Al Qaeda: Current and Future

Al Qaeda: Current and Future Trends

Many people were heard to observe that "things would never be the same" following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and some even suggested the Osama bin Laden could consider himself a "dead man walking." Almost seven years have passed, though, and while it is reasonable to assert that many things have changed, bin Laden and his al Qaeda network remain a fundamental threat to U.S. interests at home and abroad. Although there have been some military successes, fighting this shadowy international terrorist organization has defied other approaches. The purpose of this study was to provide an overview of al Qaeda, and its organizational and developmental history. In addition, the group's base and location of operations and its financing and support sources are reviewed, as well as an analysis of al Qaeda's motivations, ideology and purpose. The study also provides a list of al Qaeda's adversaries and enemies and a description of locations and tactics used in its attacks. A review of countermeasures that have been shown to be effective against al Qaeda is presented, followed by an analysis of the projected future for the group. A discussion of potential security management solutions and countermeasures that could be deployed against these projected future threats is followed by a summary of the research and important findings in the conclusion.

Al Qaeda: Current and Future Trends

There has been some progress in the war on terrorism since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and countering the threat represented by al Qaeda. For example, the removal of the Taliban government in Afghanistan served to eliminate al Qaeda's sanctuary and training camps and destroyed an important connection in the process that once provided al Qaeda's leadership with a continuing stream of new recruits. Unfortunately, continues to face a serious threat as the organization's leadership rebounds from setback after setback to reemerge in yet another region of the world to threaten U.S. interests at home and abroad. In this environment, identifying current and future trends for this organization represents a timely and important enterprise, and these issues are the focus of this study. This paper provides an overview of al Qaeda, and organizational and developmental history, and its base and location of operations. A discussion of the group's financing and support sources is followed by an analysis of al Qaeda's motivations, ideology and purpose. An assessment of al Qaeda's roster of adversaries and enemies is followed by a description of the group's typical location of attacks and tactics employed. A review of countermeasures that have been shown to be effective against al Qaeda is presented, followed by an analysis of the projected future for the group. A discussion of potential security management solutions and countermeasures that could be deployed against these projected future threats is followed by a summary of the research and important findings in the conclusion.

Review and Discussion

Name of the organization and "type" of terrorist group.

Al-Qaeda (from the Arabic, meaning, "The Base" or, alternatively, "The Foundation," Burke, 2004) is an international terrorist network headed by Osama bin Laden (What is al-Qaeda?, 2007).

Organizational and developmental history.

While the roots of the Islamic world's dissatisfaction with the Western world dates back centuries (Aydin, 2004), the organizational and developmental history of al Qaeda itself is of fairly recent origin. According to Steadman (2007), "With his 1998 fatwa against Jews and Crusaders, Osama bin Laden publicly initiated the coalescence of the many jihadist groups into a single global movement" (p. 28).

Base or sanctuary; and location of operations.

Not surprisingly, al Qaeda, as a non-state actor in international affairs, maintains operations of varying sorts and levels in far-flung locations around the world. For instance, Pakistan, one of the few countries that were formerly Taliban supporters, has since become an important strategic ally in the fight against al Qaeda. According to Jenkins (2002), "U.S. diplomacy has turned the international outrage and concern prompted by the September 11 attacks into a global commitment to combat terrorism, confirmed in United Nations Resolution 1373" (p. 1). By all accounts, al Qaeda is nowhere in particular and everywhere in general: "The 11 September attacks on the United States were a bold, calculated transnational attack by an organization that has established and maintained a multinational presence in more than 50 countries, directed by a base located -- at least until recently -- in Afghanistan" (Smith, 2002, p. 33).

Financing/support sources.

There are some profound problems involved in trying to trace the precise sources of funding for al Qaeda for various political, security and intelligence-gathering reasons. For example, in his essay, "Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya," Abuza (2003) reports that, "In early 2003, the U.S. Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control drew up a list of 300 individuals, charities and corporations in Southeast Asia believed to be Al Qaeda funders. Due to inter-agency politics, the list was winnowed down to 18 individuals and 10 companies. But even at the time of writing in early April 2003, the list was still unannounced due to diplomatic and bureaucratic pressure" (p. 169).

Given the shadowy nature of the organization, it is not surprising that its funding sources are likewise convoluted and difficult to track. According to this author, "Al Qaeda's financial network is very sophisticated and complex, dating back to the late-1980s to early 1990s. Osama bin Laden set out to establish an organization that would be self-sustaining over time; one part self-reliant, another part reliant on the ummah, the Muslim community. Built on "layers and redundancies," Al Qaeda's financial backbone was built on a foundation of charities, non-governmental organizations, mosques, websites, fund-raisers, intermediaries, facilitators, and banks and other financial institutions that helped finance the mujiheddin throughout the 1980s. This network extended to all corners of the Muslim world" (Abuza, p. 170).

What is known is that the various sources of funding for al Qaeda's operations around the world include the following:

Cash brought into the country by individuals;

Funds skimmed from Islamic charities;

Corporate entities (some very overt, others are self-sustaining fronts for terrorist activities);

Proceeds from hawala shops and gold sales;

Contributions (zakat and infaq) from its own members;

Contributions (infaq) from outsiders;

Al Qaeda investments and accounts already established in the region, especially in the region's Islamic banks, and,

Petty crime, racketeering, extortion, gun-running and kidnapping (Abuza).

Furthermore, many of these funding mechanisms remain firmly in place and there is little authorities can do about it. As Abuza emphasizes, "None of these funding mechanisms has been effectively shut down since the war on terror began. In part it has been due to the near impossibility of shutting down, for instance, hawala networks, or stopping petty crime" (p. 170). These constraints are due in part to administrative complacency, and partially attributable to a dearth of political wherewithal and conflicting diplomatic pressures (Abuza). Moreover, in their efforts to "win the hearts and minds" of potential converts, these funding sources are also responsible for some social initiatives within the Muslim community that have made them appear more benign and even benevolent from the perspective of their constituents rather than as the international terrorist organization they are in reality. For instance, according to Abuza, "Indeed, one of the aspects that made Southeast Asia so appealing to the Al Qaeda leadership in the first place was the network of Islamic charities, the spread of poorly regulated Islamic banks, business-friendly environments, and economies that already had records of extensive money laundering" (p. 170). "Al Qaeda saw the region, first and foremost, as a back office for their activities (especially to set up front companies, raise funds, recruit, forge documents, and purchase weapons); only later was it seen as a theatre of operations in its own right" (Abusa, p. 170).

Moreover, Islam is spreading across Europe in unprecedented ways, and accommodating the religious and moral views of these newly arrived immigrants is placing an enormous amount of strain on relations between European nations and the United States, but it also spells serious trouble for these countries in the future as their existing political regimens are subverted from within by the increasingly powerful and persuasive message being promulgated by "al Qaedism." In this regard, Anderson (2002) suggests that, "From a pragmatic American standpoint, too, there is little benefit to heeding the views of European elites. It is true that European cooperation in tracking down terrorist cells and security cooperation is necessary" (p. 591). This author adds, though, that the political will needed to sustain this cooperative effort will be eroded as the Islamic communities gain ground and become more influential in their presence through legitimate political channels (Anderson). For instance, Anderson writes that:

It is unfortunately especially necessary, as it turns out, that the seed beds of forces attacking America lie nearly as much in the despised immigrant Islamic communities that live at the margins of European societies -- supposedly so vastly morally superior to America, but whose Muslim populations, from Britain to Germany, are systematically shut out of post-Christian Europe and shut in upon themselves -- as in the corrupt regimes where the terrorists were born. It is an exaggeration, but not entirely so, that the United States could have done worse in dealing with Al Qaeda by simply attacking, for example, Belgium, Germany, and Italy -- attacking Al Qaeda's strongholds among those who live in the shadows of a world they do not share. (p. 592).

As the nations of Europe continue to hammer out their respective differences in their inexorable march to becoming the United States of Europe (Inc.) in the early 21st century, the support for al Qaeda will likely continue to expand throughout the region as Europeans nations seek accommodation rather than confrontation. After all, in business, "blood is a big expense" ("The Godfather," 1972). As Anderson emphasize, "European military forces, likewise although effectively useless in battle, can be helpful in long-term peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan. Europe can also assist in tracking down and seizing the financial assets of terrorists. These are important advantages, but one must still understand the fundamentally self-centered nature of European support, given its underlying desire to constrain American power in pursuit of its own counter-hegemonic aspirations" (p. 592).

Motivations, ideology and purpose.

Although the stated goal of al-Qaeda is to rid Muslim countries of what it regards as "the profane influence of the West and replace their governments with fundamentalist Islamic regimes" (What is al-Qaeda?, p. 2), the group has become more of an ideological movement than an organization since is founding. As Burke (2004) points out, "No. It is less an organization than an ideology. The Arabic word qaeda can be translated as a 'base of operation' or 'foundation,' or alternatively as a 'precept' or 'method.' Islamic militants always understood the term in the latter sense" (p. 18). The group's ideology has been termed "al-Qaedaism" by some authorities, and has established self-generating terrorist cells around the world in furtherance of its purpose (What is al-Qaeda).

According to Burke, "Today, the structure that was built in Afghanistan has been destroyed, and bin Laden and his associates have scattered or been arrested or killed. There is no longer a central hub for islamic militancy. But the al Qaeda worldview, or 'al Qaedaism,' is growing stronger every day" (p. 19). In this regard, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) reports, "U.S. authorities say the most recent example is the 'Miami Seven,' a group of men arrested June 22 for conspiring to attack Chicago's Sears Tower, among other targets. FBI officials characterized the threat the group posed as 'more aspirational than operational.' Another variant may have emerged in Canada, where officials in June 2007 arrested seventeen men in an alleged plot to bomb several buildings in southern Ontario" (What is al-Qaeda?, p. 3).

Many observers in the West are left wondering what all of the hatred is about, and why they are being targeted by foreigners with whom they have no personal connections or interests. Supporters of al Qaeda and their like-minded ilk maintain that simply being taxpayers in the United States is reason enough to be targeted because of the U.S. support for Israel and its continuing blasphemous presence of the sacred soils of Saudi Arabia et al. The inflammatory rhetoric that continues to spew from the mouth-organs of the group in various media and religious schools around the world adds further fuel to the Islamic flame, and al Qaeda continues to grow in influence if not actual physical presence. For instance, Burke advises that, "Bin Laden is a propagandist, directing his efforts at attracting those Muslims who have hitherto shunned his extremist message. He knows that only through mass participation in his project will he have any chance of success. His worldview is receiving immeasurably more support around the globe than it was two years ago, let alone 15 years ago when he began serious campaigning" (p. 19).

To accomplish its fundamental mission of spreading terrorism in support of its erstwhile ideology, al Qaeda frequently resorts to inflammatory rhetoric through its online resources or through various Arabic news outlets such as glowering countenance of al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri provided by al-Jazeera as shown in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1. Ayman al-Zawahiri's videos often air on Arabic news outlets.

Source: AP/al-Jazeera in CFR at http://www.cfr.org/publication/11035/inspiring_terror.html.

Adversaries/enemies.

The primary adversary of al Qaeda is Israel, followed closely by the United States, the United Kingdom and its coalition of the increasingly unwilling in the Middle East (Aydin). People of any different faiths from Islam, though, have also been targets of attacks by al Qaeda in the past (Cass, 2003).

Location of attacks and tactics employed.

A timeline of al Qaeda attacks and the tactics used on various Western targets is provided in Table 1 below.

Table 1.

Timeline: Al-Qaida attacks on Western targets.

Location/Description of Tactics

February 26, 1993 massive bomb explodes in a garage below the World Trade Center in New York City. Six people are killed and more than 1,000 injured in the blast. Analysts cite some links to al-Qaeda in the attack, though Osama bin Laden disavowed any connection.

June 25, 1996 powerful truck bomb explodes outside a U.S. military housing complex near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 American servicemen and wounding several hundred people.

August 7, 1998

Two bombs explode within minutes of each other near the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The blasts kill 264 people.

Seventeen American sailors are killed and 39 wounded by a bomb aboard a small boat that targets the U.S.S. Cole, a U.S. Navy destroyer refueling in Aden, Yemen.

Hijackers commandeer four commercial jetliners, crashing two of them into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and another into the Pentagon outside Washington. The fourth airliner crashes in a field in Pennsylvania. Some 3,000 people die in the attacks.

A truck carrying natural gas explodes outside a Tunisian synagogue, killing 19 people.

A bomb explodes in a resort area on the Indonesian island of Bali, setting off fires and explosions that destroyed two nightclubs. More than 200 people are killed, most of them foreign tourists

Terrorists stage coordinated attacks on Israeli tourists in Mombasa, Kenya. Three suicide bombers crash an explosives-laden sport utility vehicle into an Israeli-owned hotel, killing themselves as well as 10 Kenyans and three Israeli tourists, and wounding dozens of others.

Thirty-three people are killed and about 100 others injured in five nearly simultaneous suicide bombing attacks in Casablanca. Twelve of the 14 bombers, all of whom were Moroccan, also die in the attacks.

November 15 & 20, 2003

Car bombs explode within minutes of each other at two Jewish synagogues in Istanbul Nov. 15. A second pair of bombings five days later strike the British consulate and the offices of the London-based HSBC bank in Istanbul. The four bombings kill 58 people and wound about 750.

Ten bombs explode within minutes of each other on four crowded commuter trains in the center of Madrid, killing 190 people and wounding more than 1,400 (see graphic in Figure 2 below).

Source: Glendinning, 2005.

Figure ____. Victims sit on the tracks just outside Madrid's Atocha station as they are tended by rescue workers following one of a series of deadly explosions, March 11, 2004.

Source: National Public Radio, 2008 at http://media.npr.org/news/images/2005/july/07/corbis/madrid200.jpg.

Besides the physical attacks, there are also indications that al Qaeda is increasingly turning to cyberspace to facilitate its terrorist activities. According to Thomas (2003), "We can say with some certainty, al Qaeda loves the Internet. Evidence strongly suggests that terrorists used the Internet to plan their operations for 9/11. Computers seized in Afghanistan reportedly revealed that al Qaeda was collecting intelligence on targets and sending encrypted messages via the Internet" (p. 112). In fact, as recently as 16 September 2002, al Qaeda "sleeper cells" maintained in the United States were reportedly using Internet-based phone services to communicate with their counterparts cells abroad (Thomas). While some analysts suggest that the loss of its operations base in Afghanistan makes al-Qaeda less dangerous than it was in 2002, others argue that its ability to inspire terror is clear evidence of the group's continuing influence (What is al-Qaeda).

Countermeasures or anti-terrorist options/strategies that have been successful against this group and similar groups in the past.

While the group manages to fade into the background when the situation calls for it, when al Qaeda terrorists do emerge they can be fought in various ways: "Through its military presence in Uzbekistan, its diplomatic intervention in the confrontation between Pakistan and India over Kashmir, and its direct military assistance to the Philippines and Georgia, the United States has limited al Qaeda's ability to exploit other conflicts and develop new bases" (Thomas, p. 1). When a sufficient number of al Qaeda terrorists appear in a coordinated fashion, military countermeasures have proven effective. According to Burke, "The military component of the war on terrorism has had some significant success. A high proportion of those who associated with bin Laden between 1996 and 2001 are now either dead or in prison. Bin Laden's own ability to commission and instigate terror attacks has been severely curtailed" (p. 19). Other countermeasures that have proven effective against al Qaeda have been improved cooperation between intelligence organizations around the world and increased security budgets that have made it much more difficult for terrorists to transfer funds across borders or to successfully organize and execute attacks (Burke).

Unfortunately, "al-Qaedism's" influence continues to grow and it remains unclear whether a military response alone will ever be sufficient to counter the threats represented by the nebulous but deadly al Qaeda group. As the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) emphasizes, "Indeed, efforts to counter al-Qaeda's ideological appeal have lagged far behind the military component of the 'war on terror' (What is al-Qaeda, p. 3).

Projected future.

The picture painted by movies such as Michael Moore's 2004 motion picture, "Fahrenheit 9/11," suggests that many Americans are convinced that there is more involved that they are being told by the mainstream press. In this regard, Aydin (2004) suggests that, "Part of the problem can be chalked up to the inequity that characterizes the global public sphere and networks of communication, which do not allow Muslim objections against Western violations of universal standards to reach a Western audience" (p. 89). Another part of the problem, though, clearly relates to the current administration's resorting to deception and outright fabrications to garner domestic and international support for the invasion of Iraq. As Corn (2004) emphasizes, the Bush administration has been less than forthright in its handling of the war on terrorism, leading many observers to believe there is some type of collusion taking place, if not an outright evil Cheney-Halliburton-bin Laden cabal in place. According to Corn, "The 9/11 commission's findings show that Bush and the entire 'connection' crowd were -- and remain -- disconnected from the known facts" (p. 4).

Indeed, based on the continuing presence of U.S. And other infidel Western troops on Saudi soil and elsewhere in the Middle East, the future of al Qaeda is bright, with sufficient moral and religious ammunition to fuel their ideological cries for retribution well into the future. Likewise, a series of informal interviews with several colleagues and classmates revealed the following perceptions of the projected future of al Qaeda. In response to the question, "Will al Qaeda still be around 10 years from now?," three respondents answered as follows: