In the aftermath of 9/11 and as an effect of the ‘War on Terror', religion can be clearly seen as major cause of armed conflict. Such views, however, have fallen on fertile ground, following the massive debates about Samuel P. Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis, and the increased analytical attention to the interface between religion and conflict throughout most of the 1990s
Cause of Armed Conflict
In the aftermath of 911 and as an effect of the 'War on Terror', religion can be clearly seen as major cause of armed conflict. Such views, however, have fallen on fertile ground, following the massive debates about Samuel P. Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis, and the increased analytical attention to the interface between religion and conflict throughout most of the 1990s. Although few analysts will argue that religion is a more prominent factor in conflict now than before, the alteration of awareness is in itself a significant change. This reflects, as Oliver McTernan points out, the "opinion of a number of academics that have recognized in the midst of social, historical, political, cultural and economic factors the salience of religion also" (McTernan 2003: 87-88).
Religion may feed conflict when its normative system is considered to legitimize the use of violence. As Elise Boulding has pointed out, however, there is a duality in religious cultures as they entail notions of the "holy war" as well as the "peaceable kingdom" (Boulding 1986). We could add that in most religions there is a real tension between the two (see: Appleby 1996: 823). Hence, any attempt to explain the outbreak of violence exclusively with reference to the normative foundations of religion is deemed to failure, simply because the interpretation of these foundations is essentially contested. Nonetheless, the scriptures, narratives and rituals of a religion are often drawn upon to find legitimacy for warfare and the use of violence within a system of meaning of a higher order. The application of these resources may at times be dogmatic, and while dogmatism can in part serve as a vaccine against manipulation and misuse, it also feeds uncompromising attitudes once religion is drawn into the conflict.
To illustrate, the major differences between Protestants and Catholics in Northern
Ireland when it comes to their interpretations of Christian dogmas have had enormous social and political repercussions. Fronts are hardened by the fact that in Protestant circles there is a strong conviction that republican violence has at least the tacit blessing of the Catholic Church (McTernan 2003: 88-89).
Religion may also lead to conflict because it defines unambiguous identities, hence marking fault lines between various groups of people. The credibility of this view is reinforced by the extent to which conflicts in the post-Cold War era have seemed to follow identity boundaries that are ethnic or religious, or a combination of both. Exclusive religious identity is expressed in an absence of intermarriages, such as between Muslim Serbs and Christian Croats, between Shiite and Sunni Iraqis, or between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. Reinforced by a logic of war, a cessation of intermarriages reflects increased segregation, hostility and skepticism between conflicting groups. It is when religiously defined boundaries for inclusion and exclusion coincide with other identity markers, that the dividing line between 'Us' and 'Them' becomes most clear-cut. This is what the Norwegian theologians Sturla Stalset and Oddbjorn Leirvik touch upon when discussing the relationship between religion and politics:
That adherents of all religion have always differed among themselves in political matters, is a truism. But in times when religious identity politics increasingly asserts itself around the globe, we need to remind ourselves that the dividing lines in ethics and politics do in fact not coincide with religious differences (Stalsett, Leirvik and Beyer 2004: 10-11 ).
If we focus on the dividing lines between world religions, it may be true that those rarely coincide with political fault lines. However, the assertion by Stalsett and associates becomes more problematic if we move our focus to the level of denominations, sects and cults. In these cases, the fault lines towards other believers within the same religion are essential to the members' self-understanding, although their other important identity markers may coincide with other significant boundaries of the overall churchly organization. Relations between groups that stand close may often be more conflictual than between groups without contiguity. This is also applicable in the case of religion; relations between interrelated religious groups have often proven to be more conflictual than between world religions. While many religious identities are fundamentally inclusive and welcoming of the 'other', it remains a fact that some of the world's most exclusionary identities are religiously founded.
The organizational basis of religion can also feed into conflict. In its own right, religions may contain organizational set-ups or networks of followers that may be recruited en bloc for the war effort. In modern inter-state war, this was largely unthinkable; in the intra-state wars of today, it is not uncommon. For the Taliban, for instance, the Sunni Islamic networks rooted in the madrasas, the religious training institutions (in this case in Afghanistan and Pakistan), served as the organizational backbone. Somewhat counter intuitively, the Taliban was successful in pulling together those networks, which are both loosely organized and fragmentary, under a joint command. Religious organizations may also contribute to war through its cooperation with other organizations, most prominently the state. They may offer not only normative legitimization of action; in addition, the organization may also be used to provide leadership and a ground for recruitment. The potential of religious organizations as focal points for recruitment and mobilization cannot be over-estimated. The Islamist terror attacks in the U.S., Spain and the UK illustrates how it is not the number of adherents that is decisive, but rather the organization of activities within a religious framework. Organized religion, with scriptures and standardized procedures, limits and restricts individual freedom of action, but does therefore have a decisive potential for altering the behavioral patterns of its adherents through its control over the normative and ethical foundations of action.
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