Battle of the Aleutians a Cold Wake Up Call

Termed "the forgotten battle," the Battle for the Aleutians represented the only instance during World War II when the Japanese occupied American soil and the campaign exacted a significant toll of American lives and treasure. The Aleutians became strategically significant during World War II for the Japanese as well as the United States, but the American preparations in anticipation of this attack were woefully inadequate. Despite a U.S. naval base was being established at Dutch Harbor in 1942, the Japanese bombed the base and later occupied Attu, Kiska, and Agattu islands. Although a U.S. counterattack from bases on Adak and Amchitka retook these islands in 1943, several thousand of American lives were lost in the process and many more were injured. The purpose of this study is to provide a comprehensive and critical analysis of the primary and secondary juried and scholarly literature concerning the Battle of the Aleutians to develop an informed answer to the study's guiding research question: "How might the American response to the Japanese invasion and occupation be directly linked to the chain of events in the Pacific, and did the 'forgotten battle' mobilize Americans more than historians have admitted?" The research will show that if the weather and logistics had been only slightly more favorable to the Japanese, the outcome of Pacific theatre of operations may have been much different and the war would have been prolonged even longer.

Table of Contents

Chapter One: Introduction

Purpose of the Study

Importance of the Study

Overview of the Study

Chapter Two: Review of the Literature

Background and Overview

Background and History of the Aleutian Islands

Settlements at the Time of Battle

Geographic Issues

Events Leading to the Battle

The Campaign: Early Days

The Campaign: American Response

Analyses

Japanese Strategy

Chapter Three: Methodology

Data-Gathering Method

Database of Research

Chapter Four: Summary and Conclusion

Summary

Conclusion

Battle of the Aleutians: A Cold Wake-Up Call

In an air war, if we were unprepared Japan could take it away from us, first by dominating the sky and creeping up the Aleutians. It could work both ways, of course. We could jump off from Alaska and reduce Tokyo to powder. But if we were asleep, without planes, Japan might well seize enough of Alaska to creep down the western coast of Canada. Then we would be in for it. -- Murray Morgan, Bridge to Russia (1947)

Chapter One: Introduction

The Korean War is frequently referred to as "the Forgotten War" because although more than 33,000 Americans lost their lives, few people today remember it in contrast to more recent conflicts such as the War in Vietnam or the major conflict of the two world wars. Similarly, the Battle of the Aleutians is frequently referred to as the "forgotten battle," "forgotten war" or "the theater of military frustration" (Hodas-Walsh 1997, p. 3) of World War II, partly because it has been overshadowed by subsequent events that took place in the South Pacific Front, such as the costly Guadalcanal Campaign and the bloody battle for Iwo Jima. Moreover, the Battle of the Aleutians is not widely considered to have been a decisive battle either, and it is overshadowed in the Pacific Theatre of operations by the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the bloody events that followed. Nevertheless, it was the thesis of this study that the Battle of the Aleutians was instrumental in "waking up" the Americans and its Allies to the danger looming in the Pacific and helped to ensure an Allied victory.

The research shows that the Americans seriously underestimated the importance of protecting the islands prior to the Japanese invasion. Despite warnings from some prominent military leaders, the Aleutians remained largely out of sight and out of the minds of American policymakers until 1942 when the Japanese actually invaded American soil for the first and only time during World War II. Moreover, the battle precipitated a vast Pacific campaign and served to prepare Americans for their role in the looming war to come. This research will also take into account the American and Russian positions prior to the Battle of the Aleutians. It has been suggested that the Aleutians were "virtually undefended" which is why the occupation was a shock to American policymakers (Whitman, n.d.). At the height of the conflict, 144,000 American personnel were arrayed against 8,500 Japanese defenders (The Stamford Historical Society 2009). All told, Allied forces experienced 1,481 deaths and 2,500 wounded, sick, or frostbitten casualties compared to 2,351 Japanese battle deaths (Stamford Historical Society 2009).

Although the Japanese invasion and occupation of two Aleutian (Alaskan) islands was ultimately unsuccessful, the research also shows that had weather and geography been more favorable for the Japanese, the battle might have been lost, and the outcome in the Pacific Theatre could have been much different. The Battle of the Aleutians also kick started an "island hopping" of battles from the north to the South Pacific and was therefore significant for the outcome of World War II.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to deliver a comprehensive and critical analysis of the relevant primary and secondary peer-reviewed and scholarly literature concerning the Battle of the Aleutians in order to develop an informed answer to the study's guiding research question. The overarching research question that guided this study was as follows: "How might the American response to the Japanese invasion and occupation be directly linked to the chain of events in the Pacific, and did the 'forgotten battle' mobilize Americans more than historians have admitted?"

Importance of the Study

The strategic location of the Aleutians has not been lost on military tacticians who cite the archipelago's potential for future incursions into the United States by hostile forces. Furthermore, although it may be "forgotten" by many Americans, the more than three thousand Americans who made the ultimate sacrifice to defend this desolate but strategically important part of the United States should not be lost to the mists of time, but rather commemorated for the heroism that characterized the war in the Pacific Theatre.

Indeed, fully half again as many Americans died fighting the Japanese in the Battle of the Aleutians as the War of 1812, but American history textbooks make little or no mention of the conflict (Loewen 2005). As Hodas-Walsh (1997, p. 3) emphasizes, "Conducted over a thousand miles of islands in extremely harsh conditions it was a conflict that involved 'military frustration.' This conflict should not be 'forgotten' as it consumed hundreds of Japanese and Allied lives and resources. A close study of the Aleutian Campaign has much to offer the future operational planner." Despite the sacrifices that were made by the American army and naval personnel during the Aleutian campaign, there remains a dearth of scholarly investigation into the events that led up to the conflict and how it was prosecuted. In fact, a study by McGinnis (2012, p. 1) concluded that, "No official histories have been published specifically addressing this theatre as a separate entity."

Other military historians agree that the Battle of the Aleutians remains understudied. For instance, Huntoon (1988, p. 3) emphasizes that:

The Aleutian campaign offers significant insights as one of the first joint amphibious operations of the Second World War in a misunderstood and relatively unknown theater. This campaign reflected planning errors which led to disastrous operational results. Both the Japanese and American sides are analyzed to understand the campaign process from planning to execution to end state.

Up to this point in time, the U.S. Army and Navy had never collaborated in a meaningful fashion in a joint campaign, and the lessons learned from this experience continue to be relevant today. According to a study by Breslin (1994, p. 2), the Aleutian campaign was "America's first effort to fight in a joint theater and contains many insights as to how today's commander should fight in a joint environment." Therefore, a modern analysis of the Battle of the Aleutian Islands represents a timely and valuable enterprise. The organization of this study for this purpose is described below.

Overview of the Study

This study used a four-chapter format to achieve the above-stated research purpose and to develop an informed answer to the study's guiding research question. Chapter one of the study was used to introduce the issues of interest, including the purpose and importance of the study. Chapter two provides a review of the primary and secondary peer-reviewed and scholarly literature including a background and overview, the background and history of the Aleutian Islands, the settlements that existed on the islands at the time of the battle, and salient geographic issues that played a role in the campaign. A discussion concerning the events that led up to the battle, the early days of the campaign and the American response is followed by an analysis of these events. An assessment of the Japanese strategy used in the Battle of the Aleutians is followed by a discussion of the aftermath of the battle. Chapter three of the study is used to more fully describe the methodology used and chapter four provides a summary of the research and conclusions.

Chapter Two: Literature Review

Background and Overview

In reality, it is not surprising that it required some time for the United States to recognize the strategic significance of the Aleutians. At the time, Alaska was not even a state and its geographic distance from the contiguous United States further distanced the region from the minds of American policymakers. For instance, according to Hodas-Walsh (1997, pp. 3-4), "Not only was Alaska and the Aleutians a secondary theater of war during World War II, the United States had always considered it of secondary importance." By the fin de siecle, though, the United States had in fact begun to take some interest in the archipelago but the interest was only modest and fleeting. In this regard, Hodas-Walsh (1997, p. 4) points out that, "In 1904 the Navy established a naval reservation on Kiska Island but, never developed it any further. The arms limitation efforts in the form of the Washington Conference Treaty, signed in 1922, limited United States development of the Aleutians."

Historians point out that the Washington Conference Treaty failed to include Russia in its terms, and Miller and Wich (2011, p. 13) emphasize that, "The Washington treaty system was also weak because it lacked effective mechanisms for enforcement. The four-power treaty called upon its signatories only to consult in the event of a dispute among the powers in the region." Indeed, even when this Treaty of abrogated by the Japanese, American military leaders paid scant attention. For example, Hodas-Walsh (1997, p. 4) emphasizes that, "In 1934, Japan, a signer of that agreement renounced it. Neither the U.S. government or the military took any action."

Although the U.S. And Japan had been at odds for some time concerning issues sucha fishing rights off the coast of the Aleutians, there was little other indication at the time that this withdrawal of the Japanese from the Treaty represented anything besides its disagreements over these rights. Certainly, there was no indication that there were any serious plans to invade the islands at the time. This is not to say that the strategic significance of the Aleutians had escaped the notice of all American military leaders at time. Most particularly, in 1935, General "Billy" Mitchell cited the importance of mounting an Alaskan defense and even went so far as to suggest that Alaska was the "...most important strategic place in the world" (quoted in Cohen 1981, p. 189).

Despite this warning, though, the United States failed to take any substantive action to strengthen the Alaskan frontier against foreign incursions and it was not until 1939 that any real steps were taken for this purpose. According to the U.S. Department of Interior (Alaska) (World War II in Alaska 2000, p. 5), "In 1939 Congress established a Panama-Hawaii-Alaska defense triangle to protect America's vulnerable western coast. Alaska, the largest and least fortified of the three, soon saw the construction of naval bases at Sitka, Dutch Harbor, and Kodiak." These initiatives would soon prove to be too little, too late for American military forces in the Northern Pacific. In this regard, the U.S. Department of Interior (Alaska) (World War II in Alaska 2000, p. 5) adds that, "When Japanese Zeros struck Pearl Harbor in 1941, military and civilian workers in Alaska were still scrambling to fortify the vast territory."

Not only were military and civilians workers "scrambling," they were doing so with insufficient, inadequate and frequently obsolete equipment. For instance, in 1940, the Alaskan Defense Force was formed, headed by Lieutenant General Buckner; however, General Buckner had less than 10,000 troops and just a few outdated aircraft to defend the Aleutians (Hodas-Walsh 1997). Moreover, the naval forces assigned to the theater were also grossly inadequate for their defense (Hodas-Walsh 1997). According to Hodas-Walsh (1997, p. 6), "By 1940, the Japanese had slowly expanded their empire south, east and west. Only the northern flank still needed protection." Another military historian reports that at the time, it was thought that, "Japan had no plan to invade Alaska, and American strategists had ruled out invading Japan via this short but rugged route" (Morison 1951, p. 4).

In sharp contrast to the prevailing thinking by American leaders, Japanese military leaders recognized that the Aleutians were poorly defended; they also realized that the Aleutians were a viable approach for mounting an invasion of the United States (Hodas-Walsh 1997). Moreover, the Japanese High Command viewed the Aleutians as a potential buffer for protecting their homeland from invasion by the United States (Hodas-Walsh 1997). In fact, the Japanese High Command had good reason to view the Aleutians in this context. In the research that follows, it will be demonstrated that the Japanese believed that Lieutenant Colonel Doolittle's raid against Tokyo most likely originated in the Aleutians since they could not fathom the reality of the innovative tactics that were used. In this regard, Hodas-Walsh (1997, p. 4) advises that, "In fact the bombers had flown off U.S.S. Hornet 700 miles off the Japanese coast [and] this raid inflicted minor damage but, demonstrated that Japan was vulnerable to attack." Therefore, from the Japanese High Command's perspective, securing Kiska and Attu Kiska Islands would provide them with a buffer against American attacks on Japan's Kuril Islands (Hodas-Walsh 1997).

The commander of the Japanese Northern Army, Lieutenant General Higuda, expressed a triple goal for the Aleutians: "They wanted to break up any offensive action the Americans might contemplate against Japan by way of the Aleutians, to set up a barrier between the United States and Russia in the event that Russia determined to join the United States in its war against Japan, and to make preparations through the construction of advance air bases for future offensive action" (The Capture of Attu 1944, p.2).

Prior to the onset of World War II, the continental territory of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands is characterized by Friedl (1994, p. 2) as "neglect caused by false assumptions about the security of this territory and its waters. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 provided the basis for these false assumptions." In sum, the Washington Naval Treaty was intended to limit the size of the Japanese naval fleet and outlawed any build-up of military fortifications of the Japanese islands in the North Pacific (Friedl 1994). As the research will also show, even when Japan flagrantly abrogated this treaty, American policymakers and military leaders failed to recognize the threat. According to Friedl (1994, p. 2), "Limited funding and domestic priorities in the depression trodden years of the thirties made an easy case for ignoring the fact that Japan had withdrawn from the Treaty in 1934 and was aggressively pursuing her vision of the greater east Asia co-prosperity sphere."

In fact, in was not until 1926 that the U.S. Navy had even conducted aerial surveys of the Aleutians and the surrounding regions; however, by 1934, the U.S. Navy had dispatched three expeditions north in order to reconnoiter the islands (Werrell 2011). The first mission dispatched to the Aleutians was comprised of two tenders and six fleet submarines that surveyed various Alaskan ports as far west as Dutch Harbor (Werrell 2011). In addition, two naval aviation missions were conducted in 1934; the first was in April and was comprised of six float planes from San Diego and the second was conducted during the summer months that patrol bombers (e.g., flying boats) (Werrell 2011). According to Werrell (2011, p. 29), "This expedition was seen, at least by some, to compete with a contemporary Army Air Corps flight to Alaska." Beyond these modest missions, though, the Aleutians remained out of sight and out of mind for military planners and policymakers in Washington, D.C. until the campaign in the Aleutians began in earnest in 1942. Some of the reasons for this lack of interest and oversight can be discerned from the background and history of the Aleutians Islands which are discussed further below.

Background and History of the Aleutian Islands

The Aleutian Islands are comprised of a series of islands of volcanic origin that form a 1,200-mile curve west from the tip of the Alaska Peninsula and nearing Russia's Komandorski Islands (Aleutians Islands 2012). According to Morgan (1947, p. 33), "Between seventy and a hundred and fifty islands make up the Aleutian Chain, depending on where you draw the line between an island and a rock." The islands separate the Bering Sea from the Pacific Ocean and consist of four main groups as follows:

1. Fox Islands (nearest to the mainland); these include Unimak, Unalaska, Umnak, and Akutan;

2. Andreanof Islands; these include Amlia, Atka, Adak, Kanaga, and Tanaga;

3. Rat Islands; these include Amchitka and Kiska; and,

4. Near Islands; these are the smallest and the most western group and include Agattu and Attu (Aleutian Islands 2013).

Rugged and desolate in many places, the Aleutians comprise part of a larger series of land masses of volcanic origin. For instance, according to Morgan (1947, p. 25), "The Aleutians and the Alaska Peninsula are elemental: they were formed by fire and water. Together the Peninsula and the Chain make up one of the series of volcanic festoons draped along the western and northern edges of the Pacific the Philippines, the Ryukyus, the Japanese home islands, and the Kuriles."

Settlements at the Time of Battle

Settlements on the Aleutians were few with the main village being Unalaska. According to Morgan (1947, p. 129), "When Father Veniaminof came to the Aleutians in 1824, Unalaska was the principal town. Its population was about three hundred. In 1937, still the main metropolis of the Chain, Unalaska boasted three hundred and fifty inhabitants." Although a few other small fishing villages existed on the Aleutians in 1942, Budge (2010, p. 1) reports that, "The most important settlement in the Aleutians was Dutch Harbor, on the island of Unalaska near the eastern end of the chain," as well as Vega Bay (Attu Island), and Holz Bay (Kiska). Geographic issues were of the utmost importance in the Battle of the Aleutians. The climate has been described as having "terrible weather" (Budge 2010). Likewise, "the terrain is also very unfavorable for military operations. The islands are rugged and volcanic, with little vegetation and no timber whatsoever," (Budge 2010). These factors had an enormous impact on military operations for both the Japanese as well as the American forces in the Aleutians.

At the time of battle, the only American airstrip in the entire Aleutian chain was at Umnak, near Dutch Harbor, and "pilots reported that landing on the strip was like landing on a spring mattress -- the strip was Marston mat over arctic bog" (Budge 2010, p. 1). Other military historians also cite the paucity of human settlements in the Aleutians at the time of the Japanese attack due in large part to "their remoteness as well as the poor weather and difficult terrain" (Stamford Historical Society, 2009).

Geographic Issues

By any measure, the Aleutians are not a tropical vacation destination but are rather a series of formidable and rugged islands that have little to offer except for their geographic proximity. For instance, according to Morgan (1947, p. 32):

They are cold, but not as cold as New York State. They are barren, but not as barren as western Kansas. They are foggy, but no more fogbound than Maine. They are habitable white men have lived in them for nearly two centuries, natives for at least ten. They are not in the Arctic, nor near it. Unimak, the most northerly, is a thousand miles south of the Arctic Circle; it lies south of Moscow, south of Glasgow, south of Copenhagen."

The 1,200-mile chain of islands stretches far into the Pacific in ways that make it closer to other strategic locations than to the Alaskan mainland. In this regard, Morgan (1947, p. 33) adds that "Adak, in the central Aleutians, is nearer to Midway Island than to northern Alaska. London, Berlin, Warsaw and Rotterdam all lie farther north than Amchitka." Although characterized as a "sword pointed at the heart of Japan," the geographic reality of their location is far different. For example, Morgan (1947, p. 34) notes that, "Geographically, the Aleutians are not 'a sword pointed at the heart of Japan' [see political map at Figure 1 below] but a curved saber reaching for the side of Russia's cold Kamchatka Peninsula. The tip of the saber is Russian territory Bering Island in the Commander group."

Figure 1. Location of the Aleutian Islands off the coast of Alaska

[Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/34/Aleutians.jpg/250px-Aleutians.jpg]

The most westerly American spot is Attu, directly north of New Zealand and so far out in the Pacific that the international date line has to jog to keep the island in the same day with the rest of America. The handle of the Aleutian saber is the volcanic Alaska Peninsula, which belongs geologically to the island rather than to the mainland. Between seventy and a hundred and fifty islands make up the Aleutian Chain, depending on where you draw the line between an island and a rock. They are divided into five major groups the Fox Islands, the Islands of the Four Mountains, the Andreanofs, the Rat Islands, and the Near Islands (Morgan 1947, pp. 33-34).

The "islands had little strategic value, but as long as the Japanese held them any idea of a Northern Pacific Campaign against Japan were precluded" (The Stamford Historical Society 2009, p. 1). Japan's position in the region meant they were confident and growing more powerful after conquest of Manchuria, 1937 and attack on Pearl Harbor.

The strategic value of the Aleutians derives from their position approximately halfway between Japan and the continental United States. The western-most islands in the chain are just 650 miles from the Kurile Islands (which were part of Japan until 1945), and, of course, they extend eastward all the way to Alaska. Both sides in the Pacific War recognized the area's importance -- in 1935, General William "Billy" Mitchell, the outspoken advocate of American airpower, declared that "he who holds Alaska holds the world" -- but neither the United States nor Japan were particularly interested in venturing into the region. The harsh sub-arctic climate discouraged any serious consideration of fighting in the Aleutians or Alaska (Honky 2005, p. 30).

The weather was always the same: rain, cold, fog, and wind (frequently reaching the rate of 50 to 8o miles per hour). The sun was rarely seen. The "horizontal" rain made walking backwards an accepted method of travel. Fine volcanic sand was mixed with the wet wind, resulting in irritation to the exposed parts of the body, and dirt that could not be eliminated from clothes and living quarters (Gelbman 1949, p. 136).

Events Leading to the Battle

Many historians agree that Japan's decision to invade and occupy the Aleutians in World War II resulted from Doolittle's raid on Tokyo. Although there were other reasons, and each helped to push the Japanese in that direction, it was Doolittle's raid that was at the very heart of the matter. Evidence points to that surprise bombing raid on what Japan believed to be an impenetrable city, Tokyo, as the impetus. It was the single event that forevermore sealed the fate of Alaskans and Aleutians in World War II (Gabrielson, Zayas, Cowell, Fuega, Simpson & Bulmer 1995). The campaign has since become known as the "forgotten battle." Despite its significant impact at the time, it quickly became overshadowed by later action in the Pacific and Europe. Still, the Aleutians held a prize for whoever got there first. The U.S. Army Center of Military History says that both considered the Aleutians as the natural avenue of approach. Consequently, Japan and America viewed them as vital to the defense of their homeland (Gabrielson et al. 1995).

The connection between the Japanese invasion of the Aleutians and the Doolittle raid is also cited by Stone (2003, p. 3) who reports, "Protruding in a long, sweeping curve for more than a thousand miles westward from the tip of the Alaskan Peninsula, the Aleutians provided a natural avenue of approach between the two countries. Forbidding weather and desolate terrain, however, made this approach militarily undesirable." While spared the arctic climate of the Alaskan mainland to the north, the Aleutians are constantly swept by cold winds and often engulfed in dense fog. The weather becomes progressively worse in the western part of the chain, but all the islands are marked by craggy mountains and scant vegetation. Despite such inhospitable conditions, neither the United States nor Japan could afford to assume that the other would reject the Aleutians as an impractical invasion route.

Japanese concern for the defense of the northern Pacific increased when sixteen U.S. B-25 bombers, led by Lt. Col. James H. Doolittle, took off from the carrier Hornet and bombed Tokyo on 18 April 1942. Unsure of where the American raid originated, but suspicious that it could have been from a secret base in the western Aleutians, the Imperial High Command began to take an active interest in capturing the island chain (Stone 2003, p. 4). This point is also made by Morgan (1947, p. 34) who advises:

When Jimmy Doolittle's sixteen B-25s bombed Tokyo and other Japanese cities on 18 April 1942, there was a renewal of Japanese interest in operations in the northern Pacific. Many Japanese officers were convinced the Doolittle raiders had flown from bases in the Aleutians and wanted to deny the Americans another chance to make similar raids. That the bombers had been flown off of an aircraft carrier was difficult for them to credit.

In reality, it is little wonder that the Japanese High Command was mystified about the origins of the Doolittle raid on Tokyo because of the secrecy that surrounded the mission as well as the misinformation provided by the American president himself. In this regard, Morgan (1947, p. 34) points out that, "President Franklin Roosevelt's announcement that the B-25s had come from mythical 'Shangri-La' just added to their uncertainty."

The air power exemplified by Colonel Doolittle's raid on Toyko was not reproduced in the Aleutians given the relatively small numbers of outdated aircraft the American military leadership had allocated to the campaign. Nevertheless, it was air power that was used by both sides of the conflict for some obvious reasons. According to Horky (2005, p. 30), "The Aleutians campaign was fought almost exclusively in the air for most of its duration. The vast expanse of the theatre -- the opposing armies began almost 1,000 miles away from each other -- and the low priority it received from both the Americans and the Japanese, neither of whom were willing to divert naval forces from other areas, compelled the combatants to rely on air power for most of the campaign." Although there were nearly 150,000 American forces stationed in the Aleutians at the height of the conflict, the majority of these would play a support role for the Army and naval forces that were brought to bear against the Japanese as discussed further below.

The Campaign: Early Days

Just 6 months following their attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese bombed Dutch Harbor on Unalaska Island and took possession of the Aleutian islands of Attu and Kiska (World War II in Alaska 2000). Prior to the attack on the Aleutians, American codebreakers had determined that the Japanese efforts in the Aleutians were primarily intended as diversionary tactic that was designed to lure U.S. naval ships away from their Midway Island base of operations (World War II in Alaska 2000). According to the U.S. Department of Interior's analysis of the campaign (World War II in Alaska 2000, p. 3), "Even so, military strategists felt they could not risk leaving the Aleutians open as stepping stones for Japanese attacks on the United States mainland. In addition, the occupation of even these distant U.S. islands was a significant propaganda victory for the Japanese -- the affront could not go unanswered."

Not only was the Japanese incursion onto American soil an affront, if the Japanese could secure and hold these strategic islands, they would have a geographic proximate location from which to launch further attacks on Alaska, Canada and the continental United States. For instance, according to Hutchinson (1994, p. 5), "Strategically located by Unimak pass (which provides access from the North Pacific to the Bering Sea), Dutch Harbor is a natural harbor which would become one of the few main American bases In the North Pacific." The early days of the campaign (see Table 1 below) were characterized by preparatory steps that were designed to strengthen the islands' defenses without diverting inordinate amounts of men and materiel from the more important theatres of operation in the Pacific. In this regard, Hutchinson (1994, p. 5) reports that, "The U.S. Navy began constructing a naval base there in September 1940. It eventually would contain an oil dock, Tank farm, and submarine, seaplane and docking facilities. Controlling access to Siberia, the eastern Aleutians and the northern Alaskan Peninsula, it was the key target for the Japanese attack June 3-4, 1942." The Japanese incursions into Attu and Kiska prompted a more vigorous response from the American military and these issues are discussed further below.

The Campaign: American Response

The American response to the growing perception of the Japanese threat against the Aleutians was slow but steady; however, it was characterized by a great deal of wrangling between military leaders concerning what was needed, where it was needed, and when it was needed. The U.S. Department of Interior's analysis of the Aleutian campaign cites the incredible hardships that were involved in mounting any serious defense. For instance, according to the U.S. Department of Interior (Alaska), "Because planes departing from Kodiak and Dutch Harbor did not have the range to engage the Japanese at Attu and Kiska, U.S. forces built bases on other Aleutian islands which would allow them to strike farther west. Pilots and ground troops soon realized they were facing a second enemy, Mother Nature" (World War II is Alaska 2000, p. 3). In fact, weather is consistently cited as a major obstacle to ground, naval and air operations throughout the campaign, with many missions being cancelled as a result of inclement weather. Likewise, the conditions on the ground were miserable for the troops stationed on the Aleutians, with wind, snow and cold being as formidable of foes as the Japanese themselves. In this regard, the U.S. Department of Interior (Alaska) emphasizes that, "

The weather along the 1,200-mile island chain was some of the worst in the world, with dense fogs, violent seas, and fierce wind storms called williwaws." If the events that followed had happened to someone else, they would have been almost comical in their scope of disaster. The events, though, happened to the American forces that were doing their best with the equipment and resources they had available, but the results were still disastrous. Indeed, according to the U.S. Department of Interior's analysis of the Aleutian campaign, "Aircraft lacking accurate navigational devices or consistent radio contact crashed into mountains, each other, the sea -- simply finding the enemy was a life-and-death struggle. For soldiers in the Aleutians, contact with the enemy was infrequent and fleeting, but the weather was a perpetual adversary" (World War II is Alaska 2000, p. 3). These observations are confirmed by the day-to-day events that were recorded (as shown in Table 2 below).

Some of the key dates and actions taken as part of the American preparations are set forth in Table 1 below.

Table 1

Key Dates and Actions of American Response Preparatory to the Japanese Invasion of the Aleutian Islands

Action

Army Signal Corps and Engineers recommend the establishment of detector stations to alert the approach of enemy planes toward the Naval bases of Dutch Harbor, Kodiak, and Sitka.

August 1, 1940

The Alaska Sector becomes subordinate command in the 13th Naval District demonstrating growing realization of the importance of the North Pacific to the U.S. Navy.

August 2, 1940

Gen. George Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, approves the construction of eight early warning detector stations and one information station.

August 15, 1940

The Joint Board in Washington concludes that the strategic locations of Anchorage, Fairbanks, Kodiak, Sitka, and Dutch Harbor should provide for the defense of Alaska.

Construction of Kurile ports and airfields begins.

September 19, 1940

Annette Island airfield construction begins.

Gen. Buckner recommends the construction of an Army air base in vicinity of Dutch Harbor (Chernofski Bay, Unalaska).

December 12, 1940

War Department Order 9 designates the Army installation at Anchorage, Alaska as Fort Richardson, and the airfield and facilities as Elmendorf Field.

December 29, 1940

227 men of the 11th Fighter Squadron (the "Aleutian Tigers") arrive at Seward, Alaska.

Revised war plans state that the mission of Alaskan Army forces is: "To defend United States military and Naval installations in Alaska, including Unalaska, against sea, land and air attacks, and against sabotage; to deny use by the enemy of sea and land bases in Alaska and the Aleutian Islands; to support the Navy."

January 21, 1941

Only three locations of the eight proposed early warning detector stations proved acceptable. Additional surveys for the other five approved stations are required. On this same day, the Secretary of War approves the establishment of 12 stations.

Construction begins on Fort Greeley, with facilities to accommodate 236 officers and 5,592 enlisted men.

February 21, 1941

The first unit of the 18th Pursuit Squadron lands at Elmendorf Field, becoming the first Air Corps unit of World War II assigned to Alaska.

February 23, 1941

The 28th Composite Group arrives at Elmendorf Field. Maj. Donald W. Titus is its commander. An advance group of the 36th Bombardment Squadron and the 23rd Air Base Group (commanded by Maj. John L. Davidson) arrive at Elmendorf.

May 19, 1941

After an aerial survey of the Aleutians, Lt. Frank O'Brien recommends (in a report) Otter Point, Umnak Island, for construction of an air base to protect the Aleutians (Otter Point is 70 miles from Dutch Harbor).

May 29, 1941

Air Field Forces, Alaska Defense Command is established as headquarters of the air forces. Only 38 planes defend Alaska; all combat planes are obsolescent or obsolete.

June 26, 1941

G-2 Military Intelligence informs the War Plans Division that Japan might take advantage of war between Germany and the U.S.S.R. To move against Alaska, and urges the War Department to increase the Alaska Defense Command to full strength.

June 27, 1941

The Navy agrees to extend runways at Kodiak to allow Army bombers as well as pursuit aircraft.

July 3, 1941

Gen. George C. Marshall alerts Alaska command. Gen. John L. DeWitt cautions Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr. Of the danger of Soviet collapse and Axis operations towards Alaska.

July 15, 1941

The strength of authorized emergency garrisons for Alaska (70 officers and 1,950 enlisted men for Sitka, 235 officers and 5,600 enlisted men for Kodiak, and 225 officers and 5,200 enlisted men for Dutch Harbor) is nearing completion.

July 23, 1941

Army Engineers begin construction of an air base on Seward Peninsula, Nome.

September 3, 1941

Nine officers and 221 enlisted men arrive to defend Seward Peninsula, Nome airfield.

A provisional platoon called the Alaskan Scouts is organized for the gathering of intelligence at Fort Richardson, Alaska. It will reach a maximum strength of 66 men and two officers. The unit includes Eskimos, trappers, prospectors, Aleutians, and Indians, and is formed by Col. Lawrence V. Castner.

October 1, 1941

A provisional platoon called the Alaskan Scouts is organized for the gathering of intelligence at Fort Richardson, Alaska. It will reach a maximum strength of 66 men and two officers. The unit includes Eskimos, trappers, prospectors, Aleutians, and Indians, and is formed by Col. Lawrence V. Castner.

October 17, 1941

Maj. Everett S. Davis is given command of Army Air Force ground units. The name of the headquarters is changed to the Air Force, Alaska Defense Command.

October 27, 1941

The July alert that exposed the lack of Alaskan air defense did not result in an improved situation. Gen. DeWitt writes to the Adjutant General that: "Our mere establishment of Army garrisons in Alaska with no means for them to know what may lie just over the horizon, does not conform to any known principle of strategy, military or Naval."

November 21, 1941

War Department General Staff and Army Air Forces finally agree on Aleutian airfield construction.

November 26, 1941

A Joint Army-Navy Board approves construction of the Otter Point airbase. A Pacific-wide is alert called by Washington over tensions with the Japanese. The Alaska Defense Command has a force of 20,000 with most of the construction at Elmendorf Field and Fort Richardson completed.

December 7, 1941

Japan bombs Pearl Harbor and America enters the war.

Source: Adapted from Hutchinson 1994, pp. 1-9

Some of the key dates and actions that were taken as part of the American response to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in the Aleutians are set forth in Table 2 below.

Table 2

Key Dates and Actions of American Response in the Aleutians to the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor

Action

December 7, 1941

Twelve P-36s and six B-18s take off to avoid possible destruction on the airfield after learning of the Japanese attack. Approximately 21,500 officers and enlisted men guard Alaska. The Alaska Defense Command activates its war plan.

December 8, 1941

Bombers are ordered to begin to fly armed patrols from Anchorage to Kodiak, Alaska.

December 9, 1941

The War Department gives approval for the construction of Otter Point. The 807th Engineer Aviation Company, which will construct the base, begins to move in late December.

December 11, 1941

After being attacked by the Japanese and drawn into World War, Gen. DeWitt is finally directed to build an Umnak airfield and facilities. The Western Defense Command is activated.

December 28, 1941

The Alaskan Air Force is created.

December 30, 1941

The 11th Pursuit Squadron arrives at Elmendorf Field.

December 31, 1941

The Provisional fighter interceptor command of the Alaskan Air Force is activated.

January 2, 1942

The 77th Bombardment Squadron (Medium) joins the 28th Composite Group.

January 15, 1942

The Alaskan Air Force (Lt. Col. Everett S. Davis, commanding) is activated at Elmendorf Field. Submarine Division 41 (S-18, S-23) departs the west coast for Dutch Harbor, UnAlaska.

January 18, 1942

The first group of the 807th Engineer Aviation Company, with 64 officers and men, arrives at Otter Point to construct an airbase.

January 21, 1942

President Roosevelt is informed by Gen. Marshall that the Army expects a Japanese raid on Dutch Harbor at any time. The president wants a plan for a striking force established in Alaska and the Aleutians, and the plan's execution by summer.

January 31, 1942

In response to the president's order, Alaskan Navy and Army commanders recommend immediate negotiation to develop bases in Siberia and on Sakhalin Island. They advocate a secure convoy route to Petropavlovsk and a line of seaplane bases along the Aleutians, to be protected by Army garrisons.

February 5, 1942

The Alaskan Air Force is redesignated the 11th Air Force. The 11th Air Force will be the smallest, oldest and least known of the American air forces of World War II.

March 15, 1942

The 11th Air Force is activated at Elmendorf Field. The 11th and 18th Pursuit Squadrons are components commanded by Col. Norman D. Sillin.

March 19, 1942

Military Intelligence warns that a seizure of the Aleutian Islands, or a raid on Alaska, could be expected at any time. It is believed that the attack would be to prevent the United States from invading the Homeland from the north, or to obstruct Soviet/American communication.

March 23, 1942

The 807th Engineer Aviation Company begins laying Marston matting to create an air field at Otter Point. A 100 by 5,000-foot runway is completed by the end of March.

March 24, 1942

Lieutenant Commander Thomas Carson Thomas arrives at Dutch Harbor for the absent base commander Cmdr. William N. Updegraft. Thomas will immediately begin work on the base's defenses and security.

March 28, 1942

Seaplane tender Casco arrives in Alaska and becomes the Flagship of the Commander of Patrol Air Wing Four. Built as a seaplane tender, it offers better bunk spaces and messing facilities than tenders which were previously old four-stack destroyers.

April 7, 1942

By public proclamation, 263 Japanese-Americans in Alaska are notified that they are to be relocated.

April 12, 1942

The first submarine mission to the Kurile Islands begins. S-34 (commanded by Lt. Cmdr. Thomas L. Wogan) and S-35 (Lt. Cmdr. James E. Stevens) will patrol the coast of Paramushiru and the Sea of Okhotsk at the Onekotan Kaikyo (strait).

April 29, 1942

General George Marshall corresponds with General DeWitt to advise that Naval Intelligence reports that the Japanese admiral commanding Truk Island had requested information and charts on the close-in Aleutian waters as far eastward as Kodiak Island.

April 30, 1942

Alaska is now guarded by 40,424 officers and enlisted men.

May 1, 1942

Cape Chiniak on Kodiak Island is the only radar station operating.

May 21, 1942

Task Force 8 is formed by Admiral Chester Nimitz for Aleutian duty, (to be commanded by Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobold). The United States now knows the objectives of Midway and Dutch Harbor, the approximate strength of the Japanese Northern Area Force and that it will strike I June or shortly after. Gen. Buckner is to report to R.Adm. Theobold as his immediate superior, and Theobold is given command of all Army and Navy units.

May 27, 1942

Rear Admiral Theobald arrives at Kodiak with Task Force 8 (five cruisers, 14 destroyers, six submarines and auxiliaries). Generals Buckner and Butler meet the new Alaska commander Theobold. Capt. Leslie E. Gehres establishes the headquarters of Navy Patrol Air Wing Four at Kodiak Island. Patrol Air Wing Four is designated Task Force 8.1 under Gen. Butler's command.

May 28, 1942

The first reconnaissance flight over the Aleutian chain is flown by a B-17, piloted by Capt. Russell Cone of the 36th Bombardment Squadron. There is no sign of the enemy. Seven B-26s of the 73rd Bombardment Squadron arrive at Cold Bay. Captain Leslie Gehres commands his PBYs of Patrol Wing Four to increase patrols to cover the hours of darkness. The plan for Alaska's defense will rely on the PBYs finding the Japanese ships. After the ships are found, they are to be attacked by land-based aircraft. Then, as the final action, American warships are to engage the Japanese ships and destroy them.

May 29, 1942

A Japanese attack on the Aleutians expected, S-34 and S-35 sail from Dutch Harbor.

June 1, 1942

One heavy, six medium bombers and 17 fighters are now in place at Fort Glenn. Twelve P-40s, six B-26s, and a B-17B are at Otter Point. The total Army strength in Alaska is 45,000 officers and enlisted men.

June 3, 1942

The first Japanese bombing attack on Dutch Harbor takes place. At 0325, Japanese carriers launch aircraft.

At 0430, the Japanese second wave is launched.

At 0545, 15 enemy planes appear and begin strafing.

At 0550, four enemy bombers approach Dutch Harbor.

At 0555, Japanese "Kate" bombers release 16 bombs on Fort Mears killing approximately 25 and wounding as many. At 0635, the Japanese attack is completed.

By 0745, the Japanese aircraft carriers have recovered all of their aircraft.

June 4,1942

The Japanese again bomb Dutch Harbor. At 1154, Japanese carriers launch reconnaissance aircraft. At 1740, Fisherman's Point reports three flights of Japanese bombers approaching Dutch Harbor. At 1800, American anti-aircraft positions open up on the Japanese (Ten fighters and 11 dive bombers).

June 6, 1942

At 1027, the elite 500 Maizura 3rd Special Landing Force (commanded by Lt. Cmdr. Nifumi Mukai) invades Kiska Island. This is the first invasion of the United States of America by a foreign power since the War of 1812. There is no opposition.

Source: Adapted from Hutchinson 1994, pp. 19-24

Taken together, it is clear that the U.S. military leadership had good reason to expect the Japanese invasion in June 1942, but the key dates and actions described in Table 2 above also make it abundantly clear that the Aleutians were a lower priority compared to the rest of the Pacific theatre of operations. These same trends can be discerned from the actions taken by the U.S. military following the Japanese occupied of the islands of Attu and Kiska as set forth in Table 3 below.

Table 3

Key Dates and Actions of American Response Immediately Following the Japanese Invasion of the Aleutian Islands

Action

June 5, 1942

Ten B-17s, 18 B-26s, and 2 LB-30s search for the Japanese carrier force. Using radar a B-17 bombs the Pribilof Islands, believing them enemy ships.

June 6, 1942

Bombers from the 11th Air Force continue to search for the Japanese carriers. A Soviet freighter is attacked by P-38s from Cold Bay. A PBY spots the Japanese fleet but is chased away by "Zeros." Another PBY bombs an enemy submarine, observing no results.

June 8, 1942

A Patrol flown by Capt. Robert E. "Pappy" Speer and his co-pilot Lt. Frederick Ramputi over Kiska and Umnak discovers that the Japanese have invaded Kiska Island. A PBY piloted by Navy Lt. Milton R. Dahl of squadron VP-41 spots four transports and two destroyers in Kiska Harbor. Flying to Attu, he spots Maj. Hotzumi's force. Lt. William J. Bowers, piloting another PBY, also reports the Japanese presence.

June 11, 1942

An 11th Air Force patrol is flown from Umnak Island. The first elements of the 21st Bombardment Squadron arrive at Cold Bay, Alaska. The first Kiska bombing mission of World War II is flown. Navy planes (led by Cmdr. "Doc" Jones) from Atka Island and the tender GILLIS, and Army planes from Umnak and Cold Bay led by Capt. Jack F. Todd, bomb Kiska's landing beaches (five B-24s and five B-17s). Todd's B-24 is shot down, and a PBY flown by Ensign James O. Clark is hit by anti-aircraft fire. Japanese fighters chase the Americans back to Umnak Island, being chased away, in turn, by American Umnak-based fighter planes.

June 12, 1942

American planes continue to bomb Kiska. Six B-17s and one B-24 bomb shipping in the harbor, crews believing that they damage a cruiser and leave a destroyer burning.

June 13, 1942

American planes continue to bomb Kiska. Five B-17s and three B-24s bomb the island through clouds, two bombers turning back. A weather mission is flown by an LB-30. The U.S. War Department requests 11 U.S. commercial airlines to rush men and materials to Alaska.

June 17, 1942

Port Heiden is garrisoned by 1,400 officers and enlisted men. This fort will become known as Fort Morrow, with its mission being an intermediate air base between the Cold Bay and Kodiak airfields.

June 20, 1942

Three bombers of the 11th Air Force search for the B-24 lost the day before. Seven B-24s, one B-17, and one LB-30 attempt to bomb Kiska, with three bombing through the fog. Three bombers abort the mission.

June 21, 1942

Twenty anti-aircraft guns arrive at Nome from Anchorage by order of Gen. Marshall. "Operation Bingo" commences, the first massive tactical airlift of the war. Fifteen military transports and bombers, augmented by 40 civilian transports, airlift 2,035 troops and over 883,000 pounds of cargo to Alaska within 18 days. In addition, missions of the 11th Air Force are canceled due to weather. Only Kiska weather missions and local fighter plane patrols are flown. The 11th Service Command is established at Elmendorf Field.

June 22, 1942

Weather cancels all 11th Air Force missions except a Kiska weather mission and local fighter patrols.

June 23, 1942

Weather cancels all American flying missions except a B-17 weather mission over Kiska and local fighter patrols.

June 25, 1942

The 404th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy) will begin to operate from Nome, Alaska, rather than Fairbanks. One squadron of the 54th Fighter Group is sent to Fort Richardson and another is sent to Nome. North Head, Kiska is bombed for the first time.

June 26, 1942

Kiska Harbor is fire-bombed by five B-24s.

June 28, 1942

Weather cancels all 11th Air Force missions except for a Kiska weather mission.

June 29, 1942

Spotting a Japanese submarine but unable to attack, S-18 arrives at Dutch Harbor. Her commanding officer again requests modern radar and sound equipment. S-35 returns to Dutch Harbor, never spotting the Japanese invasion force in the deep fog.

June 30, 1942

A Kiska weather mission by a B-17 is the only mission of the day. Though attempting to bomb Kiska since 11 June, the 11th Air Force has made only six successful attempts by this time.

July 6, 1942

Admiral Ernest King informs General DeWitt of the Army-Navy decision to focus operations in the South Pacific.

July 7, 1942

Weather and bombing missions to Kiska, Attu, and Agattu are aborted due to weather. One Japanese seaplane is believed shot down.

July 8, 1942

A photographic mission is flown by a B-24 over South Head, Kiska and Little Kiska. Bombing missions are canceled due to weather.

July 9, 1942

Weather/photographic/bombing missions are flown to Kiska, but are aborted due to weather.

July 10, 1942

AB-24 mission to Kiska is aborted due to weather.

July 12, 1942

A three B-24 mission to Kiska is aborted due to weather. The 404th Bombardment Squadron arrives at Ladd Field from the continental United States.

July 15, 1942

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have their first discussion regarding a Attu and Kiska invasion. They believe a large-scale operation to recapture the islands is demanded, and that the invasion is a screen by the Japanese for a possible later invasion of Kamchatka and the Soviet maritime provinces.

July 19, 1942

The 11th Air Force flies search a mission over Agattu and Attu Islands.

Source: Adapted from Hutchinson 1994, pp. 27-34

Other responses to the Japanese occupation of the Aleutians included a U.S. Army and Navy central agreement that was forged in 1942. This central agreement represents a precedent since the U.S. Army and Navy had never prosecuted a joint campaign before. The provisions of the central agreement are set forth in Table 4 below.

Table 4

U.S. Army-Navy Central Agreement for the Defense of the Aleutian Islands

Section

Description

Section I. Operational Objective

To secure the strategic western Aleutian Islands through Army-Navy cooperation and to frustrate enemy operational attempts in the area.

Section II. Outline of Operation

A. By intercepting the enemies' supplies and reinforcements and causing confusion in their rear (mainly directing air and sea forces to the Aleutian Islands, especially the west central Aleutian area), an enemy offensive attempt will be crushed before it comes out. (All possible efforts will be made to obstruct the maintenance of enemy air bases on Amchitka Island).

B. A strategic island group will be formed around Kiska and Attu islands which will be secured by an Army-Navy defense force. The men and supplies required for this purpose, outside of those demanded by present plans, will be dispatched later, as quickly as possible. All efforts will be made to establish the above-described defense situation, with the end of February as its goal.

C. Land and seaplane air bases will be established on Kiska and Attu islands. Both air bases on the two islands will be generally completed around the end of March. The Army will principally be responsible for their construction, and the Navy will render assistance. In addition to the above, it will also be likely in the future to establish land air bases on such islands as the Semichi.

D. Defense and supply Installations: In the Kurile Islands area will be strengthened and a rear line of communications will be established.

Section III. Commanders and strength

A. Army: Commander - commander of the northern Army strength - western Aleutian Islands area -- North Sea Defense Unit. Kurile Islands area -- Kurile Islands Defense Force and air units under command of the northern army commander.

B. Navy: Commander - commander of 5th Fleet. Strength - reinforced 5th Fleet

Source: Hutchinson 1994, p. 74

This central agreement served as the foundation for the successful campaign that would follow. By August 1943, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff meet in Quebec to discuss the possibility for a Kurile invasion to settle the matter once and for all. According to Hutchinson (1994, p. 112), "Due to the terrible northern climate, they recommend that Kurile theatre missions include only sea bombardment, aerial bombing and monitoring by photo-reconnaissance." At the time, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff also determined that the American strategy would refocus materiel and troop strengths to the Central and South Pacific, and planned for an inevitable reduction in U.S. troop strength in the Aleutians to approximately 113,000 by the end of 1943 (Hutchinson 1994).

The conclusion to the Aleutian campaign was relatively anticlimactic, at least for observers sitting in the comfort of their own homes. According to Perras and O'Reilly (2004, p. 473):

In June 1942, seven months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese troops seized the Aleutian island of Attu and held it for eleven months until American troops took it back in a bloody three-week battle. A major theatre in the North Pacific appeared certain thereafter as some 35,000 United States soldiers and sailors set their sites on a second Aleutian island held by the enemy. But when this force arrived on Kiska, they discovered that the Japanese had evacuated.

Analyses

As complex as it was, some military historians suggest that the Japanese strategy in the Pacific theatre might have worked if a few things had turned out differently. For instance, according to Hagan (2005, p. 2), "Undeniably, the Japanese two-pronged attack against the Aleutians and Midway was a bold and innovative strategy which Admiral Yamamoto believed would succeed and give the Japanese a firm foothold in the North and Central Pacific." Unfortunately for the Japanese High Command, though, bold and innovative was insufficient to carry the day. Having awakened the "sleeping tiger" that is the United States by their undeclared attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese leadership could little imagine the extent of the American response in the Pacific theatre in general, and even in the Aleutian campaign as half-hearted as it was. In this regard, Hagan (2005, p. 2) points out that, "However, due to their own errors in strategic operational execution, .vulnerable fleet formations, flawed doctrinal practice, and miscalculations of American resolve, their drive to conquer the Pacific ended in tragic loss of life, humiliation, and forced them to adopt a more defensive strategy which would haunt them throughout the remainder of the war." Indeed, the failed dual attacks on Midway Island and the Aleutians representing the beginning of a downward spiral in Japanese fortunes in the Pacific Theatre, including the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot" and the Battle of the Coral Sea. In this regard, Hagan (2005, p. 1) notes that, "The defeat of the Japanese on the Aleutian Islands, and the U.S. naval victory at Midway, prevented the Japanese domination of the Northern and Central Pacific Regions during World War II."

Nevertheless, some military historians also suggest if things had turned out just slightly different, the outcome of these battles might have also been vastly different, prolonging the war with Japan even longer. For instance, Hagan (2005, p. 1) adds that, "Opponents would argue that if two additional Japanese carriers, damaged as a result of the Coral Sea battle, had been available for use in the Midway operation, the ratio of carrier to carrier strength would equal two to one in favor of the Japanese (six to three ratio), giving them superiority in both air power, and carrier/support vessel depth." There were other "what-ifs" involved in determining the positive outcome of the Battle of the Aleutians for the Allied forces as well that could have spelled a significant difference. According to Hagan (2005, p. 1), "In addition, had the U.S. Naval Intelligence Service not been able to decipher Japanese communications about the Midway/Aleutian campaign, the U.S. would have lost strategic control of the Northern and Central Pacific region." Finally, if the United States leadership had heeded the warnings of its prescient military leaders prior to 1942 to begin with, it is possible that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and Midway might have been prevented altogether. As Hagan (2005, p.1) concludes, "Had the War Department adopted Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's Orange Plan, the Japanese may have thought twice about launching an attack on Pearl Harbor, and Midway, since naval forces based at Kiska would have had provided an early warning of the impending attacks" (Hagan 2005, p. 1). In sum, the Battle for the Aleutians was a costly campaign for both sides that had far-reaching implications that were unforeseeable at the time, but many military historians agree that both sides would have been better off if they had just bypassed the Aleutians altogether. In this regard, Perras and O'Reilly (2004, p. 437) emphasize that, "In terms of overall military strategy, the Aleutian campaigns were an utter waste for both sides. They confirmed Mitchell's prophecy only if amended to a formulation modest enough to claim that he who holds Alaska rules not the world but merely Alaska."