Canadian naval technological backwardness during the Second World War

Sarty Roger -the Maritime Defence of Canada and Marc Milner - the implications of technological Backwardness: the Canadian Navy 1939-45. The main objective will be to discuss the state of the Canadian naval fleet during the Second World War, debate on the main factors that led to this situation, the tactics and the strategy adopted by the Canadian navy rulers and finally present the references and the convincing power of the two articles.

The Second World War represented an important moment in the history of human kind. Whether we discuss the issue from the German point-of-view, that wanted to rule Europe and make racial eradication, or from the Allies point-of-view, that defended the democratic values and the rights of offended national states, the Second World War was a huge clash or armies, economies, tactics and strategies.

In the end, the force that triumphed managed to allocate more resources to the conflict than the opposing party. The ground, air or see confrontation was based on technological breakthroughs, especially in the army field. National states, and especially Germany who prepared the battle ground long before the Allies, wanted to upgrade its military power so as to enable a durable and painful war.

The history may offer evidence that Hitler's dictatorship regime enabled a better concentration of industrial and economic resources that resulted in an efficient military apparatus. In the next paragraphs, we shall discuss the state of Canadian navy and its contribution to the Allied victory, the tactics and strategy adopted by the Canadian politicians and military specialists.

The state of the Canadian navy

It is the common opinion of both authors that Canadian navy was in an improper state to deploy a war of this magnitude, being unprepared form all points-of-views - low number of war ships, inadequate technological level, unskilled personnel and poor maintenance practices. However, due to the help of its Allied partners, it finally managed to pass over these difficulties from the start, and obtain positive results, together with Great Britain forces, in the naval war against Germany. We shall discuss all of them in turn.

The improper state of the Canadian navy could be translated by a reduced level of war ships (corvettes and frigates) and no destroyers. In military terms the capabilities of the Canadian navy were limited having only two types of vessels, with a defensive character, but not a destroyer, which could have brought a contribution to the offensive against the German and the Japanese enemy. To put it more exact, the Canadian forces went to war from the start with an unwanted advantage, unbalanced fleet of vessels, incapable to keep up with the enemy. The finishing of the vessels was also unprofessional, even from an war amateur point-of-view, since the paint and the primer applied to the surface of the ship, would soon disappear due to the salty environment. This inconsistency show the lack of preoccupation on the part of the Canadian authorities and small interest paid to the naval forces.

The low speed of vessels is the main characteristic of the Canadian naval force. Due to this characteristic, they were only able to guard convoys and this action was performed with extremely low efficiency. Due to the reduced water movement speed, the vessels were easy to be spotted by the enemy. It was no surprise to the historians and specialists to observe the low efficiency in sinking more performance U-boats and German submarines.

Another key characteristic of the Canadian navy power is the non-performing radar, offering a reduced visibility. This situation led to the inability of the Canadian forces to spot and defend the enemy, and perform the tasks for which they were called upon. Besides the fact the Canadian forces could not observe their task, that is defend Allied convoys travelling in Pacific and Atlantic seas, to Gibraltar, Burgundy or coming from Great Britain.

The personnel was not enough in number, and did not posses sufficient skills to conduct a naval battle of this size. A clear example for the lack of naval war specialists is that the efficiency in sinking enemy submarines was extremely law, representing 5% from the accomplishments of British forces. An interesting fact is that although the British specialists observed the shortage in specialized personnel, it only offered in 1942-1943 extensive training course for the Canadian naval military persons. However, the situation dramatically changed upon the end of the Second World War, when the Canadian naval forces numbered more than 150.000 persons employed in this industry, including technicians, specialists, naval strategy developers, making it the third largest Allied naval force.

The maintenance strategy was also unsuccessful, since the vessels needed more harbour stationing days that operational days. This situation led, in turn to a series of unfortunate situations - the Canadian navy could not maintain a well-cooperation and synergy within the convoys since the ships and the personnel were in a continuous change - one time in the war waters, and one time in harbour decks, performing maintenance and other regular procedures.

Strategy and tactics

The war found Canada unprepared for the situation ahead. Therefore, the military and the politic specialists had to formulate strategy and tactics according to the limited financial and time resources. The fundamental tactics adopted by the authorities was to follow the Allies intentions - first Great Britain and U.S.. This would just seem normal, according to first article, as the Canadian war ships represented British vessels that were not presently used by the English forces. The task of the Canadian navy was to defend British and American convoys, travelling with war machines and supplies, against the German U - boats and submarines, which presented a higher technological level.

The opinions of the two article writers

Marc Milner discusses in his article the contribution of the Canadian navy for the triumph on the Atlantic and Pacific waters. The authors remarks the extraordinary explosion of the Canadian naval capacity - from modest numbers in 1939 to a 50 fold increase up to the end of the war in 1945.

Roger Sarty acknowledges the difficulties encountered by the Canadian ships in fighting German U- boats, highlighting the shortcomings of the Canadian naval force. In my opinion, both articles are properly written, inducing the reader into the naval war time, offering interesting details on the topic. If we consider the references brought by the two authors for elaborating those articles, we may claim the authenticity of their writings.