Battle of the Bulge According

Battle of the Bulge

According to John Kline, the biggest and most costly battle of World War II began on December 16, 1944 which the German army referred to as their Ardennes Offensive. On this eventful day, "the (American) 106th Infantry Division... were hit with full force" by the German army, and after three days of fighting, "two of the Regiments, the 422nd and 423rd, were surrounded" which forced the 424th Regiment to join the 112th Regiment, part of the 28th Infantry Division. And working together as a massive armed team, these regiments and divisions "countered the German attack (by) driving the Germans back through the same area where the 106th had been in position in mid December 1944." Thus, "this German offensive became known in the U.S. Forces journals as the Battle of the Bulge."

This great battle was the turning point in the war in Europe and greatly aided in the efforts of the Allied forces to bring a quick and decisive end to the war and to the Third Reich, headed by Adolph Hitler and his Nazi counterparts.

The war plan that eventually culminated in the Battle of the Bulge was first realized in the mind of Adolph Hitler, a plan conceived out of pure desperation sometime in July of 1944 and considered over and over by Hitler throughout the month of August. His greatest concern at the time were the war reports that kept filtering into his secret headquarters in Rastenburg in East Prussia, reports that detailed how the Allies were managing to infiltrate Germany from practically every direction. But for Adolph Hitler, these reports, despite their grim statistics, did not deter him from believing that the war could be reversed in the favor of Germany.

For one thing, Hitler knew that the Allies were facing a supply shortage, due to advancing so quickly into Germany, and that the Allied troops were exhausted and needed to be re-armed and reinforced. These facts, at least for Hitler, made it conceivable that he had enough time to pull his forces together and occupy the West Wall, "Germany's belt of fortification stretching from Switzerland to the borders of Holland which would provide him with the time to plan and activate his master stroke against the Allied forces." 2

As a result of this plan, Hitler ordered the launching of a major counteroffensive against the Allied forces based upon what is now known as a Blitzkrieg attack ("Lightning War") which greatly aided Hitler and his Nazi forces in the early years of the war. In effect, this attack would take the Allied forces completely by surprise and force them to retreat which would then allow him to turn his armies eastward and destroy the next assault by the Russians.

Of course, like many of his schemes put into effect during the war, Hitler's plan for his Blitzkrieg attack against the prevailing Allies forces was very clever and when it did finally occur, the confident Allied forces were completely unprepared and utterly surprised, due to believing that Germany was ill-equipped to launch such an attack. Thus, "when the German onslaught hit in the middle of December, it led to a great and bloody struggle and became known because of the way it bent back the Allied lines as the Battle of the Bulge." 3

In order to launch this attack which Hitler thought would place Germany in a very militarily-strong position, he had to decide where it was to take place. He first considered Italy, but soon abandoned it due to its isolation; he also considered the Eastern Front but changed his mind when his generals pointed out that the Russians had far too many troops in that area. Finally, Hitler decided to attack the Allied forces in the Ardennes region of Belgium and Luxembourg. His main reason was that this area was quite rugged -- "dense woodlands, rolling hills and deep valleys and ravines" which would make it extremely difficult for the Allied forces to maneuver and push forward.

Also, Hitler recalled that the German army had occupied this region four years hence and that his "commanders were very familiar with its twisting and turning topography and its road system which would help the tank divisions to rapidly reach their intended destinations." 4

On December 12, 1944, all German forces in the area of the Ardennes were altered and quickly mustered into action. The next day, the German army took up their positions along a base line on the other side of Ardennes. As to the German army's artillery, massive guns and howitzers were moved into place some five miles behind the base line and approximately 5,000 German soldiers were ordered to move the needed ammunition by hand instead of by truck in order to conserve on petrol. On the night of December 15, the counteroffensive was initially in place, made up of 20 divisions with five more on reserve. Manpower-wise, this was a very powerful and deadly force of about 300,000 men, 2,000 pieces of artillery and almost a thousand tanks and armored assault vehicles. 5

Many military historians have often considered exactly why Hitler choose December 16 as the date for launching his Blitzkrieg attack upon the Allied forces in Ardennes. The date itself has no special significance, but it is a fact that General Manteuffel had somehow managed to convince Hitler that December 16 was a good day for the attack. Manteuffel also "persuaded the Fuhrer that... The infantry should attack first, rather than the panzers, as Hitler had planned." Militarily, "the foot soldiers would open paths for the armor (and) clear out enemy tanks...

A while) small units would infiltrate the enemy front line positions before the artillery opened fire." Also, on the evening of December 15, the sky was brightly illuminated by a full moon which helped to "speed forward the tanks over the 28-mile-long front." Thus, Manteuffel's planning "got his army off on the right foot," for in the pre-dawn darkness, the German battalions penetrated the American lines and advanced rapidly. 6

Meanwhile, the Allied forces were utterly unaware of what was occurring on the other side of Ardennes. Defensively, the Allied forces were ill-prepared for what was about to happen, due to an air of great optimism shared by a number of prominent American officers in charge of the operations. As Kline points out, the officers thought that "the Ardennes was the least likely spot for a German offensive" which influenced their decision to "keep the line thin so that manpower might concentrate on offensives north and south of the Ardennes." 7 On December 12, an intelligence report reached the office of General Bradley and stated that "It is now certain that attrition is steadily sapping the strength of the German forces" and that "the crust of defenses is thinner... And more vulnerable that it appears."

Thus, it was assumed that "the balance... is in favor of the Allies" and with continuing pressure "the breaking point may develop suddenly and without warning." 8 Unfortunately, it would be the Allied forces that would experience this "breaking point" on the morning of December 16, 1944.

For the Allied defense, the Ardennes front line was very stretched out, for along its 85-mile-long boundary, the only defenses were a cavalry group with light shoulder weapons, one armored division and four or five infantry divisions. Two of these divisions were made up of men who had just joined the forces and lacked any true battle experience, while several others were composed of men totally exhausted from previous fighting. In essence, this was about all of the defensive troops that were available at the time. However, as the morning of December 16 drew closer, there were obvious signs that the Germans were about to launch some kind of an attack. For one thing, air-born reconnaissance units had reported a great multitude of movement in the form of traffic; Tiger tanks, the German equivalent of today's heavily-armed assault vehicles, were being transported by train.

All of this aloofness as to what was occurring along the Ardennes front line bears some similarities to what happened at Pearl Harbor four years earlier, for when the Japanese were approaching Hawaii by air and by ship, numerous messages and signs of activity were ignored by the military units stationed at Pearl Harbor. With the Ardennes situation, a staff officer related to Major General Alan Jones that all of the activity was nothing to be concerned with -- "The Krauts are just playing phonograph records to scare the newcomers," he reportedly said. 9

The main reason which prompted the Allied forces to attack the German counteroffensive at Ardennes is quite clear -- this was Adolph Hitler's "last stand" against the Allied forces, for he knew that if the Americans managed to penetrate the German front lines, it would signal the beginning of the end for the Third Reich. Militarily, on the morning of December 16, an American sentry reported that he had witnessed what appeared to be flickering lights along the German line.

A few moments after relaying this message, the Germans opened fire and for the next two weeks, the Battle of the Bulge raged on and when it was finally over, 100,000 German soldiers had been killed, wounded or captured; 81,000 Americans and 1,400 British troops had also been killed, wounded or captured; a total of 800 tanks had been lost on both sides; a 1,000 German aircraft had also been destroyed. Thus, the Battle of the Bulge "was the worst battle, in terms of loss, to the American forces during World War II. 10

On December 19, 1944, General Eisenhower and his top field commanders met at Verdun in order to come up with a plan to stop the German advancement. At this time, the American and Allied forces were experiencing massive attacks -- panzers were streaming across the Allied lines and numerous German legions were marching through a gap some thirty miles wide between St. Vith and Bastogne. In addition, German paratroopers were landing at many important crossroads with enemy commandos, disguised as American soldiers, infiltrating the American/Allied front lines.

One day earlier (December 18), it was obvious to the Allied commanders that Saint Vith had to be defended and the responsibility was given to the 7th Armored Division which was then stationed in Aachen. When the order to defend Saint Vith arrived, the 7th Armored Division headed to the area. One of their most important functions was to "open an escape corridor for the regiments of the 106th Division which was trapped on the Schnee Eifel, cut off from other divisions and quickly running out of ammunition." 11

When night finally came, the defenses at Saint Vith had gained strength, for more units had arrived, such as the 106th Division and a combat detachment of the 9th Armored Division. By early the next morning, the Allies had managed to create a large U-shaped defense line around Saint Vith which extended some fifteen miles.

On the morning of December 18, the German army commenced to test the barrier which the Allies had set up by bombing it relentlessly. But due to the brave efforts of the Allied soldiers settled in Saint Vith, the Germans were repeatedly forced back and left behind destroyed Tiger tanks and thousands of dead German soldiers. On December 19, the Allies were joined by the 112th Infantry Regiment which appeared to weaken the resolve of the German army to continue its bombing of Saint Vith.

On December 21, sometime around noon, the German army commenced an attack of staggering proportions, for they began a massive bombardment on the perimeter of Saint Vith, along with battalions of tanks and thousands of infantrymen. Yet despite this huge wave of bombing, the Allies held their ground, and by midnight, the Germans commenced three additional attacks from every direction. By the morning of the 22nd, the German army had managed to penetrate the perimeter on the north flank. As a result of this action, Major General Matthew B. Ridgeway received a message from one of his commanders in the field that stated "If we don't get out of here... we will not have a 7th Armored Division left." 12

Not long after this message, it was decided that a withdrawal from the area was the best policy, due to 6,000 Allied troops killed or wounded in the last three days. By the morning of the 23rd, it was clear that Saint Vith was lost, yet the 7th Armored Division accomplished a stunning victory by blocking the supply routes for the German army. To make matters worse for the Germans, the Allies were now sending reinforcements into the Ardennes in the form of tanks, heavy artillery and thousands of foot soldiers.

After Saint Vith was abandoned by the Allies, a great number of British tanks were occupied guarding the bridges that crossed the River Meuse. At the same time, a huge assemblage of American forces, made up primarily of the 30th Infantry Division, were preparing for a counterattack by the German army along the Ambleve River which "set the stage for a showdown with Colonel Peiper, the German panzer leader whose SS troops had run amuck near Malmedy... frightening civilians and Allies alike with horrible atrocities." 13

When Peiper's panzers and his SS troops arrived near a wooded area near the Ambleve Bridge, more atrocities occurred. According to Dupuy, Peiper's troops "shot eight unarmed American prisoners of war and a German tank fired on eight Belgian civilians, killing two of them and severely wounding two others." Peiper's troops also "fired into a group of twenty civilians, killing four of them... Later, the Germans found twenty-six Belgian civilians hiding in a basement and then threw grenades. When ordered out of the basement, the survivors were shot." In all, the German troops had murdered more than a hundred people. 14

While all of this activity was happening in the area of Saint Vith, the biggest and longest fight in the Battle of the Bulge was just beginning in Bastogne, a small town about thirty miles to the southwest. The importance of this location was obvious to both sides, for in this area, numerous roads provided passage through the heavily-wooded terrain of the Ardennes. In this battle which lasted many days, the German panzers accomplished considerable damage to the Allied forces. Another battle in this area was fought around the village of Norville, "one of the grisliest small-scale clashes of World War II" in which "all manner of horrors were found... A galosh with a foot still in it... A headless paratrooper... A cremated Kraut sitting in a foxhole... A paratrooper's helmet full of brains" and "a severed arm with a wristwatch on it..." 15

Throughout the month of December, 1944, fighting raged on in various locations in the Ardennes. On December 30, General Patton launched his attack with the Seventh Corps west of Bastogne, along with the 11th Armored Division. The next day, Patton, with the Third Corps led the 6th Armored Division and attacked just northeast of Saint Vith. In this attack, the Allied forces made excellent progress despite meeting up with a large group of German panzers. At this point in the Battle of the Bulge, the German army was weakening considerably yet they continued their bombings, especially against the 87th Division which encountered heavy tank fire, machine guns and other artillery. But this did not last long, for the German army was losing its capacity to continue fighting, due in part to the massive loss of men and machine.