Authors Referenced Works Specific Recent Circumstances Discussed That Have Changed the Nature of Warfare

Changing Nature of Warfare

According to generals like Rupert Smith and David Petraeus, postmodern conflict is radically different from warfare between industrialized states, such as the American Civil War and the world wars of the 20th Century. It does not begin with a condition of peace or return to it after the total defeat of the enemy, but rather is a "continuous crisscrossing between confrontation and conflict," often with indecisive results (Smith 19). Confrontations with North Korea and Serbia, for example, continued long after the end of the actual fighting on the battlefield, and the political issues that gave rise to the conflicts remained unresolved. These types of conflicted often dragged on for years or even decades, as in Afghanistan and Somalia, and were always fought among the people, with enemies who had a strong tactical advantage over their better funded and equipped opponents because of their familiarity with local cultures and conditions. In addition, postmodern conflicts are media wars, fought out in living rooms around the world due to a 24-hour news cycle. For the new theorists of counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare like Smith and Petraeus, the main goal in this prolonged conflicts is not even to defeat the enemy on the battlefield but to win the 'hearts and minds' of the local population so it will turn against the insurgents. This is why COIN warfare always offers inducements of social, political and economic development. Unlike the generals, Andrew Bacevich calls for nation building at home, pointing out the desperate political, social and economic crisis within the United States, and a wide variety of problems that have been neglected since the 1970s. As a declining superpower, heavily in debt, the U.S. can no longer support these foreign adventures and long, drawn out wars, and indeed public opinion seems to have turned very sour on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which Gen. Petreaus firmly believes the U.S. can and should win. This may prove very difficult, however, in the context of the worse economic crisis since the 1930s, a revived isolationist and inward-looking public mood, and doubts about whether such wars are winnable at all, at least at any reasonable cost.

Political and military leaders who fail to take into account the importance of cable news coverage and the new forms of Internet communications will have failed in their missions before they even begin. Objectives in these wars generally will not be the total destruction or submission of the enemy, and "the tools of industrial warfare are often irrelevant," given that the opposition often consists on non-state actors who are not armed with tanks, planes, submarines and artillery (Smith 20). In Iraq after May 2003, for instance, there was "little utility to the force" assembled there after Saddam Hussein's army had been defeated. It could not fulfill the tasks of reconstruction and nation building and was "neither trained nor equipped for the task" (Smith 12). In the so-called War on Terror, there will never be any "decisive victory" in the old-fashioned sense because of the very nature of the enemy. As in most conflicts after the Cold War, force has been "misapplied" without useful results (Smith 27).

In the West at least, the decision to use military force will remain a political one, but in postmodern conflicts, politics and military force will be constantly intermingled, while the forces used will no longer be generic but specifically tailored to meet each specific situation as it arises. From the 17th to the 20th Centuries, Britain had a military, political and diplomatic strategy that was well-suited to its situation as an island power, even though the conditions that existed in that period are now fundamentally altered and the older policies no longer apply. In the past, it was mainly a sea power with far flung commercial and imperial interests, and maintained only a small standing army in peacetime. Diplomatically, it practiced a balance-of-power strategy with consummate skill, in order to prevent any rival industrial powers like France, Germany, Japan or Russia from dominating Europe or Asia. Indeed, the United States, Britain and their NATO allies continued this in its Cold War containment policies against the Soviet Union. During the period of its heyday as an imperial power, the performance of Britain's ground army was often poor compared to the navy, as in the Crimean War, Boer War and first three years of World War I. None of this is even remotely applicable to the types of military confrontations occurring in most of the world today.

According to the new paradigm of warfare, most conflicts will no longer be of the industrial-interstate variety, and adapting to this reality will require another revolution in military thought. Such transformational thinking will finally accept the fact that "we are living in a world of confrontations and conflicts rather than one of war and peace" (Smith 374). Decisive victories are no longer possible in the traditional sense and the political roots of confrontations will remain in place after the end of military action. Military force alone will never resolve these conflicts, especially those in which the enemy appears to be nameless and "faceless," such as "insurgents" and "terrorists" in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and the Philippines (Smith 376). Their typical weapons will be small arms and Improvised Explosive Devices set off by cell phones, and they will be concealed in and "amongst the people" (Smith 370). Massive use of force and high tech weapons will not defeat them, and insofar as these cause great destruction to civilian lives and property will actually be a victory for the enemy. Israel learned this in its 2006 invasion of Lebanon, when it inflicted tremendous damage on Hezbollah and civilians alike, thus losing the political and public relations war despite some limited military successes. Such conflicts against relatively low tech enemies may never really be one at all, but only managed and contained, with the enemy having a natural advantage over industrial states and militaries trained to fight conventional wars against other states. They will always end up fighting on battlefields that the enemy "has set and on his terms" (Smith 379). Western-style militaries have faced this exact type of situation repeatedly over the last twenty years, from Somalia to Afghanistan, fighting guerillas and armed civilians "who pick the location, time and context of every battle and skirmish" (Smith 377). In fact, they find it very useful for propaganda purposes that the Western powers inflict massive casualties on civilians.

In Iraq after 2003, this problem was especially difficult after the defeat of Saddam Hussein's regular army due to the insurgency that dragged on for eight years. Both the U.S. And its coalition partners initially failed to determine the goals and motivations of the insurgents, such as the restoration of the Sunni Ba'athist state, a Shi'ite regime allied with Iran or an Al Qaeda-style theocracy. Some were simply seeking "the destruction of the state which they no longer ruled," while the religious extremists concentrated in mosques and schools that the Western militaries could not easily target (Smith 383). They lacked intelligence and information about their opponents and therefore had no real means to coerce, deter or defeat them, nor did they have clear political and military objectives that could rally public support. Simply using constant force against guerillas without knowing who they are or what goals they desire "will likely as not reinforce the opponent's position rather than weaken it" (Smith 384).

Establishing security and order may be a worthwhile goal and one which the local population will support, but that begs the question of whose order it will be and who will enforce it. In Iraq, the "desired outcome was a democratic state operating by the norms of Western democracies and open to free trade with the West" (Smith 404). Obviously this goal was never attained, to put it mildly, and outside the Kurdish zone at least the final outcome remains uncertain at best. No one on the coalition side gave sufficient thought in 2003 to how these lofty goals might be achieved in reality or who would administer the new Iraqi state. If the Ba'ath Party was destroyed, there was always a high probability that it would be replaced by sectarian imams and mosques allied with Iran or Al Qaeda rather than by liberal democrats. This remains a problem in all Middle Eastern countries today where secular dictatorships are being challenged or overthrown by popular revolutions. Without answering the ultimate political questions, then, military force is not only ineffective but downright counterproductive. Beyond immediate military victory over Saddam Hussein, few people on the civilian or military side of the U.S. government gave sufficient thought to these hard questions of nation building, nor were the Western militaries well trained and equipped to deal with this situation. In fact, when Western-style militaries and their tanks, planes and heavily fortified bases appear in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, they automatically seem to be the enemy 'Other' rather than liberators (Smith 414).

Western moral and legal traditions require that order be maintained with the least amount of damage possible to civilian lives and property. For this purpose, regular policing is far preferable to the use of military force. In a society in which innocent civilians can be arrested, incarcerated or summarily executed, rule of law and popular support for government will not exist. Just the opposite, "the more measures to impose order involve terrorizing the population, the more the position of the opponent as their defender is enhanced" (Smith 388). A minimal use of force that will achieve the objective is the most desirable strategy, along with a military force that is restrained by the rule of law in its conduct toward civilians. In these types of conflicts the "morality of the use of force cannot be overemphasized" (Smith 391). Success in counterinsurgency warfare also requires asking the serious political, social and economic questions that were not asked before intervention in places like Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan. Among these are questions about the nature of the enemy, what their political goals are, whether the leaders of displaced regimes should be removed, whose legal system will be in force, who will administer the state apparatus, whether enough information about the desired outcome even exists, what type and degree of military force best fits the given situation, for how long, and whether it should be direct or indirect force (Smith 392).

Counterinsurgency wars are fought at the level of companies, platoons and squads rather than brigades and divisions. Even then, "the military will not be the sole or probably even the lead player," and if political, military and economic objectives are not well-coordinated the entire operation will fail (Smith 396). In industrial warfare, dealing with the civilian population is a purely secondary task compared to victory over the enemy on the battlefield, but in warfare against guerillas and insurgents the opposite must be the case. Civilian Affairs is not "considered career enhancing" in traditional military organizations, but it has to become the most important part of the mission in counterinsurgency warfare (Smith 396). Militaries trained in industrial-interstate warfare simply do not perform these types of tasks very well, and they have a shortage of officers who can deal effectively with civilians, the local populations, non-military agencies and NGOs. They are "structured vertically" with little information sharing and coordination across organizational lines, and often lack the intelligence capabilities to "learn about the enemy and the people and to find out what separates the one from the other" (Smith 399). These are not wars of attrition, but of intelligence and precision in the use of force. Dealing with the media is another key aspect of counterinsurgency operations, and "establishing the context of the event and getting the story correct from the start is…important" (Smith 400). If Western militaries are unable to do this effectively the enemy most certainly will, which is why military organizations always require their own "narrators" with commanding officers acting as the "producers" (Smith 403).

General David Petraeus agreed that the United States was totally unprepared to wage counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare in Iraq in 2003. It had no effective COIN doctrine and lacked officers with the correct language, intelligence and civil affairs experience to deal with guerilla and unconventional conflicts. Indeed, "in 2003 most Army officers knew more about the U.S. Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency" (Petraeus and Amos xv). Petraeus was an unusual officer by American standards, having a PhD in international relations from Princeton, and serving as governor of Mosul, Iraq, where he concentrated on political and economic development. He worked with Gen. James Mattis of the Marine Corps to develop a new counterinsurgency manual (Field Manual 3-24), which become so popular that even the Taliban and Al Qaeda quickly obtained copies of it from the Internet. This is why Petraeus was finally put in charge of the COIN phase of the Iraq War, then the entire War on Terror, and finally the war in Afghanistan.

He fully agrees with Gen. Rupert Smith that the main goal of COIN is not actual war fighting or winning battles but in winning over the entire population, that will then provide useful intelligence against the insurgents. His favorite motto is "Intelligence Drives Operations," which include economic, social and political development, improving host country (HN) police and security forces, and good governance, all of which must be coordinated simultaneously of the operation will fail (Petraeus and Amos xviii). Nor should the U.S. And its allies continue nation building forever, but prepare the HN forces to take over security duties as rapidly as possible. COIN must have a comprehensive strategy "employing all instruments of national political power" for the purpose of gaining "popular support while protecting the population" (Petreaus and Amos 53). NGOs, civilian governmental agencies and the United Nations all have a vital role to play in the development and civil society aspects of COIN, which are more important by far than military operations. Moreover, if the HN government is unable to win popular trust, support and loyalty, the strategy cannot succeed, which is one factor that made the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan very difficult to win. As Smith noted, excessive use of force is to be avoided at all costs in COIN operations, lest it alienate the civilian population. Military forces will have to carry out the tasks of social and economic development if civilians are not available, but "effective implementation of these programs is more important than who performs the tasks" (Petraeus and Amos 55). Important COIN tasks include providing for crime control, basic economic needs, food, water, electricity, health care and support for cultural, religious and educational institutions.

Ideally, formal memoranda of agreement or understanding will lay out the division of labor between military and civilian agencies, and unity of command and effort is vital. Many relationships on the ground will have to be worked out informally, on a handshake basis, but both military and civilian actors must have a "common understanding of purpose" (Petraeus and Amos 58). NGOs and private organizations will not necessarily be under direct military control, and probably should not be, while military commanders should also ensure that local HN authorities and leaders receive credit for successful programs. In the Army and Marine Corps, civil affairs officers, engineers, medical units, and language and intelligence units all have key roles in COIN warfare, as will security assistance for police and military forces in the HN. In ground fighting, the main going will not be to defeat the enemy, but prevent insurgent "efforts to establish base areas and consolidate their forces" (Petraeus and Amos 61). American government departments such as Agriculture, Energy, CIA, FBI, and Transportation will also be involved in COIN operations as well. NGOs will generally be in a country before COIN operations begin and remain there after the insurgency ends, and military commanders should be aware that most of them "maintain strict independence from governments and belligerents and do not want to be seen associating with military forces" (Petreaus and Amos 64). Among the most important of these will be the Red Cross, World Vision, Save the Children, CARE and Doctors without Borders, all of which provide useful social and economic development services even if they are not part of COIN operations. On the other hard, UN agencies like the World Food Program, World Health Organization, High Commissioner for Refugees and Department of Peacekeeping Operations will often be part of COIN, as will corporations and contractors funded by the U.S. government. All of these come under the unity of command and effort principle unless they are strictly independent private and nonprofit organizations (Petraeus and Amos 65).

COIN strategists prefer that civilian agencies perform civilian tasks wherever possible, and that local authorities be established to fulfill these rather than foreigners or outsiders. Numbers of available civilian personnel may be very limited, however, and they may also be reluctant to deploy on highly violent and conflicted zones. In these areas, military officers will have to be prepared to take on all these civilian tasks if no one else is available, but transition to civilian control always remains the preferred option under COIN doctrine. Petreaus repeatedly emphasizes that coordination of all civilian and military efforts is essential, starting with the National Security Council (NSC) which serves as the "principal means for coordinating policy among various interagency organizations" (Petraeus and Amos 70). Within the Department of Defense, joint interagency coordination groups (JIACGs) are charged with assisting COIN commanders with coordination of all civilian and military efforts. At the HN level, the country team headed by the ambassador is in charge of all non-military activities, while at the local levels, military forces "often represent the country team in decentralized and diffuse operational environments" (Petraeus and Amos 71). All countries where COIN operations are taking place should also have a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) under the control of the military commander, which will be used for transmitting his "guidance to other agencies, exchanging information and facilitating complementary efforts" (Petraeus and Amos 75). These CMOCs will, be directed by experienced civil affairs officers and direct medical, engineering, legal and intelligence operations.

Petraeus is distinctly more optimistic than Gen. Smith about the ability of Western nations to prevail in COIN warfare, provided their military and civilian arms are properly coordinated and they have the correct training, doctrine and organization. He even regarded the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) program in South Vietnam as a great success in 1967-73. Under the direction of Robert Komer and William Colby, he maintained that CORDS actually defeated the Viet Cong insurgency by 1972 and secured 93% of the country, with programs of land reform, agricultural improvements and social, economic and education assistance. He did not mention Operation Phoenix, which eliminated many of the Viet Cong cadres -- perhaps 50,000 or more -- but insisted that the development programs did will the support of the Vietnamese population in the countryside. CORDS was an almost purely military and CIA operation, and of its staff off 7,600, over 6,400 were military personnel (Petraeus and Amos 73). Petraeus in fact believes that the U.S. had the war won by 1972, when the North was forced to launch a massive invasion that was defeated by U.S. naval and air power in support of South Vietnamese ground forces. These would have defeated the 1975 invasion as well, had the U.S. Congress not withdrawn all aid and air support in the wake of the Watergate scandal and the resignation of Richard Nixon. He may have been correct from the purely military viewpoint that the war could have been won, even in the face of North Vietnamese persistence and determination to reunify the country at any cost. From the point-of-view of U.S. public opinion, of course, the war was already lost at the time of the Tet Offensive in 1968 and politicians after that time were mainly concerned about exit strategies. Even Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger privately doubted South Vietnam's viability no matter what they asserted in public, although naturally they did not wish to be blamed for losing the war.

Along with Smith, Andrew Bacevich is also far more skeptical about the use of military force than Petreaus, and maintains that the United States would do well to concentrate more on its social and economic problems at home than fight nation building and COIN wars abroad. When the Cold War ended in 1991, the U.S. did not enter a new era of peace. Just the opposite, its level of interventionism increased, in Iraq, Kuwait, Afghanistan, Panama, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Libya. In the 1990s, free trade and globalization were the latest cliches and buzzwords, with the U.S. presiding over an informal empire and global Pax Americana (Bacevich 2). Since America was the last surviving superpower, its leaders assumed that it would always have the political, military and economic strength to act as global hegemon or superpower, but this was definitely not the case. It concentrated very little on domestic reform or even homeland security in the true sense, and did not anticipate the attacks on September 11, 2001. In reaction to these, Bush administration policy continued to be the imposition of the Pax Americana on the Middle East and other regions, but "rather than soft and consensual, the approach to imperial governance became harder and more coercive" (Bacevich 3).

Bush and his top officials were prepared to wage another Hundred Years War against terror if necessary, and in the far periphery of the empire in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Bacevich does not simply blame Bush for all this since in his view foreign policy from the time of Vietnam has "increasingly become the expression of domestic dysfunction -- an attempt to manage or defer coming to terms with contradictions besetting the American way of life" (Bacevich 5). From the 1970s and 1980s onward, the U.S. economy was already in severe decline and the national government was facing bankruptcy, but kept pursuing the same old, worn out policies almost by inertia -- or perhaps it was just a sign of national senility. It kept piling up debts and deficits that were clearly unsustainable in the long run, but as Reinhold Niebuhr pointed out decades ago, America always suffered from the persistent delusion that it could manage history. This was a form of imperial hubris that the Bush administration obviously shared with Woodrow Wilson and many others. Indeed, the American public was always very hubristic as well in the sense that it was always demanding more "oil, credit or the availability of cheap consumer goods" from all over the world (Bacevich 9). Unlike people in most times and places, Americans simply had a sense of entitlement to all these resources, no matter that the values of "consumption and individual autonomy" are "contributing to the gradual erosion of our national power" (Bacevich 9).

America's wars are fought by a volunteer military drawn almost entirely from the lower classes and sent of to fight and die in places like Iraq and Afghanistan without much public notice or appreciation. For the more privileged members of society, no sense of shared sacrifice exists, not even the willingness to pay more taxes to support these foreign adventures. Even conservatives like Dick Cheney preferred to borrow the money, making remarks like "deficits don't matter," or at least not when a Republican occupies the White House (Bacevich 10). Furthermore, the Bush administration repeatedly showed its contempt for international law, the United Nations and even old NATO allies in ways that badly damaged the country's popularity abroad and its ability to conduct an effective foreign and military policy. Over the last forty years, American society has grown increasingly hedonistic, narcissistic and self-indulgent, while politics has become blatantly corrupt. Although the demand for consumption is higher the ever before, even though the ability to consume is starkly unequal, the country no longer has the resources to satisfy these demands.