Battle of Tannenberg in 1914

Battle of Tannenberg in 1914 was lost to the Russians due to the sending of unciphered messages between the three Russian generals. The interception of the messages by the Germans completely undermined the Russian General's plans, and encouraged the German Generals to make bolder moves.

In August of 1914 Russia decided to invade Prussia. An invasion of Prussia would significantly enhance Russia's prowess as a military power because a successful invasion of German soil would cripple the Germans, while enhancing Russia's prowess.

It should be noted that the battle took place near Allenstein, but Max Hoffman suggested that the battle be named after Tannenberg - the Teutonic forces having been defeated their by Poles and Lithuanians in 1410.

The Plans

Russia's incursion into Germany was two-pronged. General Samsonov

was to take his Second Army into the south-western corner of East Prussia, while General Rennenkampf

was to advance his army into the north-east corner with the First Army. Later their two armies would join together and assault General Prittwitz's

Eighth Army. Rennenkampf modified his plans slightly after a Battle of the Gumbinnen

on August 20th 1914. Prittwitz had seen the German forces retreating in chaos and had feared entrapment by Samsonov and Rennenkampf, whereas Rennenkampf had decided not to follow Prittwitz's troops. Out of fear Prittwitz ordered a general retreat to the Vistula River. This left East Prussia to the Russian army.

Opening Moves

The German Army Chief of Staff recalled Prittwitz and his deputy to Berlin. He appointed Paul von Hindenburg

and Erich Ludendorff as their replacements. Colonel Maximilian Hoffman

was Prittwiz's deputy chief of operations. He planned much of the German response to the Russians attack, but of course of the 'glory' went to the Hindenburg and Ludendorff.

Rennenkampf and Samsonov had bad blood between them since Samsonov had complained about Rennenkampf's conduct during the Battle of Mukden in 1905

, during the Russo-Japanese war. Russia lost this battle to the Japanese by about 90,000 to 70,000 and had lost most of their combat supplies during this conflict.

The Battle

Hoffman proposed a plan which would allow cavalry troops to act as screen along the Vistula River knowing this would confuse Rennenkampf. General Hermann von Francois's were transported by train to meet Samsonov's army. The two remaining corps of the German army were to meet the Samsonov's right wing. A fourth corp was to remain at the Vistula.

Samsonov was plagued by supply and communication problems and he was unaware the Rennenkampf had paused at Gumbinnen, instead of moving into the south-west. He moved towards the Vistula river, and the remaining troops under his command he directed towards Seeburg-Rastenburg. On August 22nd he reached the outer limits of the German line, fighting and winning small battles which encouraged him.

On August 25th Ludendorff ordered Francois to commence an attack on Samsonov, but Francois decided to wait until August 27th when his artillery would be in position. Ludendorff went to see Francois, and repeated the order, and Francois reluctantly agreed.

On his return Hoffman was shown two intelligence intercepts. The first was from Rennenkampf, and it was unciphered, i.e. In the clear rather than ciphered. It revealed the distance between his and Samsonov's armies and detailed his armies marching plans which were not towards Samsonov. He should have encoded the text, but didn't because the Russians had outrun their secure telegraphic lines, and lacked trained telegraph operators and the secure equipment needed to encipher the messages. The Russians sent the following days marching orders in clear text.

The second message was from Samsonov and was also in the clear (unciphered). It stated that the Germans were (supposedly) in a retreat towards Tannenberg and detailed his plans to follow them.

Hoffman has the two messages in hand, but Ludendorff was skeptical of the messages fearing that they were trap, but Hindenburg, knowing of the personal quarrel of the two Russians, was more likely to believe the messages..

Francois was reluctant to attack without artillery support, and delayed his attack until August 27th. His attack enjoyed success pushing the Russians back to Soldau. His actions cut off Samsonov's forces keeping them in the centre.

Ludendorff ordered Francois to move North, but Francois moved East, this action countermanded his direct orders, but contributed to the defeat of the Russians. This move cut off the retreating Samsonov.

Helmuth von Moltke

was of the opinion that the Russians might overwhelm Ludendorff in the East, and contacted Ludendorff and stated that he was sending a cavalry division and three corps to him for assistance. Despite Ludendorff's complaints that they were not needed, they were sent anyway. The troops were withdrawn from France, and were a necessary part of the Sclieffen plan.

Ludendorff sent his two corps of troops south towards Samsonov's VI Corps moving north towards Bischofsburg. Surprised the Russians retreated towards the Russian border.

Hoffman and Ludendorff intercepted another order 'in the clear' (unciphered) from Zhilinksi

to Rennenkampf. He sent Otto von Below

from Bishofsburg and sent August von Mackensen

south to meet up with Francois and they joined up in Willenberg. Samsonov was now surrounded.

Samsonov ordered a General Retreat on August 28th. His troops were widely dispersed, critically short of supplies, and communications between the various corps was in tatters.