The 2004 Lewis Prison hostage crisis and escape attempt

Arizona Dept. Of Corrections 2004 Hostage Situation

In order to understand how questions arose as part of the investigation of the incident, we need to analyze the significant events that occurred during this crisis and how the issues raised can be resolved so that such a crisis cannot reoccur.

Taking Hostages

At 3:15 A.M. On January 18, 2004, Ricky K. Wassenaar, an inmate, entered the kitchen area of the Lewis Prison Complex in Arizona, where a female civilian and a male security guard were talking and making pancakes. Steven Coy, a second convict, came in right behind Wassenaar and blocked the door. Wassenaar displayed his "shank" (home-made knife) and told the two employees it was an "escape" and he told the male guard to take off his shirt and boots. The female employee was tied up, Wassenaar shaved off his beard and put on the prison guard's uniform. An hour after first entering the kitchen, he exited to try to gain access to the prison security tower. As soon as he left, Coy sexually assaulted the female civilian employee.

Fifteen Days of Negotiations

Thirty different negotiators continued to talk with the inmates over the 15-day crisis. Sixteen law enforcement agencies are represented at the site. Small concessions were made on both sides. Via a robot, food, coffee, and cigarettes were delivered to the escapees. Inmates turned over some of the prescription drugs, their shanks, and pieces of ammunition (NICIC, 2004). Saturday, January 24th, the male hostage is released by the convicts.

The negotiations continue until February 1st, when the inmates surrender.

Analysis and Findings

~One of the primary reasons the two escapees got as far as they did was because they had a weapon -- the shank. But they supposedly had to go through a pat-down search upon exiting the dormitory and another one when entering the kitchen. It was found that the kitchen entry search was not accomplished. And it is supposed that the convicts could have previously buried the weapon in the yard and picked it up on the way to the kitchen after the dormitory pat-down. Or it may have been hidden in the kitchen to avoid both potential searches. But the kitchen area had been routinely searched just a few hours earlier. Had the kitchen search been conducted, there is a good chance the weapon would have been found. Whether or not that would have stopped the attempt is unknown. The pat-down search procedure, either as written or as accomplished, was unsatisfactory.

The recommendations for this problem would consist of increased and regular training for pat-down searches and emphasis on carrying them out thoroughly when they are done.

Random, no-notice cell searches should be conducted to detect and destroy any contraband, like shanks. And if that policy is already in effect, then further training in that area is necessary.

The kitchen is an obvious source of "weapons" (like the heavy soup ladle used). It should be guarded more heavily and made less easily accessible. Routine searches of that area should be as thorough as possible. There was no video surveillance of this area -- a significant oversight. That is part of the reason the escape attempt went undetected for so long after the two employees were overwhelmed by the convicts.

There is no question that, in this situation, the escape attempt could have been stopped before it became dangerous if only one or two of the above recommendations had been followed.

~There existed too much open access to the security tower, and procedures to enforce security became lax and ineffective. Again, there is no doubt that had proper procedures been in place or had some of the existing procedures been followed, the attempt to enter the tower could have been thwarted.

Since prisoners were allowed into the tower when medicines were dispensed, it gave them an opportunity to see what the layout was and what security procedures were in place. This should be stopped and medicines dispensed elsewhere. Prisoner access to the tower should be prohibited. Because of constant prisoner access, security detection and visual checks of inmates became routine, boring and totally unsatisfactory.

In addition, all security procedures and policies should be thoroughly reviewed and improved to provide adequate security to the tower. All officers should be re-trained in the new procedures and random, spot checks should be initiated to ensure they are being followed.

~The use of negotiators to resolve this situation was against policy, according the Arizona Department of Corrections. Yet, in this situation, on-site commanders allowed it to occur. It was found that, due to the location of the escapees in a very secure environment with good visibility of the surrounding area, taking them by force would have cost lives and my not have succeeded since the convicts had a large inventory of weapons in the tower.

With the successful results of the negotiations to resolve the crisis and bring it to a peaceful end, the DOC policy of "no negotiations" needs to be reviewed and possibly eliminated. Case by case decisions should be made in this area as determined by the on-site commander.

~Budget and staffing issues contributed to this crisis. Overcrowding of the prison leads to frustration on the part of prisoners. Significant understaffing of the security force at the prison also played a role in the exhaustion, poorly accomplished pat-downs, and lax security at the tower.

Budgets should be reviewed with appropriate expertise and state/federal assistance sought.

More guards need to be hired to ensure proper staffing, training and time off can take place.

Afterword

A prison warden was demoted and eight other supervisors reassigned after the investigation found the gaps in security compounded by "years' worth of bad decisions" in the state's prison system.

Steven Coy was sentenced to serve 7 life sentences (225 years) for his role in the attempted escape. Ricky Wassenaar received 16 consecutive life sentences plus 43 years (Baker, 2004).