Book review and analysis of literature

Army and Vietnam

Krepinevich, a. (1986). The Army and Vietnam. New York: JHU Press.

The book The Army and Vietnam by Andrew Krepinevich take a close look at some of the greatest and most controversial debates regarding Vietnam and paints them in a new light, examining them with a higher level of closeness and scrutiny. One of the contentions that the book looks at very intimately is the assertion that many ex-Army leaders have made that had they enough weapons and soldiers, America could have easily won the war in Vietnam. The remarkable aspect of this book is that Krepinevich states that this was exactly the mentality that caused America to lose the war. The bulk of the book is dedicated to examining the losing strategy that America used when fighting in Vietnam, such as the war strategies that were used in World War Two, with great success and how and why they proved to be unsuccessful in Vietnam. One of the major points of the book revolves around the fact that Vietnam was a war characterized by insurgency and counterinsurgency and the requirements of such a war meant that light infantry formations, restraint of firepower and the resolution of political and social issues within the country. "The elements of a successful strategy for the counterinsurgent involve securing the government's base areas, separating the guerilla forces from the population and eliminating the insurgent infrastructure. In an area infested by insurgency, the army must concentrate enough force to either destroy or expel the main body of guerillas in clear-and-hold operations to prepare the area for pacification

." None of these needs were addressed when it came to the general American war strategy when troops landed in Vietnam.

Another major pillar that the book addresses is the fact that a massive division persisted among American military leaders, and domestic leaders. The contentions and divisions which persisted throughout the period of the Vietnam War were incredibly damaging to the cohesiveness of the entire country and the sense of solidarity among all Americans. Many of these contentions revolved around what the very essence of war was and what the American army was responsible for doing in terms of the nature of war. Krepinevich bravely engages in some of the most invasive forms of research and looks at a range of declassified materials and interviews with officers and men and their battlefield experience. Much of Krepinevich's research consistently demonstrates that many of the soldiers experienced a form of conflict and combat that previous incidents of war had sheltered them from. Krepinevich's book details how conventional strategies of warfare ultimately were ineffective. The majority of the book demonstrates time and again how America had a role in a war which it was largely unprepared to participate in. One of the major strengths of the book is how Krepinevich is able to show how these issues are applicable even today with U.S. presences in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Analysis

Thus, the author's main purpose was to demonstrate that Vietnam was very much a different kind of war and a different kind of conflict and that the U.S. was unable to adapt in any meaningful way. This created a situation where the U.S. was harnessing outdated tactics to fight in conflict, while resources were being hemorrhaged and soldiers' lives were being lost. Essentially, many died needlessly as a result of the decisions that were made on behalf of the U.S. during this war. Krepinevich demonstrates that many of the tragedies and loss of lives suffered were ones which could have been avoided. Krepinevich deftly and bravely explores the following question: "How could the army of the most powerful nation on Earth, materially supported on a scale unprecedented in history, equipped with the most sophisticated technology in an age when technology had assumed the role of a God of war, fail to emerge victorious against a numerically inferior force of lightly armed irregulars?"

Without a doubt, this is a question which continues to plague America today, and which haunts the military when it comes to any invasion against an insurgent force.

The author harnesses a very linear, chronological structure in order to make most of his points. Krepinevich starts by giving a large amount of background, not just about the elements which led to the Vietnam war, but elements and issues which impacted America's unique relationship to war and motivations for going to war. Furthermore, Krepinevich is able to share all relevant evidence in a largely cogent and cohesive manner which the reader is able to follow.

One of the major strengths of the book is how detailed, well-researched and well-organized it is. Krepinevich clearly dedicated himself to engaging in a wide host of research techniques, and left no stone unturned. He is able to share the most appropriate and meaningful findings in his book, and to make them engaging for the reader. Krepinevich is consistently able to present highly technical information in a manner which is to the point and very accessible to the reader.