Why abortion is immoral

¶ … Abortion is Immoral -- by Don Marquis

Don Marquis insists in the first paragraph of his essay that abortion is "seriously immoral" and he is clearly upset that his point-of-view has "received little support in the recent philosophical literature" (Marquis, 1989, p. 183). Granted, his essay was crafted twenty-two years ago, but from the vigorous, even aggressive argument he puts forward, one can conclude that his passion has not died out in 2011. Marquis uses his narrative skills in the first few pages to generally conclude that both the pro-choice and the pro-life positions have valid points. Along the way, he touts his own intellectual skills -- possibly to justify his moral position or to show that he is a serious student of ethics -- with statements like, "As everyone who has taken a bit of logic knows…" (Marquis, 184). It's easy to wonder just how many students have taken courses in logic, and to speculate that Marquis is trying to distance his views from the average citizen.

The anti-abortionist position ("It is always prima facie wrong to take a human life") is "too broad, according to Marquis (185). And the "pro-choicer" position ("It is prima facie wrong to kill only rational agents") is "too narrow in scope," he continues (185). As an alert reader goes through this essay, it is clear that Marquis is arguing that both the pro-choice and the pro-life (he doesn't use "pro-life"; rather he uses "anti-abortionist") both have serious flaws in their moral and ethical positions on the subject of abortion -- and that in fact, there are "symmetries in the two positions" (186). Marquis calls the dual moral mistakes "a standoff" in a number of instances (in other words, both arguments are weak and wrong); again, he is preparing the reader for what he will deliver later in the essay -- a more substantive ethical / philosophical reason as to why abortion is immoral.

"The moral generalizations of both sides are not quite correct," Marquis asserts (188), because both arguments are "accidental generalizations" and both sides "do not touch on the essence of the matter (Marquis' italics). In page after page (roughly 189-200) Marquis engages in lengthy semantics that appears to mimic the kinds of arguments and questions that were launched in Plato's "The Republic," which of course was Socrates' style of questioning the validity of every conceivable argument and assertion. For example, Marquis uses esoteric language to flush out the wrongness of killing, per se:

"Since we do believe that it is wrong to kill defenseless little babies, it is important that a theory of the wrongness of killing easily account for this.

Personhood theories of the wrongness of killing, on the other hand, cannot straightforwardly account for the wrongness of killing infants and young children. Hence, such theories must add special ad hoc accounts of the wrongness of killing the young. The plausibility of such ad hoc theories seems to be a function of how desperately one wants such theories to work" (192).

Meanwhile, Marquis references iconic philosopher Immanuel Kant ("Kant's argument for the wrongness of inflicting pain on animals rests on a claim that, in a world of Kantian moral agents, is demonstrably false…") (Marquis, p. 194), and pro-choice philosopher Michael Tooley ("Tooley's claim that an entity cannot possess the right to life unless it has the capacity to desire it's continued existence… [is wrong]") (p. 198-99). Abortion is wrong, Marquis argues (202), because "Since a fetus possesses a property, the possession of which in adult human beings is sufficient to make killing an adult human being wrong, abortion is wrong."