Mission work and challenges among unreached people groups in Iraq

Unreached People Group Project (Iraq)

Language

Culture

Economy

Religion

Family

A Survey of Mission Work

History of Mission Work

Current Status of the Church

Number of Known Believers

Challenges

Present Strategies

Unreached People Group Project (Iraq)

The history of Iraq parallels the antiquity of mankind; therefore, a more recent examination of Iraq's history will be more suitable for evaluating the needs of unreached people in this country. The country used to be part of the Ottoman Empire but Britain occupied Iraq during World War I.

In this regard, Dawisha reports that, "Iraq was patched up together into a monarchy by the British in 1921 from three disparate provinces of the defunct Ottoman Empire. Divisions were so deep that when it came to choosing a ruler for the new state, the British realized that no local candidate would command the support of the whole population."

The country was designated a League of Nations mandate administered by the UK in 1920. Iraq subsequently gained independence and in 1932, it was established as a kingdom.

Although a republic was established in 1958, the country was actually ruled by a series of dictators for the next half century, culminating in the Saddam Hussein regime which ended in 2003 following interventions by a coalition of nations led by the United States.

Over the past 2 decades, however, Iraq experienced an enormously costly war in terms of human lives and national treasure with Iran from 1980 to 1988 that resulted in an essential stalemate.

Iraq has also engaged in hostile expeditions against its neighbor, Kuwait. According to analysts with the U.S. government, "In August 1990, Iraq seized Kuwait but was expelled by U.S.-led, UN coalition forces during the Gulf War of January-February 1991."

In response to continuing noncompliance with UN Security Council mandates over a 12-year period, a U.S.-led UN coalition force once again invaded and occupied Iraq in March 2003 pursuant to a subsequent UN Security Council resolution, resulting in the removal of Hussein. In addition, also pursuant to the UN Security Council resolution, U.S. military forces maintained a presence through 2009 in an effort to promote stability and provide the fledgling government with an opportunity to consolidate its authority; however, actual military operations did not end until mid-December 2011.

According to U.S. government intelligence analysts, "In October 2005, Iraqis approved a constitution in a national referendum and, pursuant to this document, elected a 275-member Council of Representatives (COR) in December 2005. The COR approved most cabinet ministers in May 2006, marking the transition to Iraq's first constitutional government in nearly a half century." There have also elections held for a national legislature and a new government was approved in December 2010; in addition, elections were held in 2009 for all provincial councils in the country's governorates with the exceptions of the Kurdistan Regional Government and Kirkuk Governorate.

Despite this apparent political progress, Iraq's more recent history is highly troubling for Christian missionaries. For instance, Marr argues that, "Iraq's history is one of competing views of the state put forth by its diverse groups and communities, the ways in which these have clashed, and how one such narrative -- that of Arab or Iraqi nationalism -- espoused mainly by a narrow minority (Sunni Arabs from a particular region), came to dominate the state apparatus."

Although Christians living in other parts of the Arab world have been "recognized as communities in law and public consciousness since the birth of Islam,"

the situation is different in Iraq today. Indeed, Marr concludes that, "Those seeking a 'new' narrative in Iraq must recognize the powerful historical legacy at work in Iraq in which virtually all alternative directions have been foreclosed."

Language. The official languages in Iraq are Arabic, Kurdish, Turkmen, and Assyrian; in addition, Armenian is recognized as an official language in regions of the country where speakers represent a majority of the population.

Culture. Although generally unified in Islamic religion, Iraq's culture is still marred by divisiveness in political and social realms. In fact, after being on the throne for 12 years, King Faysal I described the glaring problems with Iraqi society thusly: "Iraq is one of those countries that lack religious, communal and cultural unity, and as such it is divided upon itself; its power dispersed."

Unfortunately, the king's empirical observations concerning the divisiveness of Iraqi culture are still relevant today. In this regard, King Faysal I concluded that, "The Arab Sunni government rules over a Kurdish population, the bulk of which is ignorant, that is led by people with personal ambitions who use the [Kurds'] ethnic difference to advocate secession."

Other aspects of Iraqi culture can be discerned from Geert Hofstede's salient cultural dimensions which are applied to Iraq in Table 1 below.

Table 1

Application of Geert Hofstede's Five Cultural Dimensions to Iraq

Cultural Dimension

Description

Application to Iraq

Power distance

This dimension deals with the fact that all individuals in societies are not equal -- it expresses the attitude of the culture towards these inequalities amongst us. Power distance is defined as the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organisations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally.

Iraq scores high on this dimension (score of 95) which means that people accept a hierarchical order in which everybody has a place and which needs no further justification. Hierarchy in an organization is seen as reflecting inherent inequalities, centralization is popular, subordinates expect to be told what to do and the ideal boss is a benevolent autocrat

Individualism

The fundamental issue addressed by this dimension is the degree of interdependence a society maintains among its members. It has to do with whether people's self-image is defined in terms of "I" or "We." In Individualist societies people are supposed to look after themselves and their direct family only.

Iraq, with a score of 30 is considered a collectivistic society. This is manifest in a close long-term commitment to the member 'group', be that a family, extended family, or extended relationships. Loyalty in a collectivist culture is paramount, and over-rides most other societal rules and regulations. The society fosters strong relationships where everyone takes responsibility for fellow members of their group.

Masculinity

A high score (masculine) on this dimension indicates that the society will be driven by competition, achievement and success, with success being defined by the winner / best in field -- a value system that starts in school and continues throughout organizational behaviour.

Iraq scores 70 on this dimension and is thus a masculine society. In masculine countries people "live in order to work," managers are expected to be decisive and assertive, the emphasis is on equity, competition and performance and conflicts are resolved by fighting them out.

Uncertainty avoidance

The dimension Uncertainty Avoidance has to do with the way that a society deals with the fact that the future can never be known: should we try to control the future or just let it happen? This ambiguity brings with it anxiety and different cultures have learnt to deal with this anxiety in different ways.

Iraq scores 85 on this dimension and thus has a high preference for avoiding uncertainty. Countries exhibiting high uncertainty avoidance maintain rigid codes of belief and behaviour and are intolerant of unorthodox behaviour and ideas. In these cultures, security is an important element in individual motivation.

Source: Geert Hofstede's Cultural Dimensions (2014) at http://geert-hofstede.com/iraq.html

Economy. One of the bright spots on the Iraqi horizon is the nation's economic development. The hiatus in civil unrest provided by the U.S. military presence over the past several years gave the country the opportunity to recover and there is notable growth in the energy, construction, and retail sectors.

According to U.S. analysts, though, "Broader economic development, long-term fiscal health, and sustained improvements in the overall standard of living still depend on the central government passing major policy reforms."

The country's economy remains largely undiversified, however, and is depends heavily on the oil sector that accounts for more than 90% of the Iraqi government's revenues and 80% of its foreign exchange revenues.

In sum, although the energy sector's future appears bright, the country is still having difficulty attracting new foreign investment due to an uncertain business environment and a lack of the political and economic reforms.

As can be discerned from the trends shown in Figure 1 below, Iraqi GDP annual growth is slowly recovering from a precipitous decline in 2005.

Figure 1. Iraqi GDP Annual Growth Rate: January 2004 to January 2012

Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/iraq/gdp-growth-annual

Note: The annual growth rate in Gross Domestic Product measures the increase in value of the goods and services produced by an economy over the period of a year. Therefore, unlike the commonly used quarterly GDP growth rate the annual GDP growth rate takes into account a full year of economic activity, thus avoiding the need to make any type of seasonal adjustment.

Religion. The country is overwhelmingly (97%) Muslim (Shia 60%-65%, Sunni 32%-37%), and Islam is the official religion. Christians and other religions account for the remaining 3% of the Iraqi population.

Family. Pursuant to mixture of shari'a law and civil law, men are the heads of the household and of Iraqi society.

Some indication of the composition of contemporary Iraqi families can be discerned from the breakdown of the current Iraqi population provided in Table 2 and depicted graphically in a population pyramid in Figure 2 below.

Table 2

Demographic Breakdown of Iraqi Society Today

Age Group

Percentage of Population

Males

Females

0-14 years

37.2%

6,029,869

5,818,752

15-24 years

19.6%

3,175,754

3,082,880

25-54 years

35.8%

5,823,608

5,585,217

55-64 years

4.2%

637,889

698,691

65 years and over

3.2%

467,858

537,963

Source: CIA World Factbook at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/

Figure 2. Population Pyramid for Iraq: 2014

Source: CIA World Factbook at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/

Proposed Strategy

As noted above, many previous strategies for missionary work in Iraq have failed due to a lack of a cohesive approach that took the chasms of differences between Islam and Christianity into account. Indeed, Christian missionaries in Iraq are walking on extremely thin religious ice that threatens to break at any time because Christian proselytizing is a violation of Islamic law and represents a capital offense. In this regard, Watson reports that:

Missionaries may find they have worries other than a cold reception to their overtures in Iraq. At his trial, the accused killer of three workers at a Southern Baptist hospital said he killed them because they were missionaries. 'I acted out of a religious duty.... And in revenge from those who converted Muslims from their religion and made them unbelievers.'

From this perspective, the people of Iraq can be regarded as not being so much unreached as they are being unreached by Christianity and this is not out of ignorance but is rather a deeply seated religious conviction that will not be easily dismissed or changed by missionary work. Indeed, the Iraqi people have been reached by Islam for than thirteen centuries and the fact that Iraq remains overwhelming Muslim calls into question whether traditional Christian missionary work is still appropriate. In this regard, O'Keefe notes that, "Will proselytizing in Iraq offer comfort and hope to a nation that is 97% Muslim? Or will it reinforce the growing perception of Muslims worldwide that the war is against Islam."

The difficulties involved in providing Christian missionary work were further exacerbated by America's invasion and long-term occupation of the country which was resented by many Iraqi Muslims. For instance, according to Burk, many Muslims viewed "the American war in Iraq as an immoral extension of America's imperial ambition to dominate the world. The only way to fight terror is by working for mutual understanding and respect. The American empire's war in Iraq amounts to fighting one kind of terror with another."

Forging mutual understanding and respect certainly sounds like a viable approach to delivering missionary work in Iraq, but the fundamental constraint concerning a paucity of interest in and even hatred for Christianity on the part of many Muslims remains firmly in place. In this regard, Feuerherd asks, "How should the church respond to the 'aggressive' tactics -- designed primarily to convert Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus and other non-Christians -- used by some Christian evangelical missionaries in developing non-Christian countries?"

In many cases, Christian churches have responded by proselytizing under the thin veil of humanitarian aid and this thin veil has been readily discerned by Iraqi Muslims, generating highly negative responses. For instance, Feuerherd reports that:

A good number of the 10,000 evangelical Christian missionaries currently active in Islamic nations employ techniques (preference to Christians in humanitarian and medical services, overt proselytizing in countries where such practices are restricted and general insensitivity to the cultural context in which they are operating) that invite a backlash against churches that take a more nuanced approach.

Even more "more nuanced approaches," though, are fraught with opportunities for failure because of the potential perception of Christian proselytizing, a tendency that has been consistently reinforced by past missionary practices in the Arab world.

For instance, Kelly reports that Billy Graham's son, Franklin Graham, had adopted a heavy-handed approach to missionary work in Iraq following America's invasion and occupation that was inappropriate and ultimately ineffective. In this regard, Kelly reports with respect to Franklin Graham's Samaritan's Purse organization: "He [went] into Iraq in the wake of an invading army to convert people to Christianity. Nothing good is coming of that."

Indeed, in many ways, Franklin Graham has done more harm than good for future missionary missions to Iraq because of the heated rhetoric he has used in the past with reference to Islam. According to Kelly, "Franklin Graham once called Islam 'a very evil and wicked religion' in an interview on NBC-TV. In his book The Name, Graham wrote, 'The God of Islam is not the God of the Christian faith." He also said "the two are different as lightness and darkness.'"

The first objective of missionary work in Iraq should be "to help people of different religions to live together in peace and harmony."

The next objective involves social action: "The problems with which our world is faced are so great that there is need of the efforts of all to face up to them."

Finally, there is a need for the "sharing of spiritual values, a mutual witness to beliefs, an exploration of the riches of the respective spiritual traditions. In this way Christians and people of other religious traditions can help one another to deepen their religious commitment; to respond with greater sincerity to God's call."

In addition, there is also a compelling need for Christian missionary organizations working in Iraq to be absolutely forthright about their intentions with the Iraqi people and to acknowledge that violations of religious autonomy were committed in the past. In this regard, Feuerherd emphasizes that, "In dealing with Muslims, Christians will do well to clear the ground by honestly acknowledging the mistakes of the past that have poisoned our relations with this great faith."

An optimal strategy for the provision of missionary work in Iraq today, then, is for churches to collaborate with Muslim relief organizations in a side-by-side approach and to avoid proselytizing. In this regard, Kelly advises that, "The best thing would be to make sure Muslim relief organizations are working beside Christian ones in Iraq."

In addition, the director of advocacy and policy for Baltimore-based World Relief, Galen Carey, noted that his organization does not have a formal policy concerning proselytizing by missionary workers in Iraq but that "common sense prevails." According to Carey, "You have to be sensitive to improper influence. We have no interest as Christians to see the emergence of what some call 'rice Christians' -- people who pretend to become Christians, but really aren't. We know we need to respect the dignity and the freedom of the Iraqi people" (emphasis added).

This point is also made by Richard Cizik, an executive with the National Association of Evangelicals, who cautions, "Evangelicals need to be sensitive to the circumstances of this country and its people. If we are perceived as opportunists, we only hurt our cause. If this is seen as religious freedom for Iraq by way of gunboat diplomacy, is that helpful? I don't think so. If that's the perception, we lose."

The proscription against proselytization as part of an optimal strategy is congruent with the approach used by Baltimore-based Catholic Relief Services. For example, this organization stationed missionary workers in Iraq followed the end of the first Gulf War and prohibits proselytizing.

Likewise, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, which focuses on helping Jews in need, prohibits proselytizing. Similarly, the Geneva-based director of humanitarian affairs and international relations for the Christian group, World Vision, Tom Getman, emphasizes that it is inappropriate to proselytize in Iraq as part of the provision of humanitarian aid. According to Getman, "We try to open our hearts to others and see the full dimension of God in their experience. So we have a firm policy that we must never use a gift to persuade people to believe as we believe."

In fact, some relief organizations have made proselytizing a firing offense because of the potential negative backlash that can be triggered by such efforts in Muslim nations such as Iraq.

In this regard, O'Keefe emphasizes that, "At its root, the proselytism issue is over religious values and interpretation of biblical passages."

All of the relief organizations that prohibit proselytizing ensure that aid is delivered irrespective of religious beliefs or dogma, but they are willing to share the Gospel as part of the "Great Commission" from Jesus to "go forth and make disciples of all nations."

All of these organizations report that "they will be sensitive, even subtle, in their approach. Receptivity to a religious message will never be a requirement to receive food, water, shelter or any other aid."

The organizations that prohibit proselytizing stress that information about Christianity and the Gospel will be made available, but only if individuals approach them first. In this regard, O'Keefe reports that, "The image of Bible-toting missionaries marching into Iraq as Christian soldiers is inaccurate, they argue, because for the most part, the gospel will be shared only in private, in response to queries from curious individuals."