Organizational Accountability Review of Taiwan\'s Disaster Management Activities in Response to Typhoon Morakot

Organizational Accountability Review of Taiwan's Disaster Management Activities In Response To Typhoon Morakot

Taiwanese System of Government 174

Responsibility of Emergency Management in Taiwan 175

Disasters in Taiwan 175

Citizen Participation 189

Shafritz defines citizen participation as follows: 192

Public Managers, Citizen Participation, and Decision Making 192

The Importance of Citizen Participation 197

Models of Citizen Participation 199

Citizen Participation Dilemmas 205

Accountability 207

Definitions of Accountability 207

The Meaning of Accountability 208

The Functions of Accountability 213

Citizen Participation and Accountability 216

Accountability Overloads and Deficits 219

Assessing Accountability from Democratic, 224

Constitutional and Learning Perspectives 224

Emergency Management 229

Collaborative Management in Emergency Management 229

Stages of Emergency Management Policy and Citizen Participation Purposes 232

International Collaboration 235

Network in Emergency Management 236

Agranoff (2007) defines public networks as follows: 236

Trust in Emergency Management 237

Summary 238

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 239

Citizen Participation and Accountability 241

Citizen Participation 241

Citizen Participation and Accountability 244

Accountability for Finances 245

Accountability for Fairness 247

Accountability for Performance 248

Benchmarking in the Public and Nonprofit Sectors 250

The Theory of Benchmarking 250

Benchmarking for Improving Accountability 253

Summary 255

CHAPTER IV-METHODOLOGY 256

Introduction 257

Research Design 257

Population and Sample 262

Instrumentation 263

Construct Validity 264

Internal Validity 264

External Validity 265

Reliability 268

Data Collection Procedures 268

Statistical Analysis 269

Limitations of the Study 270

Summary 270

DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 271

Introduction 271

Reliability of the Survey Questionnaire 271

Characteristics of the Survey Respondents 279

Descriptive Analysis of the Survey Responses 283

Citizen Participation 283

Organizational Accountability 285

Correlation Among the Research Variables 291

Inferential Analysis of the Survey Responses 291

The Relationship between Demographics and Level of Citizen Participation 293

The Relationship between Demographics and Citizens' Perception of Governments' Accountability 299

The Relationship between Demographics and Citizens' Perception of Governments' Response 305

The Relationship between Level of Citizen Participation and Citizens' Perception of Governments' Accountability 310

The Relationship between Level of Citizen Participation and Citizens' Perception of Governments' Response 312

A Comparison between Citizens' Perception of the Taiwanese Central and Local Governments 313

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 318

Summary of the Findings 319

Research Question 1 320

Research Question 2 322

Research Question 3 323

Limitations of the Study 326

Implications of the Study 326

Recommendations for the Taiwanese Governments 328

Recommendations for Future Research 331

Contribution to Public Administration 331

Conclusions 334

References 335

Endnotes 359

Introduction

Shafritz defines emergency management as: [1: Shafritz, J.M. (2004). The dictionary of public policy and administration. Cambridge, MA: Westview Press.]

Actions taken to prepare for, prevent, or lesson the effects of natural (such as floods and tornadoes) and human (terrorism) disasters. Since 2001, emergency management has taken on a new sense of urgency and has been given significant new resources with advent of the war and terrorism. (p. 101)

Haddow, Bullock, and Coppola indicate, "Emergency management is an essential role of government" (p. 2). Emergency management is a task that the whole world has to face. Natural disasters visit us unannounced from time to time, like the earthquake in Japan, Haiti, and Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans. Human disasters like 911 emerge now and then as well. How governments and public administrators deal with emergencies poses a challenge, and it takes coordination and collaboration from all sides concerned to make a peaceful transition from a chaotic situation back to normal life. [2: Haddow, G., Bullock, J., & Coppola, D. (2008). Introduction to emergency management (3rd ed.). Burlington, MA: Elsevier.]

Like the rest of the world, the country of Taiwan finds itself regularly facing natural disaster and the aftermath of these events. Chen, Wu, and Lai indicate, "In the past 60 years, natural disasters have killed more than 9,000 people and destroyed more than 541,000 buildings in Taiwan" (p. 633). These disasters also caused enormous economic losses. Therefore, emergency management is not only important to the Taiwanese government but also significant to the Taiwanese citizens. [3: Chen, L., Wu, J., & Lai, M. (2006). The evolution of the natural disaster management system in Taiwan. Journal of the Chinese Institute of Engineers, 29(4), 633-638.]

When disasters occur, local and central governments often evade their accountability. Keehley and Abercrombie define accountability as "the principle that individuals and organizations are responsible for their actions. When actions and decision appear questionable, the public has the right to ask that those behaviors be explained" (p. 162).Governments is expected to become more accountable to citizens (Barata, Cain, Routledge, & Wamukoya, 2002). McDavid and Hawthorn (2006) indicate, "Canadian and American governments at the federal, provincial (or state), and local levels are increasingly emphasizing the importance of accountability for program outcomes" (pp. 5-6). The degree to which citizens trust the public and nonprofit sectors carries significant consequences. More generally, a loss in governmental accountability often results in the replacements of elected officials and decreased public support for governmental projects. Likewise, a loss in accountability in the nonprofit sector results in development projects, which are more difficult to accomplish. Accountability and transparency are directly linked to perceptions of trust (Keehley & Abercrombie, 2008). Hrebiniak argues, "Without clear responsibility and accountability, execution programs will go nowhere. Knowing how to achieve this clarity is central to execution success" (p. 25).Keehley and Abercrombie state, "The general public has proven repeatedly that they are willing to support the public and nonprofit sectors with their money -- if they can count on those organizations to be accountable. Unfortunately, too often the public trust is damaged" (p. 161). [4: Keehley, P., & Abercrombie, N. (2008). Benchmarking in the public and nonprofit sectors: Best practices for achieving performance breakthroughs (2nd ed.). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.] [5: Hrebiniak, L.G. (2005). Making strategy work.Upper Saddle River: NJ: Wharton School.] [6: Keehley, P., & Abercrombie, N. (2008). Benchmarking in the public and nonprofit sectors: Best practices for achieving performance breakthroughs (2nd ed.). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.]

Consequently, the lack of accountability can be one of the reasons for a subsequent drop in public support for governments. If governments lose public support, it becomes increasingly difficult to implement governments' policies. Therefore, accountability is the primary focus of this study.

Citizens who have previously participated may also accept policies with which they disagree, because, according to Gamson, participation may create higher levels of trust. While research on participation as it correlates to levels of trust has been conflicting (Kweit & Kweit, 1981), recent research has connected a decline in citizen trust to a number of different policies that decrease the ability of citizens to participate in the public life of their communities (King & Stivers, 1998). Additionally, Putnam connects trust with public involvement. Focused specifically on disaster recovery, Berke, Kartez, and Wenger proposed a model of recovery based on the extent of a community's vertical integration -- which are the links between the community and other political, social, and economic factions outside the community -- and the extent of a community's horizontal integration -- the quality of relationships between social organizations within a community. The authors argue that while vertical integration alone can assist a community in expanding its capabilities by enabling it access to more resources, the community can use these resources to the fullest extent only if there is a sufficient amount of horizontal integration. Further, horizontal integration lends itself well to mobilizing citizens to participate in recovery efforts and decisions. [7: Gamson, W. (1968). Power and discontent. Homewood, IL: Dorsey.] [8: Putnam, R.D. (1993). Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.] [9: Berke, P.R., Kartez, J., & Wenger, D. (1993). Recovery after disaster: Achieving sustainable development, mitigation and equity. Disasters,17(2), 93-109.]

A perceived lack of accountability may cause a precipitous drop in public support for government. Without citizens' support, governments will find it very difficult to carry out emergency policies. Hence, citizen participation plays an important role between organizational accountability and emergency management.

The intent of this study was to investigate and explain the relationship between citizen participation and organizational accountability in Taiwanese central and local governments.

Background

Taiwanese System of Government

Taiwan is a multiparty democracy founded on the Taiwanese Constitution. Unlike the United States, citizens are subject to two levels of government: central and local government in Taiwan. The Taiwanese central government consists of the Office of the President and five Yuan: the Executive Yuan, the Legislative Yuan, the Judicial Yuan, the Examination Yuan, and the Control Yuan. The Taiwanese local government includes three levels of autonomous types: (a) special municipalities, (b) counties and provincial municipalities, and (c) county municipalities and townships.

Responsibility of Emergency Management in Taiwan

The Disaster Prevention and Protection Act were legislated in 2000 since the Chi-Chi earthquake in 1999. The Disaster Prevention and Protection Act consist of eight chapters and 52 articles. Although the Disaster Prevention and Protection Act has some rules for governments' disaster prevention, response, and recovery, there is no clear and definite responsibility for the Taiwanese central and local governments.

Disasters in Taiwan

Taiwan is a region rich in typhoons. During one regular summer, more than 12 typhoons can occur; and they can often cause disastrous effects. Ironically enough, the word "typhoon" means the deadly storm of Taiwan. The most recent typhoon in Taiwan, Morakot, is historically the most damaging.

The impacts of the typhoon are incommensurable in the short-term. In the Morakot Monsoon, there was a loss of over 600 lives and the loss of homes and of entire villages buried in the land or mudslides. Aside from the social aspect of the tragedy, the country faces the long-term economic impacts. The tourist industry, for example, is one of the most important generators of income to the state budget. The Morakot Monsoon caused losses of approximately $500 million (National Disaster Prevention and Protection Commission, 2009). These losses accounted for both destructions within the tourist industry as well as associated losses from the inability to offer tourist services as initially planned. According to Wang, [10: Wang, I., Chen, P., & Hwang, K. (2009). Melamine and nephrolithiasis in children in Taiwan. New England Journal of Medicine, 360(11), 1157.]

Morakot has led to losses worth some NT$670 million in the six national scenic areas in terms of income and facilities, not including damage worth some NT$137 million to 17 hotels, such as the 30-year-old Chinsuai Hotel in the Chihpen hot spring area of Taitung County, which collapsed early Sunday due to serious landslides. (p. 1)

In Taiwan, disasters are mainly caused by typhoons, earthquakes, floods, and diseases. If the Taiwanese government cannot respond in time, severe injuries and even deaths result as demonstrated by the following disasters. The Chi-Chi earthquake, which occurred on September 21, 1999, brought the most serious misfortune and property damage over the last nine decades. According to Yang, more than 2,000 people were dead or missing, more than 8,000 people were severely injured, and more than 10,000 buildings collapsed. Another disaster is the reported Severe Acute Respiration Syndrome (SARS) pandemic disease in 2003. Hsieh, Chen, and Hsu (2004) indicate that 81 people were dead by the infection of SARS in Taiwan. According to the National Fire Agency of Taiwan, there were 81 deaths due to floods, 1,049 deaths due to typhoons, and 2,429 deaths due to earthquakes from 1999 to 2009 in Taiwan. From the statistics, the public can easily understand that if the government cannot tackle the crisis appropriately, it will threaten the public's life and property. [11: Yang, Y. (2009). The 9/21 earthquake in Taiwan: A local government disaster rescue system. Disasters,34(1), 112-136.] [12: National Fire Agency of Taiwan. (2010). Retrieved from http://www.nfa.gov.tw / Show.aspx?MID=1024&UID=1029&PID=1024]

Problem Statement

Typhoons hit Taiwan in summer or fall every year. Although Taiwanese are familiar with typhoons, nonetheless Typhoon Morakot caused severe damage to the southern part of Taiwan on August 8, 2009. According to Figure 1, Typhoon Morakot caused the highest number of deaths since the Chi-Chi earthquake in 1999. According to the National Disaster Prevention and Protection Commission, Typhoon Morakot killed over 600 people, and the accumulated financial loss was about $500 million. Zhu (2009) reports the Taiwanese population was not only affected at a socioeconomic level by the actual typhoon, but was also emotionally setback due to the tardy and inefficient responses of the current Taiwanese administration. According to the Global Views Survey Research Center, 78.2% of Taiwanese considered that the current Taiwanese administration failed to deal with the disaster of Typhoon Morakot. From the perspectives of the citizens and the international community, the current Taiwanese administration greatly mismanaged this disaster. [13: National Disaster Prevention and Protection Commission. (2009). Retrieved from http://www.ndppc.nat.gov.tw/en/ContentDetail.aspx?MID=568&UID=568&CID=2577&PID=568] [14: Global Views Survey Research Center. (2010, September). Survey on President Ma Ying-Jeou's approval rating. Retrieved from http://www.gvm.com.tw/gvsrc/eng/index.asp ]

According to Asia News, the initial response of the authorities was delayed, and even as it emerged, the actions taken proved insufficient. The Taiwanese president delayed making a decision to send troops to disaster areas, and this delay may [15: Asia News. (2009). Billions allocated for reconstruction in wake of typhoon Morakot. Retrieved from http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=16097&size=A]

Figure 1-Taiwan's natural disaster necrology from 1999 to 2009.From National Fire Agency of Taiwan, 2010.

have been a primary cause of the loss of lives. The Taiwanese president originally ordered that 2,100 soldiers be deployed to the affected regions to conduct the rescue missions. Afterwards, the Taiwanese president reconsidered the decision and assigned about 43,000 soldiers to be in charge of rescue operations. Days after the disaster, the Taiwanese president visited the town of Xiaolin, entirely buried by a mudslide (in which over 500 people were killed). The Taiwanese president stated his commitment that the mudslide was not the result of the Typhoon Morakot but was the result of construction work started 5 years before. The construction project to which the Taiwanese president referred is called the Tsengwen Reservoir Water Diversion Project. According to Hsu and Ko, [16: Hsu, J., & Ko, S. (2009). Morakot: The aftermath: Ma media comments anger disaster zone survivors. Taipei Times. Retrieved from http://www.taipeitimes.com/News / taiwan/archives/2009/08/14/2003451124]

No, in this area, this is the first time [there was such heavy rain] in many areas. That is why [the victims] were not fully prepared. If they were, they should have been evacuated much earlier. Just because they stayed where they lived . . . But you see, they didn't realize how serious the disaster was,[the Taiwanese president] said. (p. 1)

Disaster zone survivors thought the current Taiwanese administration tried to evade its accountability.

While the Taiwanese president was visiting the town of Xiaolin, his defense minister handed in his resignation. Other resignations followed, but the Taiwanese premier argued that he would not be accepting any resignations, as the country was faced with more pressing situations, which required assistance, not resignations (TaiwanNews, 2009). The political crisis continued to intensify.

In the aftermath of the disaster, the Taiwanese president was criticized for not effectively responding and being unprepared for the Typhoon Morakot (Tsai, 2009). In addition, the central and the local governments were criticized for ineffectively communicating to each other and the public. Even the Taiwanese president and premier were criticized for delaying acceptance of foreign aid (Liew, 2009). According to Formosa News (2009),

CNN, the New York Times, and other international media have all reported claims of an ineffectual rescue effort carried out by [the current]Administration, along with a refusal of foreign aid, which became an international embarrassment drawing the ire of local legislators. (p. 1)

Although the Taiwanese president and premier claim the current government disaster response was rapid, they did not announce any resignations of senior government officials who failed to take responsibility for the unpreparedness in this disaster (Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, 2009).

In addition, the Control Yuan proposed corrective measures to the Executive Yuan for the following reasons: first was a lack of leadership -- on the part of political leaders at central government who failed to lead the response and recovery efforts. The leadership of the central and the local emergency management operations were also found lacking. Second was a lack of coordination -- with central and local emergency responders failing to work together and to effectively coordinate their actions? Third was the inconsistency of information -- during the response, there was no clear effort made to collect, analyze, and disseminate information among the various responders. The media became the first source of information. Fourth was the failure of communication -- between the elected and appointed officials involved in the response who failed to communicate with each other and failed to communicate effectively with the general public (Control Yuan, 2009).

The Taiwanese president publicly offered his apologies for the lack of adequate responsiveness in the management of the crisis, but his and his government's popularity continues to decrease. According to Figure 2, the Taiwanese president's approval rating was 22.9% and disapproval rating was 64.8% on August, 2009. In comparison with July, his approval rating fell 12.6 percentage points, and disapproval rating increased 12.5 percentage points; 36.9% of the polled had trust in the Taiwanese president, but 47.2% said distrust. Compared with July, the level of public trust in the Taiwanese president dropped 8.3 percentage points, while the level of distrust in the Taiwanese president soared 8.1 percentage points (Global Views Survey Research Center, 2009).

Figure 2-Survey on the Taiwanese president's approval rating, August 2009.From the Global Views Survey Research Center, 2009.

Singularly, the Taiwanese president's approval rating remained very low since August, 2009. Survey on the Taiwanese president's approval rating on September, 2010 is shown in Figure 3. The Taiwanese president's approval rating was 30.1% and disapproval rating was 55.6% on September, 2010. In comparison with August, 2009, his approval rating increased 7.2 percentage points and disapproval rating fell9.2 percentage points; 39.8% of the polled had trust in the Taiwanese president but 41.4% said distrust. Compared with August, 2009, the level of public trust in the Taiwanese president soared 2.9 percentage points while the level of distrust in the Taiwanese president dropped 5.8 percentage points (Global Views Survey Research Center, 2010).

Figure 3-Survey on the Taiwanese president's approval rating, September 2010.From the Global Views Survey Research Center, 2010.

The Taiwanese president's approval rating on October, 2008, August 2009, and January, 2010 are the three lowest approval ratings since June, 2008. It appears that the lack of accountability is the primary reason for the drop in the public approval rating for the current Taiwanese administration. Take the event of melamine-contaminated formula for example. According to Wang, Chen, and Hwang (2009), melamine-contaminated formula is a major factor for children's kidney stones. Taiwan's Department of Health changed the safety standard of melamine from 0 parts per million (ppm) to 2.5 ppm during that time. The current Taiwanese administration did not explain why the Taiwanese government followed China's standard on measuring melamine level (Lin & Mo, 2008). Hence, the Taiwanese president's approval rating was very low during that time. The U.S. beef event is another example. The current Taiwanese administration announced that Taiwan would import the U.S. beef products that were under 30 months of age without citizen consensus. Taiwanese citizens were angry with the current Taiwanese administration, and as a result, the Legislative Yuan legislated a partial ban on U.S. beef (Chuang, 2009). Therefore, the Taiwanese president's approval rating was extremely low on January, 2010.

The most apparent example is Typhoon Morakot. As over 500 died in Xiaolin village, the Taiwanese president complained it rained too much and disaster victims were responsible for their own lack of preparation and reluctance to evacuate Miaolin village quickly when he spoke in an international press conference (Hsu & KO, 2009). According to Formosa News, [17: Formosa News. (2009). Foreign media report President Ma Ying-Jeou blaming victims of typhoon Morakot. Retrieved from http://englishnews.ftv.com.tw/read.aspx?sno =543A780619700F7D369882E68544B497]

On Friday, DPP legislators held up a telegram sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that "politely refused" all offers of material aid and the sending of rescue teams put forward by foreign governments and non-governmental agencies. This exposed the lie told by the government one day earlier that it had not refused aid from abroad. (p. 1)

Formosa News (2009) reports, "Opposition legislators emphasized that they do not believe that the Foreign Ministry would have refused all foreign assistance except for monetary donations without first gaining authorization from above and that Friday's denials from the president and premier are largely meaningless" (p. 1). Liew indicates: [18: Liew, E. (2009). Is Typhoon Morakot Taiwan's Katrina? Retrieved from http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?ots591 =4888CAA0-B3DB-1461-98B9-E20E7B9C13D4&lng=en&id=105707]

There is more than enough blame to go around the bureaucratic circles. Taiwanese officials, media, and the public are criticizing the President for delaying acceptance of foreign aid. Many countries had stepped forward to offer man-power, rescue equipment, and sanitation supplies but all were politely declined -- except for China.(p. 1)

However, the Taiwanese president said that he was unaware that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) had ordered its foreign field officers to refuse international aid offers (Lie, 2009). According to TVBS Poll Center (2009), 62% of citizens disbelieved the Taiwanese president was unaware that MOFA had refused international aid offers. Therefore, the Taiwanese president's approval rating was radically low on August, 2009.

On the whole, the current Taiwanese administration used a top-down approach for their decision making. The current Taiwanese administration operates with a lack of explanation or justification for their public policy. Keehley and Abercrombie emphasize: [19: Keehley, P., & Abercrombie, N. (2008). Benchmarking in the public and nonprofit sectors: Best practices for achieving performance breakthroughs (2nd ed.). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.]

It is imperative that members of local, national, and local communities hold public and nonprofit executives accountable for their actions in managing their organizations. Why? Because everyone's personal and financial circumstances and physical security may be directly linked to the ability to hold officials accountable for their decisions. (p. 162)

Pertinent to this claim, the lack of accountability at the Typhoon Morakot disaster is a key reason for the drop in the public approval rating for the current Taiwanese government. Also, disaster victims of Typhoon Morakot question the Taiwanese government's unresponsiveness in emergency management policy. In addition, citizens are dissatisfied with the Taiwanese government's performance in emergency management. Therefore, accountability deficits are said to be a key cause of the low explanation, justification, and responsiveness of the current Taiwanese administration.

Purpose of the Study

This study had three principal purposes. The first purpose of this study was to investigate the influence of demographics and the impact of citizen participation in the Taiwanese central and local governments' accountability in emergency management operations of Typhoon Morakot. Benchmarking is an important public management tool for government and nonprofit managers to make their organizations more effective, efficient, and responsive to their constituencies over the past two decades (Helden & Tillema, 2005; Keehley & Abercrombie, 2008; Magd & Curry, 2003; Wynn-Williams, 2005). Therefore, this researcher used Keehley and Abercrombie's benchmarking worksheet as a model to evaluate the level of organizational accountability in the Taiwanese central and local governments. [20: Keehley, P., & Abercrombie, N. (2008). Benchmarking in the public and nonprofit sectors: Best practices for achieving performance breakthroughs (2nd ed.). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.]

The second purpose of this study was to measure citizens' perceptions of the governments' responsiveness in emergency management operations of Typhoon Morakot. Schachter suggests that if people were taught to perceive themselves as true owners of the government, efforts to improve government efficiency and responsiveness might be more successful. Shafritz (2004) argues, "Presumably, the greater level of citizen participation in a program, the more responsive the program will be to the needs of the community and the more responsive the community will be to the needs of the program" (p. 48). To meet the second purpose, citizens' perceptions of the governments' responsiveness in emergency management operations of Typhoon Morakot were surveyed in this study. [21: Schachter, H.L. (1997). Reinventing government or reinventing ourselves: The role of citizen owners in making a better government. Albany, NY: SUNY.]

The third purpose of this study was to examine whether citizens perceive governments' accountability and responsiveness in a different way. To meet the third purpose, the survey questionnaire for citizens' perceptions of the governments' accountability and responsiveness in emergency management operations of Typhoon Morakot were examined in both the central and local governments.

Research Questions

In accordance with the purpose of the study, this study primarily explored the following questions:

1. To what degree do demographics and the level of citizen participation influence organizational accountability factors as perceived by the citizens?

2. How do citizens perceive the responsiveness in the Taiwanese government's response to the Typhoon Morakot emergency?

3. What difference of citizens' perception, if any, exists between the Taiwanese central government as compared to the Taiwanese local government?

Significance of the Study

Scholars have generally ignored organizational accountability in emergency management. Nowadays, issues of accountability are the essentials of governance, and accountability is a hallmark of good governance both in the public and private sectors (Behn, 2001; Bovens, 2005; Callahan, 2007; Gaventa, 2002). Levine, Peters, and Thompson indicate, "A classic problem in public administration is how to hold implementing agents accountable for their actions, either to elected officials or to the general public" (p. 76). In the political realm, accountability is the requirement for representatives to answer to the represented on the disposal of their powers and duties, act upon criticisms or requirements made of them, and accept responsibility for failure, incompetence, or deceit (Rainey, 2003). This study provides an understanding of organizational accountability in central and local governments from citizens' perspectives. [22: Levine, C., Peters, B., & Thompson, F. (1990). Public administration: Challenges, choices, consequences. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Company.]

The results of this study will disclose the different factors of citizens' satisfaction or dissatisfaction with disaster management. Such an understanding is very important because citizen participation creates a sense of ownership over the issue. This sense of ownership tends to muffle later political conflicts and increase satisfaction with eventual political outcomes (Berke&Beatley, 1997; Berke et al., 1993).

This study is important because it can also help to pave the way for establishing disaster management organizations that will transfer to the construction of responsive government, to clarify the important components of organizational accountability, and to strengthen the applicability of organizational accountability in a responsive government.

Most importantly, this study investigates the relationship between citizen participation and organizational accountability in central and local governments. This study is important because it bridges the information gap between governments and citizens (Cornwall & Gaventa, 2001), potentially resulting in improved government performance and accountability through citizen participation (Callahan, 2007; Gaventa, 2002; Gibson, Lacy, & Dougherty, 2005).

Definitions of Terms

Definitions of the following terms are based on the literature review of this study.

Accountability. Keehleyand Abercrombie defines accountability as follows: "Accountability is the principle that individuals and organizations are responsible for their actions, when actions and decision appear questionable, the public has the right to ask that those behaviors be explained" (p. 162). [23: Keehley, P., & Abercrombie, N. (2008). Benchmarking in the public and nonprofit sectors: Best practices for achieving performance breakthroughs (2nd ed.). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.]

Benchmarking. According to Magd and Curry, benchmarking is a vital management tool in order to accomplish best-value services in the public sectors. Benchmarking is an important public management tool for government and nonprofit managers to make their organizations more effective, efficient, and responsive to their constituencies over the past two decades (Helden&Tillema, 2005; Keehley & Abercrombie, 2008; Magd & Curry, 2003; Wynn-Williams, 2005). [24: Magd, H., & Curry, A. (2003). Benchmarking: Achieving best value in public-sector organisations, Benchmarking, 10(3), 261-286.]

Citizen participation. Shafritz defines citizen participation as follows: [25: Shafritz, J.M. (2004). The dictionary of public policy and administration. Cambridge, MA: Westview Press.]

Empowering individuals or groups with bargaining power to represent their own interests and to plan and implement their own programs with a view toward social, economic, and political power and control. Some government programs have enabling legislation specifically requiring that citizens affected by the programs be involved in its administrative decisions. Presumably, it is found that the great level of citizen participation in a program; the more responsive the community will be to the needs of the program. (p. 48)

Decision making. Shafritz (2004) defines decision making as "the process of selecting the most desirable course of action from among alternatives. In a larger sense, decision making is the total process by which manager's act to achieve organizational goals" (p. 85).

Emergency management. Shafritz defines emergency management as follows: [26: Shafritz, J.M. (2004). The dictionary of public policy and administration. Cambridge, MA: Westview Press.]

Actions taken to prepare for, prevent, or lesson the effects of natural (such as floods and tornadoes) and human (terrorism) disasters. Since 2001, emergency management has taken on a new sense of urgency and has been given significant new resources with advent of the war and terrorism. (p. 101)