U.S. Space Shuttle Disaster Analysis

U.S. Space Shuttle Disaster Analysis

1967, 1986, 2003 three seemingly desultory years in the continuity of post-World War II America however, upon further inspection these dates entail considerable significance as they mark three tragedies suffered by not only the National Aeronautics and Space Administration but the nation as a whole. 1961 saw three astronauts burned alive in Apollo I as it sat on the Cape Canaveral launch site. 19 years later the space shuttle Challenger was incinerated as it climbed towards the heavens. Finally, in 2003 the space shuttle Columbia, returning from its mission was destroyed upon earth reentry. These events can be viewed in largely in two contexts: engineering technicalities and design and their impact on the space flight, and management and organizational dynamics and their role in the disasters. Apollo I's mission represents the former, a series of engineering gaffes which ultimately led to the deaths of Grissom, White, and Chaffee. (NASA. N.D.). Of greater interest are the two shuttle disasters which reveal the complexities of large organizations and the obturations which prevent sound judgment and quality decision making. Reviewing the evidence it seems clear that the Challenger and Columbia disasters could have been prevented if those in the NASA organization had heeded the multitude of warnings regarding engineering and structural issues prior to launch.

In the Rogers report which catalogued and provided the final analysis and opinion as to the cause of the Challenger disaster; "the culprits were the synthetic rubber O-rings that were designed to keep the rocket's superhot gases from escaping from the joints between the booster's four main segments" (Case Study. N.D.). The result was gas leakage and flames which spread to the "shuttle's external fuel tank'…causing the explosion that destroyed the Challenger (Case Study. N.D.).

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) "identified the physical cause of the accident, a 1.67 pound slab of insulating foam fell of the external fuel tank, hit the left wing, and caused a breach in the tiles designed to protect the aluminum wing from the heat of reentry" (Case Study. N.D.) Two seemingly minor engineering technicalities had caused the same result, the destruction of both shuttles and the loss of 14 astronauts lives. Both investigatory bodies however, while pinpointing the cause of the disasters also spoke to systemic failures of NASA in the years, months, and days leading up to the tragedies.

Systemic organizational flaws are not uncommon for larger organizations, and in the case of NASA these issues were at the root of the failed shuttle flights. The Rogers report identified NASA as a disconnected entity with significant responsibilities and areas of operation spread out over three locales: Alabama, Texas and, Florida. The report identifies NASA as "working with an unrealistic set of flights" (Cases Study. N.D.); timelines "which were retained and increased pressure to meet schedules by senior NASA managers" (Case Study. N.D.). The Challenger disaster was marked by the reality that

"NASA had found evidence that O-rings had allowed hot exhaust to burn through a primary seal. Since 1982 the O-rings had been designated a "Criticality 1" issue. Indeed, a January shuttle launch in cold weather just a year earlier had shown significant burn through of the O-rings. The day before the Challenger launch, engineers at Morton Thiokol, a NASA contractor, raised concerns that the frigid temperatures at Cape Canaveral would cause the shuttle's rocket booster "O-rings" to fail -- which would mean catastrophe for the shuttle. Just hours before liftoff, Thiokol engineers were recommending that the launch be delayed. After hours of discussion, NASA pressed forward with the launch anyway" (O'Leary, J. June 2, 2010).

Much like the Challenger incident the CAIB report finds "NASA management practices to be as much a cause of the accident as the foam that struck the left wing 81 sec into flight. These practices included: allowing the shuttle to fly with known flaws, blocking the flow of critical information up the hierarchy, and inadequate safety monitoring" (O'Leary, J. June 2, 2010). As with the O-ring on Challenger, a seemingly minor technical issue was the problem. "Foam had been falling off the tank since the very first shuttle flight, and NASA had long been trying to fix it. But in each case, NASA decided it was okay to keep flying. Over time, this led to a significant understating or a collective ignoring of an actual risk" (O'Leary, J. June 2, 2010).