Assination of Rafik Hariri: Extinguishing

Assination of Rafik Hariri: Extinguishing a Light in the Middle East

Lebanon is an oddity in the Middle East; a diverse cultural mixture that were it not for outside influences vying for power and control of the country might perhaps achieve a culturally and economically successful society. It has on more than one occasion in its war torn history attempted to do that. To become a Singapore of the Middle East; or at least such was the vision held by Lebanon's late former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri (he had resigned in 2004), who was assassinated in February, 2005 (Denoeux and Springborg, 1998, p. 158). "Consciously striving to emulate its putative Phoenician heritage, Lebanon was the only truly cosmopolitan Arab country (Denoeux and Springborg, 1998, p. 158)." Under the leadership of the business wise Rafik Hariri, the vision was manifesting itself into reality. Then, in the instant it took for a car bomb attack to occur, the future of Lebanon became, once again, violent, uncertain, and a tumultuous struggle for control over the country. Geographically and strategically located on the Mediterranean, north of Israel, with Lebanon's southern most tip bordering Israel along the region of the Golan Heights; and Syria to its west. Lebanon's own internal groups resumed the tug of war for the country with Israel and the United States standing close and on alert. Heeding the United Nations order for an investigation to sort out the myriad of interested parties who might be responsible for the death of Lebanon's prime minister, and the Lebanese hope for the future, an international investigator was assigned to sort out the pieces of evidence and information surrounding the assassination. The questions to be answered stand as complex as the man himself had been, and would entail unraveling political, business, investment banking, and personal interests entwined like a ball of tangled yarn in order to find who had murdered Lebanon's former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.

Hariri was born Lebanese, a Sunni Muslim sect in Lebanon. He was an entrepreneur who saw beyond religious and political restraints and who envisioned creating an economy in Lebanon that involved rebuilding the remaining impoverished and run down sections of Beirut with glistening high rises and prospering businesses was assassinated (1998, p. 166). Research authors Guilain Denoeux and Robert Springborg lend insight into why Hariri's vision was embraced by the Lebanese people in this excerpt published in Middle East Policy prior to the assassination of the Prime Minister (1998, p. 158):

Both inside and outside Lebanon, this vision for the future of the country has been widely accepted. This is in part because it is consonant with Lebanon's previous economic rule, in part because it seems consistent with the country's resource endowment and comparative advantage, and in part because no other compelling model has been put forward - be it by the Lebanese themselves or by those in the World Bank, IMF and bilateral aid agencies who are involved in translating into its Lebanese variant the "Washington consensus" on neoclassical economic reform.

By default, therefore, it has been more or less agreed that those in charge of Lebanon's reconstruction, and especially its hard-driving prime minister, have the right model in mind, even if its implementation is viewed as inadequate or flawed. The slowdown in economic growth since 1994, the spectacular increase in the indebtedness of the state, persistent unemployment, spreading poverty, rampant corruption, rising sectarian tensions and various signs of deepening political malaise have all been dismissed by Lebanese politicians and more neutral observers alike as stemming primarily from factors beyond Lebanon's control (1998, pp. 158-159)."

In 1992, when Hariri assumed the role of Lebanon's prime minister, the country was in an economic crisis (1998, p. 159). Hariri brought to the table with him a plan and connections in business, investment banking and on the international level that helped support his vision for Lebanon as a potentially successful one (1998, pp. 159-160). Nor was he empty-handed, since Hariri was able and willing to garner convincing confidence in his goals with significant investment dollars from his own personal fortunes. Even before that, in the early 1980s while Lebanon was still in the grips of war, Hariri, who had been successful in Saudi Arabia, sent his company's heavy construction equipment into Lebanon to begin work repairing the roads that had been almost destroyed by bombing during the war (1998, p. 160). It seemed as though Hariri wanted to instill in the people a sense of hope for the future even then as his company worked to repair and remove war damage. He also created a charitable foundation that would help impoverished Lebanese young people attend college and for impoverished families to receive aid (1998, p. 160). Hariri proved his determination in seeing his country move away from war and warring into an era prosperity that would flourish in a new and different Lebanon. More importantly, he proved he had the resources and pertinent international support and connections to make that goal a reality (1998, p. 160).

Denoeux and Springborg describe Hariri's model for Lebanon this way (1998, p. 160):

After he became prime minister, Hariri focused on rebuilding the two pillars that had supported Lebanon's economic success prior to 1975: a stable currency and the infrastructure capacity to provide services more competitively than any other Arab country. He quickly implemented the IMF (International Monetary Fund) stabilization measures which, in combination with the general optimism his presence instilled, resulted within two months in a revaluation of the currency by some 1,000 pounds to the dollar and a sharp decline in inflation to 29% in 1993. Coupled with macroeconomic stabilization measures was the unveiling and immediate launching of a reconstruction plan, Horizon 2000. Its centerpiece was the building of an entirely new central business district for Beirut. According to the scheme's backers, this new district would serve as the symbol of the country's revitalization and would house its financial sector, which was to be the engine of Lebanon's economic reconstruction (1998, p. 160)."

The plan and model is criticized by the authors and others as being one focused on the stability of the currency and construction vs. rehabilitation of existing buildings; and that it did not include an agricultural component (1998, p. 160). As such, critics said, the plan failed to include Lebanon as a whole (1998, p. 160). Especially if it was Hariri's goal to create a Singapore of the Middle East, it was essential that Hariri's plan include the country as a whole, and that it facilitate institutions to bring about good governance (1998, p. 160). Hariri's plan, critics charged, was one of "laissez faire (1998, p. 160)."

The same critics agree that Hariri's background as an entrepreneur, a self-made man who achieved success and wanted to bring that same success home to his country (1998, p. 161). Authors Denoeux and Springborg suggest that this explains why Hariri would be less focused on the state in its totality and total functioning - although they do not offer any real evidence to suggest that that was in fact Hariri's frame of mind or personal thinking. Also, the time from Hariri's assuming the role of prime minister, to the date that he was assassinated, was just six years; much too short a period of time to test Hariri's model, or any model as to its long-term success since the model was abandoned with Hariri's assassination.

The authors contend, too, that Hariri saw the state, as a whole, as an obstacle (1998, p. 161). This might be correct, in consideration of the fact that Lebanon is an Islamic state, and there is no separation of powers in an Islamic state. This, the authors point out, was Hariri's legacy when he assumed office as prime minister (1998, p. 161). This, they suggest, would have worked against Hariri because the state, as whole, given the infrastructural relationship of the urban centers to the rural regions of the country is "an assemblage of conflicting interests and leaders with widely different and often irreconcilable objectives and priorities (1998, p. 161)." The authors to concede that Hariri probably knew he could not reform the state as a whole - at least not for that period in time - because of embedded interests in the state, and because of the Syrian factor. The imbedded interests being the "fiefdoms" which were under the control of certain chieftains and sect leaders, wherein the "bureaucracy operates primarily as a dispenser of patronage to sectoral interests, while public offices and public funds are use to promote the objectives of sectarian institutions and leaders (1998, p. 161)."

Understanding somewhat now the Rafik Hariri model and the dynamics as they existed in Lebanon, we can turn our attention to the investigation and the body of evidence compiled during the investigation of the assassination of Rafik Hariri that led to the arrests of persons accused with the crime of his assassination.

The Investigation of the Assassination of Rafik Hariri

To simply say that the assassination of Lebanon's Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, in February, 2005, was yet another scene of the overall dynamics of the Middle East being played out was not acceptable following the assassination, or even now. Not long after the car bombing that claimed the life of Hariri and nine others, U.S. Secretary of State, Condaleeza Rice, issued a statement saying that the U.S. Ambassador to Syria had been recalled for consultations as a result of the assassination (the Washington Times, February 16, 2005, p. A01). Short of making a specific statement of accusation that Syria had been behind the murder, Rice called for an investigation of the murder (2005, A01). It is here, at this point, that question should follow: Who had the greatest interest in seeing Rafik Hariri eliminated from Lebanon and the Middle East scene? We must ask that question before we go any further, or perform review any additional information in order to keep an open mind as we process the reports that arose from the U.N. commissioned investigation of the events. At this it would serve anyone attempting to sort through the myriad of events and information well to pause and take stock of what is known about the events without having reviewed an official report. As researchers, we have the benefit of hindsight, and it is expected that that hindsight shed light on past events. Taking stock of what we know, the following information is how we stand informed as we begin to review reports arising out of the U.N. investigation of the events surrounding the murder of Rafik Hariri.

Rafik Hariri had been elected Prime Minister of Lebanon in 1992, and had installed a government around himself staffed by people who worked for him and people whom he believed had the skills and expertise to see his plans through to fruition. It was the legally elected and recognized government of Lebanon.

Hariri was faced with mounting debt, and Lebanon was borrowing from international banks.

Hariri, in surrounding himself with those he believed to be loyal to him, had essentially created a new political party in the Lebanon that operated very differently than parties in the country's historical past.

Hariri recognized and continued the traditional institutional support of the rural chieftains and sect leaders.

Hariri posed a problem for the fundamental forces in Syria backed by Iran because Hariri was working towards stabilization of Lebanon; which precluded Lebanon's intent to be involved in future wars against Israel.

Hariri stood as objectification of social, political and economic progress that hardline Islamic fundamentalists equated with Westernization.

Lebanon's strategic location with Israel and Syria does not allow it to remain neutral of the goals of Islamic fundamentalists in the region.

Syria, backed by Iranian Islamic fundamental leadership, is an ongoing source of agitation in the region.

Syria occupied Lebanon for at least two decades prior to the assassination of Hariri, and continued to occupy Lebanon immediately following the assassination of Hariri.

The election of Rafik Hariri was not in keeping with the goals of the Syrian government.

The United States, the UN, Israel and Jordan were calling for Syria to leave Lebanon prior to Hariri's assassination.

The United Nations has proved to be ineffective, and even corrupt as revealed through the Oil for Food Program that implicated not just UN leadership, but also world leaders around the globe.

The United Nations is the body charged with selecting the international investigator, and therefore must be assessed as to its own interests, if any, in the outcome of the investigation.

The United States, as is now known, has covertly operated within the region on levels not entirely known to the citizens of the United States. In calling for an investigation, the role and interests of the United States as a covert force in Lebanon must be assessed.

Very little is known about what motive, if any, Israel might have for wanting to alter the direction in which Hariri was taking Lebanon.

Iran has made strong statements about Israel's future. From Iran's standpoint, Israel will be eliminated.

Iran has a close relationship with Syria and has been accused of using Syria as a gateway to smuggle weapons into the country that are used against Israel and Iraq.

In May, 2000, Israel withdrew its forces from Lebanon, which can only be seen as a vote of confidence that the country was moving in a direction away from that being a military threat to Israel. Even that Israel had common goals with Lebanon.

In 2004, Hariri had resigned as prime minister of Lebanon, although it was believed he was planning to run again. The Hariri camp itself could have benefited from the sympathy and strength of a public united from the assassination of Hariri.

From a lay person's perspective, without benefit of research and based on information that is made available to the average person on a daily basis; that is what we might know of the situation. Now, we can move forward with an examination of the formal evidence that is available by way of the investigative reports that were submitted to the United Nations.

In March, 2005, within a month of the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri, the United Nations dispatched a fact-finding mission to Lebanon (the Washington Times, March 28, 2005, p. A16). The role of the fact-finding team was to review and assess the investigation conducted by Lebanese authorities in the death of Hariri (2005, p. A16). The fact-finding mission would examine the crime scene (2005, p. A16) - although, good criminal procedure would suggest that some 30 days later such an examination would not produce new or even reliable evidence. To that end, author and researcher Michael R. Ronczkowski in his book, Terrorism and Organized Hate Crime: Intelligence Gathering, Analysis and Investigations (2004), says, "When gathering crime information for a law enforcement agency concerned with predefined jurisdictional limitations, most information is derived from one source, the offense and incident report (p. 71)." As suggested by the author here, this would mean that the UN fact-finders would visit the crime scene, but rely upon the formal documents of the Lebanese officials who would have investigated the scene immediately following the incident. To the extent that the fact-finders would visit the scene itself, is akin to - even after all these years - continuing to re-examine the Kennedy assassination by going back to the crime scene at the Dallas book depository. That is to say, it is a matter of examining the science of place, distance, time and opportunity.

The investigators, in this case the Lebanese investigators, had to officially report on their findings. That is a limitation on the information being presented Ronczkowski says, because it is reactive and, thusly, subjective (2004, p. 71). Neither the United Nations or the U.S. specifically or officially blamed Syria, but it was clear, at least from the statements issued by both entities, that the prevailing thought was that Syrian forces were responsible for the assassination (the Washington Times, March 28, 2005, p. A16). Also, the United States and the United Nations had concerns as to the investigative procedures that surrounded the Lebanese investigation of the assassination (2005, p. A 16). The fact-finding mission did not accuse Syria of the assassination, but it specifically stated that Syria was responsible for much of the chaos and violence in the country at that time (2005, p. A16). The fact-finding mission served as the basis from which to move forward with an international inquiry of the murder 2005, p. A16). The fact-finders reported:

After gathering the available facts, the Mission concluded that the Lebanese security services and the Syrian Military Intelligence bear the primary responsibility for the lack of security, protection, law and order in Lebanon. The Lebanese security services have demonstrated serious negligence and in carrying out the duties usually performed by a professional national security apparatus. In so doing, they have severely failed to provide the citizens of Lebanon with an acceptable level of security and, therefore, have contributed to the propagation of a culture of intimidation and impunity. The Syrian Military Intelligence shares this responsibility to the extent of its involvement in running the security services in Lebanon (2005, p. A16)."

The fact-finding mission commented on the agitation and tension that existed prior to the assassination, putting responsibility for that tense situation on Syria (2005, p. A16). The fact finding concluded, too, that Syria had directly interfered with the Government of Lebanon (2005, p. A16). The report concluded that the Lebanese investigation was insufficient and inadequate as it was under the influence of the Syrian Military and that as such, investigator reports were skewed (2005, p. A16). The fact-finding mission also refueled the United States' demand for Syria to leave Lebanon, which had been ordered under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 (2005, p. A16). Unfortunately, Syria rejected the resolution, and regardless of the Security Council's Resolution, continues to occupy Lebanon today. This demonstrates the international weakness of the United Nations as an international body without clout to enforce its own resolutions. It is the not the first time the United Nations has been proven to be a weak international body because it lacks any way to enforce its resolutions.

Still, the United Nations went through the motions of having legal auspices in the international arena by forming a commission to investigate further the assassination of Rafik Hariri (2005, p. A16).