Soviet Union and Gorbachev

¶ … Ethical Leadership: A Case Study of Mikhail Gorbachev

As the eighth and last leader of the former Soviet Union, Nobel Peace Prize laureate (1990) and best-selling author Mikhail Gorbachev was alternatively the Communist Party general secretary during the period 1985 through 1991, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and chairman of the Supreme Soviet from 1988 to 1991 as well as the first president of the Soviet Union during much of the last 2 years of its existence from 1990 to 1991. During this 6-year period, Mr. Gorbachev's role and leadership behaviors changed dramatically due to external circumstances that threatened the future of his glasnost ("openness") and perestroika ("restructuring") reform policies as well as the future of the Soviet Union itself. To determine the facts, this paper reviews the relevant literature to describe how and why Mr. Gorbachev's leadership theories, styles, and power and influence changed from one role to the next. In addition, drawing on contingency theory, an evaluation of the effectiveness of Mr. Gorbachev's behaviors in each of these roles is provide within the context of tasks, follower characteristics and organizational goals. Finally, using specific examples, a recommendation concerning how Gorbachev could have behaved differently within each role to be more effective is followed by a summary of the research and important findings concerning this Soviet leader in the conclusion.

Description concerning how and why the leader's use of leadership theories, styles and power and influence changed from one role to the next

In 1985, Gorbachev was appointed general secretary of the Soviet Union at age 54 years following the successive deaths of three elderly leaders who represented the Old Guard, making him the youngest Soviet leader in history. At the time, many domestic and international observers expected the new general secretary to implement a series of progressive reforms in an effort to improve the Soviet economy and the country's international image. During the early phases of his leadership career, Gorbachev used a transformational leadership style that was clearly intended to "transform" the Soviet Union into a modern nation by replacing outdated political and economic systems with more democratic and progressive strategies modeled on the West. In this regard, MacKinnon (2008) reports that, "One could argue in the case of Gorbachev, 'transformational leader' best acknowledges his unmistakable contribution in changing the Soviet system, dismantling Marxist-Leninist ideology and one-party rule while introducing into it elements of civil freedom and democracy" (p. 69).

Indeed, some observers suggest that in Gorbachev's early years as Soviet general secretary, he was a classic textbook example of a progressive, transformational leader. For example, Jasper (2011) points out that, "Transformation [is] a well-worn word in Gorbachev's globalist lexicon, always signifying an urgent need to deconstruct the current political/economic system of sovereign, independent nation-states and the market-based economy and restructure (transform) it into a globalized, centralized, socialized new world order" (p. 18). For a time, Gorbachev's transformational leadership style was welcomed by the some liberal elements in the Soviet Union and the majority of the international community as a breath of fresh air in an otherwise stale and stodgy Soviet bureaucracy that was rife with corruption, mismanagement and waste. Press coverage of Gorbachev in the Western media was replete with glowing reports concerning the progressive reforms that the Soviet general secretary was making, and greeted each new initiative with even greater praise.

In March 1990, Gorbachev was elected as the Soviet Union's first president, an unsurprising outcome since he was the only candidate on the ballot. By this time, growing domestic unrest and pressure from the international community had combined to force him to revert in some instances to the same types of hard-line approaches in dealing with unrest and uprising in the Soviet republics that were used in the past in what can best be described as transactional leadership (Valenty & Feldman, 2002). As MacKinnon (2008) points out, "the term 'transformational' leader fails to account for Gorbachev's inability to retain political authority and to complete the process of transformation" (p. 71).

This shift in leadership styles during his last 2 years in office as president of the Soviet Union can be attributed in large part to the challenge represented by the up-and-coming Boris Yeltsin who sought the presidency and still rankled at being fired from his post in the Communist Party by Gorbachev years before. In this regard, Valenty and Feldman (2002) report that, "Gorbachev's problems in reforming the Soviet Union were compounded by Boris Yeltsin's inflammatory rhetoric and divisive policies" (p. 17). These challenges to his presidency were exacerbated by Yeltsin's rising domestic popularity during a period when Gorbachev's was plummeting (Valenty & Feldman, 2002).

Other forces were also at work, though, that appear to have convinced Gorbachev that his former leadership style was no longer appropriate or effective. For instance, in 1990, the so-called "Black January" took place wherein Gorbachev declared martial law and sent Soviet military forces to Azerbaijan to restore order (Stroilov, 2011). The outcome of this intervention, however, was far more severe than even Gorbachev likely expected, and more than 120 protestors were killed by Soviet troops and approximately 700 more protestors were injured (Stroilov, 2011). Although Gorbachev subsequently labeled his actions in Azerbaijan as a "mistake," the Azerbaijani government officially called the intervention an "action of aggression" and seriously considered placing Gorbachev on trial for crimes against humanity (Stroilov, 2011).

In addition, on January 13, 1991, Gorbachev dispatched Soviet troops to Lithuania and assumed control of their media outlets and other governmental buildings (Francis, 1991). Unfortunately, there was also bloodshed involved in this intervention as well. For example, according to Strollov (2011), "Soviet troops, sent by Gorbachev, fired on the crowd, killing 15 protestors and wounding hundreds. Gorbachev remained silent for about a week, then denied he was responsible and blamed the military" (p. 37). It is clear that Gorbachev took this drastic measure in an attempt to remain in power as Soviet president and general secretary, but the consequences of his actions were quick in coming and severe in nature. For instance, Francis reports that, "The European Community condemned Moscow's violent crackdown in Lithuania and warned that $1 billion in promised aid might be endangered" (1991, p. 8).

The election of Yeltsin as the Soviet president in June 1991 (this time with more than one candidate on the ballot) reduced Gorbachev's role to that of general secretary and by August 1991, the situation in the Soviet Union had deteriorated to point where Gorbachev's position was no longer tenable and the events that followed in a failed coup attempt spelled the death knell for his political career and the Soviet Union. According to the BBC, "In 1991 reactionary hard-liners in the Communist Party, fearing the collapse of the Soviet Union, attempted to remove Gorbachev" (Mikhail Gorbachev, 2017, para. 4).

Under house arrest in his Crimean dacha, Gorbachev was forced to listen to the events unfold on the radio as elements of the military sought to take over the Russian parliament. The combination of mass protests and the efforts by President Yeltsin served to quell the coup attempt, but Gorbachev saw the handwriting on the wall and realized that Yeltsin now possessed the real power in the Soviet Union, at least for a few more months before the country disintegrated into a series of independent republics (Stroilov, 2011). These outcomes may appear predictable in hindsight, but the dynamic nature of world events during Gorbachev's tenure as general secretary and president proved too much for his transformational or transactional leadership style. Because hindsight is 20-20, however, it is possible to evaluate the effectiveness of his behaviors in each of these political capacities by drawing on contingency theory which is discussed further below.

Evaluation, using contingency theory, concerning the effectiveness of the leader's behaviors in each role within the context of tasks, follower characteristics, and organizational goals

The main tenets of contingency theory are especially appropriate for evaluating Gorbachev's behaviors as general secretary from 1985 through 1991 and as president from March 1990 through June 1991. For instance, according to Swatos (1994), "The theoretical perspective of contingency theory provides an appropriate organizing framework. The contingency perspective is useful in this context for focusing attention on the importance of organizational environments" (p. 163). Moreover, contingency theory provides a particularly useful framework in which to evaluate Gorbachev's behaviors due to the hostile environment he faced throughout his tenure in these political positions. In this regard, Swatos adds that, "This focus is especially crucial when the environment is turbulent or hostile. In a rapidly changing environment, whatever accommodations may have been made with hostile elements in the environment that allowed the organization to survive are likely to be called into question" (1994, p. 137).

The context of tasks in which Gorbachev exercise his power as general secretary included his attempts to implement and sustain his glasnost and perestroika initiatives which were being rejected by many members of the Soviet Communist Party as representing threats to their own interests as well as the Soviet Union. In reality, these reactions were predictable enough given the well-entrenched bureaucracy that characterized the Soviet Union during Gorbachev's tenure both as general secretary and president.

The characteristics of his followers were also operative in forcing Gorbachev to shift his leadership style from transformational to transactional, with pressure from Communist Party hard-liners and growing dissension among the leaders of the Soviet republics swirling out of control. Moreover, the organizational goals of the Soviet Union also experienced substantive change during Gorbachev's first years in office, shifting from attempting to maintain military and political hegemony in Europe and countering the growing military capabilities of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), most especially the Strategic Defense Initiative or "Star Wars" (Avni, 2014).

Indeed, Star Wars is regarded by many analysts as being the final nail in Gorbachev's presidential coffin. For instance, according to Avni, "The idea of a defensive shield against missiles was no more than a fantasy at the time. Yet many analysts credited Reagan's Star Wars initiative with hastening the fall of the Soviet Union" (p. 37). At the time, however, Gorbachev believed that further attempts to compete head-to-head with the United States and its allies militarily were useless and would only further weaken his country, a decision that many credit with hastening the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Avni, 2014). Nevertheless, it was Gorbachev's official position as general secretary that arms reductions were in the best interests of the East and West, and that he was in a position to help effect these reductions, including the elimination of nuclear weapons. As Trauschweizer (2015) emphasize, "Gorbachev and Reagan were to be partners, if not always trusting ones, in the quest to abolish nuclear arms and in the friendly summit meetings from 1985 to 1988 that changed the tone in international relations" (p. 420)..

There are also some clear indications in the historical record concerning Gorbachev's reactions to being replaced as Soviet president in June 1991 by Yeltsin, an eventuality that he worked hard to avoid and was reluctant to accept. In fact, despite this loss of power and blow to his prestige, Gorbachev attempted to continue the same patterns of behavior that marked his first year as Soviet president. For example, Jasper (2014) reports that, "Gorbachev's lust for power and his sense of loss when he was no longer head of state of the Soviet Union: He loved power, and now he's suffering at having lost it" (p. 19). In fact, in his role as general secretary, Gorbachev chose to simply ignore the results of the election and continued to behave as if he was still the freely elected president of the Soviet Union. In this regard, Jasper adds that, "The pain was such that Gorbachev would still claim to be having 'negotiations' whenever he met leading politicians in Bonn. But there was nothing left to negotiate" (p. 19). Although he would be the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991, numerous honorary doctorate degrees and countless other awards from the international community, "Gorby" was clearly no longer in charge at home (Jasper, 2014).

Although even his harshest detractors conceded his charisma and apparent political acumen as a statesman, Gorbachev did in fact exercise his presidential powers during his time in this office in less-than-admirable ways on more than one occasion in response to international environmental conditions and domestic organizational pressures. Some of the actions taken by Gorbachev during his role as president may be less well known, but they provide some indication of the shift in his leadership style when he was general secretary, including the following:

• He continued to use the KGB in its traditional role as the terrible hammer of Communist rule;

• He presided over the brutal Soviet occupation of, and genocide against, Afghanistan;

• He ordered the murderous assault of Soviet troops on unarmed civilians at Vilnius' television station, Lithuania's equivalent of the Tiananmen Square massacre;

• He hid the documents showing Soviet responsibility for the Katyn Woods massacre of 15,000 Polish military officers;

• He supported Ethiopian communist dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam's horrendous reign of torture, genocide, and forced famine (Jasper, 2011, p. 19).

Some other indications concerning how the international community viewed Gorbachev's behaviors as general secretary and then Soviet president can be discerned from the mainstream media coverage during these respective periods. As shown in Table 1 below, the tone of this coverage changed dramatically from 1985 through June 1991 and thereafter.

Table 1

Representative Western press coverage of Gorbachev's behaviors as general secretary and president

Date/Source

Article Headline

Summary

April 1, 1985/The Times (London)

"Gorbachev's new broom brings hope and skepticism"

The Times article reports the results of a recent Soviet media campaign "designed to depict the 54-year-old Mr. Gorbachev as "modest, brisk, and astute, a no-nonsense leader of the new generation, whose aim is efficiency and reform rather than self-glorification."

April 24, 1985/The Times (London)

"Russian leader's arms ban outburst"

According to this article, "Mr. Gorbachev called for revolutionary changes in the Soviet economy" and that "Russia was ready to improve relations with America."

May 2, 1985/The Christian Science Monitor

"Sweeping Agricultural Reforms by Gorbachev Predicted"

The article places the coverage in context by citing the chronically underperforming Soviet agricultural sector and enthuses that "the new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, will implement agricultural reforms that will turn the Soviet Union into a grain exporter within a decade. He's a very smart guy for openers This guy really knows the Western world. [In addition], Gorbachev, within five years, will promote joint ventures with Western agribusiness firms to build modern plants to make fuller utilization of technological inputs such as hybrid seeds and farm machinery."

November 3,1985/The Journal Record

"American banks have started lending to Russians again."

A sign of improving relations between the Soviets and the West is made clear in this article: "For reasons that analysts attribute partly to the spirit of the Reagan-Gorbachev talks but more to serious new strains on the Soviet economy, American banks have started lending to the Russians again after a five-year hiatus. The banks are First National of Chicago, Morgan Guaranty, Bankers Trust, and Irving Trust - plus a London subsidiary of the Royal Bank of Canada. It's also interesting that it is happening at the time of the summit."

December 1, 1988/The Journal Record

"Are Markets Overexcited by Gorbachev's Pledge?"

The article reports that, "Mikhail S. Gorbachev's speech before the United Nations, pledging a cutback of Soviet armed forces and redeployment of troops and tanks from Eastern Europe, lifted spirits on Wall Street as stocks and the dollar went up. The exuberance stemmed from the assumption that the Soviet leader had cleared the way for the United States to reduce its military spending. That would shrink the overall budget deficit and permit president-elect George Bush to keep his campaign promise not to raise taxes."

April 5,1989/The Christian Science Monitor

"Gorbachev in London for a Cordial Round 3"

The article cites the close and warm relationship between the Soviet general secretary and the British prime minister: "Britain may have a special relationship with the United States, but it is Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's special relationship with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that is grabbing British headlines this week. Arriving for the third time on British soil today, Mr. Gorbachev is looking forward to lively discussions with Mrs. Thatcher during his 48-hour visit. One of Thatcher's senior advisors said that the prime minister wants to hear about the progress of perestroika (restructuring) and to hear Gorbachev's account of recent Soviet elections."