Cicero in Circles the Nature

Cicero in Circles

The nature of miracles has at certain points in human history been almost as hotly contested, debated, and theorized on as the existence of God. This was true during the Enlightenment, when scientific advancement was examining the sheer possibilities of many things previously believed from the Bible and other collections, written and spoken, of folklore. But the debate over miracles is even older than the enlightenment; older, in fact, than the Christian faith. The nature and possibility of miracles was debated even in pre-Christian Rome. Cicero, the first century BCE Roman statesman and philosopher, once wrote, "What was incapable of happening never happened, and what was capable of happening is not a miracle...Consequently, there are no miracles." His position in this debate is made eminently clear by these simple lines, yet the assertion he makes seems too unequivocal and unexplained. This does not mean it is incorrect, however. Frankly, no fault can be found with the logic of this statement. If we accept the stated definitions and suppositions that Cicero makes here, then his logic is self-fulfilling. But does that make it correct? Circular reasoning and self-definition are considered logical fallacies, and though they might not make a statement untrue, they do not speak well of the strength of the argument being made. A close examination of Cicero's explanation of miracles -- or explanation of no miracles, to be more precise -- reveals that whole his circular reasoning holds true despite an application of heavy skepticism, his statement is ultimately worthless outside of itself.

Skepticism is, in my opinion, the healthiest way to go about examining a philosophical quandary. With that in mind, let us examine each aspect of Cicero's argument with a mind pointed towards doubting this statement's truth, to see if we might not be able to prove it so. Let us take the first clause: "what was incapable of happening never happened." The skeptical mind demands that we try to prove the reverse of this. To do so, we need only to think f an event incapable of happening that has happened. We quickly see the futility in this exercise -- one can hardly argue with the fact as Cicero states it. If something is incapable of happening, then by definition it can never have happened -- if it ever did happen, even just once, then it was obviously capable of happening. So despite our skepticism we are forced to agree with Cicero's first conclusion, that things incapable of happening have never happened. This first steps self-reflexive quality mirrors that of Cicero's argument as a whole, as we shall see, but we must proceed cautiously.

The next part of Cicero's argument takes the assumption (now proven through are skepticism) of the first and extrapolates slightly: "what was capable of happening is not a miracle." This is where we begin to see a true glimmer of doubt about this statement. One might argue -- and many have -- that God or the gods or some other agent, usually of some divinity, is cable of working events that would otherwise be incapable of happening. Thus, a theologian could attempt to refute Cicero by saying that God (or the gods) is (are) capable of anything, even working a miracle. A careful examination of Cicero's logic, however, reveals that he is not actually stating anything in any sort of refutable or even affirmable manner. This clause is not a true part of Cicero's argument at all, but merely a definition of the term "miracle" as he is using it (or whatever other Latin equivalent he actually wrote). If "what was capable of happening is not a miracle," then the converse must also be true; that is, what is a miracle is incapable of happening. There is no reasoning required for this, it is simply the definition of "miracle" as Cicero defines it -- his statement simply defines it in the negative ("a miracle is not capable of happening). Cicero's response to our hypothetical theologian, them would simply be, "if it was capable of happening, then it was no miracle." There is no discussion or even consideration of the miraculous agent here; causation is not important to this argument of Cicero's. He merely defines a miracle as that which is incapable of happening, and then moves on to his conclusive point.