Abington School District v. Schempp

Exclusionary Rule has become a well-established part of modern criminal law, so much so that many people fail to understand the relatively recent origin of the law and how it has been expanded beyond its initial parameters. The Exclusionary Rule is "the rule that evidence secured by illegal means and in bad faith cannot be introduced in a criminal trial" (Hill and Hill). This exclusion is not automatic but is done upon the request of a defense attorney. The Exclusionary Rule extends to evidence covered as an indirect result of illegal actions, as well as evidence discovered as a direct result of illegal acts. However, because it is a rule meant to deter illegal behavior by law enforcement, the Exclusionary Rule only applies in circumstances where law enforcement knew or should have known that their actions were illegal.

It is important to understand that certain behaviors have always been prohibited under the Constitution. Illegal searches and seizures by the police certainly fell under this category. The problem was that such illegal behavior did not give rise to a remedy for the victim of that illegal behavior. Instead, the behavior was prohibited but a criminal suspect had no personal protection. That rendered the exclusionary rule essentially meaningless. Federal courts embraced the Exclusionary Rule before the federal courts were willing to extend those protections to state courts. The Exclusionary Rule only became applicable in all scenarios when the Supreme Court decided Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

Background

It is important to understand that in federal proceedings, the Exclusionary Rule had been the rule throughout much of U.S. history. The text of the Fourth Amendment provides that, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized" (U.S. Const. amend. IV). Therefore, the Fourth Amendment directly prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. However, it fails to specify how those rights are to be enforced. This ambiguity left the Supreme Court with the task of determining the appropriate means of enforcement.

By the turn of the century, the Supreme Court was already willing to provide remedies to people who had suffered Fourth Amendment violations. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Court was called upon to determine whether an illegal search and seizure violated the Fourth Amendment. It determined that that search was illegal. Moreover, referencing an English case that was the inspiration for the Fourth Amendment the Court held that:

The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the case then before the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors and the rummaging of his drawers that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense, it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment (16 U.S. 616, 634 -- 35).

However, while Boyd made it clear that such searches or seizures were Fourth Amendment violations, it did not go so far as to establish the remedy for those violations.

In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Court expanded upon the Boyd decision. Boyd had simply made the commentary that such behavior was illegal, but it did not offer any guidance as to how governments were to deal with those circumstances. In Weeks, the Court made it clear that the federal government could not use illegally gathered evidence. Weeks did not create the Exclusionary Rule, but cited the Exclusionary Rule. However, the Court was careful to limit the impact of Weeks to federal prosecutions, an unusual decision given that the Fourteenth Amendment theoretically would have expanded any protections in the Bill of Rights to the states, at that point, anyway.

In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Supreme Court was again asked to consider the appropriate remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation. Once again, the Court seemed willing to recognize that there needed to be a remedy for such violations, but was still unwilling to force such a solution upon the states. The defendant was convicted of conspiracy to perform criminal abortions. The Court was asked to consider whether states were required by the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment to exclude illegally seized evidence from trial. The Court determined that, even though the Exclusionary Rule was a good way to discourage Fourth Amendment violations, because other methods existed to ensure compliance with the Fourth Amendment, the Exclusionary Rule was not necessary. In fact, the Court outright rejected the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment imposed the same limitations on the states as the first eight amendments of the Constitution did on the Federal government.

That is not to say that the Exclusionary Rule never applied to state proceedings prior to Mapp v. Ohio. While the Supreme Court decisions prior to Mapp did not require states to implement the Exclusionary Rule, they also did not prohibit states from enacting their own versions of that rule, and many states did so. However, that may have been even more troubling than some states choosing to enact the rule and others refusing to enact the rule, since it guaranteed that the amount of a process an American citizen would receive would be linked to the state of residency, which was something that the Fourteenth Amendment tried to prohibit, the unequal legal treatment of U.S. citizens.

Mapp v. Ohio

It was not until Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) that the Exclusionary Rule became required in state criminal court proceedings. In order to understand how Mapp impacted the utilization of the Exclusionary Rule in state courts, it is critical to develop a thorough understanding of Mapp.

Facts

The facts of the Mapp case are relatively simple. The police got a tip that Mapp and her daughter were harboring a fugitive. They went to the defendant's residence and demanded entrance to her home. The defendant called her attorney, and, on his advice, refused entry because they did not have a warrant. Later that same day, the police returned to her house and demanded entry, when Mapp continued to refuse to allow them in the home; they forced their way into the home. She confronted them and demanded to see a copy of the search warrant. The police officers waved a piece of paper in the air, claiming it was the warrant. Mapp grabbed the paper from the police and put it down her shirt; the police retrieved it from her. The officers then cuffed her and searched her house for the fugitive. During their search, the police were unable to find the sought-after fugitive or even any evidence that the fugitive had ever been in the house. In the basement, they opened a trunk and found some pornographic material, which was prohibited by law. Mapp was arrested for breaking that law, and convicted of that offense. During her trial, Mapp's attorney asked about the warrant, but the police were unable to produce the warrant or explain its absence. Mapp's conviction was upheld by the Ohio Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Ohio. Mapp then took her appeal to the U.S.

Issues

There were multiple issues before the Court. The first issue was whether the evidence against Mapp was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The second issue was whether evidence that was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment was admissible in state court proceedings. The third issue was whether Ohio's anti-obscenity law violated the First Amendment.

Reasoning

The Court looked at the connection between the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment became a critical component of the Court's decision. The Due Process Clause provides that:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws" (U.S. Const. amend. XIV).

In other words, the Due Process Clause extends the protections guaranteed in the Bill of Rights to the states.

Prior decisions had determined that the first eight amendments in the Bill of Rights determined what process was due to American citizens. The Court cited language from Boyd in support of its proposition. The Boyd Court had held that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments "apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property" (116 U.S. 616, 530). In other words, it is not the physical act of violating someone's home that forms the root of the violation of privacy; it is more the intangible fact that, having done so, the police have taken away the idea of security and privacy for that individual.

The Court also mentioned Weeks. In Weeks, the Court held that:

If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land" (232 U.S. 383, 393).

This was where the Court began to show a relationship between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and how the Fourth Amendment's guarantee that people will be free from unreasonable searches and seizures combines with the Fifth Amendment's guarantee that a person will not be compelled to incriminate himself.

Therefore, while the Fifth Amendment is not an explicit part of the Court's reasoning, it is critical to know the text of the Fifth Amendment in order to understand how the Court used that background to help come to its conclusion. The Fifth Amendment provides:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation (U.S. Const. amend. V).

The Court also discussed later cases that had reaffirmed the decisions in Boyd and Weeks. In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), that Court restated the Weeks rule as follows: "The striking outcome of the Weeks case and those which followed it was the sweeping declaration that the Fourth Amendment, although not referring to or limiting the use of evidence in courts, really forbade its introduction if obtained by government officers through a violation of the Amendment" (277 U.S. 438, 462). The Court built a strong argument in favor of the Exclusionary Rule, before turning to apply it to the states.

The Court also made an effort to build upon the decision in Wolf. Wolf involved the Court's first discussion of the interplay between the Fourth Amendment and the States. The Wolf court had "no hesitation in saying that were a State affirmatively to sanction such police incursion into privacy it would run counter to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment" (338 U.S. 25, 28). However, because the Wolf court did not see any evidence that the state was sanctioning that type of behavior, it failed to consider whether the Exclusionary Rule should be applied as a result of individual action on behalf of the state. However, the Court did not find Wolf to be controlling. Instead, the Court determined that, "It, therefore, plainly appears that the factual considerations supporting the failure of the Wolf Court to include the Weeks exclusionary rule when it recognized the enforceability of the right to privacy against the States in 1949, while not basically relevant to the constitutional consideration, could not, in any analysis, now be deemed controlling" (367 U.S. 643, 654).

The Court did not feel like the states had taken the opportunity to implement the Exclusionary Rule in their own state Court systems. This was an important consideration, because the Court had refused to require the states to observe the exclusionary rule every time the issue had been before the Court. In fact, five years before Mapp, in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) the Court had stated that the Exclusionary Rule should not be forced upon the states until the states had "adequate opportunity to adopt or reject the [Weeks] rule" (347 U.S. 128, 134). However, states did not take the opportunity to adopt the Weeks' rule. The Mapp Court believed that, "Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government" (367 U.S. 643, 655).

Analysis

The Court did not even consider the First Amendment issue. It was unnecessary for the Court to consider that issue unless Mapp's conviction was otherwise valid, and the Court determined that it was not. Following the Court's policy of not answering unnecessary questions, the Court did not even address the obscenity issue. Therefore, Mapp is known as a Fourth Amendment case, not a First Amendment case, and offers no guidance on the constitutionality of anti-obscenity legislation.

To look at whether Mapp's conviction was valid, the first thing the Court had to do was engage in an analysis of whether the evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. This analysis focused on the issue of whether or not the police had a valid warrant when they forcibly entered Mapp's home. There simply was not credible evidence that the police had a warrant when they searched Mapp's home. The police did not present the piece of paper they claimed was the warrant to Mapp. Moreover, thought Mapp took the warrant from the police, they were able to recover it. However, even at the initial criminal trial, the police were unable to produce the warrants. There was also no other evidence that support that a warrant had ever been issued. The Court had to conclude that there was no warrant. If there was no warrant, then the intrusion into Mapp's home was unconstitutional. Moreover, the circumstances of Mapp's vehement refusal that they search her home and the fact that the handcuffed her in order to effectuate the search only served to exacerbate the egregious nature of the police intrusion into her privacy.

Once the Court was satisfied that the search on Mapp's home did, indeed, violate her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, it then had to turn its consideration to the appropriate remedy for such a violation. The majority determined that the Fourteenth Amendment required states to recognize a defendant's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. They determined that, because the Fourth Amendment's right to privacy was enforceable against the states because of the Due Process Clause, then violations of those rights had to be subject to the same remedy. Therefore, the Court held that the Exclusionary Rule applied to state criminal proceedings.

To reach that decision, the Court looked at the requirements of actually enforcing the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Comparing the Right to Privacy to other rights found in the Bill of Rights, the Court rejected the notion that the Right to Privacy should be differentiated from other rights. At that time, state violation of a person's other rights under the Bill of Rights was treated in the same manner as a federal violation of those rights. Therefore, people really did receive the protections of those rights. The Court rejected the idea that the Right to Privacy was somehow different from those other rights, in a way that would require it to have fewer protections than other rights. The Court stated, "Indeed, we are aware of no restraint, similar to that rejected today, conditioning the enforcement of any other basic constitutional right. The right to privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the people, would stand in marked contrast to all other rights declared as 'basic to a free society'" (367 U.S. 643, 656). It went on to further explain that, "This Court has not hesitated to enforce as strictly against the States as it does against the Federal Government the rights of free speech and of a free press, the rights to notice and to a fair, public trial, including, as it does, the right not to be convicted by use of a coerced confession, however logically relevant it be, and without regard to its reliability" (367 U.S. 643, 656).

Furthermore, before requiring the states to adopt the same rule, the Court once again examined the wisdom of the Exclusionary Rule. There were arguments that the rule would create too substantial a burden in state criminal proceedings, which may have necessitated a reexamination of the rule as a whole. However, the Court rejected that line of though. It held that:

our holding that the exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments is not only the logical dictate of prior cases, but it also makes very good sense. There is no war between the Constitution and common sense. Presently, a federal prosecutor may make no use of evidence illegally seized, but a State's attorney across the street may, although he supposedly is operating under the enforceable prohibitions of the same Amendment. Thus the State, by admitting evidence unlawfully seized, serves to encourage disobedience to the Federal Constitution which it is bound to uphold" (367 U.S. 643, 657).

Conclusion

The Court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. The Court refused to consider the First Amendment issues before it. The Court concluded that the search of Mapp's home was conducted in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. Finally, after examining the nature of the case and the history of the Exclusionary Rule, the Court found that it should apply to the states. The Court held that:

Today we once again examine Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right to privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and, after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court (367 U.S. 643, 654-655).

Black's Concurrence

In his concurrence, Justice Black believed that the Fourth Amendment clearly prohibited the type of illegal search and seizure described in the case, but believed that the Exclusionary Rule was a judicially created remedy that Congress could negate. However, he also believed that the Fourth Amendment was not considered alone, but in connection with the other rights in the Bill of Rights, specifically the Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination. Specifically, Black stated:

I am still not persuaded that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone, would be enough to bar the introduction into evidence against an accused of papers and effects seized from him in violation of its commands. For the Fourth Amendment does not itself contain any provision expressly precluding the use of such evidence, and I am extremely doubtful that such a provision could properly be inferred from nothing more than the basic command against unreasonable searches and seizures. Reflection on the problem, however, in the light of cases coming before the Court since Wolf, has led me to conclude that when the Fourth Amendment's ban against unreasonable searches and seizures is considered together with the Fifth Amendment's ban against compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges which not only justifies but actually requires the exclusionary rule (367 U.S. 643, 661-662).

Douglas' Concurrence

Justice Douglas also concurred in the Court's decision. Douglas focused on the egregious nature of the police treatment of Mapp. He also went into a more practical discussion of the remedies that would be available to Mapp to remedy the constitutional violation. "The only remaining remedy, if exclusion of the evidence is not required, is an action of trespass by the homeowner against the offending officer…The truth is that trespass actions against officers who make unlawful searches and seizures are mainly illusory remedies" (367 U.S. 643, 670). Douglas found it untenable that a citizen would be left without a real remedy if the government violated a basic guarantee found in the Bill of Rights.

Stewart's Memorandum

Justice Stewart neither concurred with nor dissented from the Court's decision. Instead, he filed a Memorandum in which he agreed with part of Harlan's dissent. However, he agreed with the Court's decision to reverse the decision. Stewart believed that the case could have been decided on the underlying validity of the obscenity statute in question.