2003, Space Shuttle Columbia Destroyed Lives Crew

¶ … 2003, Space Shuttle Columbia destroyed lives crew lost. Within 2 hours loss signal Columbia,

A thorough analysis of the interventions posited by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) following the 2003 Space Shuttle Challenger disaster provides a large amount of insight into what went wrong that fateful February day, as well as how to fix it. These interventions can be stratified into four different categories, those involving techno/structural changes, human processes, those that are multi-faceted and those that pertain to large groups. However, there is an intrinsic connection between categories of many of these interventions, which actually involve more than the aforementioned four stratifications. The lack of safety measures in place during the Columbia accident is directly attributed to the physical errors of the actual craft (techno/structural), management issues resulting in ineffective use of resources (from individual human processes to those involving large organizational groups), as well as misplaced priorities pertaining to budgetary concerns (human processes and large groups). Virtually all of these errors are multi-faceted.

The interventions that are the least multi-faceted pertain to the craftsmanship and physical safety of proposed space crafts. Specifically, recommendation R7.5-1, which calls for an independent Technical Engineering Authority to ensure the maintenance of technical standards (that it would also need to develop) for the duration of the lifetime of the construction of a craft helps to build sound space shuttles. The fact that this recommendation also requires funding from NASA Headquarters itself independent of funding for any specific programs will also aid in its efficacy.

Interventions that correlate directly to the multi-faceted categories are all those that pertain to budgeting issues. These most eminently include findings F7.1-1 and F7.4-2, which refer to "vagaries of changing budgets" (Columbia Accident Investigation Board, 2003, p. 192), and the fact that conventional safety organizations require funding from the space program itself, which limits their efficaciousness as advisors. There are also a number of interventions that directly apply to the Space Shuttle Systems Integrations Office. Its lack of input from the Orbiter officer should ideally be changed, as is the fact that there are a number of independent databases containing valued information for the Space Shuttle Program that function as silos. Data integration and unified data governance can change this fact.

Human process interventions include the fact that Lessons Learned Interventions are not utilized by safety staff. There are several large group interventions related to the way that safety is handled and to the very structuring of NASA. These include Finding F7.4-13 regarding the conflicting roles and relationships of the organization's structure, as well as the fact that the administrator for safety is not responsible for the safety of mission. Additionally, there is no formal risk analysis process, which was directly attributable to the Columbia accident.

In many ways, the relationship and the impact of Bush's 2004 vision for NASA and Griffin's variegated implementation strategy for that vision are largely disappointing, especially the latter. The enthusiasm for the program is commendable, and the actualization of that enthusiasm in the form of budgetary resources is a boon for the U.S. space program in general. However, the degree of expedience in which Griffin would like to implement Bush's vision -- which, in 2004, included a completed International Space Station by 2010, the testing of a Crew Exploration Vehicle by 2008 and launching it for its initial manned mission by 2014 at the latest, getting men to the moon by as early as 2020 (No author, 2004) -- is disturbing, particularly when one considers the results of the findings and interventions of CAIB.

A plethora of those interventions were previously denoted in the organizational diagnosis that was completed in module 3. The most eminent of these in relation to the amount of celerity that Griffin is advocating is that relating to the external environment identified in the first of 12 organizational dimensions. Approximately two years prior to taking over at NASA, Griffin's organization was responsible for the deaths of seven crew members due to a multitude of problems, some of which involved the aura of hubris related to its external environment. Yet less than 24 months later Griffin is attempting to expedite the process of building and launching crafts -- instead of taking his time and perfecting them and ensuring that disasters like the aforementioned one do not take place. Specifically, the 2005 NASA administrator wanted to accelerate Bush's vision by having the next space launch, and the craft for it built and completed, by 2010 -- speeding up the process by four years. This appears to be measures similar to that of Daniel S. Goldin, whose wholesale policy changes represented the leadership dimension fault identified in module 3's Burke-Litwin model. Finally, this sort of expedience is also aligned with the mission and strategy factor that resulted in the Columbia disaster, in which NASA was attempting to assert its volition on the environment as opposed to garnering external feedback and appropriately utilizing it.

However, this negative aspect of Bush's and Griffin's plans s tempered somewhat by the fact that they represent upper-level administrative support and ardor for the space program, which was missing prior to the CAIB report. As such, the eighth dimension identified in the Burke-Litwin model of the CAIB report, the work climate unit in which there were marked budget constraints and a number of viable entities all vying for the same monetary resources, has largely been alleviated by the attitudes of both Bush and Griffin. The motivation for the space program, which was Burke-Litwin factor number 11, appears to be rectified as well as "NASA planned to bring the new spacecraft to the launch pad without ballooning the agency's slow-growth budget. The president's $16.5 billion request for 2006 asks for $753 million for exploration vehicle development" (Gugliotta, 2005).