Warfare the More War Changes

Warfare

The More War Changes

War is always the same. And it is always changing. The basic goals of warfare -- to capture territory and resources, to reduce the enemy's ability to fight through whatever means necessary, including the killing off of enemy combatants, to ensure that defeat will be lasting -- have been in place since the very first people began throwing stones at each other tens of thousands of years ago. But the details of each war are so different that both to those fighting each new war and to those observing it, the entire nature of warfare can seem transformed. This paper examines three recent guides to the nature of how warfare has changed over the last generation and what it means in the current political, economic, and military climate for the United States to be enjoyed in combat against its enemies.

The first of these texts is the U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual by General David Petraeus and helped to fill a gap that had existed for decades. Looking back, it is hard to imagine why the United States military had not pushed to have such a summary of counterinsurgency tactics and strategy created before given the fact that all of the wars since World War II -- and especially the war in Vietnam -- had been heavily based on counterinsurgency tactics, tactics that had time and again left the United States at a disadvantage.

However, at the time that Petraeus wrote this manual, the tactics that the U.S. military were using, and were recognizing in opposing forces, were outdated at best, essentially based in 19th century rules of warfare in which those rules were at least seemingly more clearcut.

Petraeus, like all educated military leaders, acknowledges that there has always been an insurgency element in warfare just as there has always been something of a blurring of the line between civilian and military. However, this basic acknowledgement did not help the United States when it invaded Iraq in 2003. That war would require an army that was capable of changing and adapting quickly and that would require integration with both foreign forces and foreign civilians in complex ways.

Petraeus based the manual (which was actually a collaborative effort among a number of military experts) on this doctrine of flexibility. That flexibility was based in large measure on decentralized decision-making, a fundamentally radical shift for an institution that defines hierarchy. Part of what both required and permitted that level of decentralization was that military strategy would be based on intelligence gathering. That intelligence gathering, in turn, was based on a concerted and consistent push to understand the culture and power dynamics of the communities where they were fighting.

In the Foreward, Petraus defines what he means by a counterinsurgency doctrine and why, in the face of counterinsurgency pressures in the field, flexibility in leadership and tactics is essential if the U.S. military is to have any chance of making significant progress in any of the conflicts in which it is now engaged and in which it is likely to become engaged over the next decades and indeed for the rest of this century.

Petraeus writes that the kind of counterinsurgency campaign that he believes it is necessary for the U.S. military to be able to engage is requires a "mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations, conducted along multiple lines of operation," a combination that requires service members "employ a mix of both familiar combat tasks and skills more often associated with nonmilitary agencies, with the balance between them varying depending on the local situation."

This is not easy. Leaders at all levels must adjust their approach constantly, ensuring that their elements are ready each day to be greeted with a handshake or a hand grenade, to take on missions only infrequently practiced until recent years at our combat training centers, to be nation builders as well as warriors, to help re-establish institutions and local security forces, to assist in the rebuilding of infrastructure and basic services, and to facilitate the establishment of local governance and the rule of law (Petraeus, 2006)

Petraeus is careful not to trivialize the difficulty of such a task, of the dramatic ways in which both the leadership and the ground forces of the Army and Marines must shift from the ways in which they had become accustomed to doing things.

Indeed, the responsibilities of leaders in a counterinsurgency campaign are daunting -- and the discussions in this manual endeavor to alert them to the challenges of such campaigns and to suggest general approaches for grappling with those challenges. Conducting a successful counterinsurgency campaign thus requires a flexible, adaptive force led by agile, well-informed, culturally astute leaders. It is our hope that this manual provides the necessary guidelines to succeed in such a campaign, in operations that, inevitably, are exceedingly difficult and complex. Our Soldiers and Marines deserve nothing less. (Petraeus, 2006)

Petraeus also argues in the manual that not only does the maintenance of power require the top leaders to delegate some of that power, but sometimes the most effective way to protect American troops in the field is to relax some of the most obvious forms of protection. Tactics based on the realities of counterinsurgency fighting are replete with at-least seeming contradictions, such as the above. Another one at least as paradoxical and counter to long-standing military practice is that fact that sometimes pushing back against enemy forces is the worst response: Sometimes a show of force simply produces nothing more than a return show of greater force with nothing gained. Sometimes the most effective response is simply to stay put, to stand pat.

One of the most important innovations in the manual is Petraeus's emphasis on the importance of understanding the motivation of the opposition. This is something that has all-too-often been left out of military strategy. One of the casualties of war is that sophisticated understanding of "the enemy" tend to go by the wayside, replaced by simple caricatures and stereotypes. While the psychological power of such stereotypes is certainly formidable, the result is that the U.S. forces have sometimes been left with too little insight into the goals and motivations of those they are fighting.

This lack of insight can be crippling, Petraeus writes, especially in an era in which new forms of counterinsurgency are constantly evolving. He addresses this issue in the first chapter of the manual, arguing that the contemporary political and military environment "features a new kind of globalized insurgency, represented by Al Qaeda." This new kind of counterinsurgency has had an unprecedented success in integrating the local and the global by seeking "to transform the Islamic world and reorder its relationship with the rest of the globe," linking "link disparate conflicts through globalized communications, finances, and technology." Petraeus emphasizes that this strategy is ancient with its combination of subversion, propaganda, and military force, while also emphasizing that the scale on which this can be carried out in today's world, especially because of improved global communications technology.

Petraeus creates a typology of different forms of counterinsurgency that troops as well as military brass can use to help them determine the motivations and potential strategies of their opponents. This was something that had not been done before and that clearly distinguishes this manual from previous U.S. military efforts. Until such a typology was put into place, U.S. officials were often stymied by being unable to distinguish among different types of enemy forces.

Each insurgency is unique, although there may be similarities among them. In all cases, the insurgents' aim is to force political change; any military action is secondary and subordinate, a means to an end.

Few insurgencies fit neatly into any rigid classification. Examining the specific type of insurgency one faces enables commanders and staffs to build a more accurate picture of the insurgents and the thinking behind their overall campaign plan (Petraeus, 2007)

His typology made the following distinctions, urging officer to consider in each case all of the following factors about each insurgency:

Root cause or causes of the insurgency.

Extent to which it enjoys support, both internally and externally.

Bases on which insurgents appeal to the target population.

Insurgents' motivation and depth of commitment.

Likely insurgent weapons and tactics.

Operational environment in which insurgents seek to initiate and develop their campaign. (Petraeus, 2007)

Petraeus's manual focuses on the nuts and bolts of how the armed forces can respond in ways that are in the best interests of the United States as a whole. This includes providing both the best military and the best civilian skills too. Petraeus has the authority, which he has used to great good in this manual, to push for progress and change.

As the world tumbles forward into the second decade of the 21st century, everything about the ways in which war is waged (including the way that the U.S. wins the "hearts and minds" of those in the borderlands of the civilian-military complex) is changing. This will continue to be the case for the foreseeable decades as the United States fights wars that are so far not yet even imagined. If these wars have been fought (as many have suggested) over the presence of the scarce resource of oil, the next wars may be fought over the even more precious resource of water.

Looking not too far into the future, the next wars may be fought over the consequences (the magnitude of which has not been determined) of climate change. As the surface of the world itself changes with rising seawater and increasing disastrous floods, hurricanes, and droughts, the nature of war is likely to change ever more dramatically and ever more quickly. Petraeus has proven to be the kind of military leader who can understand that strength is based on intelligence and flexibility, not a clinging to traditions and -- most importantly -- the fittest military is the one that is concentrating on preparing for the next war, not reliving the glories of the past.

The Way Forward is the Way Back

Andrew Bacevich's version of how war is changing, and how the America that fights wars is changing, is diametrically opposed to the vision that Petraeus puts forth. While the general's view is based on practical experience and a desire to save American lives, American values, and American strength, Bacevich's vision seems divorced from anything but right-wing politics. While politics and war are always partners, always two points along the same vector of power, Bacevich does not acknowledge the complex ways in which the two must interact if the pressures of history are to be handled.

Bacevich is very much intent on looking backward rather than forward. His focus is not the wars in which the United States in now engaged but on World War II, the archetype of the good war, the war in which America saved the world, making it safe for both democracy and capitalism. As is so often the case with conservative commentary, Bacevich is more interested in writing an elegy if not an actual eulogy for American exceptionalism. If Petraeus is focused on helping the armed forces learn how the rest of the world thinks so that they can be effective as both allies and combatants, Bacevich is focused on reminding Americans of what it was like when the country's might could make other nations at least pretend to think the way that we do.

Bacevich is focused on the lure of American exceptionalism, the idea that the United States has a unique role in the world that no other nation can fill. Moreover, this model of American power and influence argues that not only does the United States have the potential to play a unique role, but it is required to do so. Bacevich spends much of the book recalling the glory days of the 1940s when the United States, through the ingenuity of its people and the might of its wealth and technology, was able to come to the rescue of the world.

There is nothing wrong, of course, in honoring and even lionizing the Great Generation. Except that there is quite a good deal wrong when crediting an early generation of soldiers and officers and the civilians who supported them comes at the cost of denigrating all other generations. Bacevich writes about an America that has become fat and lazy, a nation that has lost its way since World War II, a war that left the United States as "the strongest, the richest and . . . The freest nation in all the world." That assessment is probably accurate, but it is also irrelevant in ways that Bacevich does not seem to understand, or at least not in ways that Bacevich is willing to acknowledge.

The state of the nation after World War II was particular to the state of the world in the mid-1940s. The enemies that the United States defeated, the allies that it worked alongside of, the state of race and gender relations at home in the United States, the particular technological, medical, and scientific progress at the time -- all of these combined to make the country a safe and wealthy place. That particular set of variables will never be in place again, something that Bacevich is evasive (at best) about acknowledging.

Bacevich argues that what made America great in the decades following World War II was not based in anything specific about that historical moment but rather in the nature of the American national character. This is the core of his argument, because a "national character" is recoverable in a way that historical reconstruction cannot be. If Bacevich were to acknowledge that much of the success that America enjoyed after World War II were due to issues out of the control of the United States, then he would not be able to argue that America can once again fight and win wars the way it did in Normandy. If what has happened in the jungles of Vietnam and the mountains of Afghanistan is, however, due to a failure in the current generation of Americans, then there is some hope (he believes) that former military might can be regained.

One of the truly fascinating contrasts between Bacevich and Petraeus is how the latter understands that the United States is fundamentally like all other countries. For Bacevich, this is something to be denied as untrue and probably even immoral. Petraus describes the importance of narrative as a key psychological as well as political and cultural force in helping to build and maintain loyalty in an insurgent force.

The central mechanism through which ideologies are expressed and absorbed is the narrative. A narrative is an organizational scheme expressed in story form. Narratives are central to the representation of identity, particularly the collective identity of groups such as religions, nations, and cultures. Stories about a community's history provide models of how actions and consequences are linked and are often the basis for strategies, actions, and interpretation of the intentions of other actors. (Petraeus, 2007)

Petraeus will go on to describe how this dynamic fits in with how Al Quaeda functions. Before turning to that, however, it is highly informative to consider the passage above in terms of how it can be applied to the United States, or indeed to any nation.

Every nation, and indeed every relatively large community, has narratives that it tells itself. These are an important part of how culture is maintained. Americans are told the story of George Washington and the cherry tree, of Ellis Island and the melting pot, of how America saved the world from the Nazis. These help define us a people, which is something that Petraeus recognizes but that Bacevich does not. Petraeus writes that Al Qaeda uses narratives "very efficiently in the development of a legitimating ideology" creating a narrative that dictates that: "In the collective imagination of Bin Laden and his followers, Islamic history is a story about the decline of the umma and the inevitable triumph against Western imperialism. Only through jihad can Islam be renewed both politically and theologically" (Petraeus, 2007).

Bacevich is arguing much the same thing, although (of course) from the other side. He is arguing that America can only become America again by reclaiming the cultural identity that it had after World War II, a generation that knew how to pull together, a generation that knew how to sacrifice, a generation that knew who it was. If we could only go back to that world, to knowing how to live within our means. Bacevich argues that he is looking forward even as he looks back. Urging his readers to cast off the concept of exceptionalism, he at the same time sneaks it in through the back door.

He insists that the United States cannot rely on military force alone, and in this he is of course correct. He points to the limits of brute force in the current wars in which the United States is engaged, and in this he is also correct. And he is also correct that part of what has changed during the course of these wars is that Americans have become far too used to the idea of a war without end, a war without borders, a war that was never declared and so one that can never be ended.

So why does so much good sense fail to convince? Because his recommendations about how to end the kind of war that seems to have no end and that has so detrimentally pulled America off its true course are so thin. We must somehow return to being our own better angels, he suggests. Well, perhaps. But how does one begin to do so in a world in which we as Americans have become embroiled as much as our enemies in endless bellicosity?

For Bacevich everything has changed about war except the most important aspects of it: In his world, we continue to be on the side of what is good and true, and it is this aspect of exceptionalism that will continue to define us. We have to change the way we fight war, perhaps (although Bacevich is consistently short on details), but we will continue to understand why we fight by using precisely the same narrative. And so long as the narrative does not change, then very little else matters.

Where Petraeus knows that war will always be defined by what individuals have to do and have to suffer, Bacevich seems to believe that war is something that we can re-construct so that it means something entirely different. If one had read Bacevich on his own, that claim might just possibly have been tenable. However, read in conjunction with Petraeus, Bacevich's work seems far too abstract. Everything has changed about war, both men agree, but only Petraeus understands that the basics of war never change at all.

The general is not making any claims about whether this is good or bad, simply that it is the nature of war and the nature of humanity. Bacevich's book is in large measure a book about how he would like the world to be. But while he would like a world without the kind of wars that the United States is now fighting, that is not in any way a real response to how wars must be fought differently in the 21st century. One cannot close one's eyes, click one's heels together and make war different.