Moral Hazard The term moral hazard arises out of a contractual agreement. When the terms of the contract serve as motivation for one of the parties to behave in a manner that is "contrary to the principles laid out in the agreement" (Investopedia, 2013). An example that is commonly used is when a salesperson is paid entirely on salary. The salesperson in that case has little direct incentive to perform according to the spirit of the contract, save for the threat of dismissal. The deal assumes that both parties will act according to the spirit of the contract, but the way the contract is structured this is not necessarily the case.

The concept of moral hazard is often applied to the financial industry. Most contracts are designed to prohibit moral hazard, but multiple hazards have been identified. For example, homeowners who found themselves in arrears or their homes under water might have received assistance. This creates a moral hazard. Normally, when a borrower fails to repay a mortgage, there are penalties that are incurred. These include foreclosure or credit problems that could prohibit future borrowing and could harm one's employment chances (Pritchard, 2013). If these consequences are not seen through, the borrower may realize that there is no longer disincentive to default. Thus, the homeowner will realize that it is better for him or her to default, perhaps receive assistance, and remain in his or her home. It has been argued that this particular form of moral hazard led to excessive borrowing during the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis.

There were other forms of moral hazard at work in that crisis as well. Normally, financial institutions maintain limits...

The reason is simple -- a mortgage in default is a financial loss to the institution. This loss, however, was mitigated during the crisis not once but twice. The use of credit default swaps and other instruments to sell the risk associated with mortgage portfolios removed the risk to the lending institution. Because they profited from the loan, but did not bear the consequences of the default, these institutions were incentivized to increase lending, and to increase the riskiness of their portfolios.
Yet a third moral hazard emerged as well, when the government moved to bail out some struggling banks, under the doctrine of "too big to fail." Too big to fail is one of the most significant moral hazards in the financial system. Essentially, it is the recognition that the collapse of a major bank would a catastrophic effect on the banking system and from there the entire U.S. economy. The bankers who knew this were willing to take unusually large risks in their portfolios, knowing that the costs of those risks would be paid by the American taxpayer (Dowd, 2012). Worse, the same bankers who acted in this manner were cashing significant bonuses for themselves during the good years, could barely restrain themselves from more bonuses even in 2008-2009 and have since resumed generous bonuses so quickly after the taxpayer bailouts. The moral hazard is that the bankers benefit from taking excessive risk, knowing that they will not pay the cost.

Financial observers note that many of the issues of moral hazard that were present during the crisis remain. The too big to fail doctrine not only remains intact,…