Admiral Halsey's leadership and tactics at the Battle of Leyte Gulf

¶ … Admiral Halsey\'s tactics and strategy at the Battle of the Leyte Gulf: Good or bad leadership, we won the war in the Pacific and ultimately helped win WWII.

Admiral William F. Halsey is counted among American naval history\'s most controversial leaders. In spite of his intimidating appearance and fierce repute (he was nicknamed \'Bull\'), the Admiral was remembered by his men as a kindly person who accorded them all great respect. His motivational leadership approach in the course of the 1942 South Pacific war is believed by many to mark the war\'s turning point. Samuel E. Morison, in fact, counted the commander among the most celebrated naval fighters ever[footnoteRef:1]. Still, like most great people, his eventual victory during the Second World War era only came after a few misses. His risk-taking nature during several independent actions led to American military losses, and was censured by some. His most well-known incident is, probably, his behavior whilst commanding the 3rd Fleet in the Leyte Gulf Battle. Halsey\'s strategy and tactics in the course of this battle have been fiercely debated by historians, and even today, people hold different views with regard to this issue[footnoteRef:2]. [1: Morison, Samuel Elliot, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II -- Volume XII \'Leyte\', (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1958).] [2: Goedecke, Jeffrey. \"Fleet Admiral William F. \'Bull\' Halsey: Effectiveness and competence in command. \" (Geddes Papers, 2004), 25 -- 30.]

Command, Effectiveness and Competence

The definition of \"command\" in the military control and command system context is: the power legally exerted by a military commander over his/her subordinates based on assignment or rank. The aspect of command incorporates the power and accountability of efficiently utilizing resources at hand, as well as planning military personnel employment, organization, direction, coordination and control to achieve the assigned objective[footnoteRef:3]. [3: Commonwealth of Australia (Australian Army). Land Warfare Doctrine 0 -- 0, (Command, Leadership and Management, 2003) pp. 2 -- 3]

Competence is described by the American naval forces using the following 3 key themes: knowledge (strategic and technical proficiency), leadership (leading of individuals) and setting an example (maintenance of superior standards) (Montor et al., 1987). According to the Macquarie Dictionary, effectiveness denotes service to achieve a goal; i.e., generating the anticipated or required outcome[footnoteRef:4]. [4: The Macquarie Concise Dictionary, 2nd edn, (Sydney: The Macquarie Library, 1988), p. 558]

William F. Halsey

It is, first, imperative to have a glimpse at Admiral Halsey\'s early life in order to understand what experiences and influences formed his leadership approach and overall personality. Born as William Fredrick Halsey Junior on October 30, 1882, in New Jersey\'s Elizabeth City, into a family with two ancestors in the navy: a naval captain (his father) and Captain John Halsey (a contracted privateer-turned-pirate), Halsey was, apparently, destined to join the navy. In the year 1900, after earning a presidential appointment (only 5 slots were chosen by the President per year), he joined the nation\'s naval academy. Although not very bookish (he preferred football and socializing to learning), he successfully passed every exam and graduated at the 43rd rank in a class of 62 students[footnoteRef:5]. [5: Carver, Michael. Military Commanders of the Twentieth Century, (Boston: Weidenfeld & Nicolson 2006), p. 433.]

Immediately after America\'s entry into the First World War, Halsey signed up for the Queenstown-based American Destroyer force; Queenstown was the previous name of Irish town, Cobh. Halsey\'s duty during the war was, largely, to commandeer destroyers, and perform escort and anti-submarine patrol tasks within the Atlantic region. It is here that he earned his reputation as a natural and perceptive leader who took instinctive action. He is claimed to have stated that, as the individuals on the scene were exceedingly better informed as compared to those working from the headquarters, the latter almost always failed to instruct them appropriately[footnoteRef:6]. This heralded his independent actions as commander in WWII, when he held total control of the battles raging within South Pacific territory. His instant, impromptu decision in the Leyte Gulf battle was censured by many. He received the Naval Cross for the previously-mentioned WWI-era anti-submarine patrolling[footnoteRef:7]. [6: Ibid.] [7: Ibid., 25.]

Subsequent to WWI, Admiral Halsey commandeered a team of destroyers running in the Pacific as well as the Atlantic, followed by an aircraft carrier\'s command (under the condition that he receives aviator training and qualification first). Thus, at 52 years of age, Halsey became a pilot, in control of SARATOGA, the aircraft carrier. In the year 1937, he shifted to the Floridian naval post in Pensacola city as a Commandant. This was followed by his promotion to the Rear Admiral rank, after which he returned to the navy as a carrier division\'s commander. In spring 1940, Halsey was appointed Commander Aircraft Battle Force at Vice Admiral Rank, and successfully commandeered every Pacific Fleet and air group carriers[footnoteRef:8]. [8: Ibid., 26]

Thesis Statement

Halsey\'s biggest asset -- his exceptional leadership and command -- was a leading factor underlying America\'s victory in the Pacific battles and the Second World War.

Leyte Gulf

Admiral Halsey\'s team flew a total of 2,400 operational flights off central Philippines, and destroyed two hundred Japanese planes, several ships and installations, losing just 8 American planes in the process, on 12th and 13th September, 1944. After further Filipino reports of a lack of Japanese on the island, the Admiral formulated a boldplan. The subsequent advice given by the Admiral led to scheduled operations to alight at the island of Letye being rescheduled to October of that year, from the previous plan of alighting in December[footnoteRef:9]. [9: Ibid., 27.]

The Nimitz-ratified Leyte Gulf strategy of September 1944 ordered Pacific region forces to aid and defend South West Pacific Area Command forces[footnoteRef:10]; meanwhile, the 3rd fleet (that of Admiral Halsey) was commanded to destroy enemy air forces and navies that were in control of, or a threat to, places in the Philippine region. A directive aimed expressly at Halsey further stated that if there was a chance to destroy most of the enemy\'s fleet, it ought to become a high-priority mission[footnoteRef:11]. Hence, clearly, Halsey was given vague orders that could, apparently, be interpreted as desired. [10: Ibid, 27.] [11: Gilbert, Alton. Bull Halsey, (Anapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1985), p. 47]

On 20th October, 1944, over 60,000 US soldiers arrived on the island of Leyte, almost totally unopposed. This proved to be a great blow to Japan, which knew it couldn\'t afford to let American troops strengthen their position. Hence, Japan\'s navy headquarters commander, Soemu Toyoda, directed its Combined Japanese Fleet to implement plan \'Sho-1\'[footnoteRef:12]. [12: Ibid., 28.]

Halsey bombarded Japan\'s huge Centre Force with air attacks on 24th October, forcing Kurita to fall back to the Philippines region\'s Sibuyan Sea. News of Japan\'s Centre Force\'s retreat and the Northern Force\'s contact report left no room for further encouragement for Halsey. In his view, he was, as of now, in control of the leading northern carrier group. Also, the 7th Fleet could effectively tackle any advancing Japanese. Thus, he abandoned San Bernardino Strait and journeyed northward with his ships (64 in total) towards a battle he felt would definitely destroy Japan\'s Fleet. Admiral Kinkaid, on the other hand, wrongly supposed Halsey had created a Task force 34 which he left posted at the Strait, for its defense[footnoteRef:13]. [13: Ibid., 29.]

Kurita had left the Strait to face Admiral Kinkaid\'s 7th Fleet at the same time as Halsey reached the Northern Force\'s aircraft range. Kinkaid felt his team was failing and signaled higher command for ascertaining Task Force 34\'s status and location. Nimitz, based at the US navy base, Pearl Harbor, became concerned regarding the situation unfolding in the Pacific and contacted Halsey, asking him where TF 34 was. As was the norm, the encoder added an immaterial phrase at the message\'s beginning and end for befuddling Japanese decoders. The phrase at the ending, \'the world wonders\', was, unfortunately, still a part of the message that reached Admiral Halsey[footnoteRef:14]. [14: Ibid., 29.]

Understandably (given he received a misleading message), Halsey was enraged at his boss\'s supposed disparagement of his behavior and of himself from so far away. Thus, when he was just 42 miles away from the northern force, he was left with no option but to form and detach a Task Force 34 that went back south. At this point, Halsey was sure he had just lost a chance at achieving one of history\'s biggest naval victories. Later, he confessed his belief that he gave up on a chance he had aspired for since his cadet days. To him, one of WWII\'s most decisive battles was abandoned, giving way to \"the Battle of Bull\'s Run\"[footnoteRef:15]. Andidora\'s \'Iron Admirals\' censures Halsey for misjudging the Centre Force\'s might and getting furious with Nimitz, which, in the end, proved no help to the 7th Fleet, and at the same time, proved to be a lost opportunity for the 3rd Fleet to destroy the Northern Force of the Japanese[footnoteRef:16]. [15: Ibid.] [16: Andidora, Ronald. Iron Admirals -- Naval leadership in the Twentieth Century, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2000), p. 147.]

But, fortunately for the US, Kurita\'s forces also misjudged the 7th Fleet\'s power, thereby retreating prematurely. The end result might have been rather different if Kurita had fought further. One may contend that Halsey\'s choice of abandoning the Strait led to the loss of a 7th fleet escort carrier, one destroyer escort and a couple of destroyers, allowing most of the Centre Force a safe escape. Still, most of the 3rd Fleet caused serious damage to the Northern Force, thus successfully ending the Japanese\'s naval offensive capacity during WWII[footnoteRef:17]. [17: Ibid., 30.]

Competence and Effectiveness in Command

Halsey undoubtedly exercised command effectively. In the immediate aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack, he was made in charge of every vessel, with an aim at hunting down the Japanese attackers. He endeared to the nation as a commander who decisively struck Japan as revenge for the Pearl Harbor attack. When the Japanese appeared to be enjoying successes in the Pacific region battles, Halsey was chosen as the US South Pacific forces\' leader. His superiors undoubtedly held him in high regard; further, he was quite popular among his subordinates, who were greatly loyal to him. According to a staff official, Halsey\'s greatest forte was his exceptional leadership skills. Although he was, at all times, a true professional demanding that each subordinate gives professional performance, they found him charismatic. Whoever was \"touched by his magic wand\" was motivated and resolute on excelling[footnoteRef:18]. [18: Ibid., 32.]

Admiral Halsey\'s greatest credits include his strategic perceptiveness to invade Leyte earlier than was planned, which served to effectively shorten the Second World War. One can argue that when Halsey was in charge, accountability fell for US ships\' losses, including HORNET, GAMBIER BAY, CHICAGO, and PRINCETON. His most contentious decision -- of abandoning San Bernardino Strait completely -- continues to be debated by many. It can be held that Halsey may have misjudged the situation, or was eager to fight, especially after missing the Midway and Coral Sea battles. Hence, he perceived this as his chance to enjoy a huge naval win over Japan. According to Morison, Halsey\'s wrong guess proved to be the mainfactor in a series of misassumptions[footnoteRef:19]. Prof. Clark Reynolds\' work, The Fast Carriers, slams Halsey as well, raising doubts about his intelligence and stating that the prudent thing to do was, probably, dividing up his forces so that the Strait would also be defended, which was a strategy apparently overly complicated for him[footnoteRef:20]. [19: Ibid.] [20: Ibid., 29.]

On the other hand, a more in-depth examination of the aforementioned events suggests several aspects otherwise backing Halsey\'s choice. Nimitz was, definitely, vague in his directive to Halsey. Vague reports, inadequate communication, and a complex higher control and command system were all factors that played a part in this episode. The ghost-in-machine phrase has been employed by Gooch and Cohen for denoting this sort of calamity[footnoteRef:21]. According to the authors, one cannot blame any single individual for such mistakes (not even leaders). Instead, this \'ghost\' represents an element of the intrinsic vulnerability of the overall entity. But, perhaps the most salient thing is, commanders will only be able to take logical action based on the facts on hand at the precise moment a decision is being made. At the Leyte Gulf scene, Halsey could, by no means, know of the poor state of the northern force and the fact that it was nothing but a decoy, meant to mislead[footnoteRef:22]. Moreover, he properly followed the period\'s naval code which emphasized force concentration. Additionally, a headquarters study received just 30 days before the aforementioned events cautioned the naval forces against dividing their carrier force. Thus, as a man on field and considering the facts he knew at that moment, Halsey lacked any good option but the one he chose. Andidora concurs with this perspective and claims it would be an irrational decision to break up the carriers he had at hand when he had no knowledge of the power of Ozawa\'s carriers. Therefore, Halsey\'s decision was in keeping with the law of concentration and was right, given the situation and facts available[footnoteRef:23]. Hence, although, in a way, the Leyte Gulf battle might be considered an example of a military fiasco, a number of factors combined yielded the outcome. [21: Cohen Eliot.A. & Gooch, John. Military Misfortunes: the Anatomy of Failure in War, (New York: The Free Press, 1990), p. 243] [22: Ibid., 31.] [23: Ibid.]

Criticism of Halsey\'s Competence and Effectiveness in Command

Halsey\'s success and capability in command has largely been criticized by concentrating on his individual decisions. This biased perspective doesn\'t adequately represent the huge responsibility associated with his role as South Pacific US forces\' commander. Halsey took risks and was met with some losses, but these ultimately contributed positively to the big picture, bringing America glory in the end. The Admiral\'s comprehensive technical know-how, particularly with regard to carrier air strength, helped him position and utilize his troops to attain decisive outcomes. In the commander\'s role, Halsey took daring action based on the facts at hand, arguably turning the winds in America\'s favor and defeating Japan prematurely within the Pacific region. Hence, history corroborates the fact that, in the capacity of the US South Pacific forces\' commander during WWII, Halsey was both highly capable and successful[footnoteRef:24]. [24: Ibid., 30.]

Command in World War II

At the time of the Pearl Harbor attack of December 1941, Admiral Halsey was 150 miles off the coast of Hawaii, on board the ENTERPRISE. On his return, Halsey was met by the horrendous sight of the mass massacre wrecked by the Japanese air strike and swore to kill all Japanese[footnoteRef:25]. The above example was only one of a number of hostile statements and promises of revenge made by him, popular with the media, his subordinates, and, eventually, all of America. He became the bluntest and most open enemy of Japan, following the Pearl Harbor attack. He became an extremely ruthless and forbidding foe[footnoteRef:26]. [25: Ibid., 30.] [26: Bassett, James, Admiral William F. Halsey, Carver, Michael Sir (Ed.), Warlords: Military Commanders of the Twentieth Century, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1976).]

February 1942 saw Halsey commandeering a carrier fleet and attacking Roi, Kwajalein, Jaluit and Wotje atoll. His ship was frequently seen from Japan-held territories. Potter maintains that he was taking awful risks exposing himself and his fleet in this way[footnoteRef:27]. Still, his risk-taking propensity, together with his efficient utilization of armed forces, gleaned decisive outcomes. These hits, which marked the very first time US troops attacked Japan\'s Pacific defenses, accorded Halsey heroic status among Americans. His name as America\'s very first defeater of Japan echoed all over the US navy, among sailors, as well as across the globe[footnoteRef:28]. [27: Ibid., 47] [28: Ibid.]