Historical Origins of Modern Ethnic Conflicts in Burma and Malaysia

Ethnic Conflict in Southeast Asia: What Beginnings?

Despite the insistence of some academics, usually ones with limited historical background, that ethnic conflicts are only a result of white, Western influences in all pockets of the world, there appear to be in all places and at all times ethnic conflicts of varying intensity, with the West in the rearguard of such conflicts and not in the vanguard. The case seems especially apparent in Southeast Asia, where the modern world took form under a series of peasant uprisings -- usually, yes, directed against their colonial overlords, Westerners -- which despite being of "many different kinds" were "all…agrarian" and "took place in rural areas among persons engaged in agricultural occupations of a traditional kind."

These uprisings, which were closer to general discontent regarding misplaced and paternalistic welfare policies than to violent revolt, were the result of the visible economic inequities that were apparent between the more advanced Western cultures (the conquerors) and the less advanced Southeast Asian ones (the conquered), which in turn became religious and ethnic conflicts.

This should of course be no surprise: it is perhaps a general rule that ethnic conflicts, though stemming often from differences between the values, attitudes, beliefs, and opinions of different and competing civilizations, are underscored by large differences in the distribution of economic resources between the conflicting ethnic groups involved. Poor Southern whites were the perpetrators of many of the crimes against blacks in the Jim Crow South; poor Germans suffering under the yoke of extraordinarily high inflation and decades of future tribute to France and Britain attacked mostly wealthy Jews. Ethnic conflicts are more often than not sparked by competition for a very limited set of resources, with the losing side voicing its anger in violent behavior. Again, Southeast Asia is no different.

The economic discrepancies between the Westerners and the Southeast Asians can be seen most clearly in Dutch Indonesia, where the Dutch had long-since been exploiting Indonesia's natural resources when a change in policy in around 1870 attempted to put a new humanitarian light on it. This so-called "Ethical Policy" was in fact more or less the same policy, but it had humanitarian backing for its business motives.

Though the particulars of each rebellion were somewhat different, the Can Vuong movement, the Katipunan rebellion, and the Aceh War were all of a similar nature -- responses to economic differences between colonizers and colonized.

One way in which this economic discrepancy between conflicting ethnic groups in the same territory is often manifested is in the trend of the economic losers -- and the initial perpetrators of violence -- towards religious movements which both justify their actions and provide solace for having to endure economic hardship. Religion, because it relies on faith, tends to generate large bodies of followers in times of intense breakdowns of the economic and/or legal orders. These religions were somewhat different. While most stable religions in times of tranquility, or in times when they seek to keep tranquility are bound up in arguments over the role of fate and destiny, these religious movements -- for they were not lasting religions per se -- can be seen to have advocated the possibility of changes in the social order.

Again, think back to the Jim Crow South -- what mobilized poor, Southern whites more than the redemption embodied in the Southern Baptist movement? If it were said that in the case of many Southeast Asian uprisings "religion can be seen to have provided both a language for articulating discontent and the social forms for mobilizing adherents against their perceived enemies," then, in such circumstances we would be hard-pressed to disagree. Let me return to the example of Dutch Indonesia; though ethnic conflict was far less pronounced (and came much later) in its initial stages there than in other areas of Southeast Asia, the Islamic revival as a response to vast economic disparities between colonizing Christian Dutchmen and colonized Indonesians continues to have profound implications to the modern age.