Arson Investigations Definition and Elements

Arson Investigations

Definition and elements

Deeper issue with criminal codes

Types of arson litigation

wildfires and arson

Definition of a Fire

Mechanisms (scientific)

Understanding basic of fire properties and segue to client-based research.

Clay v. United States (537 U.S. 522, 2003).

Dual conviction with arsons

Writ of certiorari becomes legal issue.

Contrast of definition of legal argument

Serious nature of motivations and "waiting period"

James v. United States. (550 I.S. 192, 2007)

Prior conviction of arson places inmate into tougher situations.

ACCA law stricter with arson component

Begay v. United States. (553 U,.S. 137, 2008).

ACCA component as well.

Court noted again that any arson component literally moves that complaint upwards in hierarchical severity.

United States v. Knights (543 U.S. 112, 2001).

Once again, arson is seen as more serious than even murder.

Arson terms cited within court opinion as part of dual nature of case.

VII. Jones v. United States, (529 U.S.848, 2000).

a. More specific to arson, but decision revolves around property

b. Becomes way to define and translate the nature of previous criminal actions.

VIII. Conclusions and implications

Arson is the term for a crime of intentionally or maliciously setting a fire to structures, vegetative areas, or areas of forests. It is different in scope and legislation from any natural causes of fire, and usually describes the crime of one setting a fire to property to collect insurance compensation (Ford, 2005). The elements of arson, under U.S. criminal codes, vary depending on jurisdiction and severity. In most cases, for instance, the element of "dwelling" is no longer required, and arson is charged by the burning of any real property that occurs unlawfully. Prosecutors use the degree of severity to define and litigate arson charges. First degree arson generally occurs when people are injured or killed during the course of a fire; second degree arson when damage is limited to the destruction of property (Gandolfi, 2007). Again, depending on the severity of the issue, arson may be a misdemeanor, criminal mischief, or destruction of property. If breaking and entering are part of the crime, burglary is charged, and if someone is killed, homicide is added to the charge (Decker and Ottley, 2009). Finally, wildfires, also known as forest fires, generally occur in national parks or other heavily wooded areas. These types of fires require a great deal of human and fiscal resources to control, but often the environmental and ecological damage is incalculable (Hall, 1999).

What is Fire -- Fire is the rapid oxidation of a material during the process of combustion. Combustion releases heat, light, and a number of by-products called reaction components. The flame is the visible part of the fire, and consists of glowing hot gases. If the fire rises to a high enough temperature, though, the gases may become ionized to produce plasma. Fire investigators also pay attention to the color and intensity of the flame, which allows greater analysis into chemical agents or accelerants used in arson. Besides the heat and oxygen deprivation, the most critical component of arson is the amount of smoke that may be inhaled which, often contributes to witness death prior to burns or heat (Harris, 2009).

The purpose of this essay, however, is not to focus on the scientific and chemical properties of fire, but to understand the way in which the crime of arson interacts with the American legal system. To do this we will analyze six distinct cases that were argued before the Supreme Court centering on arson. Within these cases we will not only describe the legal arguments, but focus on the manner in which the decisions on the cases affected law enforcement's ability to investigate and ultimately prosecute cases involving arson.

Clay v. United States -- 537 U.S. 522, 2003. Erick Clay was convicted of the dual crimes of arson and distribution of cocaine in Federal District Court and his conviction upheld in November 1998. Exactly one year after the time for seeking a writ of certiorari expired; Clay filed a motion for post conviction relief under 28 USC section 225 which provides that motions are subject to a one year time limitation that runs from the day the conviction becomes final. The legal question becomes, when does a judgment become "final" and, given the nature of the crime of arson, when the appellate Court confirms the verdict, does a judgment become final for a post conviction relief?

In a unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that for the purpose of starting the clock a conviction becomes final when the time expires for filing a petition for certiorari contesting the appellate court's affirmation. Under this rule, Clay's section 2255 motion was timely (U.S. Supreme Court Case 537, 2003). Regarding arson, the Court's decision had little impact upon prosecution, but tremendous impact on sentencing and the necessity for the prosecution and lower courts to ensure arson related issues are filed and tracked appropriately (Cornell University Law Department).

James v United States -- 550 U.S. 192 (2007). This is a decision by the Supreme Court that held that a convicted arsonist, who was additionally convicted of firearm position. The government then sought an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The ACCA allows for a minimum 15-year sentence if the convicted criminal has three prior convictions for arson, drug offenses or other violent felonies. The lower court found that the arson charge was not serious enough to count as an ACCA ruling, but the Court of Appeals held that the arson plus the drug trafficking offense was indeed serious. Thus, the question becomes, "does a conviction for arson and attempted burglary qualify as a "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act.

The Court found that yes, and by 5-3 said that the arson plus the combination of burglary did constitute a serious enough offense to be used in ACCA. For arson investigators, this portion of the ruling pointed to the nature of the Court in ascribing a serious nature to arson and, of course, drug offenses (Supreme Court Decision 550, U.S. 192).

Begay v. United States -- 553 U.S. 137 (2008). This case also has a component of the ACCA, with arson as a peripheral note to the seriousness of the manner in which the Court finds the crime. In 2004, New Mexico resident Larry Begay was arrested after brandishing and unsuccessfully shot a rifle while begging his sister for money. Begay pleaded guilty to the firearm arrest, but prior had been convicted of arson and a DWI. Considering the arson/DWI offense, does this constitute habitual enough crime for stricter sentencing? Again, with a majority view, because of the incident of arson in Begay's background, the Court viewed that the previous arrests did constitute violent felonies, and that the examples of burglary, arson, and extortion were already mandated by Congress to be part of the serious nature of the sentencing structure of this nature.(Supreme Court 553 U.S.).

United States v. Knights -- 543 U.S. 112 (2001). A California Court sentenced Mark Knights to probation for a drug offense and included the condition that he would submit his person or property for search at any time. In the aftermath of arson at the site of a Pacific Gas and Electric transformer, a sheriff's detective with reasonable suspicion, search Knights' apartment. Based in part on items recovered, including a PGE padlock, a Federal Grand Jury indicted Knights for conspiracy to commit arson. Knights attorneys argued for a motion to suppress evidence, begging the question, does a search pursuant to a common probation condition satisfy reasonable suspicion, satisfy the Fourth Amendment. The Court found yes, in a unanimous opinion, noting that it was the serious nature of the arson that allowed less latitude and more stringent search parameters. The Court then concluded that, based on ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis, reasonable suspicion is constitutionally sufficient to render a warrant requirement unnecessary (U.S. Supreme Court 543 U.S. 112, 2001).

Jones v. United States -- 529 U.S. 848 (2000). Ironically one of the more serious cases for our analysis, the arson portion taken very seriously by the Court, but the ruling more on property and legal interpretations than the crime itself.

In 1998, Dewey Jones, of Detroit, tossed a Molotov cocktail into the home of his cousin, James Walker, Jr., in Fort Wayne, Indiana. Walker's home was severely damaged. Subsequently, Jones was convicted in U.S. District Court of violating 18 U.S.C. section 844(i), which makes it a federal crime to "maliciously damage or destroy, ...by means of fire or an explosive, any building... used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce." The Court of Appeals affirmed Jones's conviction. Before both courts, Jones unsuccessfully argued that section 844(i), when applied to the arson of a private residence, exceeds the authority vested in Congress under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. Thus, the question posits, does the Federal Arson statute apply to the arson of a private residence?

The Court, in this case, found that "No," it does not. In a unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that an owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial purpose does not qualify as property "used in" commerce or commerce-affecting activity, such that arson of such a dwelling is not subject to federal prosecution under section 844(i). Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote for the Court that "[w]ere we to adopt the Government's expansive interpretation of section 844(i), hardly a building in the land would fall outside the federal statute's domain." (Supreme Court Case; "Oyez Project -- Jones v. United States."

Trends and Conclusions -- in each case over the last two decades that has reached the Supreme Court with an element of arson attached, we note that it is the nature of the arson that seems to trip the balance from slightly serious to quite serious. The high court takes arson very seriously, likely due to a number of factors: arson can rapidly destroy property at all levels, not just the intended victim, but the community as a whole. Fighting arson is an expensive societal cost, involving many people who often risk their lives in the pursuit of taming the fire. So many other criminal activities, too, can be attached to arson: burglary, breaking and entering, assault, attempted murder, and murder itself. Thus, for the Supreme Court, the idea of arson is as a pentultimate crime.