Ottoman Empire and Germany

WWI: The Forces of Nationalism, Imperialism and Militarism

The forces of nationalism, imperialism and militarism irrevocably led to World War I in several ways. Germany had become an industrialized nation, vying for economic power and rivaling the power of Britain (Gilbert, 1994). Germany had also defeated France in the prior century in the Franco-Prussian War and taken the territories of Alsace and Lorraine. France wanted them back (Bradberry, 2012). Russia also had a grievance with Germany: it wanted the Bosporous Straights that were "controlled by Germany through her alliance with the Ottoman Empire" (Bradberry, 2012, p. 42). The only way for each of these countries to get what they wanted from Germany was to go to war: their alliance gave them the opportunity to attack Germany on all fronts, and Germany's support for the Austria-Hungary attack on Serbia (in retaliation for the Serbian assassination of Archduke Ferdinand) gave the Triple Entente (France, UK, Russia) the pretext it needed to attack Germany. Germany played right into their hands by reasoning that if she did not support Austria-Hungary against Serbia (which was allied with Russia), Serbia and the Russians might defeat Austria-Hungary and thus have Germany surrounded by enemies on all sides -- France to the West, Russia to the East. Of course, this is exactly what happened anyway; Germany wrongly considered that Russia would not join the fray if it saw Germany openly supporting the Serbian-Austria-Hungary context -- in actuality, this is exactly what Russia, France and Britain wanted.

Russia mobilized against Germany, and Germany responded in kind. France followed days later with its own mobilization against Germany. Germany reacted by entering into Belgium to deliver a swift blow to France -- desiring to close the Western Front as soon as possible so as to be able to concentrate solely on the Eastern Front against Russia. This did not go according to plan -- and the invasion of Belgium, followed by reports of atrocities committed by the German "Huns" as Western propagandists called them, gave support to the British reason for waging war against Germany -- officially based on the fact that Germany had "violated Belgian neutrality" (Bradberry, 2012, p. 40). The real reason for Britain's attack on Germany, however, was more complicated and -- like that of France, Russia and later the U.S. -- had everything to do with nationalistic, imperialistic and militaristic factors, which this paper will now explore. Lloyd-George, Prime Minister of the Wartime Coalition Government (1916-1922), had been very instrumental in securing this deal (Lloyd-George, 1939).

Imperialism, Nationalism and Militarism

One of the most important nation-states to emerge from the ashes of WWI and WWII was the Zionist state of Israel. Prior to the 1940s, Israel had no nation-state to call its own. Zionists (the name for political Judaism) sought the creation of their own state in the early 20th century, appealing first to the Ottoman Empire for land in Palestine. The Empire told the Zionists that they were free to take the land but that Turks would not give them support or protection against the Palestinians (Weir, 2014). The Zionists turned to Britain. The Balfour Declaration written in 1917 to Lord Rothschild, signed by the UK's Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour, indicated that Britain would give Palestine to the Zionists to make for themselves "a national home for the Jewish people" (Balfour Declaration, 1917). In exchange for this land, all the Zionists had to do was motivate the U.S. to join the war and help the flagging Allies to defeat Germany and the Turks (Weir, 2014; Bradberry, 2012). Thus, at the heart of the conflict of WWI was a thirst for nation-building and Empire. For Britain, it was a matter of crushing an economic threat to its hegemony (after the war, Germany's colonies were seized and its country broken up); for France, it was a matter of taking back part of the land it had lost to Germany decades earlier; for Russia, it was about taking the Straights; for the U.S. it was about facilitating the goal of the Zionists in the political and economic sectors -- Jacob Schiff, Rabbi Wise, Bernard Baruch, Louis Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter -- which was, of course, Israel (Bradberry, 2012).

Germany also had dreams of empire, which were momentarily dashed by the outcome of the war. Yet Germany's aim was more nationalistic than it was imperialistic or militaristic. Russia's control of the Straights was a militaristic goal. Britain's destruction of Germany was an imperialistic goal. Germany's goal was nationalistic -- the expression of Germanic nationhood through support of its neighbor Austria-Hungary and through its pride in economic and industrial development. German culture was celebrated both there and in the U.S. where many Germans had emigrated. It was not until the propagandists set their sights on destroying the image of the German in order to swing support from staying out of the war to getting involved in the war in the U.S. that the German nationalists were seen as villains (Bradberry, 2012).

The factors that played into the nationalism and how it in turn fed into the war were several: first, the individual nations viewed themselves as significant, great and deserving of praise; they used this spirit to drum up support for their political and militaristic objectives: and they all characterized the enemy as inferior. The spirit of nationalism had grown in Germany for years, supported by the country's rapid industrial rise as a competitor to the powerhouse that was Britain. Germany's exports were numerous and it depended heavily on imports for food (a point which Britain exploited after the war in an effort to force Germany to sign the Versailles Treaty). Its pride lay in its ability to be industrial and provide the world with industrial products. Its nationalism was also rooted in its military alliances throughout central Europe and its unique Germanic history -- which, ironically, was not so distinct from the history of Britain (the Anglo-Saxon world had roots, after all, in Germania).

Nationalism fed the flames of war however when the fighting actually started. The UK quickly whipped up national fervor against the "Huns" by promoting the narrative that Germans were barbarians who were cutting the hands off children in Belgium and raping women (stories that were never confirmed or in any way proven to be true) (Bradberry, 2012). And in the U.S., the Americans who were fervently anti-war and isolationist only finally supported Wilson's entry into the war once the Lusitania was sunk -- and once hysteria against German agents penetrating American agencies was firmly established (Weiner, 2012).

The alliance system that had been brewing in Europe also contributed to the war: Germany's alliance with Austria-Hungary was a natural and historic one that was rooted as much in militaristic principles (protection of borders) as it was to cultural similarities (Bradberry, 2012). Its alliance with the Ottoman Turks was natural based on their geographical relation and trade. Pan-Slavism on the other hand was the root of the Russian-Serbian alliance -- which was also geographical and cultural. The Triple Entente, however, was not really culturally or ethnically-based so much as it was militaristically-based: all three empires had something to gain by defeating Germany, so their alliance -- already in the works prior to the outbreak of the war -- was a direct contributing factor to WWI's actual break-out.

America's Entry

America itself had less to gain from entering the war in Europe. In fact, Americans wanted nothing to do with it. Wilson had won the presidency on the platform that he would keep America out of the war (Weir, 2014) -- yet when the Zionists within the Establishment made their agreement with Britain, they single-handedly maneuvered Wilson (who had been supported by them) into pushing for America's entry into the war (Weir, 2014). America had remained neutral between 1914-1917 because of an isolationist movement which had permeated American society: the Anti-Imperialist League, led by powerful voices like Mark Twain, were instrumental in shaping public opinion -- and the memories of the wars abroad (the Spanish-American War, for instance) were still all too fresh in American minds. With the economy in weakened condition and national spirits and attitudes geared towards staying out of foreign conflicts, America was obliged to be neutral.

That changed, of course, once the agreement between Britain and the Zionists was reached. Louis Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter, not to mention Rabbi Wise, were extremely influential in persuading Wilson to go against his campaign promise and enter the war on the side of the British. Without the U.S. entering the war, the Entente would not have won. Germany was holding its own against it; the power of the U.S. was what tipped the scales and led to Germany's defeat -- and that happened precisely because of the pull of the Zionists in the financial and political sectors (many of them descended on Paris after the war to be present at the Peace Conference with Wilson) (Bradberry, 2012). The sinking of the Lusitania and the propaganda against German spies/agents/Huns was mere window dressing.