Battle of Hue City

Battle Analysis of the Battle of Hue City

The battle for Hue city took place over twenty-six days as part of the larger Tet Offensive, and examining this battle in particular will demonstrate some of the nine principles of war in great detail. In particular, by examining some of the problems presented to Marines in the Battle for Hue city and the ways in which they ultimately dealt with those problems will reveal how both sides of the battle enacted the nine principles of war to varying degrees of effect and success, and point out how the lack of certain principles resulted in the high rate of casualties and the length of the battle.

Before examining the particulars of the battle in more detail, it will be useful to note some aspects of Hue city itself, as a way of understanding the context of the battle. Nearly any critical work examining the battle begins with the layout of Hue city, because as Andrew Lawler notes, "there are two distinct parts of Hue City," with the older being "the interior -- the Citadel […] a walled fortress of the ancient empire, surrounded by a moat" that "covers roughly three square miles with towers, gardens, houses, markets, and pagodas-as well as the former imperial palace from the early 19th century" (Lawler 92). The rest of the city is "the modernized part […] which includes the university, stadium, hospital, prison, and government buildings," and "the Perfume River divides the city in two, with the Citadel to the north and the modern city to the south" (Lawler 92). As the battle drew on, the Marines would eventually fight their way through the south side before retaking the Citadel.

Having understood the layout of Hue city, one may now move on to an analysis of the battle proper. As Lawler remarks, "the North Vietnamese had relied on speed and surprise to enter the city, and were quite successful" so that "their well-planned attack, combined with the poor communications and intelligence capabilities of the South Vietnamese and U.S. forces, allowed them to enter the city with virtually no resistance," exemplifying the principles of mass, offensive, and surprise by concentrating their forces at the necessary points and enacting an aggressive, surprising attack (Lawler 93). According to Norman Cooling, "Viet Cong sappers had infiltrated Hue on 29 January while the two NVA/VC regiments moved toward the city with 7,500 soldiers," so that by "31 January, the 6th NVA linked up with its guides and at 0340 seized a bridgehead into the Citadel" and "by 0800 the 4th NVA had also entered the Citadel, and shortly thereafter the VC flag was waving over the Imperial Palace" (Cooling 67). However, although "The North Vietnamese had orchestrated a sound plan of attack to enter the city […] once inside, they failed to secure the city's centers of gravity," demonstrating a lack of objective (beyond breaching the city) which led to their downfall. In particular, they failed "to knock out the An Cuu bridge, which connected the south side to the Marine Corps base at Phu Bai, along the main highway running through Hue," thus allowing the Marines to respond much more quickly, as well as other key outposts throughout the city (Lawler 93).

As mentioned before, the North Vietnamese's plan took both the South and the U.S. off guard, and it also managed to knock out one of the U.S. greatest battlefield abilities, namely, the airstrike. "The Marines were unable to use air strikes in support of their operations because of the weather and the rules of engagement-enabling the North Vietnamese to fortify their fighting positions, making squad and fire team rushes ineffective," so that "Marines had to quickly acquire combat skills while fighting within the city's three-dimensional setting" (Lawler 93, Loring 46). At this point in the battle, the North Vietnamese had the overwhelming advantage in terms of numbers, but the Marines quickly adapted so that "they began to soften the enemy positions with 106-mm recoilless rifles, the 90-mm guns of their M48 tanks, LAAWs (light antitank assault weapons), 3.5-inch rockets, 81-mm mortars, and tear gas," and when they were close enough to buildings to breach them, "they blew holes in the sides with C-4 explosive, then threw hand grenades in to clear the way. Then they entered the buildings through the holes that had been created by the C-4" (Lawler 92). The adaptive work and house-to-house fighting done by the Marines exemplifies the principles of objective, economy of force, maneuver, and security. Firstly, the Marines had a distinctly clear objective (to retake the city), and their small numbers allowed them to deploy rapidly and with outsized effect, because "though the North Vietnamese held an overwhelming advantage in sheer numbers of troops, the Marines held the advantage in terms of technology and firepower" (Lawler 92). Finally, although the North Vietnamese' battle plan initially gave them numerous unexpected advantages (such as the U.S. inferior numbers and the inability to call in airstrikes), the Marines acted quickly to reduce the practical effects of those advantages.