20th century United States foreign policy

Truman in Hypothetical Crisis

As President Harry Truman faces the Russian missile crisis in Venezuela, the situation in the states is one of cautious alert. President Truman is known for his hard line position when it comes to the Russians (Brown, Seyom, 1994, p. 17). Truman believes in flexing his American Military muscle, and will stand up to the threat of Russian missiles in Venezuela. The Venezuelan's claim that they fear the United States has a goal of "regime change," for Venezuela. President Truman abandoned what was once a successful and mutually beneficial "good neighbor" policy between the United States and South American countries (Rabe, Stephen G., 1998, 1). This kind of approach to foreign affairs is not Truman's way. He is a president that responds to aggression, but he is not the aggressor. Truman has a "walk softly, but carry a big stick" approach to foreign affairs.

Venezuela is making a mistake by challenging Truman, because, if necessary, he will respond with force. He will not, however, initiate an attack, because he is not of the nature to do that. Truman favors a strong United Nations influence, and garners support of the nations of the world, including South America, in the United Nations (Brown, 8). Truman is also "in awe" of the strength and power that foreign nations have built for themselves (Brown, 17). He also considers himself a propagator of world policy, and as introduced his Truman Doctrine and European Recovery Program, and has created Third World aid programs (Brown, 8). For these reasons, Truman opts to work through the crisis in a United Nations forum.

President Eisenhower in Hypothetical Crisis

President Dwight D. Eisenhower, a former U.S. Army general, and war tactician, and his primary fault as president is that he leaves matters of foreign affairs to his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles (Rabe, Stephen G., 1988, 1). Dulles possesses no real expertise prior to becoming secretary of state, and his foreign policy approach is really one of glob-hopping and making promises that commit the United States not to a foreign policy, but to a haphazardly thought long-range anti-communist alliance (Rabe, 1). Dulles facilitates the atmosphere of Cold War paranoia in the United States. It is, however, good that at the president has the final say in matters that could be disastrous, like the current crisis in Venezuela. Eisenhower is a strong politician, and he knows how to confront the threat of nuclear armament (Rabe, 1). Eisenhower did not favor a military belligerence, and did not give in to the efforts to raise his anger or to cause him to make decisions out of fear (Rabe, 1).

The President also has a distinct foreign policy as it relates to South America. We can call his approach one of "moderation and prudence (Rabe, 1)." President Eisenhower thought that the World War II approach to Latin America was one of "wooing" them (Rabe, 1). He also believed that in the post World War II environment, South America had been neglected, and had lost its confidence in the United States (Rabe, 1). Now, this crisis, the President feels, is as a result of that neglect. The President is confident that he can resolve this conflict with diplomacy, and by bringing about Latin American confidence in the United States leadership - him. Eisenhower wants to take relations between the U.S. And South America back to Roosevelt's "good neighbor" policy (Rabe, 1).

The first step towards becoming a "good neighbor" in this crisis is to reassure Venezuela that the United States has no desire to take steps to bring about "regime change" in Venezuela. At the same time, the President wishes to make it clear to Venezuela that the United States will not tolerate the presence of a nuclear threat in South America. The President understands, too, that Russia will agitate the situation in order to test the President's fear factor as it pertains to Russia's nuclear capability, and to assert itself as a world power presence in an adversarial role as the future owner of nuclear weapons in the Southern Hemisphere. The President senses Russia's underlying motive.

The President understands that the first step is to bring the Venezuelan President Chavez-Chavez under control, which is a challenge, because this South American leader wants to assert himself as the spokesperson for the country, and for South America in general.

President Eisenhower approaches the problem from a new and different direction as was approached by Secretary of State Dulles is recommending, which is one of strength, show of force, and confronting the potential threat by parking American warships off the coast of Venezuela. Although the President does find Dulles' input valuable, because Dulles has spent a lot of time in Venezuela. For that reason, the President understands he must re-examine what Dulles has done in South America in order to effectively change that outlook not just in Venezuela, but in South America. As Dulles makes his recommendations, President Eisenhower decides which parts of Dulles' approach are effective, and which need to be changed.

President Eisenhower calls an immediate emergency meeting of his cabinet to set into motion the emergency contingency plan to implement change in the ineffective and hostile American foreign policy in South America. While the President's military expertise sees the build up of military force being created in Venezuela by the sale of arms and submarine power to Venezuela, the President sees the sale as one which will be followed by a more serious nuclear arms sales to - or purchases by, Venezuela.

The President outlines his plan for creating and introducing a new "good neighbor" plan for South America to the cabinet. Dulles assures the President that he understands and supports the plan and will act in accordance with Eisenhower's directions. Using the valuable input of Dulles, who knows the minds and habits of the South American leaders well, President Eisenhower selects a new South American leader that the United States will support to dominate overall South American policy. This is not regime change, but it is selecting a South American leader whom the United States can rely upon as a supportive leader with a like mind as the President in handling Chavez-Chavez. Rather than respond to Chavez-Chavez with threats and weapons, President Eisenhower will respond with the weapon of a South American leader personality stronger, more pragmatic, and with a calmer outlook than Chavez-Chavez.

The contingency plan involves bringing all South American leaders to the table at a location in the United States. President Eisenhower selects Phoenix, and the heads of state begin arriving the next day. President Eisenhower has already "bonded" with the leader of Brazil, Venezuela's neighbor, and, now, an American partner in diplomacy, because President Eisenhower has had long discussions with the Brazilian and reassured him of America's commitment to South America economically, politically, and socially. By the time the other leaders begin arriving in Phoenix. The Brazilian President has already contacted other South American leaders, including Chavez-Chavez, and has successfully asserted himself as the "main" leader. Chavez-Chavez relents.

John F. Kennedy in Hypothetical Crisis

President John F. Kennedy (1961-1963) is confronted with the hypothetical crisis in Venezuela. We have the benefit of history, and Kennedy's handling of the Bay of Pigs, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. We see that Kennedy's foreign policy is one that is untested, and that he has fallen into the Eisenhower dilemma of relying upon Dulles, whom he inherited from the Eisenhower administration. Kennedy saw the current world order as a competition between the United States and the Soviet Union (Brown, Seyom, 1994, 119). He quickly learned, however, that while in the office of the president he held great world power, he nonetheless needed to exercise great caution in administering that power. He also needed to surround himself with a reliable and loyal cabinet. Kennedy decided not to rely upon the advice of John Foster Dulles in the current crisis with Venezuela, as he had done when he involved the United States in a covert operation in Vietnam.

Kennedy elected to handle the current situation in Venezuela by advising the South American leader, Chavez-Chavez, that so long as they were buying the Soviet Union's junk, and throw away warfare, then the United States did not perceive it as a threat. However, Kennedy made sure that the South American leader understood that he would perceive the Venezuelan-Soviet relationship in their military business a hostile refute of normal relations with the United States.

President Kennedy elects to approach the problem from a "Cold War" distance, and confers with his closest advisors: his brother, Robert F. Kennedy, Robert McNamara, and Dean Rusk (Brown, 145). Conferring with these advisors, the President determines that the threat of military build up in Venezuela is a non-threat, because it involves outdated Soviet military equipment, and Venezuela is not getting a good deal.

Politically, however, Kennedy sees the buildup for what it is: the Soviet Union establishing a political alliance in America's backyard with a rogue Venezuelan leader, Chavez-Chavez. Kennedy recognizes the need to establish a bond with all the South American leaders, thereby isolating Chavez-Chavez politically as ineffective leader in South America. Kennedy perceived the Third World in terms of the "national military establishment," and vulnerable to the manipulations of the Soviet Union (Schwab, Orrin, 1998, 1). Kennedy had already gone around with Cuba, and did not wish to repeat his mistakes in Venezuela, but he also had no intention of surrendering Venezuela to the Soviet Union in the way in which Cuba had been surrendered before him.

President Kennedy saw South American diplomacy as the route to turning Venezuela away from bonding with the Soviet Union. He recognized that he could not alienate the rest of South America from the United States, or that would drive them into the sphere of Venezuela's influence over them towards the Soviet Union.

Kennedy calls a meeting with Chavez-Chavez, in private, with just Chavez-Chavez and his closest advisors, non-Soviet, of course; and Kennedy and his closest advisors. They meet quietly in Mexico, with Mexico's President Allientae as mediator, to begin negotiations. By the end of the meeting, Kennedy has convinced Chavez-Chavez that the purchase from the Soviet Union of outdated military equipment would present a hardship to Venezuela. It would obligate Venezuela to purchase parts and replacement parts from the Soviet Union, since the weaponry and submarine are of Soviet manufacture. Kennedy helps Chavez-Chavez to see that the submarine is also a "white elephant," and that it will soon be obsolete as a military weapon against aggression. More importantly, Kennedy convinces Chavez-Chavez that the United States does not want "regime change" in Venezuela, and is looking to establish a political alliance with the Venezuelan leader.

In exchange for a mutually beneficial alliance, Kennedy agreed to work with Venezuela for a mutual alliance in a North-South American Security Treaty. It would entail a non-aggressive pact between the U.S. And the countries of South America. Any problems would be resolved between the U.S. And the South American nations through the treaty, and, if necessary, with arbitrators. Kennedy understands Venezuela's need to be secure among its South American neighbors, too, and does not object to Venezuela arming itself for ground forces. Kennedy worked to persuade Chavez-Chavez that if he needs military supplies, Venezuela should work with the United States to that endeavor. That the United States would resolve Venezuela's naval concerns and security with joint security forces that would make routine runs along the Venezuelan coast using United States National Guard vessels and Venezuelan naval personnel.

There was left much work to be done on the joint objectives in Kennedy's proposed pact, but he was successful in reassuring Venezuela that the United States did not see itself as the facilitator of regime change in South America.

The Johnson Administration in Hypothetical Crisis

The Lyndon B. Johnson Presidency (1963-1969), which followed that of John F. Kennedy, whose death early into his first term in office left Johnson with the responsibility of continuing Kennedy's work in resolving much of the foreign policy initiated by Kennedy (Brown, Seyom, 1994, p. 17). This included the Hypothetical Crisis, which Kennedy had worked on with Venezuelan President Chavez-Chavez, and for which work on a joint security pact had begun prior to Kennedy's death. Johnson was not very interested in Venezuela's problems, and chose instead to rely on others to deal with the work that had begun under Kennedy. John dispatched Central Intelligence Agents to South America, and rather than work towards a joint resolution and initiative as Kennedy had begun, Johnson elected to let Venezuela discover for itself how untrusting a partner in politics and trade the Soviet Union could be. Rather, Johnson elected to use covert operatives in South America, especially in Brazil, Honduras, Nicaragua, Columbia, Belize, and other South American countries to attempt to create a political environment favorable to the United States in South America. It would, in Johnson's mind, be a force that would serve to deal with Chavez-Chavez.

Johnson's approach was consistent with the policies that had been handed down from the Truman Administration under NSC directives 48 and 68 (Brown, 36). Johnson felt that there was a communist pattern emerging in the South American states, which had been identified in 1948 (DeConde, Alexander, 1963, 727). Johnson perceived a covert presence in South America would be more conducive to the U.S. ability to address that problem as it arose, and that it would prevent a police action or the need for United Nations referendum in order for the U.S. To expeditiously address the problem. Johnson felt that a CIA initiative would be less expensive, and would be less demanding on the U.S. military forces, which were at that point in time heavily invested in Vietnam.

Vietnam consumed the Johnson presidency, and after six years in office, two completing the term of John F. Kennedy, four years of his own elected term, Johnson left the office of the President of the United States choosing not to run for re-election. The office wore heavy on Johnson's body and mind. Very little could be attributed as having been accomplished under the Johnson Administration. Thousands of young American died in Vietnam, and America's foreign policy was in tatters, both because of Kennedy's incomplete term, and because Johnson himself proved an inept decision maker in matters of foreign policy. Johnson's image had been damaged by the press, which accused him of "huckerstism (Brown, 200)."

Johnson was no less effective in South America, but the full impact of Johnson's decision to send the CIA into South America to establish a base for American intelligence in the Southern Hemisphere would later come back to the haunt the Johnson legacy. Johnson liked to think of himself as a man who resorted to military muscle only as a last resort, and instead preferred to reason (Brown, 200). Johnson's inability to commit himself to the agenda that Kennedy began in South America in Venezuela was manifest of his inability to cope with changing cultural conditions at home, as well as the war in Vietnam.

Johnson's decision not to withdraw from the presidential campaign in 1968 was based on three factors: racial unrest and rioting in major cities across the United States; the student militancy focus on the war in Vietnam (Brown, 204). Tangential to this was Eugene McCarthy and Robert F. Kennedy's efforts to use the student militancy as an anti-administration force against President Johnson (Brown, 204). The third and perhaps most important factor, however, was the briefing by Clark Clifford, who succeeded Robert McNamara as Secretary of Defense, on March 1, 1968, wherein Clifford apprised Johnson of the poor and ineffective situation the United States was mired in with the Southeast Asian war (Brown, 204).

Meanwhile, the CIA continued its covert operations in South America, and because Johnson felt the nation had sustained enough damage, he gave the CIA a near carte blanche operation in South America. Chavez-Chavez turned to the Soviets, rejecting the United States proposal of joint forces as proposed by Kennedy. The Hypothetical Crisis remained unresolved when Johnson left office, and the Soviet Union began supplying military equipment and forces to Venezuela in exchange for oil and desperately needed trade items.

In hindsight, Johnson seemed content to let the war in Vietnam and even foreign policy run itself. His administration was consumed with the problems of the counter cultural movement at home, and with the problems of racism in the country's major inner cities. The Hypothetical Crisis was just one more thing that Johnson felt overwhelmed by, and he was content to let the CIA handle that. It was, after all, the least of his problems, because he heard very little from then CIA Director John McCone.

Richard M. Nixon and the Hypothetical Venezuelan Crisis

Like President Johnson, President Richard M. Nixon's presidency was overshadowed by the way in Vietnam. He, too, chose to ignore foreign policy around the world because of the war in Vietnam. Fortunately for President Nixon, he had a very capable Secretary of State in Henry Kissinger, and when the Venezuelan Hypothetical Crisis began, Nixon quickly sent Kissinger to assess the problem. It was widely known that both Nixon and Kissinger put great stock in how America was viewed as a super power by other countries in the world (Brown, Seyom, 1994, 214).

Kissinger took with him that message when he met with Chavez-Chavez, reassuring him that it was the American people's desire to meet international issues in an open and public way, and to resolve them without conflict whenever possible (Wittkopf, Eugene R., 1990, 7). Opposing the spread of Communism was something that surveys showed the American wanted the United States to pursue (Wittkopf, 12). That changed in 1974, but until that time, it was the expectation of the American that the government would pursue that policy (Wittkopf, 12). Kissinger was delegated with conveying that message to Venezuela's Chavez-Chavez.

Kissinger reassured Chavez-Chavez that it is not the policy of the United States to pursue regime change in other nations, but Chavez-Chavez wants more than reassurance. Kissinger takes Chavez-Chavez's demands back to President Nixon, but Nixon perceives the demands, which would commit the United States to Chavez-Chavez in writing as the president for life of Venezuela. Nixon cannot make this commitment, because it is contrary to the United States Constitution, and Nixon knows that it would be tantamount to signing American support in favor of a self-appointed dictator.

News of the Venezuelan leader's alliance with the Soviets has become public knowledge, and Americans are taken aback by the boldness of the Soviet Union in attempting to expand their presence in South America by way of a formal agreement with Venezuela. The public calls for the United Nations to intervene, but the United Nations action leads only to rhetoric, because the United Nations is without power or a military component to act on its rhetoric. So while the UN condemns the alliance in South America, the UN has no other moves choices to make other than make demands that Venezuela and the Soviets will no doubt ignore. The United Nations was never intended to be an enforcement organization (Leopold, Richard, 1962, 629). It was chartered as, and always intended to be an organizational forum wherein nations could resolve their problems (Leopold, 629).

When Nixon left office, the situation with Venezuela remained tenuous, and was still being debated in the United Nations. The United Nations had initiated economic sanctions against Venezuela when Chavez-Chavez began receiving arms from the Soviet Union. Eventually, however, the Soviets discovered that Chavez-Chavez was not a reliable or a serious partner and became estranged from Venezuela. It did, however, continue to buy oil from Venezuela.

Ronald Reagan and the Hypothetical Crisis

Ronald Reagan was focused on his fireside economics, and his foreign policy reflected his goal to make the world a safe place for free enterprise (Brown, Seyom, 1994, 8). Ronald Reagan, known as a great delegator, also allowed other countries to take the lead in keeping communism at bay (Schonberg, Karl K., 2003, 183). Reagan did not feel the need to keep the United States at the front of the charge against communism, rather, it was his goal to see communism eliminated because communism was counter productive to the notion of free trade (Brown, 8). However, Reagan was not an aggressive muscle flexor, and he did not seek to bring about regime change in foreign countries.

Therefore, when the Hypothetical Crisis arose during the Reagan years, Reagan looked to the United Nations as a forum for mediation, which had evolved into a kind of super-government with its own agenda for controlling its constituents (Schonberg, 184). This was a courtesy, even mechanical move, because the UN was perceived by the American Congress, and specifically Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms, as a "power hungry and dysfunctional" forum (Schonberg, 184). Reagan, however, was an experienced government leader who knew that credibility required the diplomacy of going through the UN.

Reagan appealed to Chavez-Chavez's sense of economics, and, if nothing else, convinced the dictator that it was in his best economic interest not to form a military alliance with the Soviet Union. Reagan arranged a meeting with Chavez-Chavez, inviting him to Camp David for a week. Also invited were the Presidents of Brazil, Chile, and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher - who is one of President Reagan's staunchest supporters in foreign policy. The bilateral support between these leaders was effective, and Chavez-Chavez recognized the many advantages to being on the "big" team, as opposed to that of the Soviet Union.

Reagan was able to make important points when addressing the economic alliance between Venezuela and the Soviets, by pointing out that the Soviets had much more to gain than did Venezuela. Also, if other world countries went along with UN economic sanctions against the build up of weapons and force along the Pacific coast of South America, then Venezuela would lose even more economically. Reagan was effective, too, in helping Chavez-Chavez to see the deteriorating condition of communism in the Soviet Union.

If we said Reagan had a strong expertise, it would be in analyzing and understanding the Soviet Union. Reagan believed that he was elected in 1980 because Americans wanted less big government in their domestic affairs, and bigger representative on world-wide foreign affairs (Brown, 389). Reagan understood economics on a small and on a wide scale too. He believed that history was something to be used as a tool, and he relied on the events and outcomes of past events and outcomes as a tool by which to inform his decision making process (Brown, 389).

Chavez-Chavez came under the Reagan spell, which was Reagan's renowned aura of diplomacy, dignity, intellect and a bit of American cowboy glamour. Reagan also provided assurances to Chavez-Chavez that America was not about regime change. The leaders agreed to a bilateral initiative to secure the coast of Venezuela, and Reagan agreed to support Chavez-Chavez as a legitimate world leader, but stopped short of endorsing the dictator's right to rule for life.

George H. Bush and the Hypothetical Crisis

George H.W. Bush was criticized by the Clinton campaign for focusing too much on foreign affairs, and neglecting the domestic economic problems that were on the rise in the United States (Brown, Seyom, 1994, 8). As former director of the CIA, it is perhaps not surprising that Bush put his greater focus on foreign rather than domestic affairs. People were surprised when President Bush did not "finish" the job during the Gulf War, and he pulled out of Iraq without deposing Saddam Hussein (Gareau, Frederick H., 2004, 176). However, the President felt that he had acted within his United Nations mandate, and did not believe his mandate allowed him to act in a way that would remove Saddam Hussein from Iraqi government (Gareau, 180).