Block scheduling in secondary education

Gun Control

Advocates argue that gun control laws reduce the incidence of violent crimes by reducing the prevalence of firearms. Gun laws control the types of firearms that may be purchased, designate the qualifications of those who may purchase and own a firearm, and restrict the safe storage and use of firearms. On this view, fewer guns mean less crime. Thus, there is a two-step linkage between gun control and crime rates: (1) the impact of gun control on the availability and accessibility of firearms, particularly handguns, and (2) the effect of the prevalence of guns on the commission of crimes (Moorhouse and Wanner, 2006).

The subject of Gun Control has returned to the center of attention after two successive events; firstly, the passing of the Brandy Bill in the early 1990's; and secondly, concentration of media on assault weapon. Media is being used, both by supporters and rivals of gun control, to promote their claims. History is said to be repeating itself once again as this process has been invoked several times before in the same manner. United States of America is not only the most controversial country on this issue, but it also has the most relaxed and complicated rules and regulations regarding Gun Control (Zimring and Hawkins, 1987; Kopel, 1992). These relaxed rules are said to be due to the controversial role that guns have played in American History (Hofstadter, 1970). If one examines the history of American government's Gun Control Policy, then one realizes that these policies have less to do with the love of Guns and more to do with the political process. While one can continue to put forward strong claims, both for and against Gun Control, American history verifies the dedication towards pluralism and incrementalism. Gun Control Policy evaluation reveals conflictive use of language and symbols together with complicated methods of policy formulation and execution.

History

Between the beginning of the Sullivan Law in New York in 1909 and the passing of Brady Bill in 1993, one can divide the history of Gun Control into five different periods. While some researchers and scholars have added a sixth period which denotes the attempts made by the Southern States to block the supply of arms to the Black population after the civil war had ended (Kates, 1979).

The passing of Sullivan Law in New York in 1909, which legalized the possession of guns, opened the doors of gun possession to the general public. This law has been passed during the time when ban on drug-use and alcohol-consumption was being strongly advanced. The passing of Sullivan Law has been not only as an outcome of this but also due to fear of increase in crime rates and population of new immigrants

Sugarmann, 1992; 171-179). In the New York City the police had strict control over the use of guns and only the most influential were allowed to possess handguns. This successful control over possession of handguns was being used as a model by supporters of Gun Control; while the opponents were using this situation to unite its support (Vizzard, 1993; 134).

Penetration of the Federal Government

In 1927, efforts were being made to control the flow of guns from one state to another. However these efforts were only limited to postal mails and they did not include common carriers. Congress started taking the issues of Gun Control more seriously during the early part of the 1930's. The then Attorney General Homer Cummings proposed a bill to control all kinds of guns, excluding shotguns and rifles. He aimed to do this by transfer-tax policy and a country-wide registration system, which he modeled after the "Harrison Narcotics Act." While the bill had been put up for hearings, in both upper and lower houses; it was countered by the NRA along with various sports associations and the firearms industry (Leff and Leff, 1981).

After intense debates and arguments, the bill was finally passed with the exclusion of handguns and semi-automatic rifles (Sugarmann, 1992; 33). The enactment of the National Firearms Act (NFA) in 1934 obligated a registration and a transfer-tax on all criminal-kind of guns, such as, silencers, machine guns, and sawed-off shotguns and rifles. The bill had been passed under strong support from the government and some powerful members of the Congress. Despite this, southern and western legislators gave little attention to this bill and by and large opposed it (Vizzard, 1993; 174-176).

The federal government continued to use the interstate commerce authority to further restrict the flow of guns from one state to another. Four years after the enactment of National Firearms Act (NFA) the Federal Government finally enacted the Federal Firearms Act (FFA). FFA required from the gun retailers to not only maintain sales record but also to acquire a license for selling guns. This act however did not include any form of enforcement procedures. NRA, in an attempt to stop a strong preventive gun possession law, was primarily responsible for the drafting of this bill (Kennett and Anderson, 1975; 192-193; Sugarmann, 1992; 30). With the passage of time, both the public and the government lost its interest in Gun Control. This can be due to the fact that crime rates started to decline in 1934 and continued in a downward trend for almost three subsequent decades. The department of treasury not only administered the laws but also enforced it. This was due to the fundamental transfer-tax regulation in the NFA. This process eventually stopped after the Tax division of Alcohol and Tobacco in the Internal Revenue Services where little to no attention was given to this act (Vizzard, 1993; 166).

Assassinations Revive the Issue

With the passing of the Gun Control Act (GCA) in 1968, interest in Gun Control once again reached its highest point. Also, earlier assassination of President Kennedy invoked a lot of controversy over the issue. All through this time, Senate hearings were being conducted, primarily by Senator Thomas Dodd, to augment licensing of gun dealers, as well as, control interstate sales and purchase of guns (Vizzard, 1993; 185-188).

After consecutive assassinations of two political personalities, Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr., the GCA had been ratified by the Congress. However, in spite of full support by the federal administration, the law had been passed with an extremely narrow margin. The passage of Bill had also been strongly advocated by a very vast majority of the general public. This public support is said to have had a very strong influence on the final outcome of the Bill (Vizzard, 1993; 185-188). The GCA had several provisions, which preceding gun control bills did not possess. For instance, the licensing obligations of gun dealers became more precise and simple, display of fake records and selling of guns to people who had been forbidden by law would lead to legal penalties. No preference had been given in the issuance of license of gun dealers and everyone had to get registered with an annual fee of $10.

Reporting processes, registration and licensing of people who had been banned from purchasing and possessing guns were not set up to assist law enforcement agencies to achieve the purpose of the ban. While, executive laws had been enacted to help in the execution, nonetheless, these procedures had been very rarely used by the local authorities. In the end, the law became no more than just an outline of proposed policy than an actual policy it self despite the fact that it provided a lot more controlling procedures than the FFA (Vizzard, 1993; 185-188).

Execution of GCA and the General Reaction of the Public

Implementation of laws and regulations eclipsed policy formulation, after the enactment of the GCA. The execution of the policy transformed the reaction of the interest groups, which they used to promote their attempts to unite and influence policy formulation. In order to evaluate the policy models of both incrementalist and pluralist, one only has to assess the proceedings of this period (Vizzard, 1993; 185-188).

The Federal Firearms laws were overseen and enforced by the "Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Division" (ATF), which had been formed in 1972. All through the initial years of formation the ATF had not been prepared, both politically and executively, to enforce the laws of gun control (Vizzard, 1993; 165-170). Gun dealers and informal traders of guns were a small minority; nonetheless, they had been the most vocal group after the commencement of ATF. The opposition of gun control had become more focused in its campaign to relax the laws, while the execution of GCA through ATF had little to no impact on the reality on ground. The opponents argued by adopting the incremental model, stating that ATF had been the first step towards total prohibition of gun possession (Hardy, 1979; Vizzard, 1993; 170-190).

Supporters of gun control also used their influence to present a succession of legal proposals in the Senate to limit possession of handguns in the pretext of limiting Saturday Night Specials. They presented these bills by forming official advocacy groups after being convinced that GCA had been the first step towards a total ban on gun possession (Sherrill, 1973; Vizzard, 1993; 170-176). Opponents of gun control became more proactive and in 1977 after the capture of NRA leader, they began to harm the reputation of the GCA officers and executives. They aimed to scare the gun owners into thinking that they will be harassed and prosecuted for possessing guns.

Opponents of gun control pushed the Carter administration to remove the proposals which aimed at changing the execution of the laws. After this was done they became even more proactive in their campaign (Vizzard, 1993; 228-235). In 1979 and 1980, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms was called in for Hearings in the Senate after they sidestepped Congress to trigger a change in policy utilizing executive power. While the federal administration had influenced this strategy on not only the treasury but also the ATF, they rapidly backed out from the ATF and dumped the strategy as they saw strong resistance (Vizzard, 1993; 180-188).

A supportive administration of opposing gun control soon took office in the form of Ronald Reagan. Merger of ATF with American Secret Service has been the instant outcome of Reagan's victory. Adversaries of gun control immediately changed their stance to go up against this merger as they had called for a complete elimination of ATF. Symbolism lost and real politics won; as ATF had become no more than a mere symbol, a symbol, too valuable to abandon. Despite the fact that ATF successfully managed to survive, its chief had been replaced for the second time in less than three years. Also, its morale had been plunged due to reduction in both staffing and budget (Vizzard, 1993; 185-188).

Agenda of opponents of gun control reigned supreme all through Reagan and Bush presidency. ATF shifted its focus to armed criminals and drug mafia from the business and trade of firearms. ATF became an innate part of both Reagan and Bush administration's war against drugs due to its change of focus. Any activity that seemed to be connected to gun control was avoided; such became the approach of the ATF while Reagan and Bush had been in office (Vizzard, 1993; 185-188).

Overturning these development

Volkmer-McClure Bill had become the primary focal point of the opponents of gun control after Reagan took office. The tactics used to pass the bill had a key element of defaming the ATF. GCA had been weakened by limiting its control over trade and commerce of guns in 1986 after "Firearms Owners' Protection Act" had been enacted. Furthermore, the policy of gun dealer to report the identity of the buyer had been limited in this act. It is said that the dynamics began to change even before the enactment of Volkmer-McClure (Vizzard, 1993; 254-258).

Throughout the 1970's one could see slow but steady weakening of the thought that GCA would soon become the first legal procedure to bring about an incremental transformation and ban guns possession completely. A number of advocates who believed in such thought had been discouraged when they saw augmented support from Congress for Volkmer-McClure bill and the 1982 defeat of the California program to forbid handgun commerce (Vizzard, 1993; 254-258).

Handgun Control, Inc. (HCI) materialized as the guiding force amid supporters after the Proposition 15. Throughout the subsequent decade, HCI counteracted the issue and revitalized its fate and influenced drastic changes in the policy. A Teflon covered bullet had been designed by a local firm named KTW, which had the power to penetrate cars, even police body armored cars; as shown in an NBC news presentation. While almost all bullets used in handguns had the power to penetrate soft-armored vehicles, the bullet designed by KTW had become known as "cop killer bullets." The issue of gun control once again becomes center stage with this technology out in the market. This time both the law enforcement agencies and the general public supported gun control. This was followed with a progression towards introduction of a bill to ban armored-penetration bullets by Mario Biaggi, who had been an ex-New York police officer. As it turns out, the NRA opposed the bill out without any reservations (Davidson, 1993; 85-98).

For two primary reasons, the ATF largely closed its eyes towards the issue. Firstly, it was put forward that this issue had absolutely no practical implications; and secondly, ATF had no desire to be connected to gun control in any way. This issue tuned to have vital political repercussions, despite the fact that it failed to make any impact on policy change. This issue was seen by HCI, as well as, many others, as a wedge between the police and the NRA. Soon after the enactment of Volkmer-McClure, the police started to openly favor gun control. The supporters of gun control found a winning combination to overcome the NRA propaganda. The HCI diverted its focus from forcing an all-inclusive policy towards gun control to presenting restricted and fairly inoffensive tenders with wide symbolic interests. Such tenders too were either opposed by the NRA, which demonstrated their extremism or were accepted as control programs. While this strategy to defame NRA had worked, it diverted the focus of the Congress from drafting an all-inclusive policy of gun control (Davidson, 1993; 85-98).

The enactment of the Brady's Bill national interval period and the passing of the Brady's bill had been next in line to stir up controversy in this contentious issue. Interval periods had already been enacted as majority of the people already lived in states. Majority of the laws on gun control had far more practical implications than the Brady's laws as they did not even forbid the maintenance of sales record by the police. Majority of the banned people used to obtain guns from private transactions and the law disregarded this as well. Majority of the local police chiefs started to file law suits to prevent its execution as it obligated them to check the sales record instead of the state or federal officials. ATF had little influence over its agents and it had been assigned to confront and execute a law which had been made difficult by both state and local factors (Davidson, 1993; 85-98).

Another transformation seems to have taken place with the enactment of the Brady's law. Advocates choose two different directions as a response. While the response of the Congress was very unenthusiastic, the HCI proposed a number of comprehensive policy alternatives, which included licensing of gun owners and their registration. While certain guns had been banned by the Congress, these guns can be classified less by functions than by type. For instance, assault weapons (which have been banned) can also be classified as semi-automatic revolvers, which are coverable as well. The control over assault rifles and evasion of controlling pistols, which can be considered more politically risky, gives little practical explanation. This has been overcome by the Congress by controlling the distribution of pistol magazines (Davidson, 1993; 85-98).

The democratic power of interest groups

The National Rifle Association (NRA) has been portrayed by the media as the most powerful group behind the entire controversy over the gun control policy. By using major legislators it has successfully managed to frustrate and prevent the wishes of the vast majority. Since 1934 NRA has played a key role in gun control policy making and while majority of the American people strongly support enhanced legal control over possession of guns. This however is not the complete picture of the dynamics of policy making of gun control. The factors that have been able to successfully shape gun control regulations along with every other regulation are far more complicated than just an interest group manipulating Congress votes (Davidson, 1993; 85-98).

Firstly, to simply illustrate NRA as an interest lobby that has been extremely well-financed can be considered as partly true, but it is far from being completely true. NRA is a grass root institution with support that stretches out far beyond its official members. NRA's policy has not been limited to manipulating the Congress but also influencing the hearts and minds of the American people. Such strategy has disheartened the bureau from conducting practical experiments so as to seek and offer solution and become more effective in controlling of possession of guns and modifying present laws (Davidson, 1993; 85-98).

Use of democratic ideals for achieving political ends

The issue of gun control reflects the cultural ideals of democracy, human rights, equality, freedom, power, human nature, and economic efficiency; each of which have been shared through the drafting and execution of gun control policies. The opponents of gun control measures not only have been able to limit the consideration of alternative policies and but also have influenced the execution of strategies. Cobb and Elder (1972; 85-87) characterized four different standards for evaluating the political plans of these interest groups. These four standards are:

Wide-ranging public awareness of the issue.

Agreement that it represents a momentous problem

Legality as a public concern,

Vulnerability to modification by government proceedings.

Later on, Kingdon (1984; 188-200), identified the procedures as one of political-industrialists and policy-issues that infrequently joined one another to expose policy gaps for only a limited frame of time. Motivating both operations is the assumption that most federal policies will be short of sufficient citizen-backing to evaluate the program. Any change in systematic procedures will only be given due consideration when wide-spread public awareness has been generated. Therefore, the motivation is less towards execution of policies and more towards drafting policies. Execution of federal policies is not considered a vital skill because discussions on such subjects slow the process of policy adoption.