Mental Illness Is a Highly

Mental illness is a highly debated social issue that has far reaching consequences for all of society. Within this debate, in the philosophical front are countless challenges to the validity of diagnosis and repercussions of labeling an individual with "mental illness" which is often socially and emotionally destructive and based on fundamental judgments about what is within and without acceptable social and cultural norms. (1. Edwards, CC2010, pp. 0087) Szasz in "the Myth if Mental Illness" even goes so far as to claim that "mental illness" and its current proponents are false and that mental illness, as it is viewed today is simply a construct, not at all unlike the beliefs of antiquity that blamed behavioral deviations on the devil, a convenient myth that allows some to judge and develop ideas and standards for treatment of those who supposedly suffer from it. (2. Szasz, CC2010, pp. 0239)

Szasz goes on to claim that there are two basic constructs of mental illness, the first subsiding squarely in the medicalization camp where the view is that all supposed mental illnesses are organic and a result of a medical condition of the brain that dictates abnormal beliefs and/or behaviors and that if it has not already been discovered will be discovered and detailed by science in the future. In this first camp ar clinicians who have unending faith in science to eventually unlock an age old mystery and hopefully offer direct solutions for brain diseases or conditions which are blamed for "mental illness." In so doing this group wields all the power over those who suffer by making sometimes foundational judgments about their health and well being based on outward symptoms of "disease."

The second camp according to Szasz derives from labeling the "abnormal" behaviors or beliefs, of some, as outside some acceptable ethical and cultural standard and therefore in need of address. Szasz's alludes to the belief is an extremely suspect tool for judgment, as it was once acceptable to label and ostracize individuals based on their belief structure, such as a belief in a certain religion or faith that would be unknown to the observer until the individual voiced it, and that which was acceptable to condemn has changed over time but not enough to allow only a few to wield power over an individual for his or her voiced beliefs. (3. Szasz, CC2010, pp. 0242) Szasz's challenge to this camp is that these standards and observations of behaviors and/or beliefs are grounded in judgment and judgment is ultimately an arbitrary and wavering standard, unfair on all counts. The standard changes, according to Szasz, wavers according to personal beliefs of those in power as well as by culture and time and therefore does not fairly engender the "sufferer" with what he or she needs to live a better life. (4. Szasz, CC2010, pp. 0240)

Szasz then claims that what is currently constructed as "mental illness" is nothing more than a problem of living for the sufferer, and that needs and standards must be met to aid in the resolution of the problem. (5. Szasz, CC2010, pp. 0240) Finally, Szasz claims that the current construct of "mental illness" is simply a way for society to lighten the blow of the moral and ethical conflicts in human relations. Szasz claims that this construct, rooted in whether or both camps allows those in the position of judgment to wield all the power over those who are supposedly ill and therefore negates the validity of the sciences that are fundamentally charged with helping those who are affected. (6. Szasz, CC2010, pp. 0243)

Sedgwick conversely, though he acknowledges Szasz's reasons for challenging the definitions of "mental illness" contends that judgment is a very difficult concept to remove from mental illness and mental health as both concepts can be expressive of how effective an individual is at living his or her life within the social fabric. Sedgwick contends that ideally determining if someone is either mentally ill or mentally healthy should be value and judgment free but this is exceedingly difficult to do in a case where social behavior is the greatest factor in determining the need for intervention and therefore a label of mental illness. (7. Sedgwick, CC2010, pp. 0245) Sedgwick notes that work is being done to challenge culturally specific variations in diagnosis of mental illness and bold attempts are being made to create "culture-free" assessments of certain mental disorders. Sedgwick contends that human developed medical enterprise is ultimately extremely value-loaded as a result of its fundamental interest in preserving human life and other biological forms which matter to it, i.e. plants and animals we as humans rely on and therefore care about. (8. Sedgwick, CC2010 pp. 0246)

Sedgwick answers Szasz and others who challenge the very existence of "mental illness through philosophy, by contending that judgment cannot be removed from medicine as it is the very core of assistance, and without judgment, and/or a model of classifying some deviations, which all diseases are, by their variation from the norm would destroy the ability of the medical community to provide any help whatsoever to individuals outside the most basic visible defect, i.e. treatment for a laceration or a broken bone. Sedgwick does so by contending that even before humans had the scientific knowledge to "cure" any disease they still recognized it as deviant from the norm and made at least some attempt to alleviate suffering or at the very least remove the deviant from the larger social order for protection of the whole. Sedgwick's work claims that the development of the idea of illness can be culturally specific and can allow the inclusion of widespread "illnesses" such as would be considered deviant by some cultures is thought of as the norm and within the construct of health and that only through the observation of outsiders is the deviance labeled a deviance. (9. Sedgwick, CC2010, pp. 0247) Sedgwick is also quick to point out that all social deviance is not illness and that the social construct of some social deviance is labeled as criminality, wickedness, poor upbringing or even simple bad manners. (10. Sedgwick, CC2010, pp. 0248)

Sedgwick acknowledges that there is danger through mechanistic thinking to attest that mental illness does not exist because it cannot in some cases be altered or improved by a therapy based on mechanistic understandings. (11. Sedgwick, CC2010, pp. 0248) Though Szasz comes to the conclusion that mental illness is a myth, he does so from a very different perspective, claiming that Sedgwick's contention and support of a value-based system of medicine is in error. (12. Szasz, CC2010, pp. 0239-0243) Sedgwick demands that any failing in this system is not rooted in the values themselves but in the inability of the collective medical community to produce a unitary integration of human illness that does not place either mental or physical illness on a different level, simply because they are treated differently and mental illness is less visible and less "mechanistically" explainable. Sedgwick, unlike Szasz, contends that the validity of the psychological sciences be elevated to the level of all other medical sciences and that mental illness should be viewed as such, "illness" and not as a less valid state of being. (13. Sedgwick, CC2010, pp. 0248)

Edwards then goes on to argue for a balance that ultimately creates not a black and white idea of mental health or illness as either containing all that is good, or all that is bad about human existence but one that constructs the ability of those who suffer with any malady (physical or mental) with rational autonomy, or the ability to rationalize what he or she must do and what the medical response must be to allow the individual to live the best life he or she can, while not harming or seriously burdening society. (14. Edwards, CC2010, pp. 0089-0090) Edwards sites the challenges that are placed up against the "mental ill" patient as a result of labeling and society's response to that label as one of the most grievous of all human offences yet, conversely labeling mental illness and constructing a set of standards and practices for its treatment is essential to helping any individual. (15. Edwards, CC2010, pp. 0087) the balance between these two conflicting circumstances is according to Edwards the issue that needs to be addressed by broader society and the mental health profession. Alienating and ostracizing those who are labeled as mentally ill and forcing them to confront challenges to autonomy, discrimination and limitations of opportunity fundamentally challenges rational autonomy as it by its very nature challenges the individual further than he or she would be challenged if he or she were not labeled as mentally ill. (15. Edwards, CC2010, pp. 0087-0088)

This conflict is not inevitable, according to Edwards' thinking and yet it is the current social reality of mental illness, a bold conundrum, to get help one must be labeled and to be labeled may mean serious losses and fundamental challenges to everything it means to be a productive human being in society. Edwards challenges the extreme on the other end as well, i.e. that total wellness sis the only possible state of being labeled healthy. The scholar sites the World Health Organization's definition of wellness as complete mental and physical wellness as far too broad and encompassing and illegitimates the reality of human existence. (16. Edwards, CC2010, pp. 0090) Edwards ultimately argues that the challenges faced by both those who believe that the "optimum" health of an individual is the only alternative associated with curative behaviors is fundamentally to charged as it means that an individual is not acceptable to society until he or she is completely well. The answer then according to Edwards is to set a more realistic goal of reaching rational autonomy, i.e. The most basic ability of an individual to function in society. (17. Edwards, CC2010, pp. 0091-0092)