Analyzing the Blitzkrieg Incident

¶ … blitzkrieg not a war-Winning innovation for the Germans during WW2?

During the first stage of the Second World War in Europe, Germans wished to circumvent a long-drawn-out war. The nation's plan was using a succession of short military campaigns for crippling the enemy side. It succeeded quickly in overrunning a large portion of Europe. For over two years, Germany employed a novel military strategy known as lightning war (i.e., "Blitzkrieg," in German) for achieving swift victories. The tactics necessitated a concentration of planes, artillery, tanks, and other offensive weaponry along a limited front. A breach would be driven by these forces into the opponent's defenses, allowing rapid penetration and free movement of armored tanks behind the opponent's lines, leading to disorder in their defenses, and shock. The German air force ensured that enemies didn't get to redeploy their forces or resupply sufficiently, and thus, the latter were unsuccessful in sending reinforcements for sealing the breaches created by the former in their front. However, German forces were able to encircle enemy troops, coercing them to concede (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2015). But this new war tactic failed in assisting Germans with winning the Second World War because of:

Lack of Resupply Resources and Lack of Logistic Foresight

One key problem was that Operation Barbarossa, which began on the 22nd of June, 1941, was only assigned a two-month supply of tires, fuel, spare parts and other requisite resources. The Germans expected their Soviet campaign to be accomplished within a period of two months, so the aforementioned supplies would suffice, in their view. Further, they believed they could get their hands, thereafter, on the unlimited supply of Russian resources, both raw materials and manufactured foods (Muller, 2011). But by the time two months had lapsed, Germany was nowhere close to the distant Soviet areas in which the most precious material good -- oil -- could be availed. The major reason for German tanks' progressing forward into the apparently endless expanses of Ukraine and Russia (albeit increasingly slowly) was the American rubber and fuel, imported through occupied French territories and Spain. USA's share of German imports of Motorenol, an essential engine lubricant, rose sharply in summer 1941, from 44% (July 1941) to a whopping 94% in September of that year (Jersak, 1999). Their condition was exacerbated due to their loss of superiority over Moscow's airspace. Furthermore, scarce food and ammunition could be transported to the German front, as partisan activity served to severely hamper their lengthy supply lines (Ueberschar, 2011). Lastly, winter was beginning its descent over Russia, although the cold was just the same as that of every year during that season. However, German leaders, positive that their campaign in the east would complete before summer's end, hadn't equipped their troops to handle mud, rain, snow, and frigid temperatures that accompany the typical Russian autumn and winter seasons.

German Leadership

One main factor was German leaders' inability to really grasp how a Blitzkrieg works. This offensive military strategy requires constant mobility, since it strikes major enemy points in the swiftest possible manner, ensuring that they surrender immediately. To put it simply, an effective Blitzkrieg makes the opposing army devote their all towards reacting -- nonstop -- without a chance to take a proactive stand, since any counter-offensive action against forces, which are stretched so thinly, can be highly disastrous. However, Hitler didn't understand this aspect, and, after Minsk's speedy besieging and capture, he ordered his army to move towards capturing Kiev, against Guderian's and others' advice to take on Moscow next; while this decision helped consolidate German positions, it eliminated the advantages of surprise and speed. Hitler failed as he had underestimated Russians' resolve as well as its government's huge production potential. The end result was quite far from what Hitler had envisioned -- a speedy Russian surrender. The pause at Kiev gave Stalin a chance to transform the struggle into the historic Great Russian "Patriotic War," lowering the possibility of Russia's capitulation (h2g2, 2006).

Why It Was Only Effective Against Smaller Countries

Blitzkrieg is effective in case of nations that have a small size and can be covered quickly. The early successes of Hitler's army were in countries such as France, Poland, Belgium, and Holland, most of which could easily be completely covered in a short period of time. Therefore, the tactic garnered a huge success in these places, which had virtually no time to get over the surprise attacks and fight back. Another factor that worked to Germany's favor was that a majority of these countries had no strong armies (Sadasyula, 2014).

The Blitzkrieg Was Not Designed for Lengthy Wars

This war tactic was new and revolutionary, appealing to Hitler's unorthodox mind; he had witnessed, firsthand, the stationary trench warfare's failure at Flanders. The tactic also attracted German war strategy planners for another lesser-known reason: a swift defeat of opponents was essential for the German economy, which wasn't on war footing, as yet. War production in Germany hadn't reached its stride till the year 1942. The blitzkrieg strategy resolved the issue of lacking industrial capability and material stocks required for a long campaign (Longwood.edu, 2003).

Germany Lacked the Vision to Utilize Armor, the Air, and Artillery Effectively During the Blitzkrieg

The Nazi air force, Luftwaffe, had a broad basis. It lacked any limiting central doctrine; the only code it followed was that its resources be utilized for supporting the national strategy, in general. It had a flexible nature and was capable of carrying out operational-tactical as well as strategic bombing. From 1939 to 1941, flexibility was an asset for the Luftwaffe. Paradoxically, after that, this asset turned into its weakness. Whilst the enemy's air force was tied to army support, Germany's Luftwaffe utilized resources in an operational and more general manner. It shifted from missions of air superiority, to mid-range prohibitions, to calculated strikes, to missions of close support based on ground force needs. Indeed, far from playing the role of a specialist leading panzer, not even 15% of Luftwaffe officers were assigned to close army support at the outset of the Second World War (Buckley, 1998).