Americans with Disabilities Act and UK Disability Discrimination Act compared

American Disabilities Act

American's With Disabilities Act

In 1990 the United States Congress passed a body of legislation regarding the rights of disabled people in the United States. In 1995, Parliament signed a similar act into law also guaranteeing the rights of disabled people. Though each of the laws have been amended to various degrees since their initial implementation, there is still a great deal of room for improvement. Among the primary differences between the two pieces of legislation is the extensive structure and scope of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) relative to that of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA). Among the primary pitfalls of the ADA is its seemingly vague and relatively undefined language as well as several loopholes resulting from such poor construction (Stowe, 2000). For the DDA it is the exceptionally narrow scope which defines the vulnerability of the legislation. Because though the DDA is modeled to a degree on the ADA the five additional years of practical implementation of the legislation may prove probative in the further amendment and correction of the DDA.

Methodology

Both of the acts studied for this paper are part of the public record. Access to the acts in their entirety is available via governmental organizations as well as not for profit non-governmental interest groups working specifically for the rights of the disabled. A careful analysis of the acts themselves, court decisions, and scholarly works on the topic of the acts and their implementation provided the basis for the comparisons and conclusions drawn herein.

Literature Review:

Overview of the Subject Matter

With the Civil rights movement, which culminated in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, came an increased awareness of individual rights to protection from discrimination. The Americans with Disabilities Act passed by congress in 1990 is a civil rights law which protects the rights of those individual who are classified as legally disabled. This definition of disability includes a physical or mental impairment which significantly limits a major life activity (Stowe, 2000). This definition though has been amended overtime to correct for conditions which are within the power of an individual to correct such as poor eye sight immediately correctible using lenses as well as current substance abuse (Schwochau & Blanck, n.d.). It has also been amended to include formerly unclassified learning disabilities such as dyslexia. The definition of disability is necessarily broad, sighting the limiting of major life activity as the primary criteria for inclusion. The implications for an act protecting individuals against such discriminations are system wide throughout law, commerce, and entertainment. To enforce such a code requires the development of discrete sets of criteria which can be enforced locally, as well as nationally in the context of both public and private entities (DeLeire, 2000). In order to best serve the auspices of such an act, the language would need to include specifications regarding policy, practice, and physical space when applicable.

The act, composed primarily of five title sections; employment, public entities, public accommodations, telecommunications, and miscellaneous provisions. Each of these titles represents a specific functional area of the legislation which has been developed to ensure the most complete and effective protection for minority populations. Of particular interest in the context of this paper is the third title so called public accommodations.

Title III

Title three of the ADA is a complicated code to enforce. The ambiguous language present even in the name indicates that, while this area of legislation is necessary, perhaps an effective implementation strategy is still yet to be developed (Stowe, 2000). Title 3 specifically guarantees that no individual may be discriminated against on the basis of disability with regards to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, or accommodation of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns leases or operates a place of public accommodation (Stowe, 2000). Though the fact that construction on such sites after the successful passing of the ADA would have to comply with the code is expected, provisions within the legislation account for existing structures and the necessary renovation of those structures in order to comply, within reason. The specific definition of a place of accommodation includes; places of lodging, recreation, transportation, education, and dinning. Implicit within that listing are stores, care providers, and places of public display (Stowe, 2000).

Language of the act

One of the most significant problems facing the ADA is the ambiguous nature of the language. Though to a degree the ambiguity is necessary as to be specific, risks leaving part of the target population unprotected, the resulting disputes over what specifically "public accommodation" includes have been the cause of nearly all of the court decisions involving this title since its enactment.

The leading question remains whether or not a public place of accommodation is defined as a physical structure. Though the legislation provides numerous examples of "places of public accommodation," there is no specific definition of the term. Thusly, judges must decide based on terminology which currently has no existing definition (Stowe, 2000). It is within the purview of specific courts to determine the specific scope of the term. This ambiguity has lead to a number of significant precedents being set on either side of the issue. Further, the relative necessity of a physical location is disputed. With the advent and exponential growth of technology and the internet it has become legally relevant to determine whether or not a company's website or phone service is designed in compliance with the ADA (Grabois, Nosek, & Rossi, 2005).

Whether or not an individual or individuals may bring suit regarding websites was tried in California federal court in 2006 when the National Federation of the Blind brought suit against Target citing that because their website was not readily or fully accessible to the blind, they were n violation of Title 3 of the ADA (Stowe, 2000). Though the case was ultimately settled for more than $9million, Judge Patel stated that the case was precedent setting in that it broke ground in terms of developing limitations of the term "public accommodation."

Preeminent also in the debate is whether Title 3 includes organizations not specifically tied to a physical place as well as goods such as insurance policies which can be considered in the "Goods and services" part of the legislation. It is held that the spirit of Title 3 was to free the disabled from the discrimination imposed by public places either in terms of physical access to their premises or access to their services. This "spirit" of the law has not been upheld in some precedent setting cases, however it has been the consensus among those cases tried that a wider definition of public accommodation and the goods and services accountable to the legislation there in is preferable than a narrower one (Stowe, 2000).

The ADA was amended in 2008 by George W. Bush. The amendments were signed into effect as of the first of January 2009. The most notable change resulting from this amendment is the broadening of the definition of disability. Previous to this amendment, there was a heavy burden of proof on the plaintiff to prove their disability. This burden of proof was pervasive present in not only businesses and recreational centers but in education as well. In cases such as those brought against Boston University, students who claimed disabilities were deemed ineligible unless they had documented proof of said disability (Stowe, 2000). Two landmark cases, Sutton v. United Airlines and Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams in which the plaintiffs cases were dismissed as being unable to prove grounds for ADA violation.

In the case of Sutton v. United Airlines, the plaintiffs' twin women who applied for jobs as airline pilots were denied the position as a result of their poor eyesight. They filed because with simple corrective surgery there eye sight would be such that they were able to meet the minimum requirements for flying. Because the women suffered a disability which was able to be corrected the courts dismissed the case stating that they could not be considered disabled. However, it was this disability which ultimately resulted in their denial of consideration for the job.

In the case of Toyota Motor Manufacturing KY Inc. v. Williams, is a case regarding specifically the responsibility of an employer to make adjustments to their facilities to accommodate disabled employees. The plaintiff Miss Williams was diagnosed with Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, a chronic disorder which requires special wrist supports in order to prevent further injury as well as the discomfort of continually repeating the stress which resulted in the injury initially. Miss William's employer, Toyota Motor Mfg did not provide her with the necessary equipment in order to facilitate her continued safe and healthy employment despite her injury. The case was dismissed as a result of a decision that regarded Carpal Tunnel as an injury which did not ultimately constitute a disability as it was deemed in the original decision that it did not substantially limit one or more of Miss William's life activities. (Schall, 1998)

In addition to a lightened burden of proof and broader definition there were two additional changes resulting from the amendment which served to positively affect the impact and ultimate effectiveness of the legislation. This amendment clarified the fact that judges are not allowed to assess possible mitigating factors such as medication, corrective surgery, or specialized equipment in the determination of whether or not an individual is disabled. This change is directly related to the Sutton case. Further the amendments clarified the definition of major life activities. This amendment relates directly to the Williams case in which a judge deemed that Carpal Tunnel wasn't in fact a significant impairment to major life activities, it merely precluded her from successfully completing specific tasks in the work place. Though the language of the Act is still quite ambiguous, these changes help to clarify and protect the intention of the act.

Exceptions

In the context of Title 3 there are two notable exceptions to the physical alteration mandate (Stowe, 2000). Historical buildings such as are reported on the national register of historic buildings and landmarks may abstain from changes to their structure or facade which would in some way be detrimental to the historical value or integrity of the structure. Such places whose architecture is of specific historical relevance may site that protected status as a reason for not complying with Title 3 guidelines.

The second exception to the physical code of the Title is if the necessary amendments are outside the financial possibility of a business. Extensive renovation and redesign of in progress building projects can be extremely costly. It is not the intention of the Congress of the United States to impose financial burdens upon businesses which would ultimately drive those businesses to financial ruin (Stowe, 2000). Necessarily a large fortune five hundred corporation would be able to afford necessary remodeling where a smaller local business might not. If through presentation of complete financial records, and projected costs of renovation it can be observed that it is outside a company's financial means to adhere to the statute then they will be permitted to make only those changes they are able to reasonably afford without fear of prosecution.

There is another exception which is of note in the context of "goods and services." The purposes of Title 3 are to protect disabled individuals from discrimination or less favorable treatment as a result of their disability. In terms of businesses who provide services though it is much more difficult to determine what their due diligence is in terms of ensuring that the individuals partaking of that service are not being treated unfairly or excluded from that service. In the context of insurance providers, and lending organizations this becomes very difficult and very ambiguous legal procedure. If a lending organization enters into a mortgage or loan agreement with an individual who is disabled, it is unclear where the responsibilities lie in ensuring that the individual was fully aware of the terms and conditions of the agreement, and that the proposed borrower would be able to meet those obligations. Though this particular aspect of the Title is still determined on a case by case basis, in an effort to avoid class action lawsuits against corporate health care providers, and businesses who engage in commerce directly with other businesses and not individuals a specific exemption was put in place to ensure that only businesses dealing directly with individuals were potentially liable for non- compliance with Title 3 codes.

Insurance

Of all the cases heard in the context of the ADA, the most common complaint is in terms of insurance (Schwochau & Blanck, n.d.). Health insurance particularly is a hotly debated area of the legislation in that it is currently unclear how specifically the Title is intended in terms of acquiring insurance and determining the coverage amount for specific medical conditions and procedures. The United States penal system endeavors not to intervene in the running of independent businesses unless there has been a gross violation of civil rights or criminal activity. In determining though whether or not a health insurance provider refusing coverage to an individual with a known disability constitutes a proprietary right of the company, or a violation of Title 3 there is no clear answer and as such cases are adjudicated on an individual basis.

The insurance issue is far more complex though than simply the decision to insure or not to insure. Health care providers also determine the maximum amount of financial coverage for given treatments and even diseases. In the everyday running of business insurance companies make determinations based on the projected price of treatment for different illnesses and injuries. The companies must make objective determinations based on primarily financial reasons to either increase or decrease the amount of care they are willing to cover (Schwochau & Blanck, n.d.).

Another hotly contested topic is the amount of money available for diseases like aids and disorders such as schizophrenia which poses interesting paradoxes for insurers and policy holders alike (Grabois, 2005). While AIDS is not strictly a disability it can be debilitating without appropriate medical care. If an insurance company limits the amount of coverage available for an AIDS patient, then effectively that patient will become disabled and be unable to participate in normative daily activity. Schizophrenia also requires lifelong intensive care, if an individual is not treated consistently and properly they become a risk to not only themselves but those around them. These treatments though are quite expensive, for an insurance company to fully cover all treatments for all patients would drive insurance premium rates up making it impossible for the majority of citizens to purchase health care. A clear and definitive line has yet to be established regarding the difference between discrimination and good business practice (Schwochau & Blanck, n.d.). While insurance companies have responsibilities to their policy holders, they also have responsibilities to their share holders as well. Finally in the context of insurance and Title 3, is the issue of disparate coverage for mental and physical disability. It is not uncommon for insurance companies to provide different coverage for mental health care and physical health care. Further it is not uncommon for the coverage of mental health care to be less than that of physical health care. It can be argued though, that for those individuals in need of extensive mental health care coverage, this is a discriminatory practice (Grabois, 2005).

While it has been determined that insurance itself is within the scope of Title 3 as it is a service provided by a place of public accommodation, the content of those policies is not necessarily within the scope of the legislation. Though initially paradoxical, upon closer analysis of the legislation, there is no mention made of the specific characteristics of the specific services to which individuals with disabilities must be granted legal access. As in the case of employment, it is wholly reasonable for an insurance provider to set standards of health and maximum expenditures of care expenses which will ultimately deny some individuals of necessary care . (Grabois, 2005) the legislation indicates that the disabled must have access, to legally enforce a policy in which they must also be given more coverage than any other non- disabled individual would be reverse discrimination and equally unjust. It is possible as evidenced by a recent Seventh Circuit Court ruling that it is possible to have both a broad definition of "place of public accommodation" and a legal position which indicates that the content of an insurance policy not come under the auspices of Title 3 legislation. There are many ways of interpreting the jurisprudence of insurance, policy content and Title 3 compliance. This as yet undefined area of legislation remains a legal quagmire which will not be resolved until the ambiguity is removed from the language of the Act.

Precedent Setting Cases

In 1994 Carparts Distribution Center v. Automotive Wholesalers Association (AWANE) first tackled the insurance in the context of coverage dilemma. The plaintiff was an insurance policy holder who had been diagnosed with HIV then AIDS. Following the formal diagnosis of the policy holder, he attempted to reimburse a number of medical bills through his policy and was turned down as a result of the insurer changing the amount of coverage available for AIDS treatment. Consequently the plaintiff sued Automotive Wholesalers Association citing not only the ex post facto alteration of coverage which was reduced to $25,000.00 and the vast disparity between that amount available for AIDS treatment and the $1million per policy coverage available for non-AIDS related treatments.

When this case came to trial, no one had defined the scope of "place of public accommodation" in the context of the specific coverage of an insurance policy. The ultimate decision of the case, were it not overturned later, would set a precedent for the future adjudication of similar cases in the future. The judge had to decide whether or not an intangible service provided by a company which the plaintiff had never physically been to could be considered a place of public accommodation.

In the original decision, the judge chose a narrow definition of the term place of public accommodation citing that as the plaintiff was not being discriminated against or prevented from entering a physical structure for the purpose of participating in activities therein, that AWANE was not a place of public accommodation and as such the insurance claim was not subject to the legislation of Title 3. This decision did not stand though, the plaintiff appealed to the court of appeals which overturned the decision. Though the appeals court did not specify that the content of insurance policies were subject to Title 3 compliance regulations, it did indicate that the functional definition of "place of public accommodation" upon which the adjudication was based was prohibitively narrow (Stowe, 2000).

The overturning of the first ruling and the legal decision that a wider scope was appropriate in representing the stated purpose of the legislation set the tone definitively for future cases in that to limit Title 3 to the services available only to an individual who physically enters a building for the purposes of utilizing services or purchasing goods there in, while an individual using those same services or purchasing those same goods remotely was not covered by the legislation was absurd. It was this decision in part upon which Judge Patel based his decision in the National Federation of the Deaf v. Target case.

Another important case in the context of the adjudication of Title 3 is the Parker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company which took place in 1997. This case dealt specifically with the disparate coverage policies for physical and mental health within insurance policies. This case is different from the previous in that it is not dealing specifically with the content of insurance policies in general, but rather the fairly common practice of allocating more coverage for physical medical needs than for psychological medical needs (Stowe, 2000). Also it addresses the culpability of uninvolved third parties insurance for the decisions made by employers who purchase specific policies for their employees.

In this case, the plaintiff had been issued a policy by her employer which provided full physical medical coverage up to age 65; however it only provided 24 months of mental health coverage. The plaintiff, diagnosed with severe depression, sued upon the cessation of her coverage after a period of two years. Were this the case of an individual purchasing a policy directly then it would be in clear violation of the ADA, however this is not such a case. Parker was given the policy as part of the benefits package provided to all employees.

This is an example of the practical application of one of the exemptions built into the legislature (Stowe, 2000). The insurance company in this case is protected because they did not sell the policy specifically to the plaintiff. Had the insurance company sold that particular policy to that customer with knowledge of her psychological disorder, then they would have been in violation of Title 3. However, the insurance company who merely provided the coverage to her employer for all of the individuals in his employ was not aware of Miss Parker's psychological disorder and as such cannot be held accountable for any discrimination which results from the acquisition of their policy via a third party purchaser (Stowe, 2000).

The 6th circuit court determined in favor of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company citing their status as a wholesale establishment. A wholesale establishment is a business which sells directly to other businesses. They have no direct contact with the individuals who may ultimately be given access to their services and are thus not accountable for the misuse or misapplication of those products if they have in good faith fully explained the parameters and appropriate uses of said service.

This protection is a necessary addition to the legislation in that it prevents the allocation of blame to genuinely uninvolved third parties. The individual culpable for the misallocation of the policy was the employer if he was aware of Miss Parker's medical condition.

Membership Organization Disputes

Under the purview of Title 3 is the legislation governing goods and services in the context of place of public accommodation (Stowe, 2000). The application of this legislation to organizations not strictly tied to a single specific place is possibly one of the most difficult areas of interpretation. The primary issue is determining whether an entity such as a sports organization or competition can itself be considered a place of public accommodation, or the facility in which it is operating can be considered a place of public accommodation.

One of the most frequently litigious such organizations is the NCAA. By definition the NCAA is a collegiate athletic association. Though collegiate athletics do not seek to discriminate the regulations implicit in the performance of various sports precludes individuals with certain disabilities from participation for their own protection, for the protection of other players, and for the promotion of the highest athletic standards of the game. It would contravene the obligations of the NCAA to its members to drastically alter the rules of play or the requirements for eligibility to include all disabilities (Stowe, 2000). That is not to say that the NCAA does not welcome disabled athletes who are eligible for participation according to the openly available criteria based solely on the safety of participants, rather that as an independent organization the NCAA must fulfill its obligation to all parties.

One such example of a case where an organization was sued in the context of a Title 3 violation was the 1995 Tenet ParaAmerica Bicycle Challenge. The plaintiff Mr. Brown, brought suit when he was barred entry to the event for refusing to wear a helmet while operating a special tricycle. Ultimately the courts have held that in the instances of iindependent organizations and competitions unless the organization is preventing the individual from having access to a physical facility the claim does not have bearing in terms of a Title 3 dispute.

This ruling in Brown v. Tenet ParaAmerica Bicycle Challenge is not uncontested by contradictory decisions in other similar cases. In the Shultz v. Hemet Youth Pony League the plaintiff brought suit as a result of a player with cerebral palsy being disallowed to play in a lower age bracket. The ruling in this case was notable because it stated that a member organization can be considered a place of public accommodation regardless of its connection to a physical structure or location. This ruling put into question the standing of previous rulings regarding organizations such as the NCAA exempt from Title 3 litigation in regards to the rules governing eligibility. In this ruling, member organizations ranging from small youth baseball leagues to large national athletic organizations and even independent competitions such as bike races could be considered in a broad definition of the term places of public accommodation and as such they are liable for non- compliance with Title 3 (Stowe, 2000). This like so many other specific issues facing the ADA and those individuals attempting to enforce it all stem from the base of ambiguous language. A problem which also beset the earlier 1964 Civil Rights Act which is in large part what the ADA is based on.

Connection to the Civil Rights Act 1964

Title 2 of the civil rights act is the statue of that legislation most closely relevant to Title 3 of the ADA. Title 2 discussed in essence the rights guaranteed all individuals specifically equitable treatment in and access to places of public accommodation. Also under Title 2, member organizations such as those discussed above could be considered places of public accommodation given their connection to a physical location. This relatively narrow definition of places of public accommodation influenced heavily court decisions in which the term places of public accommodation was disputed in Title 3 cases (Stowe, 2000).

In the case, Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America was based on the premise that the Boy Scouts of America organization was violating the plaintiff's civil rights by denying him entry to the organization unless he professed belief in a supreme being. This case took place in 1992, ironically occurred before many of the precedent setting cases for Title 3 had occurred. The courts ruled that because the Boy Scouts of America organization lacked a close connection to physical facilities it could not be considered a place of public accommodation and was thus entitled to the exemptions of private organizations. Because this decision was ruled on an earlier statute, judges in subsequent decisions relied on this decision as support for their narrow definition of the term "place of public accommodation." Effectively, a cursory and inaccurate analysis of Title 3 was the grounding of a decision for a Title 2 case for the Civil Rights Act. In retrospect, it is likely that had this case occurred after the literally hundreds of pages of published analyses which resulted from Title 3 cases specifically in terms of the scope of defining place of public accommodation.

One decision which occurred after the Welsh case which may have resulted in a different judgment was the Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company. This ground breaking court case ultimately ruled that electronic space as well as physical space were covered under the statute of Title 3 (DeLeire, 2000). This is an important decision in that it stipulated that place of public accommodation was not necessarily dependent on a physical location. This is also different in that no case previous to this one had actually asserted a definition of place including theoretical places such as the internet or phone being included in the context of the legal definition of place. The inclusion of these unorthodox characteristics of place has gone a long way in opening the forum for discussion on a definitive inclusive definition of place of public accommodation as opposed to previously held narrow definitions (DeLeire, 2000).

Pitfalls in Practical Application

One of the practical drawbacks of ambiguous language is that individual citizens are often unable to discern in what specific ways the new legislation does or does not relate to them. In a study conducted to determine the degree of compliance in doctors offices, the majority of those physicians who responded and actively saw patients with disabilities had little idea whether or not their practice qualified as someplace which was covered in the act (Grabois 2005). Beyond that, the nature of the act and the frenzy of related civil suits resulting from it caused a number of physicians to refer disabled clients to other offices.

One of the most common responses to the questionnaire was an overall sense of not wanting to change overtly the existing policies and practices which were proving useful (Schwochau, et al., n.d.), (DeLeire, 2000). Physicians were more likely to attempt to add extra pamphlets or audio materials and have office staff assist patients in any way possible than they were to redo their office intake procedure. This indicated an underlying problem not only with the statute but also with society's understanding of the inherent discrimination in their unwillingness to make concessions for individuals in genuine need of assistance. Another observation was that the various requirements for compliance especially those regarding the retrofitting of existing structures were met with an unwillingness to expend the money and the effort to make such changes preferring instead to develop restrictive interview and assessment forms which would ultimately serve to eliminate those with disabilities from their perspective patient pool.

Though there was a great deal of negative feedback regarding the required adjustments resulting from the ADA, there was also a positive feedback. Several of the physicians reported that they had even gone as far as installing elevators in the buildings where there offices were located as well as remodeling the interior of their offices in an effort to make patients as comfortable as those patients without disabilities (Grabois 2005). Ultimately as the definitions of the terminology as well as the rise in accountability for non- compliance become more regular and commonplace it is likely that this act though flawed will result in the more equitable treatment of those formerly marginalized members of society as well as a sense of accountability for those individuals unwilling to make even the minimal adjustments necessary for the equitable treatment of all people.

Disability Discrimination Act 1995

The disability discrimination act is a piece of legislation passed by parliament in 1995. This act though based in part on the ADA is far less comprehensive than its American counterpart. Rather than specifying distinct and discrete areas of legal distinction as ADA the DDA combines all of those parts into one umbrella statute. One of the most notable distinctions between the DDA and the ADA is the approach with which the DDA tackles the concept of disability. The ADA is focused on disability primarily as a static concept looking at if from a legal and financial perspective. The DDA though is based on a sociological understanding of disability and the relative benefit of community support systems in the development of successful aid programs and equitable living standards.

The DDA not only places an obligation to the disabled on employers it also works on service providers. This inclusion of service workers ensures that especially those disabled individuals dependent on welfare and social security were treated equitably and not denied those necessary services as a result of their disability. The regulations regarding service workers was introduced in three stages. Spanning eight years the stages encompassed initially the basic right to equitable treatment, then the requirements for service providers to make reasonable adjustments to their services in order to accommodate disabled persons, and finally was the physically adjusting their facilities in order to make their services as well as their facilities more accessible to the disabled.

Additional amendments to the DDA include a plethora of legislation regarding more specific aspects of the subjective experience of life in the UK for a disabled individual. Some of the amendments include legislation regarding special educational needs as well as rules regarding the collection of passengers by private hire cars. The continual update and amendment of the initial act indicates a continuing commitment to the goals and commitments to change which instigated the enacting of such legislation. Though there is undoubtedly a great deal of legal and political commitment to ensuring the equitable and treatment of disabled members of the population, a similar sense is not apparently shared by members of the general public.

As was seen with the physician responses to the ADA, there has been a negative response to the DDA. The impending threat of potential legal troubles as well as a lack of awareness regarding the context and implications of the statute has resulted quite possibly in a decrease specifically in the employment of disabled individuals. Employers are wary of statutes like those in the United States where companies could be held libel for a great deal of money as a result of non- compliance. Part of the concern regarding this legislation in particular is the amount of legal power disabled people wield relative to the power of other individuals who are not disabled. A tenant for instance who neglects to pay their rent for a period of sufficient length so as to provide the landlord with sufficient grounds for possession, the tenant would be able to file an injunction preventing the landlord from doing so if the problem was the result of their disability.

These increased number and nature of protections were concerning to judges in their potential for misuse however, in successive acts of parliament they have not been weakened or removed. These protections were put in place primarily for the purposes of allowing the mentally disabled to keep their homes. Also as part of this act are increased provisions for governmental aid for the disabled. In the ADA, though equity was stressed, as was the need for disabled people to be able to have access to goods and services without impediment, in the DDA increased social awareness, programs, and protection was developed for the disabled. These community-based programs would be instrumental in integrating the disabled more successfully and productively into mainstream society.

Previous civil rights legislation in the UK focused in the concepts of direct and indirect discrimination. The discrimination of the disabled is a topic too complex to be effectively resolved through an attempt to prevent such overtly negative actions. Direct discrimination is defined as that discrimination in which an individual or group of individuals is treated less favorably explicitly as a result of their race, color, nationality, national origin, or disability. Indirect discrimination occurs when there are rules or regulations in place which are inherently preventative of individuals working as a result of their race, color, nationality, national origin, or in this case their status as disabled. Though these two concepts are fairly apparent, and would be easy to isolate and eliminate, these two types of discrimination alone are not the only methods of discrimination against the disabled which were pervasive throughout society. Discrimination occurs when individuals with a disability are prevented from entering a building office or other venue, or are prevented from participating in an activity solely as a result of their disability and without just cause.