Challenger Disaster: Judgment in Managerial Decision Making

Judgment in Managerial Decision Making

Almost everyone has, at some point, been a victim of groupthink -- perhaps by thinking of speaking up in a meeting, and then deciding not to, so as not to appear unsupportive of the team's stand. Although such occurrences are quite common, and may appear quite normal, they are indicative of faulty thinking. Groupthink is, in basic terms, "a phenomenon that occurs when the desire for group consensus overrides people's common sense desire to present alternatives, critique a position, or express an unpopular opinion" (Mind Tools, 1996). Groupthink is detrimental to the process of decision-making because it drives out challenge, giving rise to poor-quality decisions (Bazerman & Don, 2008).

The Challenger disaster perfectly demonstrates how groupthink can lead to negative outcomes. Months before the space shuttle take-off, Marshall Engineers discovered a few faulty parts in the flight but opted to proceed with the launch, so as to avoid negative press. Their actions ended up in a fiery explosion midair which claimed the lives of the seven passengers aboard the shuttle (Mind Tools, 1996).

The explosion threw the public into frenzy, and the Roger's Commission was, as a result, put in place to look into the causes of the explosion (SHU, n.d.). The commission held that a faulty O-ring was the immediate cause of the accident, but not the only cause; a flawed process of decision-making at NASA, "was an equal, if not more important factor" (SHU, n.d.).

In the months leading up to the launch of the Challenger Flight, Thiokol engineers had raised concern with NASA's Marshall engineers about the suitability of the solid rocket booster and its ability to withstand the Shuttle's weight in flight. Days after the explosion, NASA's top managers appeared before the Roger Commission and, in their defense, told the commission that they were not aware of any rocket booster-controversy between their Marshall engineers and the Thiokol engineers, and maintained that they would not have authorized the launch of the controversial shuttle, had they been briefed. This only means that the Marshall engineers, the only people in NASA who had information about the faulty shuttle system, opted to remain silent so as not to shatter the dreams of the institution, and the expectations of the public.

This, at first sight, appears quite unrealistic. One would argue that a reputable institution such as NASA ought to have more coordinated systems, and more centralized decision-making systems. The subsequent subsections reveal some of the factors that made NASA's systems vulnerable.

The constraints associated with launch were retired, thus compromising the shuttle's safety. However, the system was quite shallow and provided no imperative that constraints gain the authorization of all levels of management (SHU, n.d.). This made it relatively easy for the officers at levels II and IV of the decision making structure to disregard the safety concerns raised by their Thiokol counterparts, and get away with it.