Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.402

¶ … Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.402 (1985).

Factual background

New York City used federal funds from a Title I program of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to pay salaries of public school employees teaching in private parochial schools in the city. The program in question was established to help children from low-income families. The teachers in question were not employees of the private school, but were city employees assigned by the city to the schools in question, and supervised by city employees. All professional involved in the program were directed to avoid becoming involved with religious activity at the school, to bar religious materials from their classrooms, and used only materials and equipment paid for under Title I. Furthermore, those Title I materials were used only for the remedial program, and the classrooms were cleared of all religious material for the remedial classes. Taxpayers brought an action in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York, alleging that the program violated the Establishment Claus of the First Amendment, which guarantees the separation based of church and state. The trial court granted the taxpayers' motion for summary judgment, and the appellant court reversed. The case was then brought to the Supreme Court for review.

Issues

Does the use of public school funds to run a non-religious educational program at a parochial school violate the establishment clause? Does the fact that the instructors are public school employees told that they are under the sole control of the public school system change the outcome of the case? Does the fact that New York adopted a system for monitoring the religious content of publicly funded classes in religious schools differentiate this case from prior cases that have determined such funding to be a violation of the Establishment Clause?

Reasoning

In two prior cases, the Establishment cause was considered an insurmountable barrier for the use of public funds in religious schools [473 U.S. 402, 408]. The programs involved in this dispute are essentially similar to programs that the Court found unconstitutional in prior legal challenges. "In both cases, publicly funded instructors teach classes composed exclusively of private school students in private school buildings. In both cases, an overwhelming number of the participating private schools are religiously affiliated. In both cases, the publicly funded programs provide not only professional personnel, but also all materials and supplies necessary for the operation of the programs. Finally, the instructors in both cases are told that they are public school employees under the sole control of the public school system" [473 U.S. 402, 408]. The fact that New York had a system for monitoring the religious content of the classes did not make the funding constitutional, because, even if the monitoring was successful at preventing public funding from being used for religious material, the monitoring created the type of excessive entanglement of church and state that the Establishment Clause tried to prevent. "Even where state aid to parochial institutions does not have the primary effect of advancing religion, the provision of such aid may nonetheless violate the Establishment Clause owing to the nature of the interaction of church and state in the administration of that aid" [473 U.S. 402, 409].

It is important to keep in mind that the Establishment Clause has two purposes. First, when a state becomes enmeshed with a particular denomination, it can impact the freedom of religious belief of those who are not members of that denomination. Moreover, when the government is supervising religious content, then the government is necessarily intruding into sacred matters. As previously determined, for an aid program to be nonentangling, the state has to be able to identify and subsidize separate secular functions, without on-site inspections or other forms of ongoing supervision [473 U.S. 402, 411]. Furthermore, the schools in question existed for the purposes of advancing a religious belief, for example, many of the schools receive funding from a church, require attendance at religious services, pray during class, and report back to a church or parish [473 U.S. 402, 412]. In fact, this program actually contains all of the critical elements of entanglement proscribed in earlier case law: the aid is provided in a pervasively sectarian environment, and ongoing inspection would be required to ensure the absence of a religious message [473 U.S. 402, 412].

Analysis

In order to maintain the separation between church and state, it is important to look at the impact that funding a sectarian program will have, not only on that program, but also on the state officials involved and non-members of that sect. In this scenario, in order to ensure that religion was not being funded by the program, the state would have to engage in monitoring of the program. The problem with that type of monitoring is that anything that approaches the teaching of values could be considered religious, and might be considered religious in the setting of a religious school. Furthermore, because the classrooms were to be cleared of religious items, the state would be involved in making a determination of what constituted a religious item. In addition, the program would require routine, frequent administrative contact between the staff of the religious school and the state workers, which would result in an entangled relationship. Moreover, the judgments made by agents of the city could be significant to the religious beliefs of each school. Finally, because these schools are religious schools, established primarily for the purpose of promoting the beliefs of particular religions, it infringes upon the religion of non-members to have their tax dollars pay to support children in these programs.

Conclusion

The court ruled in favor of the taxpayers. The court determined that the Title I program in question violated the Establishment Clause. That is, because placing city employees as teachers in parochial schools and having them supervised by city employees, meant that the state was establishing a presence in the church. Even when state aid to a parochial institution is not for the purpose of advancing religion, it can still violate the establishment cause if the provision of that state aid furthers the interaction of church and state.

Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997)

Factual background

In Aguilar v. Felton, after the Supreme Court hold that New York City's Title I parochial school remedial education program violated the Establishment Clause and remanded the case back to the District Court, the District Court entered a permanent injunction. 10 years later, petitioners, the parties bound by the injunction, filed motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision denying the motion on the merits.

Issues

Does a federally funded program that provides supplemental, remedial instruction to disadvantaged children violate the Establishment Clause if such instruction is given at a sectarian school by government employees? Have the Supreme Court's later Establishment Clause cases sufficiently undermined the earlier decision to constitute the type of changes justifying relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5)? Does New York City's Title I program give aid recipients any incentive to modify their religious beliefs or practices in order to receive program services? Does New York City's Title I program result in governmental indoctrination, define its recipients by reference to religion, or create an excessive entanglement?

Reasoning

Under Title I, a local education agency (LEA) providing services to private school students faces several restraints. The LEA must retain complete control over Title I funds, use public employees to provide services, and provide secular services. However, the prior Court's decision determined that there was too much entanglement between the secular services and religion, and LEA's had to implement expensive changes to comply with that Court's decision, thus reducing the amount of Title I funds available for services. While the Court was aware that its earlier decision would cause that type of increase in expenses, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5), petitioners would be entitled to relief if it was no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application, whether because of factual conditions or a change in law. The Court rejected the costs of the program and statements that the Court would change its prior decision. However, the Court agreed with the contentions that the prior decision was undermined by subsequent Establishment Clause decisions. The Court's recent cases undermined the assumptions that the prior case and its companion cases made about government aid and the Establishment Clause. The Court continues to ask whether the government has acted with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion. However, the Court has modified its approach to assessing indoctrination in two ways; first, it abandoned the presumption that the placement of public employees on parochial school grounds inevitably resulted in the effect of indoctrination or served as a symbolic union between church and state. In fact, the Court expressly rejected the idea that a public employee's mere presence on private school property is sufficient to indicate that the public employee is inculcating religion in the students. Moreover, the Court also expressly rejected the idea that the presence of a public employee on private school property created a symbolic link between church and state. The Court said there was no evidence to suggest that any teacher under the program and question had attempted to inculcate religion in students. Moreover, the cooperation required between the parochial school employees and the public employees regarding student progress was the same, regardless of the location of the classes. The Court determined that it did "not see any perceptible (let alone dispositive) difference in the degree of symbolic union between a student receiving remedial instruction in a classroom on his sectarian school's campus and one receiving instruction in a van parked just at the school's curbside" [521 U.S. 203].

Next, the Court has abandoned the rule that all government aid that aids the educational function of religious schools is unconstitutional. A prior decision permitted the placement of a publicly-funded sign language interpreter in a private school. Both types of aid were intended to help students, regardless of the school they chose to attend. The Court rejected claims that the provision of remedial services would reduce the burden on parochial schools and, therefore, indirectly provide financial aid for religious instruction. The Court believed that it was possible to distinguish between supplemental and general education. The Court determined that there was no financial incentive to engage in a program, where aid was allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria, and where such aid was made available to potential beneficiaries without regard to religion.