Attack of 911 Has Posed a Serious

¶ … attack of 911 has posed a serious threat to the aviation industry. For the first the world could realize that airplanes are not only the mode of transportation but can also be utilized as potential bombs. Many passengers are apprehensive of air travel. This led Governments, Policy Makers, aviation industries and regulatory authorities to think a while about aviation security. The aviation security is being revolutionized since then to adopt newer technology for the purpose of ensuring the need of complete baggage screening, explosive detection, biometry identification, risk analyses, deployment of adequate skilled personnel, strengthening of cockpit doors etc.

An analysis of the effects of September 11th and Terrorism on Aviation in the United States and Around the World

The terrorist attack in the morning of September 11, 2001 converted the United States became a nation transformed. An airliner flying at the speed of hundreds of miles per hour with about 10000 gallons of jet fuel plunged into the North Tower of the World Trade Centre in Lower Manhattan at 8:46 AM. Seventeen minutes later, another airliner dashed into the South Tower. The Twin Towers collapsed within 90 minutes with fire, smoke puffing upward and steel, glass, ash and bodies falling below. A third airliner at 9:37 AM rushed into the western face of the Pentagon. A fourth airliner crashed into the field in Southern Pennsylvania at 10:03 AM that was targeting the Capitol of U.S. Or White House but forced down by the passengers. The death toll rose to more than 2600 in World Trade Center, 125 at Pentagon and 256 on four planes that outnumbered that of the incident at Pearl Harbor in December 1941. (The 9/11 Commission Report-Final Report of the National commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States)

This attack was perpetrated by 19 young Arabs, in group of four to five taking with them only small knives, box cutters and cans of Mace or pepper spray could able to hijack four plane and able to convert them into deadly guided missiles. On the very day the 19 hijackers could able to get through a security checkpoint system and their success in penetrating the system was cent percent. The defense of U.S. air space at the moment was relying upon the two federal agencies, the Federal Aviation Administration -- FAA and North American Aerospace Defense Command -- NORAD. The prevailing protocols on September 11 were quite unfavorable that resulted in an attack with utilization of hijacked planes as weapons. Immediate attempt was to bring refinements to the system for developing defense mechanism by civilians who never handled a hijacked aircraft that attempted to disappear and by military not ready enough to deal with a situation of transformation of commercial aircraft into weapons of mass destruction.

The probe into the incident brought out several points of vulnerability at the spot and operational failures of the opportunities those were not exploited by the organizations and systems at the moment. The vulnerabilities and loopholes included, not watch listing the future hijackers Hazmi and Mihdhar, not following them after their travel to Bangkok, not publicizing the information linking individuals in the Cole attack to Mihdhar, not taking sufficient timely measures to find out Mihdhar or Hazmi in the U.S., not according due emphasis to the nab of Zacarias Moussaoui, narrated as interested in flight training with a view to utilizing an airplane in a terrorist act, not recognizing passports fraudulently manipulated, not ientifying airline passengers by the computer-based screening system, not strengthening aircraft cockpit doors or taking other measures to prepare for the possibility of suicide hijackings. (The 9/11 Commission Report-Final Report of the National commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States)

The missed opportunities to prevent the 9/11 incident were also regarded as signs of a general inefficacy to adapt the mode government handles problems to the new challenges of the twenty-first century. The permeable aviation security system was exploited up to the maximum possible extent by the hijackers to their advantage after studying the publicly available materials on the aviation security system and applied arms that contains less metallic material and were mostly permissible. Irrespective of the fact that two of the hijackers were on the U.S. TIP OFF terrorist watch list, the FAA failed to utilize the TIP OFF data. The hijackers succeeded after beating only one layer of security -- the security checkpoint process. Although, several hijackers were chosen for extra screening by the CAPPS system, this was applied to greater scrutiny of their checked baggage. Once on board the hijackers could easily captivate the aircraft personnel those were trained to be non-confrontational in the event of a hijacking.

Taking the magnitude of the menace of the day and especially the security loopholes it has become imperative to devise strategies to protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks. The recommendations, among others, were to deal with the problems of screening people with biometric identifiers along the agencies and governments incorporating out border and transportation systems by chalking out a complete screening system that deal with common problems and sets common standards; rapidly finalize a biometry entry exit screening system, that also speeds qualified travelers; devise strategies for ignored parts of the transportation security system; to avoid arguments about a new computerized profiling system from delaying introduction of crucial improvements in the 'no-fly' and 'automatic selectee' lists. (The 9/11 Commission Report-Final Report of the National commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States)

The attacks of September 11, 2001 led to accord renewed urgency to the security of the aviation system of United States and the efforts to strengthen the aviation security have received a great deal of congressional attention. The Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act on November 19, 2001, that established the Transportation Security Administration under the Department of Transportation. The TSA was assigned with the primary responsibility of ascertain security in aviation along with that in other modes of transportation. The Congress enacted Homeland Security Act on November 25, 2002 that placed the TSA under the newly created Department of Homeland Security that was assigned with the overall responsibility for aviation security. The Act of Aviation and Transport Security shifted the security-screening responsibilities from the airlines to TSA and laid down a set of requirements to enhance the aviation security. (Aviation Security Progress since September 11, 2001, and the Challenges Ahead)

The Act required, among others the deployment of federal screeners in all the 429 commercial airports in the nation within one year and also to adopt the application of Explosive Detection Technology at such airports to ensure screening of every place of checked baggage for explosives. Some of the Aviation Security liabilities continued to remain with FAA. To illustrate, FAA is liable for the security of its air traffic control and other computer systems and of its air traffic control systems. The Airport Improvement Program -- AIP trust fund is also to be administered by FAA that is applied in financing the capital improvements to airports, inclusive of some security developments like terminal medications to accommodate Explosive Detection Equipments. Over the years TSA and FAA implemented several measures to bring out considerable improvement in the field of aviation security. The TSA executed the congressional mandates and find out various choices for enhanced adoption of technology and information to regulate access to secure different areas of airports and to enhance passenger screening. (Aviation Security Progress since September 11, 2001, and the Challenges Ahead)

FAA concentrated on its continued efforts on enhancing the security of the air traffic control systems and facilities of the nation. In the initial year of its establishment the TSA attempted to concentrate mainly on adhering to the aviations security deadlines earmarked in ATSA. TSA started with 13 employees but within 1 year the Agency had hired and deployed about 65,000 passenger and baggage screeners, federal air marshals, and others. It could accomplish the target of deploying federal passenger screeners at airports by hiring, training, and deploying over 40,000 individuals to screen passengers at 429 commercial airports by November, 2002. It could be able to hire and deploy more than 20,000 individuals to screen all checked baggage during the period. It could adopt explosive detection systems or explosives trace detection equipment for the purpose of screening about 90% of all checked baggage by December 31, 2002.

It confiscated about 4.8 million prohibited items inclusive of firearms, knives and incendiary or flammable objects from passengers and has entailed considerable progress in expanding the Federal Air Marshal Service. In order to exert its greater regulation over access to secure areas of airports and other transportation facilities, TSA is extending the initiatives that entail greater utilization of technology and information. The Agency is probing into the establishment of a Transportation Workers Identification Card -- TWIC Program that envisages introduction of a uniform, nationwide standard for the secure identification of 12 million workers, those who require unescorted physical or cyber access to secure areas of airports and other transportation systems. TWIC involves an assimilation of the standard background screenings and biometrics in order that a worker can be securely matched to his or her credential. With complete adoption of the program The TWIC card will emerge as the standard credential for airport workers and will accepted by all modes of transportation. Besides, TSA has been developing the next-generation Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System or CAPPS-II. (Aviation Security Progress since September 11, 2001, and the Challenges Ahead)

CAPPS-II is one of the automated passenger screening systems that embody personal information so that the identity of the passenger could have easily ascertained at times of contingency. The security requirements envisages running of the identifying information against national security information and commercial databases and assignment of a risk score to the passenger. The risk score determines further probe into the passenger prior to going onboard. Moreover, the TSA has also developed initiatives so as to enable it to apply its passenger screening instruments more efficiently. It has attempted to develop a registered traveler program that affords to prescreen low-risk travelers. Under such program after voluntary application to participate the low-risk travelers after going through a background check would receive a unique identifier or card that would enable them to be screened more quickly and would concentrate more on the other passengers necessitating more extensive screening. At the same time FAA also concentrated more on the strengthening of security of the nation's air traffic control computer systems.

FAA has instated an information systems security management structure headed by the Chief Information Officer, the office of which has developed an information systems security strategy, security architecture, security policies and directives and a security awareness training campaign. This office also managed the FAA's incident response center and implemented a certification and accreditation process to ensure that vulnerabilities in current and future air traffic control systems are identified and weaknesses dealt in effectively. Irrespective of the fact that TSA has concentrated much making it certain that the bombs and other threat items are not carried into the commercial aircraft by passengers in their luggage the risk continues that influence much on the air cargo, general aviation and airport perimeter security. It has been estimated by TSA that about 12.5 million tons of cargo are transported every year out of which 9.7 million tons are transported on all cargo planes and about 2.8 million tons are transported on passenger planes. (Aviation Security Progress since September 11, 2001, and the Challenges Ahead)

The inherent risks involved in this respect are introduction of undetected explosive and incendiary devices in cargo placed aboard aircraft; the transportation of undeclared and undetected hazardous materials; aircraft hijackings and sabotage by perpetrators having access to cargo aircraft. ATSA lay down that all cargo carried aboard commercial passenger aircraft is screened and that TSA is required to adopt a system to screen, inspect or ensure the security of cargo on all-cargo aircraft. The primary approach of the TSA to ensure air cargo security and safety and to comply with the cargo screening stipulations is to adopt its 'known shipper' program that allows shippers that have instituted business histories with air carriers or freight forwarders to ship cargo on planes. Many measures have been taken by the TSA during the period for increasing the cargo security that includes implementation of database of known shippers which has been developed in the same analogy to that of Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System.

The General Aviation Security is also considered much vulnerable since general aviation pilots are not screened before taking off and the cargo carried by the general aviation planes are not subject to screening at any checkpoint. FAA has instructed with voluntary guidance to flight schools and businesses that entail services for aircraft and pilots at general aviation airport. The guidelines include application of varied keys for access to the aircraft and start the ignition and not providing students access to aircraft keys ensuring positive identification of flight students and training employees and pilots to report suspicious activities. The Airport Perimeter Security is considered to be quite vulnerable in paving the way for individuals to attain unauthorized access to aircraft and secure areas of airports. There is the possibility of launching attack by the terrorists using a shoulder-fired missile from the perimeter of an airport as well as from locations just outside the perimeter. It is therefore, felt significant for TSA to coordinate with FAA and the airport operators for application of a number of technologies to secure and assess airport perimeters that incorporate barriers, motion sensors and closed-circuit television. (Aviation Security Progress since September 11, 2001, and the Challenges Ahead)

Following the attack of 9/11 an ad hoc Research, Engineering & Development Advisory Committee -- REDAC, security Subcommittee is constituted in U.S.. The objective of the subcommittee is to evaluate varied aviation security research opportunities and entail short, mid and long-term suggestions in respect of the promising technologies for security benefits. The objective of FAA has been to eradicate the possibility of all potential damages to aircraft, passengers and crew along with support for national security and counter terrorism. The Subcommittee studies various available technologies and recommended for implementation of the same to combat occurrence of such future incidents. (Aviation Security Initiatives Post September 11, 2001)

The regulation of people coming out or entering into the protected areas like physical buildings, information systems and national borders, are considered as one of the primary requirement. The adoption of biometric technologies in the sphere of aviation security was considered more effective. The Biometric technology automates the identification of people by means of one or more their distinct physical or behavioral features. The Biometric technologies are varied in complexity, capabilities and performance and can be used for the purpose of verifying or to institute a person's identity. The peculiar biometric technology involves application facial recognition, fingerprint recognition, hand geometry, and iris recognition, etc. And it could be applied in order to screen the identity by means of measuring and analyzing the human natures depending upon the attributes of the individual. And this is in contrary to the things the individual may have or would know about. The identification of the physical characteristics or attributes is based on the direct measurement of the physical part of the body. On the other hand we could understand that the behavioral characteristics or features are inclusive of the data which are acquired from actions, like the speech and signature. The traditional identification methods are found to normally apply something you have like that of identity card or something one would know like that of the password. (Aviation Security Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies)

However, the biometrics technology lays stress on the characteristics integral to something you are. The Biometrics technology is considered to be a young technology. There prevail three key performance metrics such as false match rate FMR, false non-match rate FNMR and a failure to enroll rate FTER. In order to enhance the performance effectiveness the systems have been developed with integration of two or more biometrics. Multiple biometrics normally involves combination of facial and iris recognition. Some systems also integrate fingerprint and facial recognition technologies to enhance identification. The biometric application to become more effective necessitates identification, exchange and integration of information from various and probably unfamiliar sources and functions. The standards prescribed by National Institute of Science and Technology known as Common Biometric Exchange File Format facilitate data exchange between various system components and simplify integrating the software and hardware from various vendors. (Aviation Security Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies)

The Aviation Security Biometrics Working Group formed in joint collaboration of FAA and the Department of Defense Counter-drug Technology Development Program Office examined the application of biometrics in respect of four aviation security applications such as identity verification of employees thereby ensuring access of only authorized personnel to the secured areas within an airport; safeguard of public areas in and around airport using surveillance; identify verification of passengers boarding aircraft and verification identity of flight crews prior to or during a flight. (Aviation Security Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies) Prior to 9/11 only Explosive Detection System was normally applied for screening checked bags belonging to persons identified by the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System. CAPPS facilitated the air carriers to concentrate EDS screening on a limited number of passengers. (Aviation Security Initiatives Post September 11, 2001)

Taking in to consideration the hazards of 9/11 incident the congress mandated to screen out all checked baggage applying explosive detection systems at airports by December 31, 2003. The TSA made considerable progress in establishing Explosive Detection System -- EDS as well as Explosive Trace Detection systems that apply chemical analysis to detect traces of explosive material vapors or residues, in 400 airports of U.S. To entail efficacies in screening baggage. However, previously, the use of stand alone ETD and the minivan-sized EDS machines installed primarily in airport lobbies and were not integrated in-line with airport baggage conveyor system. By the end of September 2004 TSA could procure and place about 1200 EDS machines and about 6000 ETD and took steps to integrate the same in-line with airport conveyor baggage system in the 400 airports of the nation. (Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems)

The development of new Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening system -- CAPPS II to identify passengers has been successfully implemented in respect of aviation security. However, the development of CAPPS II has brought out many issues incorporating whether data accessed by the system might compromise the privacy of passengers. In order to deal with the challenges being involved with regard to developing, taking it into implementation and operation of CAPPS II it has been suggested that the Homeland Security would instruct the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration to undertake measures for the purpose of developing plans for detecting the specific or particular functionality for increment of CAPPS II. It would imply applying established plans in relation to tracking developmental progress to ensure about promised functionality, etc. (Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System Faces Significant Implementation Challenges)