The Apollo program and President John F Kennedy

John F. Kennedy and the Apollo Program

Among other things, the 1960's will probably be remembered most prominently for its culmination in the moon landing, successfully achieved by the United States of America. Often hidden from public view is the political intrigue and innuendo accompanying such large, prestigious projects. President John F. Kennedy, the American president at the time, played the main deciding role in the launch and success of the Apollo program. Interestingly, his interest was not so much focused on space exploration itself, but rather on the political ends to be gained from the success of such a publicly popular endeavor. While President Kennedy announced the goal of an American moon landing before the end of the decade on 25 May 1961, there was a large amount of uncertainty regarding the launch and sponsorship of the program. The final deciding factor, and the driving force behind the eventual success, was motivated by President Kennedy's political goals. According to Dick (Oct 22), only the Panama Canal compared with the Apollo program in size of a non-military endeavor.

Political Motivations

President John F. Kennedy was elected as president of the United States in 1960. As such, his focus was upon power structures and American/Soviet relations rather than romantic visions of conquering the last frontier of space (Dick, Oct 22). He therefore had little direct interest in the space program itself. What was mainly important for him was maintaining the balance of power and influence, especially as these relate to Russia.

When the Soviet Union however began to make significant non-military progress in space, this forced Kennedy to pay more attention to the space program in his own country. From the beginning, his interest was politically motivated, although the space program itself was built upon American pioneerism. For Kennedy, the space program became a competition, or the "space race," as it became known.

To prove that the United States was as capable as Russia in their space endeavors, Kennedy was obliged to commit government time and resources to NASA's civil space program. The Cold War therefore served as a basis from which NASA could expand its program to culminate in Project Apollo. For Kennedy, however, this was not of primary importance. Instead, the civil space program was to serve as a concomitant research endeavor with the military space program in terms of such developments as ICBMs and satellite reconnaissance systems.

With this in mind, Kennedy was nonetheless not prepared to launch the civil space program without an advisory committee. This entity was headed by Jerome B. Wiesner of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Wiesner's 12 January report in 1961 focused largely upon the importance of space exploration in the minds of civilians. He emphasized to Kennedy the importance of gaining civilian popularity by these means, and warned against letting Russia take precedence over the United States in this area:

Space exploration and exploits have captured the imagination of the peoples of the world. During the next few years the prestige of the United States will in part be determined by the leadership we demonstrate in space activities." (Dick, Oct. 22)

While Wiesner emphasized the importance of several space technology applications, including non-military and national security applications, he considered human spaceflight less important. The reason for this was the status of the American launch vehicle technology at the time. It was not developed sufficiently to safely place an astronaut in space without significant risk and a concomitant low chance of success. Furthermore, the scientific value of such an endeavor was low, while other more established space technologies yielded better results. Wiesner therefore recommended developing the programs that were already strong and use these to establish the United States' position in space technology. Kennedy however disagreed with Wiesner's assessment (Dick, Oct. 22).

Kennedy was in fact more motivated to pay attention to human space flight. Again, this is motivated by politics and public support. The public was much more entranced by the prospect of putting human beings in space than the other, more "useful" applications mentioned above. Kennedy was therefore motivated not as much by scientific use as by public support for his administration. The president did however recognize that the risks to the astronauts themselves were minimized, while also minimizing Russia's chances of preceding the U.S. manned space flight effort. He therefore addressed these risks by a clever political innuendo.

President Kennedy offered to cooperate with the Soviet Union to explore space. He spoke directly to the Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, in January 1961, asked the Soviet Union publicly for their cooperation, and called for a limitation on war during the exploration of space. Consequently, Kennedy accomplished a number of political goals. It is interesting to note that Kennedy knew that the Soviet Union would be unlikely to accept his offer of friendly cooperation (Dick, March 24). Nevertheless, in the eyes of the public, his diplomatic role as statesman was established by seeing friendly cooperation instead of competition. By refusing, Russia would contrast with the apparently friendly Americans, by attempting to monopolize space for their own benefit. This in turn minimized the prestige of the Soviet Union regarding their own space accomplishments as opposed to those of the United States. Even if Russia did accept the agreement, this would still provide a favorable picture of the United States as recognized equal in terms of their space technology as compared with that of the Soviet Union (Garber, 2002).

Interestingly, the Moon program itself was not as much a priority as manned spaceflight in terms of an orbiting astronaut. However, specific radical advancements by Russia during 1961 decided the issue of the moon landing, despite Kennedy's marked unwillingness to commit to a space program that was significantly aggressive. This unwillingness was evident in Kennedy's reluctance to provide the expanded budget for the program requested by James E. Webb, NASA Administrator, in March 1961. The lunar landing program was already in existence as a long-term goal during the Eisenhower administration. Webb, however, wished to accelerate this goal. Once again, Kennedy's unwillingness was motivated by his public image. He was unwilling to raise the necessary taxes to allow for the large increase. On the advice of his budget advisor, therefore, he provided NASA only with a modest increase (Garber, 2002).

Kennedy's unwillingness changed radically as a result of two significant events during this time. The first and most important was the successful effort by the Soviet Union to send the first human being into space. This occurred on 12 April 1961, when Yuri Gagarin entered space in a one-orbit mission in the craft, Vostok 1. This momentous event almost immediately placed the Soviet Union most prominently in the public eye. This was greatly assisted by Gagarin's outgoing personality, which made him an effective spokesman for the Soviet Union.

Not only had the chance to place the first person in space therefore been lost for the United States, but they have also faded to the background of the public consciousness. The country's effort to send a man of its own, Alan Shepard, into orbit, was dismally bleak when compared to the Russian accomplishment in more than one respect (Garber, 2002).

Most importantly, the United States appeared to attempt an imitation of the Russian effort, which in itself is not a very prestigious accomplishment. While Shepard was the first American in space, his suborbital flight lasted only 15 minutes, with 5 minutes of weightlessness, while Gagarin spent 89 minutes in weightlessness. Gagarin's spacecraft was much bigger at 10,428 pounds than Shepard's, which weighed 2,100 pounds (Dick, Oct 22). According to the media, the United States still led the way in terms of military and technological space research, the Russian effort was by far more spectacular, and therefore more prominent in the public view. For the public therefore, the United States had fallen behind in the space race. Again, this had important implications for the Cold War, because the United States apparently lagged technologically behind the Soviet Union. President Kennedy therefore faced the desperate necessity of needing to demonstrate his nation's technological leadership in the eyes of the world (Garber, 2002).

Another motivation for reconsidering the importance of the Moon program was an important event in the Cold War. The Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba occurred in April of 1961, with the purpose of overthrowing Castro. Because the attack was conducted by Cuban refugees, it was assumed that they would be welcomed by their compatriots. This was however not the case, and the mission was a failure. President Kennedy's and the American reputation was badly damaged by this disaster.

Combined with the Soviet space situation, the Bay of Pigs invasion served as part of the motive to accelerate the Moon program. According to Dick (Oct 22), Kennedy made his commitment to Project Apollo public on 25 May 1961. This announcement speech was filled with references to the contrast between the "free" world and that of "tyranny."

Kennedy used the space effort as a symbol of winning "the battle for men's minds." The spectacular effect achieved by the Russians therefore had a significant effect upon the minds of citizens around the globe (Dick, March 24).

The financial and political implications of the Apollo program became significant once the president made the decision to commit the United States to a Lunar landing. It was important to the president to set a goal that his country had a good chance of achieving before the Soviet Union. After a definite decision for the launch of the project was made, further important issues of politics and financing became deciding factors in the growth and development of the program.

The decision proved to be sound if the reaction of the nation could be used as a measure of effectiveness. The American imagination was captured, and they lent overwhelming support for Kennedy's decision to sponsor the moon landing. In the eyes of the nation, difficulty, expense and complication were minor issues in the light of the grand achievement that it promised to be.

In terms of the political issues mentioned above, the Apollo program and intended moon landing were so ambitious that it effectively dealt with most of the problems faced by the administration during the time. If they were successful, the Soviet leadership in space and technology would be effectively rivaled, and any other embarrassing political decisions, such as the Bay of Pigs would vanish into the background. Indeed, the presidential commitment to the program was sufficiently dramatic to once again place the United States at the forefront of the space race. Interestingly, this was accomplished by no more than announcing the president's intention to commit to the program. Nothing practical had been accomplished to back the commitment. Yet the size of the program was sufficient to impress the nation's imagination in symbolic terms, and Kennedy effectively refocused the spotlight of the world upon the United States (Dick, Oct 22).

The timing is also significant. In 1961, neither the United States or the Soviet Union had nearly the technological or scientific capacity to carry out a moon landing. This was in fact so far beyond the ability of either country that the early success of the Soviet Union's space endeavor could in no way predetermine whether they would be able to rival the American in a project of such scale. The United States therefore had a reasonable, or even a strong chance of success. The public mood, as seen above, was therefore one of excited optimism and complete support.

The concomitance of political and public support for the program provided NASA with the drive and resources necessary to launch the project on a very large scale.

Additional programs were also created for further scientific and technological support and research that could be used prior to and after the moon landing. From the beginning, the program was therefore conducted on an integrated basis (Dick, Oct 22).

This integration also occurred on the public scale: in addition to international prestige, the technological group assigned to the Apollo program proposed a national effort that would incorporate not only scientific, but also commercial components. In this, the positive mood of the nation could then be used to full effect to encourage continued support for the Apollo. In retrospect then, it is easy to see how Kennedy, despite his initial misgivings, had little other choice than to announce his commitment to the program. The overwhelming confluence of people, institutions and interests moved the administration inevitably towards the decision and its culmination. Once the decision had been made, financial and technical issues, along with the promised time scale, needed particular and close attention.

After the Decision: Financial and Scheduling Issues

According to a 1962 schedule drawn up by Brainerd Holmes, the Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, the first human Apollo launch was set to take place during March 1965. Several more launches were set for the ensuing years until 1968, with the first piloted Lunar landing set for the latter half of 1967. This, according to the schedule, was the earliest possible date at which such an attempt could be made.

The human factor was however not far behind in complicating many of the issues surrounding the Apollo program. Holmes and James Webb for example experienced significant strain in their relations, starting in the summer of 1962. Dick (Oct 22) regards this problem as one of professional pride. Holmes had for example been labeled in the media as the "Apollo czar," while Webb received no such recognition. This strain was exacerbated by the feature of a Holmes photograph on the cover of Time magazine during August 1962. On a personal level, this made for difficulties in professional performance.

Another issue that ran concomitantly with personal and scheduling issues was the financial issue. Kennedy's full acceptance of the Apollo program means that he also had to make a commitment in terms of resources. Holmes was therefore obliged to approach Webb for supplemental funding to ensure that the schedule was met on a timely basis. This funding amounted to $400 million, which was not in the Fiscal Year 1962 budget shortfall (Garber, 2002).

Holmes approached the issue from several angles, but was rejected by Webb on several occasions. Holmes retaliated by complaining to the media and Congress, whereafter he approached President Kennedy directly, thereby undermining Webb's authority, further straining the relationship (Garber, 2002).

Webb however, on 29 October 1962, also approached Kennedy via a letter (Webb, 1962) concerning a modification to the budget so that the Lunar landing program could be revised to occur six months and twelve months earlier than scheduled. Both were however large sums of money and required revisions to the existing budget and an appeal to Congress for additional funding. Kennedy reacted to this by requiring a review of the national space effort. The culmination of the review was a report concluding that Apollo required $16.4 billion in total to succeed, and in addition also addressed the issue of project acceleration.

Holmes and Webb continued to experience personal conflict. According to Garber (2002), Holmes publicly complained about Webb's effect on the space program. Holmes however apologized to Kennedy, presumably for one of his comments during these complaints. President Kennedy reacted to the conflict and budget issues by calling a meeting for the purpose of being briefed on his options regarding the program. Both Homes and Webb were present.

In terms of the budget, the issue of the extra requirement of $400 million was discussed, together with options of accelerating the program. A specific requirement for the approval of this amount was an assertion by the president that it was in the interest of national security. The outcome of the meeting was that Apollo received a national security designation during April 1962, according to which the program had top priority for attention and material. This indicates the political importance of the program for Kennedy. It was however also politically important to ensure that the Apollo program did not adversely affect other programs of high national security importance. Other issues still to discuss was the acceleration of the program and the increase of the budget (Garber, 2002).

The acceleration of the program was a very important issue, especially in terms of other essential NASA programs. According to Webb, an important concern was the significance of these other programs to ensure the success of Apollo. Accelerating Apollo itself could decrease its chances of success, as the other programs were designed to provide research data for Apollo. Without sufficient data, it would be nearly impossible to accurately determine the success of Apollo on the basis of much more than guess work.

On this issue, Kennedy and Webb experienced a serious disagreement during the meeting. Webb, as mentioned above, was concerned about the technical and scientific necessity of key programs at NASA for the success of the Apollo mission. Programs such as the Centaur upper stage and the Surveyor would for example be neglected if Apollo received priority attention above all else. Webb's second concern was his own negotiating position in the face of a clear statement from the president regarding the priority of Apollo. If the president were to clearly state the priority of Apollo above other programs, Webb feared that this might be to the detriment of his position (Garber, 2002).

Specifically, the key programs mentioned above were not formally part of the Apollo program. Webb nonetheless believed that their timely completion was crucial to the success of Apollo. Centaur for example was created with the purpose of robotic probes into space, its relevance to the Apollo program lay in its use of liquid hydrogen for a propulsion fuel. Webb felt that the knowledge gained from the use of this fuel was vital to the Apollo program. According to Garber (2002), this was an accurate assessment, as benefits were indeed gained from observing Centaur's use of these fuels.

Webb furthermore addressed the issue of scientific programs in the same vein. Ranger and Surveyor were two programs that Webb deemed important in this regard. These two programs were important in several respects: characterizing the lunar environment and the subsequent design of a manned Lunar Module, and selecting a landing site. While they were not technically part of the Lunar landing program, Webb nonetheless argued for the importance of their specific aspects.

Secondly, Webb also resisted a clear statement from Kenney regarding the highest priority importance of Apollo, as he feared that this would further detriment the key programs and also be used against the points he makes for them. Such a statement could also easily be used against him in the press, presenting Webb as a detriment rather than an asset to the program (Dick, Oct. 22).

Two projects were of specific importance as preliminary parts of the Apollo program itself. These were Project Mercury, by which orbital spaceflight was investigated, and Project Gemini, which was designed to fill the considerable existing knowledge gaps that still existed after completing Mercury.

Project Mercury

The aim of Project Mercury was an American manned orbital space flight. There are several reasons for the relative obscurity and lateness of the Shepard flight. The flight was for example postponed for a number of weeks in order to resolve problematic details. it's final culmination on 5 May 1961 took place less than three weeks before Kennedy made the Apollo announcement. Another, suborbital mission was launched on 21 July, and was also problematic and resulted in the astronaut Gus Grissom nearly drowning upon his return to Earth. These experiences were however valuable in terms of resolving potential problems in space flight, as well as the eventual moon landing (Dick, Oct. 22).

In the final stages of Project Mercury, a capsule was developed that would support a human being in space for as much as three days, instead of just minutes. The choice of the Atlas instead of Redstone launching vehicle was furthermore problematic in terms of controversy. In addition to the practical problem of mating the vehicle to the capsule, NASA engineers were in disagreement regarding the vehicle's propriety for human space flight. It was believed that the flimsy-looking technology would not be safe for human spaceflight. However, after several successful tests, the dissent began to clear. On 20 February 1962, John Glenn, as the first American to do so, circled the Earth three times in the Friendship 7 Mercury craft (Dick, Oct. 22).

Although there were still problems, this was much more spectacular than the Shepard attempt, and provided the United States with a much-needed boost in reputation and morale regarding the space program. Problems included the failure of the autopilot and a loose heat shield. In general, and in the light of previous experience, the flight was a resounding success. Glenn became symbolic of the national pride cultivated by this success as a representative of heroism and dignity. As such, he was also representative of the potential power of not only the space program, but particularly the astronauts taking part in the program, over public opinion. NASA made full use of this discovery and frequently used not only Glenn, but also other astronauts in their public relations endeavors (Dick, Oct. 22).

After three more successful flights during 1962 and 1963, Gordon Cooper circled the Earth 22 times in 34 hours on 15-16 May 1963. The culmination was not only successful in terms of accomplishing the spaceflights themselves, but also in terms of the technical data NASA was able to gather for the future of the Apollo project. Aspects of tracing, control, microgravity and biomedical issues were for example clarified during the flights (Dick, Oct. 22).

Despite this enormous learning experience, however, there still existed several technological gaps between the requirements for orbital travel and those for a Lunar landing. Project Gemini was launched with the purpose of filling this gap.

Project Gemini

Project Gemini was created to supplement the learning that could be accomplished by ground-level experimentation and training. Three major areas to be addressed by the project included the ability of spacecrafts to dock with each other in space, astronauts working outside the spacecraft, and data regarding physiological issues related to extended spaceflight (Dick, Oct. 22).

Gemini included such features as the ability to sustain two astronauts during flights lasting more than two weeks. Fuel cells were used instead of batteries. The most important research goal was rendezvous and docking techniques. Costly delays were however caused by unforeseen problems such as the redesign of fuel cells and long hours of overtime to fuel flow and vehicle control. The financial implications of these difficulties were significant: the initial estimate of $350 million rose to more than $1 billion. The commitment to the Apollo program however took precedence over financial concerns, and NASA had little trouble justifying the rising costs (Dick, Oct. 22).

After the resolution of difficulties, Gemini was occupied by human begins for the first time in 1965. Edward H. White II performed the first spacewalk in June 1965 during a four-day flight. By November 1966, eight more flights had been completed. The precedent was now set for the implementation of the Apollo program.

Speculation: What if Kennedy had lived?