Battle Of Imphal

Imphal

In 1942, the Japanese had successfully conquered Burma and then stood poised on the border with India. The Japanese invasion and conquest of Burma in 1942 was so successful and rapid, that their supply lines ran out before they could advance further into India. Needing to stop and rest, the Japanese Army gave the British a chance to respond to the incursion. General Slim and the Burma Corps were able to set up a base in Imphal to stave off the encroaching Japanese threat. "If the Japanese had moved swiftly for Imphal then the outcome that was to change the war in the region may have been very different."[footnoteRef:1] [1: "The Battle of Imphal 1944." History Learning Site.]

Under Lieutenant-General Kawabe Masakasu, the Burma-Area Army of the Japanese command was considering an immanent advance into Assam province. The province was a critical geographic juncture. Known as "the hump," this mountainous region straddling India, China, and Burma was the point where allied aircraft, including that of the Americans, were bringing supplies from India to China. Masakasu's military strategy was therefore not developed with the interest of colonizing India but rather, thwarting the British and American aerial control of the region.

Moreover, the British air force had been using northeastern India as a key transit zone and supply route between its station in India and China. The Japanese believed that the British were repositioning themselves in Imphal under General Slim in order to take Burma back after it had been so carefully won by the Japanese.[footnoteRef:2] Therefore, the Japanese invasion of this part of India would be a strategic maneuver, carefully calculated, and ultimately fatal for the Japanese. [2: "The Battle of Imphal 1944." History Learning Site.]

lthough the Japanese made some advances, the Burma Area Army ultimately failed in two critical battlefronts at Imphal and Kohima, fifty miles from each other. The Battles of Imphal and Kohima were in fact major turning points in the Eastern front of World War Two, which is why the battles are referred to collectively as the "Stalingrad of the East."

The Japanese plan was to attack on two separate fronts in northeastern India, the cities of Imphal and Kohina. According to Chen, "Mutaguchi planned to pin-down or destroy the forward-deployed Indian troops with Lieutenant General Motoso Yanagida's 33rd Division, then the 33rd Division will be reinforced by Lieutenant General Masafumi Yamauchi's 15th Division to take Imphal."[footnoteRef:3] Masakasu vied for control of a whole region northwestern India, and the Army set its eyes on Manipur province in particular because of its geographic importance. Imphal, the capital of Manipur, "was situated amidst a plain where an invading army from the east must march across."[footnoteRef:4] Control of Manipur meant cutting off the British from valuable supply routes, and would stymy the Royal Air Force. A "subordinate formation" of the Burma Area Army also played a key role in the Japanese strategy to take Assam; the subordinate command would be "responsible for the central part of the front facing Imphal and Assam," and it was named as 15th Army.[footnoteRef:5] The new commander of the 15th Army was Lieutenant-General Mutaguchi Renya. According to Lyman, Renya "had been a 'star' of the conquest of Malaya and Singapore. Now he proposed a 'March on Delhi.'"[footnoteRef:6] Renya's motivations and plans can easily be described as being "grandiose" in nature and egotistical as well.[footnoteRef:7] He has been quoted as saying, "If I push into India now, by my own efforts ... I will have justified myself in the eyes of the nation."[footnoteRef:8] Renya's hubris would certainly play a major role in the Japanese setback at Imphal and Kohima. One of his lieutenants did not like or respect Renya. Lieutenant-General Sato Kotoku and Lieutenant-General Renya "were from opposing army factions and there was mutual deep distrust between them. Sato was convinced Mutaguchi was using the offensive to further his own ambitions and was reluctant to see his men die for so vain a purpose."[footnoteRef:9] [3: Chen, C. Peter. "Battle of Imphal-Kohina."] [4: Chen, C. Peter. "Battle of Imphal-Kohina."] [5: Lyman, Robert 2012. Kohima, The Battle that Saved India. ] [6: Lyman, Robert 2012. Kohima, The Battle that Saved India. ] [7: Lyman, Robert 2012. Kohima, The Battle that Saved India. ] [8: Lyman, Robert 2012. Kohima, The Battle that Saved India.] [9: Lyman, Robert 2012. Kohima, The Battle that Saved India. Retrieved online: http://www.robertlyman.com/kohima1.htm]

Moreover, Lieutenant Sato understood that the Japanese army was ill prepared for the invasion. Their supply lines were weak. Sato knew this, but the ambitious Renya would not listen. As a result, many Japanese troops died due to starvation rather than in combat.

The Japanese were also facing a ground invasion and hand-to-hand combat with the British and the Anglo-Indian armed forces. As Lyman points out, the Japanese army was not up to the task from a purely technological standpoint. "Despite their stunning early successes of the Second World War, the Imperial Japanese Army remained remarkably backwards in adopting modern methods and equipment."[footnoteRef:10] Still, Lieutenant-General Mutaguchi had a healthy 100,000 troops in his command and the Japanese intelligence gathering and reconnaissance methods used at Kohima and to a lesser degree at Imphal were admirable.[footnoteRef:11] [10: Lyman, Robert 2012. Kohima, The Battle that Saved India. Retrieved online: http://www.robertlyman.com/kohima1.htm] [11: "The Battle of Kohima 1944." History Learning Site.]

On the Allied side, Lieutenant General Geoffrey Scoones commanded the Indian IV Corps in Imphal when the Japanese invaded. The Anglo-Indian Fourteenth Army was in control of the entire Imphal plain, headed by Lieutenant-General William Slim. Major-General John "Blackjack" Grover was commander of the British 2nd Division, and Lieutenant-General Montagu Stopford was in charge of the XXXIII Indian Corps. Most of the soldiers were not British, although their commanders were. Fighting in the Anglo-Indian army were soldiers from Burma, India, west and east Africa.[footnoteRef:12] [12: Lyman, Robert 2012. Kohima, The Battle that Saved India. Retrieved online: http://www.robertlyman.com/kohima1.htm]