Causes of the Korean War

Korean War refers to the military conflict between North and South Korea that started on June 25, 1950 and lasted until the armistice signed on July 27, 1953. During the war, both adversaries attempted to re-unify the country under their own regimes and ideology and several major powers including the United States, the UN forces, the Peoples Republic of China, and the Soviet Union also became involved in the conflict. It has at times been dubbed as a civil war between the two Koreas; at other times it is described as a proxy war between the forces of Communism led by USSR and China on the one side and the forces of Capitalist led by United States on the other, fought in the backdrop of the post-World War II Cold War. In any case, the Korean War is recognized as one of the most destructive wars of the 20th century in which as many as 4 million Koreans are believed to have died throughout the peninsula, most of them civilians. In addition, China lost as many as 1 million soldiers, and the United States suffered more than 140,000 casualties with 36,934 dead and 103,284 wounded. Other UN nations suffered 3322 dead and 11,949 wounded (Cumings). The economic and social cost of the War to Korea, especially in the North was colossal, where hardly any building remained standing after three years of hostility and bombings. The aftermath of the War not only affected the future relations between both parts of Korea but its consequences extended well beyond the borders of Korea. The causes behind the conflict are many and differ significantly from the perspective of each adversary. In this essay, I shall examine the background of the Korean War and take a look at all possible causes which led to its start and contributed to its escalation and sustenance for such a long period. It includes the perspective of all the parties involved including North and South Koreas, the United States, the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China.

Background

For a proper understanding of the causes behind the Korean War, it is important to examine the modern history of Korea as well as the world order that emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War.

Korea had a long history as a unified, independent country until the Japanese started to flex their imperialist muscles in the late nineteeth century. Following its victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, Japan occupied several parts of Korea and formally annexed the entire country in 1910. From then onwards, Japan mercilessly exploited the country and ruled it with an iron hand until its comprehensive defeat and surrender suffered as a result of the use of the atomic bombs against it by the U.S. In 1945 ("Treaty of Annexation").

As the Second World War drew to a close, it had become obvious that the United States and the Soviet Union would emerge as the two pre-eminent world powers in a post WWII world. This circumstance, by itself, was a dangerous sign as history shows us that whenever two great powers came into close contact with each other, it became almost impossible for them to avoid conflict. In the case of the United States and the U.S.S.R., there were further grounds for mutual antagonism. Both countries represented the opposite spectrums of political ideologies. While the U.S. represented democracy, individual liberty and capitalism, the U.S.S.R. was the world's first socialist republic, which was committed to the spread of the communist revolution among the 'down-trodden' masses of the world. Both of them were looking for areas of influence in Europe as well as Asia and manuevered to promote their own political ideologies (Bell, 55). Even though the Koreans had expected to become free after Japan's defeat, the United States and Soviet Union decided to divide the Korean Peninsula with the U.S. taking control of the Southern part and the Soviet Union the North of the Peninsula. The dividing line between the two parts of Korea became the 38th parallel with the capital city, Seoul, lying in the American-controlled southern half.

The long-term plan of both the Soviet Union and the United States was not to continue their direct occupation of North and South Korea indefinitely but to build and promote regimes that would further their interests and follow their respective Communist and Capitalist ideologies. The Americans, therefore, supported Syngman Rhee, an anti-communist Korean who had lived for a long time in the U.S. And had emerged as a right-wing leader in the South after the end of the Second World War. The Soviet Union (and China), on the other hand supported Kim Il Sung, a former Korean guerrilla fighter who had fought with Chinese Communist forces against the Japanese in Manchuria in the 1930s and who had emerged as the leader of the left-wing by pushing for radical land reforms in Korea aimed at taking away land from big land-owners and redistributing it among the impoverished Korean farmers. By 1948, the political division of the Korean peninsula was formalized with the southern part named the Republic of Korea (ROK) led by Rhee and backed by the United States and the United Nations, and the northern part became the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK); it was led by Kim Il Sung and supported by the U.S.S.R. And China.

The American administration in the south had retained several Japanese colonial administrators and collaborators to their previous positions of power within Korea. This policy was understandably very unpopular among Koreans who had suffered horribly under Japanese colonial rule for 35 years. Moreover, the left-wing policy of radical land redistribution in the North also found significant support in the South, especially among the landless peasants. This led to a guerilla movement in South Korea, which was supported by Kim's government. The ROK government, with active support from the United States, crushed the guerilla movement with force and pushed the communists into the hills. In the meantime, both Rhee and Kim were intent on re-uniting Korea but under their own ideologies, i.e., capitalism and communism respectively. In their aim, both leaders had the covert as well as overt support of the cold war adversaries -- the U.S. And its allies on one side, and the Soviet Union and China on the other. The stage was, therefore, set for a serious escalation of hostilities between the North and South Koreas (Edwards, 41-43).

The Causes of the Korean War

Internal Conflict: The Civil War Thesis

As we saw in the preceding paragraphs, most of the causes for the Korean War are embedded in the Korean history and the political and economic circumstances prevailing in the country at the end of the Second World War. One of the popular theses attempting to explain the reasons behind the conflict is that the Korean War was part of a continuing internal civil conflict in Korea which started at the end of World War II. During most of the twentieth century when Korea was ruled by Japan as a rice-producing colony, the Japanese had tried to extinguish all vestiges of Korean national identity (Kaufman, 4). The attempt, however, failed and at the end of World War II, almost all political groups believed in the unification and independence of Korea and considered the Soviet and the U.S. occupation of the North and South of their country as a temporary phenomenon. Although all these groups were united in this objective, they were deeply divided ideologically and politically and were at daggers drawn. On the one side was a conservative elite of landowners, businessmen, and manufacturers who had enjoyed a privileged status under Japanese rule that they sought to retain. Opposed to them were political leftists, including large numbers of peasants and workers, who sought a fundamental change in the social and political structure of Korea (Ibid). Even before Second World War II officially ended in August 1945, clashes had taken place between the opposing groups as workers' and peasants' unions flourished and communist strength grew.

Hence, when the American and Soviet occupation forces landed in Korea in 1945 to supervise the surrender of the Japanese, they found a country on the verge of a civil war. Although both the occupying powers had agreed on the eventual independence of Korea, their time frame for such independence and the modus operandi differed with that of the Korean political groups. Inevitably the two super powers proceeded to support groups that were closest to their own ideologies, i.e., the Americans supporting the right wing led by Syngmann Rhee and the Soviets supporting the leftists led by Kim Il Sung.

At first, Kim and the left wing guerillas were hopeful that the peasant uprising against Rhee's regime in the south would topple the right-wing regime and re-unify the country under communist rule. However, when the uprising was crushed by Rhee with the help of the Americans, Kim decided that he would re-occupy the South militarily and hoped that a majority of the Korean population in the south would revolt against their own government and join them once the military action had started. In order to do so, Kim built up a formidable army which was armed by the Soviets. His army was also bolstered by the arrival of veteran Korean fighters from China after the end of the Chinese civil war between the Communist and the Nationalists in which the Communists under Mao had triumphed. On the other hand, Rhee's government was relatively weak due to the communist insurgency in the south and his army had not been armed to the same level as that of North Korea by the United States.

Nevertheless, Stalin did not approve of such an attack at first because he did not want a direct confrontation with the United States at that stage. After the Soviet testing of the atomic bomb in 1949, and the success of the communist revolution in China in the same year, Stalin gained more confidence. Hence, when Kim Il Sung approached him in the spring of 1950 to seek his [Stalin's] approval for military action across the 39th parallel with the assurance that it would be a quick, decisive war, Stalin gave him his go-ahead (Weathersby, 95). In this way, the main cause of the Korean War can be attributed to the ongoing civil war between the left-wing groups seeking radical land-reforms and the right wing conservative elite of landowners, businessmen, and manufacturers who sought to retain the status quo.

The Korean War as Part of the Cold War Confrontation

Even if the primary reason for the start of the Korean War is assumed to be the internal conflict between the left and right wing groups within the country, it would never have escalated into a major international event in the absence of the Cold War conflict between the two world major powers at the time. Russia's experience of foreign aggression on its territory during the World Wars had convinced it to seek buffer states around its territories for security reasons, both in Europe and in Asia. Moreover, the U.S.S.R. As the flag-bearer of Communist ideology felt obliged to support spread of the communist revolution around the world in the post World War II world.

As the Soviet Union started to support Communist movements around the globe, the United States feared a "domino effect" and sought to counter the Soviet influence through a policy of aggressive "containment." This policy of 'containment' meant that the United States would seek to confront the spread of Communism wherever it felt that it intruded into its area of influence. Immediately after the end of World War II, the United States was concerned about the 'containment' of Soviet influence in Europe. It also sought to protect its interests in Japan but was somewhat ambiguous about the extent of its interest in protecting Korea. Such ambiguity was reflected in the U.S. Secretary of State Acheson's speech before the National Press Association in January 1950, in which he placed Korea outside of the American defense perimeter in Asia. This assertion by Acheson is in fact cited by some historians for being, at least partly responsible for the start of the Korean War as it may have been construed as an indication by North Korea and the Soviet Union about United State's lack of seriousness in directly defending South Korea against a Communist take-over (Weathersby, 92).

As it turned out, Stalin was wrong in his assessment that the United States would not react strongly to a military action by North Korea. As soon as the heavily armed North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel on June 20, 1950 led by Soviet-made tanks, Washington and its allies were sure that the attack had been planned in Moscow and that it signified a new Soviet aggressiveness. They assumed that if the West did not resist, there would be similar attacks elsewhere along the Soviet Union's vast periphery, in Europe and perhaps the Near East. Within days of the attack, the United States and 15 other members of the United Nations had committed their armed forces to a defense of South Korea, thus escalating an internal conflict on the peninsula into a major international war (Weathersby, 92).

Moreover, in its Cold War-mindset the Truman administration thought of the Communist threat as a monolith. It assumed that Mao Zedong's new communist regime in Beijing had also helped plan the attack, and the action may be part of a 'master plan' by the Chinese Communists to also attack Taiwan -- where their Nationalist foe, Chiang Kai-shek had fled after being defeated in the Chinese civil war. The U.S. Seventh Fleet was quickly dispatched to the Taiwan Straits, not only committing the United States indefinitely to the defense of Taiwan but making enemies with Beijing, which the Chinese would repay only months later to rescue North Korea from certain defeat.

In some ways, therefore, Burton I. Kaufman, a leading historian of the Korean War is quite right in labeling the conflict "a great power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union superimposed on a civil war between North and South Korea." (Kaufman, 5)

The United States' View

The official U.S. view about the causes which led to the Korean War is that it happened as a result of an international Communist conspiracy to expand its influence over the whole of the Korean peninsula, formulated with the connivance and active support of the North Koreans, the Soviet Union, and Communist China. Many people in the United States were also inclined to believe it was a diversion set up by the Soviets to draw attention from a war to be launched in Europe. The "diversion theory" has proven to be inaccurate, but the belief continues that the invasion somehow fit into the larger Communist desire to rule the world. The U.S. administration also purported to have been taken by surprise at the all-out attack by North Korean army on June 20, 1950 when it crossed the 38th parallel. Both these views -- that the attack by North Korea was a pre-planned Communist strategy and at the same time being taken by surprise, do seem a little contradictory. Add to this the fact that the Americans had all but withdrawn its troops from Korea by 1949 and had only lightly armed the South Korean army, which was no match for the much stronger North Koreans, and the whole U.S. policy towards Korea in the post World War II years seems perplexing. In order to understand the seemingly contradictory acts of the U.S. government in Korea we have to appreciate the fact that the U.S. wanted to cut down its military spending after the end of World War II. It is also a fact that President Truman, unlike his predecessor -- President Roosevelt, was no visionary strategist. He had to handle the Republicans who were anxious to take back the country into its customary isolationist mode and the Congress was not too keen to sanction increased budgets for the military. In such a situation, the Truman administration had to prioritize its international commitments. Its first priority lay in Europe and Asia took a back seat as far as the American commitment for defense against Communism was concerned; in Asia too, the U.S. defense perimeter consisted of Japan, the Philippines and the defense of Taiwan against possible attack by Communist China. As far as Korea was concerned, the U.S. had an agreement with the Soviet Union about division of the peninsula at the 38th parallel and it was convinced that the Soviets would not risk a direct confrontation with the United States on the peninsula. Hence, in the back drop of a depleted army budget, when General MacArthur, the Far Eastern commander and head of the occupation of Japan, endorsed withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea in the spring of 1949, the State Department agreed to pullout its combat soldiers from Korea. By the end of June the withdrawal was complete save for a permanent deployment of a U.S. military advisory group. The U.S. continued to provide military and economic aid to South Korea but deliberately did not build up the South Korean army to a level where it would be encouraged to attack the North Koreans.

Hence, in some ways, the apparently perplexing U.S. contention that it was taken by surprise at the North Korean attack on its southern neighbor may not be altogether false. What is more surprising is the American administration's ambiguity regarding U.S.'s commitment to defend ROK in case of attack by the Communists. In particular, the Secretary of State Dean Acheson's infamous speech of January 12, 1950, implying that the United States could not guarantee South Korea's security in case it is attacked, was a real disaster.

The Soviet Role in the Korean War

Release of secret archival material after the collapse of the Soviet Union has revealed that Stalin was so determined to avoid a military confrontation with the United States, fearing that the Soviet Union was not yet strong enough to win, that he would not have approved Kim's suggestion of invading South Korea if Washington had made it clear that it would respond with force (Weathersby, 94). The change of heart by the Soviet dictator came about due to more than one reason. The first was the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war; the fact that the United States seemed to have deserted Nationalist China at the last moment convinced Stalin that it would not defend South Korea. The second reason was the successful testing of the atomic bomb in 1949; the Soviets had now freed themselves from nuclear blackmail and gained immense confidence. The third reason was that Moscow was aware of the drastic cuts in the American military budget following the Second World War and the resulting decline in its military strength. Last but not the least, the disastrous Acheson speech of January 1950 was almost certainly a factor in Stalin's decision to support an invasion of South Korea; this is reflected in Stalin's explanation in May 1950 to Mao Zedong that it was now possible to agree to the North Koreans' proposal to invade South Korea "in light of the changed international situation." (Quoted by Weathersby, 94)

The previously classified Russian documents also reveal the extent to which Stalin was willing to go to avoid a direct military confrontation with the United States. For example, it is now known that in early October 1950, when Stalin thought that the Chinese would not intervene to stop General MacArthur's rapid advance into North Korea after the Inchon landing, the Soviet leader ordered the North Korean army to evacuate the country and withdraw to Chinese and Soviet territory as he was not prepared to pit Soviet forces against the Americans even at the expense of sacrificing North Korea (Ibid.) Furthermore, Stalin had only given his approval for the North Korean invasion of South Korea on Kim's assurance of a quick and decisive victory within a few days and his assessment that the United States would not intervene directly to defend South Korea.

The Soviet policy towards North Korea during the rest of the war is also indicative of the cynical mindset of Stalin -- aimed only at narrow self-interest and least regard for the his North Korean allies. North Korea was pressured by the Soviets to continue to meet its export quotas for minerals and other items to the Soviet Union during the war and no concessions were made. Once the Korean War had become a stalemate, Stalin continued to pressure the North Koreans and the Chinese into taking a hard line in the armistice negotiations with the United States arguing that the United States was in greater need to reach a negotiated settlement. It is, however, more likely that he did so for purely selfish reasons -- letting the U.S. bleed at minimal cost to the Soviet Union. Even as North Korea suffered tremendous damage due to American bombings in early 1952 and were willing to negotiate an armistice for an early end to the war, Stalin cynically declared to Chinese foreign minister Zhou Enlai, "the North Koreans have lost nothing, except for casualties that they suffered during the war." (Quoted by Weathersby, 96) it was, therefore, only after Stalin's death in March 1953, that his successor government, concerned about the precariousness of their own rule, gave the go-ahead for negotiating the armistice which was finally signed on July 27, 1953.

One of the conspiracy theories regarding the start of the Korean War is that the Soviet Union deliberately 'sucked in' the United States into the war by walking out of the U.N. Security Council on purpose and failing to use its veto, enabling the passing of the resolution authorizing military action against North Korea. The other and probably more credible theory about the Russian ambassador's absence during the UN Security Council debate is that Russia wished to avoid a direct confrontation with the United States at all costs. If it had vetoed the resolution, Stalin was afraid that the United States would enter the conflict on its own. In such a situation, Stalin would have been obligated to enter the war and risk a direct confrontation with the U.S. since the Soviet Union had a pact with North Korea for the defense of Korea in case of an attack by the United States. However, with the passing of the Security Council resolution, the United Nations was technically in conflict with North Korea and the Soviet Union could wriggle out of its obligation for defending its ally (Edwards, 55).

North Korean Viewpoint

There is hardly any doubt that the Korean War started when North Korea launched a massive invasion of South Korea across the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950. This fact apparently makes the North Koreans the primary aggressor in the conflict. Looking at the war from the point-of-view of North Korea, however, the causes behind the war were diametrically different. The left wing, pro-peasants and workers government of North Korea believed that the American "Imperialists" had installed an illegal government in the South that protected the interests of a tiny minority -- the privileged classes that had collaborated with the Japanese occupiers and were now dancing to the tune of their new "masters" to protect their privileges. The North Korean government headed by Kim Il Sung, therefore, felt obliged to unite the country and to throw out the Imperialist American forces and their lackeys. The official North Korean version of the start of the war is that they were forced to retaliate against provocation by the South Koreans who crossed the border (the 38th parallel) first. This last contention of North Korea seems a bit far-fetched since the South Korean army was a lot weaker and smaller than the better equipped and more battle-hardened North Korean army and it would have made no sense for South Korea to risk an all-out war with their stronger neighbors in 1950.