Terrorism Shares Features in Common With Irregular

Terrorism shares features in common with irregular warfare, insurgency, and crime. Like crime, terrorism violates the law and infringes on the rights of others. Like insurgency, terrorism "appeals as a weapon of the weak," (Arquilla, Ronfelt & Zanini 1999, p. 134). Similarly, Arquilla et al. (1999) note that terrorism "has appealed as a way to assert identity and command attention," (p. 134). Like irregular warfare, terrorism is asynchronous and asymmetrical, not ascribing to the rules of war. However, terrorism is unique in that "today's enemy is not a state but a transnational, non-state actor" that uses warfare that is "not traditional…elusive…and…exploits…industrial and technological advantages," (Howard n.d.). As Howard (n.d.) points out, terrorism more resembles a virus than anything else (p. 123). Moreover, terrorism involves ideology and paradigms that underwrite its existence: in the case of al Qaeda a pseudo-religious doctrine. The goals of terrorism are farther-reaching and more global than those of guerilla fighters or ordinary criminals.

In a post September 11 environment, al Qaeda has been forced to alter its targeting strategy away from spectacular or theatrical attacks because of three factors. First, al Qaeda's financial resources and networks have been infiltrated and compromised, in part due to "loss of sanctuary in Afghanistan," (Howard n.d., p. 123). Second, similar causal factors have led to a breakdown in al Qaeda's communications network and compromised the organization's ability to coordinate and orchestrate large-scale events. Third, the United States has made considerable efforts to thwart the proliferation of terrorist cells.

In his essay "Preemptive Military Doctrine: No Other Choice," Ret. Brigadier General Russell D. Howard notes that indicators of success in the war on terror are difficult to measure. Unlike with traditional warfare in which the signing of a treaty signals the end, terrorism involves a whole new set of rules. "Victory and defeat are elusive terms in a war on terrorism," (Howard n.d. p. 126). Howard (n.d.) considers success in different terms. "Instead of body counts and casualty rates, success in the war on terror may be measured in numbers voting, schools opened, and women in the workforce," (Howard n.d. p. 126).

Arquilla, et al. (1999) identify three paradigms that shape the goals and strategies of terrorists. Those three paradigms include terror as coercive diplomacy, terror as war, and terror as the harbinger of a 'new world,'" (Arquilla et al. 1999, p. 149). Coercive diplomacy refers to the fact that "terrorism has often sought to persuade others, by means of symbolic violence, either to do something, stop doing something, or undo what has been done," (Arquilla et al. 1999, p. 149). In fact, it was until only recently that weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) were not thought to be in line with traditional terrorism due to the coercive diplomacy paradigm. The war paradigm of terrorism, on the other hand, fully embraces the potential of WMDs. According to the war paradigm of terrorism, "the worse the damage the better," (Arquilla et al. 1999, p. 149). Therefore, the war paradigm can sometimes be antithetical to the coercive diplomacy model. The use of WMDs may be in collusion with state actors or not. Finally, the new world paradigm is built on religious ideology. It "harks back to the dynamics of millennialist movements that arose in past epochs of social upheaval," and "is likely to seek the vast disruption of political, social, and economic order," (Arquilla et al. 1999, p. 150). All three of these pradigms of terrorism: the coercive diplomacy paradigm, the war paradigm, and the new world paradigm, "offer room for Netwar, cybotage, and other advanced acts of terrorism (Arquilla et al. 1999).

Gabriel Weimann (2004) identifies eight different ways that contemporary terrorists use the Internet including psychological warfare, publicity and propaganda, data mining, fundraising, recruitment and mobilization, networking, sharing information, and planning and coordination. These ways overlap, and are not mutually exclusive, because terrorists will use the Internet for multiple means. Psychological warfare refers to the use of misinformation and propaganda spreading, or the creation of what Weimann (2004) calls "cyberfear," (p. 5). Publicity and propaganda are important to contemporary terrorism networks, and the Internet can be harnessed as a tool. Weimann (2004) identifies three main rhetorical strategies used by terrorists on the Internet: that terrorists have no other choice but to use terror; that terrorists are freedom fighters; and via the use of nonviolent imagery and diction.