Davis and Beauchamp
At the present moment Michael Davis' "Some Paradoxes of Whistleblowing" begins from the standpoint of skepticism toward what he describes as the "standard theory" of whistleblowers. In this, he lays out what is taken to be the justification offered for whistleblowers, but notes that they are not individual actors but parts of a larger organization. The information they leak to the public is not information that they have acquired, but the sort of information "with which one is entrusted." (Davis 5, italic in original). In order to justify the disloyalty of the whistleblower, Davis notes the "more or less standard" theory declares the act "morally permissible" if there is a risk of harm to the public, the whistleblower has reported it to superiors and concluded the superior will not take action, and has exhausted any other internal means of taking action (Davis 6). In addition, Davis notes, two other elements make whistleblowing not justifiable so much as mandatory -- if the threat is confirmed by evidence that would "convince a reasonable, impartial observer" and that revealing the threat "will (probably) prevent the harm at reasonable cost (all things considered)." (Davis 7). As these parenthetical asides might indicate, Davis is already considering the paradoxes inherent in this standard account of whistleblowing. The first is that whistleblowers generally do so at extraordinary risk to themselves, with little risk to the corporation: this he calls "the paradox of burden" (8). The second is about the level of "harm" that is implied to the public, noting that such things as "injustice, deception and waste" will not constitute the level of harm to prompt anyone to risk the burdens just described (8). Davis' third paradox derives from the second, and involves the fact that the efforts of whistleblowers are generally not successful in time to prevent the harm (which was the initial justification for the act): he terms this the "paradox of failure" (10). Davis proposes instead a "complicity theory" of whistleblowing, in which the act is morally permissible if it is directly related to the individual's work for a corporation and that specific work will result in serious moral wrongdoing. This would render whistleblowing justifiable, while undoing the paradoxes, if the conditions outlined by Davis are met (11).
Tom L. Beauchamp's "Affirmative Action Goals in Hiring and Promotion" argues in favor of preferential treatment of minorities in hiring decisions, finding it "morally justified" within the context of "well-constructed policies with specific, targeted goals." Beauchamp rejects the characterization of affirmative action as "reverse discrimination," noting that such policies are not exclusively geared toward racial minorities, but are also in place toward people with disabilities and Vietnam veterans (195). Beauchamp notes that many corporations, aware of the stigma that attaches to the term "affirmative action," have opted instead to describe these programs in the language of "diversity" (196).
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