Arms Sales to the Third

Arms Sales to the Third World

Basic details

Interesting facts

This is a paper on Arms Sales to the Third World. Discussing the top seven arms sellers to the Third World and who the major buyers are. France and Russia follow the U.S.; but China's sales was around U.S.$2.7 billions in 1999 dropped to $400 millions last year with Pakistan remaining a major buyer.

Third World Arms

Who Sales Them?

The global arms business is on the upswing again and the United States, as has been the case many times in the past, accounts for nearly 50 per cent of the sales to developing countries. The New York Times, in a Congressional Research Service Report that was highlighted states that the international arms sales grew by eight per cent in 2000 to nearly $40 billions and the U.S. contracted for about $18.6 billions of it. The U.S. sales increased by about $6 billions between 1999 and 2000 thanks to a large extent by the contact to sell 80 F-16 jets to the United Arab Emirates, a deal that is put at around $6.4 billions. France and Russia follow the U.S.; but China's sales was around U.S.$2.7 billions in 1999 dropped to $400 millions last year with Pakistan remaining a major buyer.

Between 1997 and 2000, Russia had agreed to sell Iran some U.S.$300 millions in weapons measured in constant 2000 dollars. Russia agreed to sell Iran some U.S.$300 million in weapons, but during the same period Russia delivered Iran some U.S.$800 millions in arms and in late 2000 Moscow served notice, despite objections from Washington, that additional major sales to Teheran were being pursued. (William W. Keller & Janne E. Nolan, the Arms Trade: Business as Usual?. Vol. 109, Foreign Policy, 12-01-1997).

Since the end of the Gulf War in 1991, Iraq was a major buyer of Russian weapons, but this is no longer the case. India and China are now the principal clients of Russia and the point is that as Moscow enters into joint production deals with the two countries, eventually there would be the drop in purchases from Russia as domestic production in the two countries start.

The patterns of arms sales by Russia and China are not the only challenges for the Republican administration. Domestically, it sets off a larger debate and criticism in many quarters, on the one hand the U.S. goes about telling the developing world about the need to come to grips with peace and developmental imperatives; it unleashes its manufacturing sectors to keep nations in conflict. (Rimanelli, Marco, East-West arms control and the fall of the U.S.S.R., 1967-1994: radical change or expedient accommodation? Vol. 29, East European Quarterly, 06-22-1995).

Arms transfers can and do upset military balances, but they can rarely create or sustain them. History and logic combine to demonstrate time and again that one nation's balance is another's threat. War after war in the Middle East and Persian Gulf has followed one arms import frenzy after another. At some point, it becomes impossible to say which came first war or the means by which it was prosecuted. (1)

Security risks remain a constant preoccupation in the ex-USSR, be them the result of widespread fears of a Russian reunification drive of the Soviet empire. To address these new "global" concerns, traditional, bilateral, lengthy, technical arms control negotiations are no longer feasible, while unilateral arms reductions and disarmament's are not a real long-term solution either, but only another tool.

In the new post-Cold War world, America also faces the task of reshaping its arms control strategy to overcome new and more subtle threats to her national security. Clearly negotiations achieved during the Cold War is over as is also the threat of an East-West nuclear World War III, but the world still remains a dangerous place in many unexpected ways for U.S. And Western security. The Cold War's end and the U.S.S.R.'s collapse have left America as the only global Super Power, but burdened with a $4/5 trillion deficit, declining economic- military resources and uncertain leadership. America's internationalism will increasingly rely on closer cooperation with the United Nations and the West to foster international stability and stronger Western solidarity (2).

Chinese arms sales to the Middle East became controversial, particularly in the United States, because of China's willingness to export tactical and strategic missiles, regardless of the consequences to regional stability. In response, the United States began to pressure and to restrain its ballistic-missile exports. Chinese leaders maintained that their country had adopted a prudent and responsible policy on arms sales, selling only a limited quantity of weapons. Nevertheless, China's attempts to use the international security framework to its own advantage were contradictory. China's withdrawal from the Perm Five arms-transfer talks, sale of M-11 missile components to Pakistan, undercut the credibility of its commitment to arms control and thus its ability to influence the direction of such efforts. (Sismanidis, Roxane D.V., China and the Post-Soviet security structure.. Vol. 21, Asian Affairs: An American Review, 04-01-1994, pp 39).

Washington's sale of F-16 fighters to Taipei weakened Beijing's enthusiasm for arms control because the deal highlighted Chinese concerns that the arms-control regime was an instrument that the West hypocritically wielded against such developing countries as China while declining to abide by the rules established by the regime. (3)

After the Persian Gulf War was over, there was a tremendous amount of interest in American weapons because of their performance during the conflict, and those nations that had cash, in the Middle East. Some of our allies in Asia, decided that they wanted to upgrade their own weapons programs and it was relatively easy for us to carry forward the momentum and the psychology of 'America makes the best' and take advantage of it. And that's what American corporations did. (Author not available, arms trade. The Hutchinson Dictionary of World History, 01-01-1998).