The Big Dig: Boston's largest infrastructure project

Big Dig Project -- a Major Transportation Issue

Boston's Big Dig project is best known as the most expensive and possibly the most controversial highway project in the United States. Big Dig describes the Central Artery/Tunnel Project (CA/T), a large project that that rerouted the Central Artery (Interstate 93), the main highway running through Boston, into a 3.5-mile tunnel under the city (Wikipedia, 2008). While the project was originally estimated to cost $2.8 billion when it was first proposed in 1985, it ended up costing over $14.6 billion, according to 2006 estimates.

The Big Dig project included the construction of the Ted Williams Tunnel, the Leonard P. Zakim Bunker Hill Memorial Bridge, and the Rose Kennedy Greenway in the space vacated by the previous I-93 elevated roadway.

The Big Dig project was designed to relieve Boston residents of the traffic problems caused by congestion on the Central Artery (I-93), an elevated six-lane highway that crossed through downtown Boston (Wikipedia, 2008). When the highway was built in 1959, only 75,000 cars used the road on a daily basis. However, by 1990, this number had more than doubled. City planners predicted that, by 2010, Boston residents would be subjected to up to 16 hours of traffic jams. Something needed to be done.

An article in the Boston Globe (2008) noted: "In all, the project will cost an additional $7 billion in interest, bringing the total to a staggering $22 billion, according to a Globe review of hundreds of pages of state documents. It will not be paid off until 2038."

By the time the project was handed off as "completed," it had resulted in exorbitant costs, criminal charges, injuries, and death (Wikipedia, 2008). The Massachusetts Attorney General ordered the contractors involved in the project to refund taxpayers $108 million for failing to deliver work that was of decent quality.

On January 23, 2008, Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff, the company that was responsible for managing the project, would pay $407 million in restitution for its poor oversight of subcontractors, and accept responsibility for the death of a motorist (Wikipedia, 2008).

The Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MTA), which did not feel that it was experienced enough to handle the scope and magnitude of the CA/T Project, hired Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff to provide preliminary designs, manage design consultants and construction contractors, manage the project, and provide consulting services (LeBlanc, 2007). Some MTA employees were sent to work with Bechtel/Parsons employees in an integrated project organization.

The Big Dig project replaced the city's elevated downtown expressway, the Central Artery, with a two-mile, twin-decked tunnel and opened over twenty-seven acres of previously inaccessible land to public use (Curtin and Witter, 2005). This helped to re-unite a city that was divided by an aboveground highway system. While the public is the main beneficiary of this project, tangible and quantifiable benefits also extend to individuals and business entities.

For example, there are two cylindrical office towers One and Two International Place, which were constructed in Boston's financial district in the late 1980s (Curtin and Witter, 2005). Until the spring of 2004, these structures stood within forty feet of the elevated highway. The offices of several of Boston's most prominent firms overlooked congested traffic. Occupants below floor six had views of rusting steel beams. Today, these firms overlook public parks, greenway, botanical garden, and open space with public art. The noise and ugliness of traffic has been moved underground.

This shows that the Big Dig project had its roots in the givings theory, which argues that "instead of government compensating the land-owner for that which was taken, the landowner should pay the government for that which was given (Curtin and Witter, 2005)."

The Big Dig project faced several political, financial, environmental and engineering obstacles from the start. According to Wikipedia (2008), "the downtown area through which the tunnels were to be dug was largely landfill, and included existing subway lines as well as innumerable pipes and utility lines that would have to be replaced or moved." To make matters worse, tunnel workers ran into several unexpected geological and archaeological barriers, ranging from glacial debris to sunken ships lying within the reclaimed land.

Despite barriers, the project was approved in 1991, and federal environmental clearances were delivered in 1994.

In 2003, five years late and billions over budget, the massive elevated Central Artery highway was replaced by a tunnel routing Interstate 93 under downtown Boston (Stern, 2003). However, the city was not exactly celebrating.

The Big Dig project was not completed without controversy. It resulted in criminal arrests, as well as charges for escalating costs, leaks, poor execution and use of substandard materials (Wikipedia, 2008). In May 2006, six executives of Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff, including its general manager, were arrested and charged with fraud.

Over 200 complaints were filed by the state of Massachusetts as a result of leaks, cost overruns, quality concerns, and safety violations. In July 2006, a Big Dig I-90 tunnel a large plate of concrete from the tunnel ceiling fell on a car, with one death, a woman crushed to death. A major investigation resulted, and closure of part of the Big Dig for a while.

Despite these controversial issues, the project was hailed as an engineering marvel, especially due to the challenge of building among subway tunnels and steam pipes while the city was alive above ground (Stern, 2003). To allow for 7.5 miles of underground roads, 16 million cubic yards of dirt -- enough to fill New England's football stadium 16 times -- was excavated.

The cost was also something to marvel about. The project cost more than double the Panama Canal's cost in today's dollars (Stern, 2003). National and state citizens paid much more than expected in tax dollars. Naturally, they expressed frustration as hidden costs continue to surface and statewide highway tolls continued to grow. The Massachusetts Turnpike Authority planned a $150 million lawsuit against the project management company.

The economic plan for the project called for improvement of the traffic flow in the Central City, better access to the underutilized South Boston Seaport area, and improved urban design and quality of life in areas that had been cut off or overshadowed by the elevated highway structure.

The excavation, tunneling, and road and bridge project is as wide as an interstate highway, and was built through unstable landfill, nine railroad tracks, glass and steel office towers, and many fragile, older brick buildings. Above all, it was built without destroying historical buildings or disrupting the city's business.