Peter the Great: Brutal Reformer

Peter the Great: Brutal Reformer

From the perspective of the 17th century, few state ambitions were of greater consequence than those pertaining to territorial expansion, particularly where great landmasses with monarchical hierarchies are concerned. To one view, the success of an empire's sovereign leader is to be judged according to the physical scope of his rulership, the pale of his state's cultural influence and the longevity of his dynasty subsequent to these acts of expansion. And if we are to measure Tsar Peter I of Russia, most commonly known as Peter the Great, according to these yardsticks, he is most assuredly among Russia's most important historical figures. And justifiably, Peter the Great is commonly credited for policies that would lead to the modernization of Russia and the lasting dissemination of its identity into the regions which ensconced it. However, much of this praise is often spoke at the expense of our reflection on his occasional political brutality, a sense of personal entitlement in his policy orientation which descended from an aristocratic upbringing and a tendency toward oppression in the far reaches of his empire that significantly damages his credibility as a stimulator of progress. To be certain, Peter the Great was a defining leader in Russian history and a catalyst for an inflection point in the cultural identity of the Eurasian expanse. But he was also the product of privilege who during the course of his classical education in various forums of Western Europe, showed far greater interest in shipbuilding than governance. These realities would eventually feed into both the positive aspects of his leadership and the serious drawbacks that would impose harsh impingements upon the freedom of the Russian people and the inhabitants of the lands conquered beyond its borders.

First, it is necessary to address the degree to which we may say that Peter the Great was deeply successful in his rulership. This will be important, because it is simultaneously a cause for much of the violence which would become a part of his policy. As NNDB (2010) reports, "Peter's claim to greatness rests mainly on the fact that from first to last he clearly recognized the requirements of the Russian nation and his own obligations as its ruler. It would have materially lightened his task had he placed intelligent foreigners at the head of every department of state, allowing them gradually to train up a native bureaucracy. But for the sake of the independence of the Russian nation he resisted the temptation of taking this inviting but perilous shortcut to greatness." (NNDB, 1)

Indeed, the authority that Peter established in the lands beyond his own borders would be accomplished fully by occupation, a premise in which Peter had gained great confidence based on the advice of his Western European counsels. With respect to said counsels, it is extremely relevant in our understanding of Peter the Great that he was explicitly encouraged in many of his priorities by the progress made in Western Europe. Following the invasion of the Mongols and the Tatar occupation which experienced some historical cross-over with the power of the tsars, Russia experiences an isolation from other parts of Europe which produce something of a lag in its modernity. The artistic, architectural and philosophical revolutions that were redefining these parts of Europe would be scarcely felt by the Russians. Peter's upbringing, however, would expose him to teachings, experiences and visits throughout Europe. These would become an important part of his rulership.

Among this principles, he would be instilled with the belief that ethnic claims to rulership play a significant part in planting lasting seeds of influence. Accordingly, "he was determined that, at whatever cost, hardship and inconvenience, Russia should be ruled by Russians, not by foreigners; and before his death he had the satisfaction of seeing every important place in his empire in the hands of capable natives of his own training." (NNDB, 1) He would conduct this ambition simultaneous to a number of ideological reforms intended to bring a greater sense of modernity to the lands known as the Russian Empire. Accordingly, our research denotes that Peter made it a high priority to bring strict cultural control over the Russian court. From the seat of power in Moscow, Peter decreed that those in the court were require to adopt European clothing fashions and to shave their beards. Those desiring to keep said bears were charged an annual tax to do so. (Wikipedia, 1)

These measures would demonstrate two important features of Peter's rule in simultaneity. The emphasis on Western cultural orientation as a way of both inducing Russian modernity and in bringing about an end to its isolation from other European monarchies would illustrate the degree to which Peter truly viewed himself as a European king. Simultaneously, the intrusive policy entrance into the personal lives of his staff members would demonstrate his willingness to impose heavy pressure upon the Russians in the display of his Europeanism. And as noted in the introduction to this discussion, from the measure of imperial success defined by the European mode of conquest, we may indeed say that Peter the Great was markedly important in the scope of Russian history. Without debate, great changes occurred during his rule. and, as Levykin (1999) indicates, "under Peter's rule, Russia became a great European nation. In 1721, he proclaimed Russia an Empire and was accorded the title of Emperor of All Russia, Great Father of the Fatherland and 'the Great.'" (Levykin, 1)

Of course, becoming a great 'European' nation would come with its own distinct features, both in terms of the degree to which Peter would consider dramatic reform to be absolutely necessary and the hardline stance which he took on enforcing any number of modes for reform. Here, Peter would especially leave his stamp on a Russian people which have largely been ruled by the iron-fist of a deeply centralized power through the end of the 20th century. Even today, it is unclear that the Russians have been liberated from a certain cultural orientation toward dictatorial rule. The great irony with many of these tenures of rule is one that seems to have come to prominence during Peter's reign. Namely, Peter was aggressively committed to achieving governmental reform in the interest of improving the ability of the government to serve the interests of the public. And yet, in order to achieve this end, he made great effort to impose an extreme fortitude of rulership. With respect to this view of his entitlements as a ruler of Russia, Peter did not represent a major departure from the view of Russian tsarist authority.

According to Gordon (1755), "the Emperor of Russia being an absolute Prince, to whom his subjects are obliged to pay obedience without reserve, he can raise upon any emergency, some hundred thousands of men. Vast revenues are annually brought into his treasury, which accrue to him not only from the common taxes, but from his having the monopoly of all the rich furs, and other choice commodities exported out of his dominions: all which, as well as the lives and fortunes of his greatest subjects, are at his sole disposal." (Gordon, 4) in this respect, it may be said that the Russian aristocracy did not differ in its social role significantly from the role of the European aristocracy. But with Peter I, a distinguishing mark would be his declared interest in bringing about progress, reform and improvement for the people of Russia. It may be stated that he did so, but not without first our clear acknowledgement that this was at the expense of any who sought to stand in his way or took a philosophical point of divergence from his ideologies.

A good example of this internal contradiction may be observed in the measures which he generally employed when attempting to bring what he perceived as positive reform to the people of Russia. Accordingly, Hughes (2002) reports that "high on his agenda was the issue of how to inculcate and develop honesty, responsibility and enterprise in the ruling elite and as usual he sought solutions in regulations and penalties. An edict of 25 October 1723 declares: "whosever shall commit an injustice in a court or in any matter whatsoever entrusted to him or which is a part of his duties and he commits that injustice for his own ends, knowingly and of his own volition, that man, as an infringer of the state laws and his own duty, shall be condemned to death, either physical or political according to the severity of the crime and deprived of all his property." (Hughes, 182) Here, the Hughes text considers, Peter makes as the highest type of crime that which is committed against state rather than against any one individual. This would help to firmly establish our understanding of the power which Peter accorded himself. It would also help to familiarize the Russians with his liberal usage of capital punishment, which Peter proved more than willing to invoke even as he rhetorically address the need for greater social progress in Russia.

Certainly, the most powerful demonstration of his approach to protection of his authority and the state against political dissent would come in the form of his uncompromising treatment of rebellion. The enormity and ethnic variations defining the Russian empire would subject it inherently to acts of rebellion, regional conflicts and various small but organized efforts at undermining the authority of the tsars. Peter took an extremely decisive approach to these threats to his authority, responding to rebellion with not the slightest withholding in retribution. This is best exemplified by the first uprising of his rule, where the streltsy emerged in support of the authority of his half-sister Sofia. Most acts of rebellion would come about in the opposition of Peter's apparently greater admiration for aspects of European rather than Russian culture. Accordingly, our research reports that "heavily influenced by his advisors from Western Europe, Peter reorganized the Russian army along modern lines and dreamed of making Russia a maritime power. He faced much opposition to these policies at home, but brutally suppressed any and all rebellions against his authority, the rebelling of streltsy, Bashkirs, Astrakhan and including the greatest civil uprising of his reign, the Bulavin Rebellion." (Hughes, 1)

Peter's response to the streltsy rebellion would help to set the tone for his low level of tolerance for civil insubordination. The tsar's forces reportedly suffered the loss of only a single serviceman as a result of the uprising. In unilateral response, Peter had 1200 streltsy rebels executed for their roles in the insurrection. Here, Peter would show his true colors to those that may have perceived his European inclinations as affectations dictating a lesser interest in rulership than aristocratic hedonism. But the transition from the Peter the wealthy young recreationalist to Peter the reformer would see his pursuits turn not just to the affairs of state and empire, but to the continuity of his own lineage. Peter may be said in this regard to have employed a certain foresight in justification of his excesses of violence. Peter adopted on behalf of tsarist Russia an understanding of his divine appointment to leadership which suggested an intellectual and spiritual hierarchy justifying his authoritarian tendencies. In this regard, he would be a catalyst in the Soviet ascendancy to feudalism. The disjointed territories of Rus and Kiev had become the province of a single crown, which Peter intended to retain for generations.

It is thus that we find even in Peter's own words a recognition of his authority as being for the good of a peasantry and court which he characterizes as lacking the wherewithal to makes its own decisions. Here, we begin to understand the perspective that drove Peter to such ends of authoritarian excess in pursuit of that which he perceived to be necessary and even progressive reform. Like most reformers, Peter would be faced not just with opposition from fringe ethnicities and border regions, but would also suffer the opposition of forces internal to his own government. It would be Peter's response largely to appeal to an even greater demonstration of his willingness to employ force against his political enemies.

On this point, Hughes reports that "Peter was frustrated that his reforms were not working more quickly and that few people seemed to understand his most cherished ideas. In a manifesto on the encouragement of factories issues in November 1723 he wrote: 'It's true that there are few who are willing to participate, for our people are like children who, out of ignorance, will never get down to learning their alphabet unless the master forces them to do so. At first they find it tedious, but when they learn their lesson they are grateful. This is evidence in the current state of affairs where everything has to be done by force, but already thanks can be heard and fruit has been produced." (Hughes, 182)