Challenger Shuttle Disaster While People

Challenger Shuttle Disaster

While people remember the Challenger Shuttle Disaster as a tragic loss of life and a case of mechanical failure, such events do not happen in isolation. While O. rings failed, the events that led to their failure were organizational in nature, not mechanical. The Challenger blew up because of organizational dysfunction as well as a technological problem (Kruglanski, 1986). The organizational problems resulted in flawed decision-making.

Because of outside pressures, NASA developed the shuttle as a vehicle without clear application. Congress wanted the program to be self-supporting, and expected the shuttles to be reliable, reusable vehicles. These pressures forced NASA into a business role as well as a science research one. This resulted in conflicts, stress on the staff, and short cuts to meet business-based decision deadlines (Forrest, 1995). The lack of focus resulted in difficulty developing effective management support systems because of the conflicting program goals. Due to political expectations for the program, emphasis on meeting launch deadlines changed decisions about whether to launch or not into something that was deadline-based rather than risk based. Decision-makers were pressured to approve launches, and reasons to delay were discouraged in the group (Forrest, 1995). As one NASA official said afterwards, "People being responsible for making Flight Safety First when the launch schedule is First cannot possibly make Flight Safety First no matter what they say." (Eberhart, 1986) NASA demonstrated other specific shortcomings. Their database provided sometimes faulty information, and concerns expressed at the middle-management level did not move up to the chain to decision makers, so those at the top were not always aware of potential problems (Editorial, 2003). In addition, NASA did not allow anonymous voting on final decision to launch, subjecting each individual to peer pressure (Forrest, 1995).

For its part, Morton-Thiokol (M-T) buckled to pressure by NASA to minimize possible risks. (M-T) told NASA not to launch if the air temperature was below 53° F, but this would have caused a delay for several days, so NASA pressured the company to reconsider (Forrest, 1995). In fact M-T had known about the O-rings' potential = susceptibility to cold temperatures for several months, but out of a desire to continue doing business with NASA, caved in to their pressure to approve the launch (Forrest, 1995). This happened because All members of the Group Decision Support System (GDSS) felt the pressure to approve launch, and decisions, no matter how accurate, to delay the launch were actively discouraged (Forrest, 1995). M-T made it easier for themselves to bend to this pressure when they regrouped as a private meeting, which eliminated any outside influences against a choice to recommend launch (Forrest, 1995),

To avoid these problems in the future, NASA has to take into account the difficulties with self-regulation. NASA was faced with incompatible demands that led to flawed decision-making in 1986, and those conflicts tainted the decision-making process (Vaughan, 1990). In important group decisions such as those made by GDSS, people must be free to speak up, to play the role of devil's advocate so assumptions are examined and challenged, to maintain a flexible time frame, to develop agreement on how they will proceed, to allow for individual personalities, and to constantly consider alternative plans (class notes).

In addition, the Rogers Commission made specific recommendations related to these issues. They suggested that NASA restructure its management system, including bringing astronauts into management positions, which will increase attention to flight safety issues. They suggested a full examination of all critical systems before conducting any more shuttle launches. They were instructed to establish an Office of Safety, Reliability and Quality control. These suggestions bring safety back to prominence in decision-making, and should downplay the effect of pressure to meet deadlines (Harwood, 1986).

The Rogers Commission also criticized NASA's communications and instructed them to devise ways that information flows from bottom to top as well as from top to bottom. In addition they expressed concern about a tendency for management to be somewhat isolated from others, further interfering with communication (Harwood, 1986). If middle management had been able to communicate effectively with upper levels in 1986, the GDSS would have heard about O. ring concerns from within NASA as well as from M-T.