Augusto Pinochet and Human Rights

Augusto Pinochet and Human Rights Abuses

Augusto Pinochet was the principle actor in a notorious military coup in Chile -- ironically, the date was September 11, 1973 -- that was partly orchestrated by the United States. This bloody coup led to an extraordinary period of human rights violations and other heinous crimes in Chile. This paper relates to the human rights part of the Pinochet story, what happened to the people of Chile because of the legacy of Pinochet, why that is important today, and how the violations of human rights in Chile mirrored similar violations in Europe and elsewhere.

How Pinochet Came to Power in Chile -- Multiple Violations of Human Rights

By 1973, the constitutionally elected government of Chile had been a "stable democracy" for most of the twentieth century, according to Nigel Rodley writing in the Nordic Journal of International Law. This was not typical of South American governments, Rodley explains, but notwithstanding the democratic tradition in Chile the country was overthrown by a military coup on September 11, 1973. Led by a military junta that General Augusto Pinochet had control over, and by money and covert actions by the United States, the coup put Pinochet in power and led to the demise of president Allende, who committed suicide rather than be assassinated by the members of the military that were part of the coup.

Veronica Valdivia Ortiz de Zarate writes in the peer-reviewed journal Radical History Review that the coup placing Pinochet in power partly resulted from the inability of Allende to put a coalition government together and to find solutions to immediate national problems. but, de Zarate explains, Pinochet was also put into his dictatorial position due in part to the covert actions of U.S. President Richard Nixon.

The late Republican president, known to be fiercely anti-communist and anti-socialism -- and in hindsight Nixon is a disgraced and corrupt American leader who was forced to resign in the wake of the Watergate scandal -- authorized the CIA to undertake a "…two-track policy." That two-track policy was zeroed in on "…simultaneously destabilizing the Chilean economy and society by financing opposition groups and by a massive propaganda campaign against" Allende's government (de Zarate, 2003, p. 186). On the morning of September 11, 1973, the citizens of Chile watched in amazement as the Chilean air force bombed the presidential palace, La Moneda.

Shortly after the destruction of the presidential palace, the Pinochet regime began a massive campaign of human slaughter, killing "…as many as 1,500 people… during the first days after the military takeover. The dead floated near the banks of the river that crosses the city of Santiago," de Zarate continues (187). Those in the Allende government -- including the presidential guard -- were shot and killed, and others in the Allende administration that survived the initial assault "…were shot later and their corpses disappeared" (de Zarate, 187). Members of the Chilean air force said later their task was to "…put a definitive end to the Marxist government" of Allende; of course they were greatly influenced by propaganda campaign paid for by the Nixon CIA, which funded the propaganda campaign and other covert acts against Allende with more than $6 million in American taxpayer dollars (187).

For his part, Pinochet argued that his violence against citizens and his other corrupt and heinous acts were necessary because Chile was "…in a state of war for seventeen years" (de Zarate, 187). That was Pinochet's pithy justification for his brutal policies of slaughter and torture, but in fact, according to the Rettig Report, the violations of human rights committed between 1973 and 1989 had nothing to do with war or civil war. "Rather," de Zarate asserts, "they were committed against defenseless people for political reasons" (187).

The first phase of Pinochet's repressive dictatorship was brutal; between September and December 1973, the following violations of human rights were reported: a) massive detentions throughout the country; b) thousands of prisoners were detained in "concentration camps"; c) there were mass executions of "political prisoners" and of ordinary peasants that were involved in "…the process of agrarian reform"; and d) there were untold numbers of executions of young people that were living in "urban squatter settlements" -- called "social cleansing" by Pinochet's spokespersons (de Zarate, 187).

The second phase of the repression took place between 1974 and 1977. It was a "systematic policy" of exterminating those believed to be a threat politically. The policy of "forced disappearance" was implemented on a massive scale, de Zarate continues. Thousands of victims were hauled to detention centers, blindfolded, given psychological and physical torture, which included "…rape, especially, though not exclusively, of female prisoners. Torture often resulted in death" (de Zarate, 188).

The third phase of the Pinochet repression (between 1977 and 1989) prominent opponents of the military regime, union leaders, and others fighting against being ruled by a dictator were killed by either the police or military, de Zarate explained on page 188.

The CIA and Human Rights in Chile

On the subject of human rights, the United States has been in violation of the human rights of people in a number of countries, including Chile. Indeed, was it in the best interest of citizens in Chile, was it in the best interests of justice, and was it in the best interest of international fair play on the part of the world's most powerful democracy to have the Central Intelligence Agency funding -- and engaging in -- covert acts in Chile to bring down a freely elected president (Allende) and help install a brutal, blood-thirsty, corrupt general? The answer is obviously no. The only reason that the people in America and in Chile (and elsewhere in the world) know about the skullduggery that the CIA was engaged in is because the Americans were pressured to declassify some of the documents that the CIA kept.

Peter Kornbluh writes in the peer-reviewed NACLA Report on the Americas that the CIA tried to cover up the "most egregious aspects of the U.S. intervention in Chile," but the documents that the CIA was pressured to release (in 2000) showed strong support for a military coup. In a Memorandum sent to then presidential advisor on national security, Henry Kissinger, the CIA director admitted to "three years of massive covert operations" designed to "destabilize the government of Salvador Allende" (Kornbluh, 2003, p. 30).

"This Agency did not conduct covert action operations in support of either of the two democratic candidates who opposed Salvador Allende in the 1970 presidential election," the memo to Kissinger stated (Kornbluh, 28). The role the CIA filled was "…limited to an effort to denigrate Allende…during the campaign"; and after the campaign, the CIA engaged in a policy designed to "…maintain maximum covert pressure to prevent the Allende regime's consolidation," the CIA assured Kissinger, during his confirmation hearings as Nixon's Secretary of State (Kornbluh, 28).

The memo indicates that a total of $6,476,166 of U.S. taxpayer money was invested in projects and programs in Chile that were intended embarrass, harass, or otherwise harm and bring down the Allende presidency (Kornbluh, 28). What those de-classified documents have done is opened the door to civil lawsuits that Chilean victims could potentially file against the CIA and other American officials, Kornbluh continues on page 31. The documents name manes, reveals specific "atrocities," and fully exposes those who perpetrated the atrocities, Kornbluh continues. Hence, since the release of the unclassified documents, the United States has been shown to not only be accountable for some of the bloodshed in Chile, the U.S. is also shown in media outlets around the world to be cooperating with those who commit human rights violations through the egregious crimes of those accepting covert American money (Kornbluh, 31). The final irony vis-a-vis the legal demise of Pinochet is that by releasing the documents, the United States helped England and Spain bring Pinochet closer to justice; and of course this was the same Pinochet that the Americans helped to illegally and brutally seize power from Allende in 1973.

In David Wallechinsky's book, Tyrants: The World's 20 Worst Living Dictators, he explains that "All dictators stay in power through violence or the threat of violence, yet most of them try to gain the support of at least some of their citizens" (Wallechinsky, 2006, p. 7). They gain the support by using the ploy of patriotism or nationalism, Wallechinsky writes. "Every dictator presents his citizens" with an argument that goes something like, "Our nation is being threatened by an outside force" (Wallechinsky, 7). That is very close to what Pinochet told the citizens of Chile after seizing power. He said the country was near to a civil war, and the only way to prevent that war was to take over the country because the Marxist reforms Allende tried to carry out -- the potential cause of the so-called oncoming civil war -- was incapable of preventing that supposed civil war.

Writing in the Dictator's Shadow: Life Under Augusto Pinochet, author Heraldo Munoz references Pinochet's "carefully crafted book about the 1973 coup" which was called El Dia Decisivo (the Crucial Day). In that book, which Munoz claims was just a "long interview with a fictitious journalist," Pinochet portrays himself as a life-long "anti-Communist," and he recounts an experience he had as an army officer in Pisagua, a prison where communists were incarcerated. "The more I knew those prisoners and listened to their thoughts, while, at the same time, I studied Marx and Engels, the more I became convinced that we were mistaken about the Communist Party," Pinochet wrote. "It was not just another party… it was a system that turns things on their heads, dismissing any loyalty…" he continued (Munoz, 2008, p. 28). As though justifying the cruelty he perpetrated on thousands of civilians -- in the name of him keeping a grip on his dictatorship -- he said he was "…troubled that these pernicious and contaminating ideas could continue and spread throughout Chile" (Pinochet quoted by Munoz, p. 28).

Human Rights Violations in Chile Under Pinochet

Nigel writes that in Pinochet's first five years as dictator of Chile, there was "…widespread and systematic murder, torture and enforced disappearance" (16). Even though the murders and disappearances were fewer after those first five horrific years under Pinochet, "…torture remained common," Nigel continues (16). When a civilian government took over Chile in 1991, the new president established the "National Commission of Truth and Reconciliation" which documented the following: a) 1,068 "confirmed cases of extra-legal or summary execution"; b) 957 cases that were confirmed of "enforced disappearance"; and c) other cases (641) for which a "conviction" could not be confirmed and another 449 in which not enough information was available (Nigel, 16-17). Interestingly, Pinochet was shielded from prosecution after he was out of office, because initially he was an army commander (until March 10, 1988) and couldn't be held accountable for his actions as dictator; and secondarily, he was sworn in as "Senator-for-Life" the next day, March 11, 1988. This amnesty he was afforded also was given to his colleagues and subordinates, in most cases (Nigel, 17).

Pinochet's Arrest in London

Although he was protected from prosecution for his crimes in Chile, he could not avoid being ensnared by two international arrest warrants, one issued by a judge in Spain and the other by highly placed judge in London (Nigel). Pinochet was charged with conspiracy to murder and to torture, and actual torture and hostage taking. Later an expanded list of crimes was added to the initial charges, including "genocide and murder, as well as conspiracy to commit murder" (Nigel, 18).

Could Pinochet actually be extradited from London? That was a question that hovered over the London legal establishment. The answer in time was, yes he could be extradited and returned to Chile, but he never was prosecuted. Kristin Sorensen writes that first the Supreme Court ruled that Pinochet was not fit to stand trail because of his mental and physical health problems. Later, the Santiago Appeals Court took Pinochet's immunity away from him but he died in 2006, was never convicted of his many crimes, and "cases against him have been dropped" (Sorenson, 2009, p. 4).

However, by June, 2007, the courts had prosecuted one of Pinochet's top generals, Raul Ituriaga Neuman, and he was to report to prison to serve a five-year sentence. He had been convicted of ordering the kidnapping in 1974 of Luis San Martin Vergara, a member of the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR). But Neuman never showed up and so apparently very few of Pinochet's bloodletting military brass ever were held accountable for the atrocities and other crimes (Sorenson, p. 3)

Neuman did leave a video statement: "I openly rebel against this arbitrary, biased, unconstitutional and illegal sentence… I was subjected to undue prosecution," he claimed (Sorenson, 4). He argued that like about 500 other members of the military who he had also been prosecuted unfairly. His prosecution took place he said "…under the complacent gaze of the government and institutions that do not defend our rights, which we are justly claiming" (Sorenson, 4). The spokesman for retired officers (who served with Pinochet) is Hernan Bayas, who issued a statement saying "Sooner or later, there will be a storm," which was not a very veiled reference to "military consequences" that Bayas claimed would be brought to bear if "human rights cases were not dropped" (Sorenson, 4).

Sorenson notes that at the time this book was published (2009) the present commander of the Chilean army, General Oscar Izurieta, has put forward gestures of cooperation with some of the military personnel that were implicated in some of the "…most notorious cases of human rights violations," including assassinations of elected officials and the poisoning of the former President of Chile, president Eduardo Frei Montalva in a Santiago hospital in 1982 (Sorenson, 4). It is almost humorous to reflect on Izurieta's demand that those army personnel accused of some of the most heinous crimes against innocent civilians should be considered "innocent until proven guilty," Sorenson continues. Those officers should be given "a complete and fair trial in the courts," Izurieta demanded.