The Bay of Pigs invasion

America and the Bay of Pigs Invasion

By the time the United States found itself in a place where it had to make excuses and apologies for the failed attempt at the Bay of Pigs to install a Cuban exile provisional government; the basis for invasion had long before that point been discussed, planned, a plan abandoned, and another plan formulated that in April, 1961, resulted in what President Kennedy himself referred to as a "tragic mistake (Higgins 1987)." The failed attempt at landing some 1500 Cuban exiles on the shores of Cuba at Bay of Pigs would, over the next several decades, be debated, argued and by now, revealed for it was; a combination of a U.S. President's belief that a flex of muscle was tangential to thwarting Communism in the North American hemispheres; the near ridiculous misinformation fed to him by his CIA advisers; and a reluctance on the part of his Joint Chiefs of Staff to step forward and aggressively advocate their military expertise that would cause them to privately predict the plan's odds of failure as being much greater than its odds for success (Higins 1987).

Historically, the U.S. supported at the Bay of Pigs began long before the actual effort, and long before John F. Kennedy became president of the United States. The Platt Amendment was a document that had been carefully constructed following Cuba's liberation from Spain, which gave the United States an opportunity for direct invasion of Cuba should American interests in the region become at risk by way of Cuba's hostility to the United States (Higgins 1987). This opportunity for direct military intervention was later waived by President Roosevelt as he pursued a path directing America away from Latin American imperialism (Higgins 1987). The United States, however, maintained its right to continue to occupy and operate a military Marine base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Higgins 1987).

Following Roosevelt's death, American imperialism in South American was once again resumed as a course of political direction during the Truman administration (Higgins 1987). President Truman had to take seriously the threat posed by Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, a hardline leftist, now posing a threat to American business interests in the region; most notably the United Fruit Company (Higgins 1987). Nicaragua's Dictator General Anastasio Somoza, felt threatened by Guatemala and Cuba (Higgins 1987). Truman held fast to a policy of non-intervention in Latin American internal conflicts, but this did not mean that he would ignore threats to American interests there (Higgins 1987). Still, there was little that Latin American leaders could garner in the way of arms and military support from the Truman administration.

President Eisenhower followed Truman, and because Eisenhower was strong anti-communist, he put into place many of the people who would later provide the basis of information and encouragement to Kennedy in taking action not only to attempt to assassinate Fidel Castro, but to pursue the covert action of the "tragic" Bay of Pigs (Higgins 1987). Historian Trumbull Higgins notes,.".. all the dilemmas faced by the Kennedy administration in Cuba in 1961, were already befogging the necessarily more cautious State Department in Guatemala during Eisenhower's first year in office (Higgins 1987, 20)."

The series of events that lead Kennedy to the Bay of Pigs is complex in political terms, and in terms of the key players, and especially head of the CIA, Allen Dulles. There would, much later, be autobiographies and books on the subject, and it would appear that many of the players wanted to minimize their own roles in the fiasco; not the least of whom was Allen Dulles. To this day, it really remains unclear, based on the many sources, as to whether or not Dulles just made hugely bad interpretations of the information provided to him; or whether he was just inept in his interpretation of that information. It would seem, in some instances, that Dulles was either outright deceitful, or had just a very, very bad comprehension of the information supplied him. This latter idea being much harder to believe, when considering Dulles' position, experience, background and education.

Another element that strongly contributed to the fiasco at the Bay of Pigs, was President Kennedy's own strong anti-Communism ideas, and his willingness, if not eagerness, in flexing America's muscle in the face of Communism. Kennedy's anti-communism, his ambivalence as to a course of action, and his fears are all evident in the following quote (Higgins 94):

We must realize that any bluff will be called. We cannot tell anyone to keep out of our hemisphere unless our armaments and the people behind these armaments are prepared to back the command, even to the ultimate point of going to war. There must be no doubt in anyone's mind, the decision must be automatic; if we debate, if we hesitate, if we question, it will be too late (John F. Kennedy 1940)."

Having expressed these ideas and sentiments, it becomes a good question as to why the President opted for an invasion of "guerilla" type Cuban ex-patriates and exiles over an overt military action. Also, prior to "Operation Mongoose," there was an earlier plan, the Trinidad Plan, in support of an invasion of Cuba (Higgins 1987). Even though that plan, like Mongoose, involved the use of exiles as a guerrilla force; it would have been a militarily better executed plan that was supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff over the latter plan (Higgins 1987).

There had been much back and forth in discussion and planning prior to the actual April 17, 1961 event at the Bay of Pigs. Of those events and the back and forth, several things are certain; there were leaks at the highest levels of discussion and planning (Higgins 1987). The Cuban ambassador to the United Nations reported to the United Nations information that could only have come from sources at the highest levels of the Kennedy administration (Higgins 1987). Fidel Castro gave speeches warning Cubans of the threat a poised United States that was ready to initiate a full-scale invasion of the country; and he invited the exiles and expatriates to come back and give it their best shot, assuring them that they would - as they did - fail (Higgins 1987).

Later, in the aftermath, it would be revealed through government investigations that there had been misinformation throughout the discussions and even prior during failed attempts to assassinate Castro (Blight, Kornbluh and Reinner 1999). Kennedy would remark, "I have made a tragic mistake. Not only were our facts in error, but our policy was wrong because the premises on which it was built were wrong (President Kennedy to Clark Clifford after the Bay of Pigs, April, 1961) (Higgins 154)."

There were a host of problems that lead to the "tagic mistake." First, the president opted for a covert guerrilla operation of expatriates, not knowing that these expatriates were poorly trained (Higgins 1987). Also, the area chosen for the invasion was a poor choice, but one highly recommended by the CIA (Blight, et al. 1999). That the Joint Chiefs of Staff never really supported the Trinidad Plan and especially not Operation Mongoose, but never made their feelings about the either plan aggressively clear as being contrary to their support (Higgins 1987). The President himself fed into the frenzy of misinformation with obvious signs that he should have picked up on without the benefit of advisors, especially when Castro responded to the information that Castro had with statements of force and preparedness (Higgins 1987).

The final conclusion about the United States government's support of the plan for the Bay of Pigs can only be one of all these elements coming together and being ignored by the United States. Clearly Kennedy and the CIA - less the Joint Chiefs who made clear afterwards and historically their lack of support for the operation; never fully fathomed the inabilities and lack of training and capability of the "brigade" force, or the invading expatriates who would invade, conquer and establish a provisional government after ousting Castro (Higgins 1987).