehicles being developed for different terrains and climates. This was quite vital as the military had been forced to develop special purpose vehicles to be used in Afghanistan and different ones to be used in Iraq. This increases the production costs as the vehicles are not multi-purpose.

Three technology development awards were given for the JLTV technology development (TD) phase. The three contractors selected for the TD phase...

The TD phase lasted 27 months and the contractors were required to build four test sub-configurations within the first 15 months. Testing was to take place during the next 12 months. The TD phase was needed to determine and mature the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into the full system, reduce technology risk, and demonstrate the integration of critical technology elements on the prototypes. In this phase, the three contractors would develop prototypes that would be based on the RFP given. There would be an assessment of the viability of the technologies and refinement of user requirements...…required amount of JLTVs. Overall, the testing confirmed the JLTV was not operationally suitable since there were deficiencies in maintainability, reliability, manuals, training, crew situational awareness, and safety. There were notable defects like engine wiring problems, brake system faults, and damaged tires. The lack of training and manuals denied the crews an opportunity to attempt to fix some of these issues. The vehicle is meant to be light but there is still a need to increase its operational capability (Osborn & John, 2010). It is a tricky balance as when there is an increase in armor, the weight of the vehicle will increase and this will hinder its trafficability and transportability.

When compared to the HMMWV the JTLV surpasses most of the thresholds. The operational mission failures miles for the JTLV are 2,400 and that of the HMMWV is 500 to 600 miles. This indicates the JTLV is superior to the HMMWV. However, without proper testing, it would not be possible to justify its usage in any live mission. The military did go into full-rate production, which was approved in June 2019. The JTLVs have also been fielded to the Ordnance School at Ft. Lee VA. Hopefully, this will increase the knowledge of the soldiers and they can learn more about the vehicles.

In conclusion, the T&E acquisition process for the JTLV was successful as the Army was able to gain the competitive advantage of having different contractors manufacturing the prototypes and choosing the best amongst the three. Knowledge of system capabilities and limitations was acquired during the process, which necessitated the requirement changes or modifications. Using this strategy, the Army was able to develop and manufacture a vehicle that could guarantee the safety of its soldiers when it is deployed. The overall risk reduction was achieved as the vehicle was deemed safe and it could be improved in the future to meet all the operational and reliability requirements. The JLTV program was a way of demonstrating that competitive prototyping can…