Automotive Practices -- Ford v.

¶ … Automotive Practices -- Ford v. Toyota

While both the Ford Motor Company and Toyota Motors have a similar consumer demographic, namely of middle-class, middle-income families, their managerial and marketing strategies could not be more different. During the 1970s and the 1980s Toyota excited the interest not simply of car buyers everywhere, but management gurus with its philosophy of rigorous, constant improvement facilitated by teamwork and a cohesive company philosophy. The Toyota Production System continues to emphasize two main principles: "Just-in-Time" production and Jidoka. The former term refers to keeping minimal inventory to enable the company be more responsive to shifts in consumer demand, and the "manufacturing and conveyance of only 'what is needed, when it is needed, and in the amount needed'" ("Toyota Production System Terms," 2006, Toyota Motor Manufacturing).

Jidoka production means "the ability to stop production lines...in the event of problems such as equipment malfunction, quality issues, or late work" and this aids in the prevention of defective equipment, "helps identify and correct problem areas using localization and isolation, and makes it possible to 'build' quality at the production process" ("Toyota Production System Terms," 2006, Toyota Motor Manufacturing). Lean manufacturing and refusing to be satisfied with errors and waste, even when they are number one is at the core of Toyota's philosophy.

But while Ford was innovative during its much earlier conception, as it was the first car manufacturing company ever to make effective use of the moving assembly line and interchangeable parts, it has been criticized for a lack of attention to detail in recent years. "What bothers me at Ford these days is the product planning, which seems to be [in] complete chaos and confusion, as well as an inability to correct problems" in current models (Flint, 2005). Rather than defect minimization and continual innovation and improvement, which resulted in the revolutionary Prius at Toyota, Ford tends to cling to tradition: "A recent Merrill Lynch report says Ford has replaced 15% of its vehicles a year, second-lowest in the industry to GM's 14%" (Mayne, 2005). When sales of a new model called the Freestyle proved sluggish, Ford balked and pulled the new, gas-efficient vehicle from the market, even though it had "just spent over $1 billion to prepare the Chicago plant to build the Freestyle" (Flint, 2005).

Also in contrast to Toyota, Ford boasts a heavily unionized workforce rather than stresses the need for employees to sacrifice for company success. Although both place a premium value on company loyalty, Toyota's method stands in sharp contrast to Ford's rewarding of its workers with long-term benefits and extensive retirement packages. This has proved a drain on Ford finances in recent years. and, although they aim at a similar car-buying audience, both companies have emphasized vastly different types of vehicles. Ford enjoyed its greatest success selling SUVs during the 1990s, while Toyota remained devoted to cars like the Camry, mid-sized family vehicles that are especially popular now, with the rising cost of fuel.