Truman and Eisenhower's responses to a hypothetical Venezuelan missile crisis

Truman in Hypothetical Crisis

As President Harry Truman faces the Russian missile crisis in Venezuela, the situation in the states is one of cautious alert. President Truman is known for his hard line position when it comes to the Russians (Brown, Seyom, 1994, p. 17). Truman believes in flexing his American Military muscle, and will stand up to the threat of Russian missiles in Venezuela. The Venezuelan's claim that they fear the United States has a goal of "regime change," for Venezuela. President Truman abandoned what was once a successful and mutually beneficial "good neighbor" policy between the United States and South American countries (Rabe, Stephen G., 1998, 1). This kind of approach to foreign affairs is not Truman's way. He is a president that responds to aggression, but he is not the aggressor. Truman has a "walk softly, but carry a big stick" approach to foreign affairs.

Venezuela is making a mistake by challenging Truman, because, if necessary, he will respond with force. He will not, however, initiate an attack, because he is not of the nature to do that. Truman favors a strong United Nations influence, and garners support of the nations of the world, including South America, in the United Nations (Brown, 8). Truman is also "in awe" of the strength and power that foreign nations have built for themselves (Brown, 17). He also considers himself a propagator of world policy, and as introduced his Truman Doctrine and European Recovery Program, and has created Third World aid programs (Brown, 8). For these reasons, Truman opts to work through the crisis in a United Nations forum.

President Eisenhower in Hypothetical Crisis

President Dwight D. Eisenhower, a former U.S. Army general, and war tactician, and his primary fault as president is that he leaves matters of foreign affairs to his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles (Rabe, Stephen G., 1988, 1). Dulles possesses no real expertise prior to becoming secretary of state, and his foreign policy approach is really one of glob-hopping and making promises that commit the United States not to a foreign policy, but to a haphazardly thought long-range anti-communist alliance (Rabe, 1). Dulles facilitates the atmosphere of Cold War paranoia in the United States. It is, however, good that at the president has the final say in matters that could be disastrous, like the current crisis in Venezuela. Eisenhower is a strong politician, and he knows how to confront the threat of nuclear armament (Rabe, 1). Eisenhower did not favor a military belligerence, and did not give in to the efforts to raise his anger or to cause him to make decisions out of fear (Rabe, 1).

The President also has a distinct foreign policy as it relates to South America. We can call his approach one of "moderation and prudence (Rabe, 1)." President Eisenhower thought that the World War II approach to Latin America was one of "wooing" them (Rabe, 1). He also believed that in the post World War II environment, South America had been neglected, and had lost its confidence in the United States (Rabe, 1). Now, this crisis, the President feels, is as a result of that neglect. The President is confident that he can resolve this conflict with diplomacy, and by bringing about Latin American confidence in the United States leadership - him. Eisenhower wants to take relations between the U.S. And South America back to Roosevelt's "good neighbor" policy (Rabe, 1).

The first step towards becoming a "good neighbor" in this crisis is to reassure Venezuela that the United States has no desire to take steps to bring about "regime change" in Venezuela. At the same time, the President wishes to make it clear to Venezuela that the United States will not tolerate the presence of a nuclear threat in South America. The President understands, too, that Russia will agitate the situation in order to test the President's fear factor as it pertains to Russia's nuclear capability, and to assert itself as a world power presence in an adversarial role as the future owner of nuclear weapons in the Southern Hemisphere. The President senses Russia's underlying motive.

The President understands that the first step is to bring the Venezuelan President Chavez-Chavez under control, which is a challenge, because this South American leader wants to assert himself as the spokesperson for the country, and for South America in general.

President Eisenhower approaches the problem from a new and different direction as was approached by Secretary of State Dulles is recommending, which is one of strength, show of force, and confronting the potential threat by parking American warships off the coast of Venezuela. Although the President does find Dulles' input valuable, because Dulles has spent a lot of time in Venezuela. For that reason, the President understands he must re-examine what Dulles has done in South America in order to effectively change that outlook not just in Venezuela, but in South America. As Dulles makes his recommendations, President Eisenhower decides which parts of Dulles' approach are effective, and which need to be changed.

President Eisenhower calls an immediate emergency meeting of his cabinet to set into motion the emergency contingency plan to implement change in the ineffective and hostile American foreign policy in South America. While the President's military expertise sees the build up of military force being created in Venezuela by the sale of arms and submarine power to Venezuela, the President sees the sale as one which will be followed by a more serious nuclear arms sales to - or purchases by, Venezuela.

The President outlines his plan for creating and introducing a new "good neighbor" plan for South America to the cabinet. Dulles assures the President that he understands and supports the plan and will act in accordance with Eisenhower's directions. Using the valuable input of Dulles, who knows the minds and habits of the South American leaders well, President Eisenhower selects a new South American leader that the United States will support to dominate overall South American policy. This is not regime change, but it is selecting a South American leader whom the United States can rely upon as a supportive leader with a like mind as the President in handling Chavez-Chavez. Rather than respond to Chavez-Chavez with threats and weapons, President Eisenhower will respond with the weapon of a South American leader personality stronger, more pragmatic, and with a calmer outlook than Chavez-Chavez.

The contingency plan involves bringing all South American leaders to the table at a location in the United States. President Eisenhower selects Phoenix, and the heads of state begin arriving the next day. President Eisenhower has already "bonded" with the leader of Brazil, Venezuela's neighbor, and, now, an American partner in diplomacy, because President Eisenhower has had long discussions with the Brazilian and reassured him of America's commitment to South America economically, politically, and socially. By the time the other leaders begin arriving in Phoenix. The Brazilian President has already contacted other South American leaders, including Chavez-Chavez, and has successfully asserted himself as the "main" leader. Chavez-Chavez relents.

John F. Kennedy in Hypothetical Crisis

President John F. Kennedy (1961-1963) is confronted with the hypothetical crisis in Venezuela. We have the benefit of history, and Kennedy's handling of the Bay of Pigs, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. We see that Kennedy's foreign policy is one that is untested, and that he has fallen into the Eisenhower dilemma of relying upon Dulles, whom he inherited from the Eisenhower administration. Kennedy saw the current world order as a competition between the United States and the Soviet Union (Brown, Seyom, 1994, 119). He quickly learned, however, that while in the office of the president he held great world power, he nonetheless needed to exercise great caution in administering that power. He also needed to surround himself with a reliable and loyal cabinet. Kennedy decided not to rely upon the advice of John Foster Dulles in the current crisis with Venezuela, as he had done when he involved the United States in a covert operation in Vietnam.

Kennedy elected to handle the current situation in Venezuela by advising the South American leader, Chavez-Chavez, that so long as they were buying the Soviet Union's junk, and throw away warfare, then the United States did not perceive it as a threat. However, Kennedy made sure that the South American leader understood that he would perceive the Venezuelan-Soviet relationship in their military business a hostile refute of normal relations with the United States.

President Kennedy elects to approach the problem from a "Cold War" distance, and confers with his closest advisors: his brother, Robert F. Kennedy, Robert McNamara, and Dean Rusk (Brown, 145). Conferring with these advisors, the President determines that the threat of military build up in Venezuela is a non-threat, because it involves outdated Soviet military equipment, and Venezuela is not getting a good deal.

Politically, however, Kennedy sees the buildup for what it is: the Soviet Union establishing a political alliance in America's backyard with a rogue Venezuelan leader, Chavez-Chavez. Kennedy recognizes the need to establish a bond with all the South American leaders, thereby isolating Chavez-Chavez politically as ineffective leader in South America. Kennedy perceived the Third World in terms of the "national military establishment," and vulnerable to the manipulations of the Soviet Union (Schwab, Orrin, 1998, 1). Kennedy had already gone around with Cuba, and did not wish to repeat his mistakes in Venezuela, but he also had no intention of surrendering Venezuela to the Soviet Union in the way in which Cuba had been surrendered before him.

President Kennedy saw South American diplomacy as the route to turning Venezuela away from bonding with the Soviet Union. He recognized that he could not alienate the rest of South America from the United States, or that would drive them into the sphere of Venezuela's influence over them towards the Soviet Union.

Kennedy calls a meeting with Chavez-Chavez, in private, with just Chavez-Chavez and his closest advisors, non-Soviet, of course; and Kennedy and his closest advisors. They meet quietly in Mexico, with Mexico's President Allientae as mediator, to begin negotiations. By the end of the meeting, Kennedy has convinced Chavez-Chavez that the purchase from the Soviet Union of outdated military equipment would present a hardship to Venezuela. It would obligate Venezuela to purchase parts and replacement parts from the Soviet Union, since the weaponry and submarine are of Soviet manufacture. Kennedy helps Chavez-Chavez to see that the submarine is also a "white elephant," and that it will soon be obsolete as a military weapon against aggression. More importantly, Kennedy convinces Chavez-Chavez that the United States does not want "regime change" in Venezuela, and is looking to establish a political alliance with the Venezuelan leader.

In exchange for a mutually beneficial alliance, Kennedy agreed to work with Venezuela for a mutual alliance in a North-South American Security Treaty. It would entail a non-aggressive pact between the U.S. And the countries of South America. Any problems would be resolved between the U.S. And the South American nations through the treaty, and, if necessary, with arbitrators. Kennedy understands Venezuela's need to be secure among its South American neighbors, too, and does not object to Venezuela arming itself for ground forces. Kennedy worked to persuade Chavez-Chavez that if he needs military supplies, Venezuela should work with the United States to that endeavor. That the United States would resolve Venezuela's naval concerns and security with joint security forces that would make routine runs along the Venezuelan coast using United States National Guard vessels and Venezuelan naval personnel.

There was left much work to be done on the joint objectives in Kennedy's proposed pact, but he was successful in reassuring Venezuela that the United States did not see itself as the facilitator of regime change in South America.

Richard M. Nixon and the Hypothetical Venezuelan Crisis

Like President Johnson, President Richard M. Nixon's presidency was overshadowed by the way in Vietnam. He, too, chose to ignore foreign policy around the world because of the war in Vietnam. Fortunately for President Nixon, he had a very capable Secretary of State in Henry Kissinger, and when the Venezuelan Hypothetical Crisis began, Nixon quickly sent Kissinger to assess the problem. It was widely known that both Nixon and Kissinger put great stock in how America was viewed as a super power by other countries in the world (Brown, Seyom, 1994, 214).

Kissinger took with him that message when he met with Chavez-Chavez, reassuring him that it was the American people's desire to meet international issues in an open and public way, and to resolve them without conflict whenever possible (Wittkopf, Eugene R., 1990, 7). Opposing the spread of Communism was something that surveys showed the American wanted the United States to pursue (Wittkopf, 12). That changed in 1974, but until that time, it was the expectation of the American that the government would pursue that policy (Wittkopf, 12). Kissinger was delegated with conveying that message to Venezuela's Chavez-Chavez.

Kissinger reassured Chavez-Chavez that it is not the policy of the United States to pursue regime change in other nations, but Chavez-Chavez wants more than reassurance. Kissinger takes Chavez-Chavez's demands back to President Nixon, but Nixon perceives the demands, which would commit the United States to Chavez-Chavez in writing as the president for life of Venezuela. Nixon cannot make this commitment, because it is contrary to the United States Constitution, and Nixon knows that it would be tantamount to signing American support in favor of a self-appointed dictator.

News of the Venezuelan leader's alliance with the Soviets has become public knowledge, and Americans are taken aback by the boldness of the Soviet Union in attempting to expand their presence in South America by way of a formal agreement with Venezuela. The public calls for the United Nations to intervene, but the United Nations action leads only to rhetoric, because the United Nations is without power or a military component to act on its rhetoric. So while the UN condemns the alliance in South America, the UN has no other moves choices to make other than make demands that Venezuela and the Soviets will no doubt ignore. The United Nations was never intended to be an enforcement organization (Leopold, Richard, 1962, 629). It was chartered as, and always intended to be an organizational forum wherein nations could resolve their problems (Leopold, 629).

When Nixon left office, the situation with Venezuela remained tenuous, and was still being debated in the United Nations. The United Nations had initiated economic sanctions against Venezuela when Chavez-Chavez began receiving arms from the Soviet Union. Eventually, however, the Soviets discovered that Chavez-Chavez was not a reliable or a serious partner and became estranged from Venezuela. It did, however, continue to buy oil from Venezuela.

Ronald Reagan and the Hypothetical Crisis

Ronald Reagan was focused on his fireside economics, and his foreign policy reflected his goal to make the world a safe place for free enterprise (Brown, Seyom, 1994, 8). Ronald Reagan, known as a great delegator, also allowed other countries to take the lead in keeping communism at bay (Schonberg, Karl K., 2003, 183). Reagan did not feel the need to keep the United States at the front of the charge against communism, rather, it was his goal to see communism eliminated because communism was counter productive to the notion of free trade (Brown, 8). However, Reagan was not an aggressive muscle flexor, and he did not seek to bring about regime change in foreign countries.

Therefore, when the Hypothetical Crisis arose during the Reagan years, Reagan looked to the United Nations as a forum for mediation, which had evolved into a kind of super-government with its own agenda for controlling its constituents (Schonberg, 184). This was a courtesy, even mechanical move, because the UN was perceived by the American Congress, and specifically Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms, as a "power hungry and dysfunctional" forum (Schonberg, 184). Reagan, however, was an experienced government leader who knew that credibility required the diplomacy of going through the UN.

Reagan appealed to Chavez-Chavez's sense of economics, and, if nothing else, convinced the dictator that it was in his best economic interest not to form a military alliance with the Soviet Union. Reagan arranged a meeting with Chavez-Chavez, inviting him to Camp David for a week. Also invited were the Presidents of Brazil, Chile, and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher - who is one of President Reagan's staunchest supporters in foreign policy. The bilateral support between these leaders was effective, and Chavez-Chavez recognized the many advantages to being on the "big" team, as opposed to that of the Soviet Union.

Reagan was able to make important points when addressing the economic alliance between Venezuela and the Soviets, by pointing out that the Soviets had much more to gain than did Venezuela. Also, if other world countries went along with UN economic sanctions against the build up of weapons and force along the Pacific coast of South America, then Venezuela would lose even more economically. Reagan was effective, too, in helping Chavez-Chavez to see the deteriorating condition of communism in the Soviet Union.

If we said Reagan had a strong expertise, it would be in analyzing and understanding the Soviet Union. Reagan believed that he was elected in 1980 because Americans wanted less big government in their domestic affairs, and bigger representative on world-wide foreign affairs (Brown, 389). Reagan understood economics on a small and on a wide scale too. He believed that history was something to be used as a tool, and he relied on the events and outcomes of past events and outcomes as a tool by which to inform his decision making process (Brown, 389).

Chavez-Chavez came under the Reagan spell, which was Reagan's renowned aura of diplomacy, dignity, intellect and a bit of American cowboy glamour. Reagan also provided assurances to Chavez-Chavez that America was not about regime change. The leaders agreed to a bilateral initiative to secure the coast of Venezuela, and Reagan agreed to support Chavez-Chavez as a legitimate world leader, but stopped short of endorsing the dictator's right to rule for life.

George H. Bush and the Hypothetical Crisis

George H.W. Bush was criticized by the Clinton campaign for focusing too much on foreign affairs, and neglecting the domestic economic problems that were on the rise in the United States (Brown, Seyom, 1994, 8). As former director of the CIA, it is perhaps not surprising that Bush put his greater focus on foreign rather than domestic affairs. People were surprised when President Bush did not "finish" the job during the Gulf War, and he pulled out of Iraq without deposing Saddam Hussein (Gareau, Frederick H., 2004, 176). However, the President felt that he had acted within his United Nations mandate, and did not believe his mandate allowed him to act in a way that would remove Saddam Hussein from Iraqi government (Gareau, 180).

When the Venezuelan Hypothetical Crisis arose, it was with conviction that George H.W. Bush reassured the Venezuelan dictator, Chavez-Chavez that he would not attempt to effect regime change in Venezuela. However, the President, an adept foreign affairs administrator, cautioned Chavez-Chavez that to commit to a relationship with Russians that would involve weaponry or even a Russian military presence in South America would put at risk the foreign relations between the U.S. And Venezuela, which were always good in the past.

Even though Chavez-Chavez was testing his dictatorial mettle, the Bush administration response was sufficient to convince him that, first George H.W. Bush was not interested in South American regime change. He recognized, too, that Bush had exercised restraint in dealing with Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War.

Bill Clinton and the Hypothetical Crisis

Bill Clinton's administration was focused on the American economy and balancing the budget, as he promised in his campaign, that many of his perhaps better ideas of America's status on the international level were sacrificed to that goal (Brown, Seyom, 1994, 8). "The realist constraint on idealist impulses has operated at a number of crucial junctures...(Brown, 8)." Nowhere is this more apparent than when examining the Clinton Administration. It was, after all, Bill Clinton, the man who mesmerized America such that they turned a blind eye to the leader whom, although he embodied their living Constitution, broke ripped the fabric of that paper when he took an oath to tell the truth - after all, isn't the justice system the backbone of not just the Constitution, but of all Americans - lied under oath.

It should come as no surprise, then, that when the Venezuelan Hypothetical Crisis arose, Clinton turned a blind to it, and left it to pass on to the next administration. Like Rwanda, he would later express his regrets, but Clinton's regrets are adding up regret for dollar that he cut out of the American Government budget when he balanced it during his administration. Clinton had accused his predecessor, George H. Bush, of being too preoccupied with foreign affairs, and for allowing the U.S. To go into a deep budget deficit (Brown, 581-584). Addressing challenging foreign issues would cause the nation's budget to bulge, and Clinton wasn't going to let that happen.

As he did with the genocide in Rwanda, as he did when he took the oath to tell the truth, Clinton treated the Venezuelan Hypothetical Crisis as if it was over-blown, not a concern, and not really happening, because it went beyond dropping a bomb on something to make a point. Clinton would, as he did in explaining his sexual escapades while in office, apologize for ignoring the events in Rwanda (Jones, Bruce D., 2001, 123). Clinton's policy response to foreign crisis was to drop a bomb from 35,000 feet, or to question the definition of the English language, as was the Administration's response when questioned about genocide in Rwanda (Jones, 123).

Clinton's Administration operated under the idea that the fall of Soviet Communism meant that there was no longer a threat to the United States by Russia. When Russia, however, began selling its war machine parts to Venezuela, Clinton chose to ignore it. He did not respond to the rumblings of Chavez-Chavez as regarded what Chavez-Chavez perceived as Venezuela's potential threat to the United States if Clinton decided to covertly effect regime change in Venezuela. While Clinton's Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, to Venezuela, Albright's job was only to convey that Clinton was not going to acknowledge the threat publicly, but cautioned Chavez-Chavez that if he made any noise about the potential threat of a Venezuelan-Russian threat to America, that she could assure him the threat would cease to exist. Just as Clinton had waged an air war in Bosnia under the guise of NATO leadership and mission control, Albright warned Chavez-Chavez that the same potential to take out his government existed. Albright assured Chavez-Chavez that the only way the U.S. would effect regime change in Venezuela was if Chavez-Chavez was less than discreet in collecting Russia's broken war artifacts.

Clinton never took seriously the threat posed by Russia's sale of its outdated arms to Venezuela. So long as there was no nuclear element to the sale, Clinton chose to ignore it, assessing the Venezuelan leader as a showman wanting attention. Clinton's foreign policy has been described by some experts as "pathetically naive (Hyland, William G., 1999, 185)."

George W. Bush and the Hypothetical Crisis

For the first time in American history, the United States was openly invading another country with the goal of overtly effecting regime change when the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2002. When the Hypothetical Crisis became an issue, George Bush had already invaded Iraq. The Venezuelan leader could not be consoled by the rhetoric suggesting that it was not the nature of the United States to engage in regime change, especially since Chavez-Chavez, the Venezuelan leader, had grown up with an awareness of U.S. activity in South America with respect to regime change in Nicaragua (Solaun, Mauricio, 2005). The public perspective is, in this second presidential term, that Bush has become bloated with the power of the United States, and that he governs from a bully-pulpit.

Since Chavez-Chavez could not rely upon Bush, and because of the past historical involvement of America in South America, Chavez-Chavez went forward with his plans to with the Russians. Chavez-Chavez saw the United States in their weakest hour, suffering the weight of a long and costly war in Iraq and Afghanistan. This led Chavez to believe that he had an advantage over the Americans, and he began making louder noises. He even began using the economic problems in the United States against the Bush administration by suggesting that his country would donate oil to the poor.