Civil Wars it Is Estimated That Between

Civil Wars

It is estimated that between 1900 and 1967, there were 526 civil wars called throughout the world (Civil pp). Today, there are literally dozens of wars going on around the globe, and dozens more that have ended during recent years, such as the civil wars in Guatemala and Tajikistan.

According to Christopher Cramer, most literature concerning civil wars has highlighted the role of political instability in the relationship between growth and inequality (Cramer pp). Although there are interlinkages between distribution, conflict and growth, these interlinkages are complex and cannot be read off or predicted from any convincing repeated empirical relationship between variables that are often loaded with too much and unclear meaning (Cramer pp). Cramer takes the title to his article, "Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing: Exploring Growth, Distribution and Conflict Linkages" from a short story by Sicilian writer, Leonardo Sciascia, about a Sicilian dragooned into fighting on Franco's side during the Spanish Civil War (Cramer pp). Sciascia writes,

"A civil war is not a stupid thing, like a war between nations ... A civil war is something more logical, a man starts shooting for the people and the things he loves, for the things he wants and against the people he hates; and no one makes a mistake about choosing which side to be on ... Despite its atrocities, a civil war is a kind of hora de la verdad, a moment of truth" (Cramer pp).

This quote expresses the view that civil war is not simply an outbreak of irrational hysteria that is perhaps based on some immutable and fixed "ethnic" antipathy, but is rather a perfectly sensible venting of feelings that cannot be contained by "normal peacetime relations" (Cramer pp). Thus, civil war is fundamentally class based, and in this sense it is about uneven distribution of income, wealth and political power (Cramer pp). For Sciascia, civil war is "a moment of truth," for it exposes and brings to the surface a conflict that otherwise is only latent and hidden from view (Cramer pp). While some see war as the continuation of politics by other means, other might suggest that war is the continuation of political economy by particular means (Cramer pp).

This view concerning the logic of civil war contrasts greatly with typical perceptions of civil war in developing countries where wars used to be seen in terms of "proxy" Cold War ideological contests, but more recently have been seen in terms of some primordial anarchy (Cramer pp).

This argument may be one aspect of the larger argument that "political and economic progress are not tied together in any easy, straightforward, functional way" (Cramer pp). Cramer argues that the idea that inequality leads to instability or conflict and that this conflict has exclusively negative effects on growth merely oversimplifies the true relationships and the nature of their interaction, and can actually be misleading (Cramer pp). According to Cramer, there are clear counter-examples, such as India, which has over a long period of time combined highly unequal distribution of income and power with relative political stability (Cramer pp). Moreover, "to the extent that there has been rising political instability in India recently, it is not clearly associated, certainly at an aggregate level, with a decline in investment or growth (Cramer pp).

Cramer believes that maldistribution is not always necessary and is hardly sufficient to provoke extreme instability, and where it is significant in the emergence of conflict, it is most likely combined with low growth and sharp economic crisis before the war, and other factors including the political economy of identity relations, that "themselves will not neatly fit into a quantifiable variable" (Cramer pp). Furthermore, where distributional issues are significant does not mean that anyone can predict some cut-off point beyond which a given "Gini" coefficient will be associated with a certain degree and form of instability or the outbreak of civil war (Cramer pp).

Generally, civil war is messier than the clear notion of conflict between the classes, however, the idea of civil war as an "hora de la verdad," a moment of truth, is certainly useful (Cramer pp). The political economy of civil war in the least developed countries may confirm some notions that "in periods of transition or crisis generative structures, previously opaque, become more visible" (Cramer pp). From a long-run perspective, conflict as a "moment of truth" is what give it a potentially cathartic effect, yet this perspective is lacking among the ultra-pessimists of cost of war exercises (Cramer pp). Moreover, such an analytical approach is "clearly distinct from that adopted in recent econometric applications of so-called political economy, that appear to founder on the complexity of historical realities" (Cramer pp). Cramer stresses a need for caution in the international application of supposedly equalizing and stablizing policies, in the interests of political stability, peace and in turn growth (Cramer pp). The appropriate policies are likely to be specific to each country, and rather than hope growth will be rise from a prior set of conditions of equality, policies should focus on growth more urgently on a basis of inclusion, primarily through employment, rather than difficult-to achieve redistribution of assets (Cramer pp).

After more than thirty-six years, the internal conflict in Guatemala formally ended in 1996 with the signing of the Peace Accords (Guatemala1 pp). Since then, some 200,000 paramilitary troops have been disbanded, and approximately 3,000 guerrillas have been demobilized and resettled, and are now being integrated into the Guatemalan political and economic life (Guatemala1 pp). Although there has been some progress, many of the Peace Accord commitments remain unfulfilled, and there are still enormous problems of poverty, particularly in the rural areas, and of participation, credit, and economic opportunity (Guatemal1 pp).

Guatemala is a democratic republic with separation of powers and a centralized national administration, and its 1985 Constitution provides for election by universal suffrage of a one-term president and a unicameral congress (Guatemala1 pp). In January 2000, Alfonso Portillo of the Guatemalan Republican Front, FRG, took office as President, after a free and fair December 1999 run-off election (Guatemala1 pp). The FRG maintains its majority with 63 seats in the 113 member Congress (Guatemala1 pp). Despite pledges, the Portillo administration and Congress have taken only limited steps to implement the 1996 Peace Accords concluded with the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity, URNG, guerrillas in 1996 (Guatemala1 pp).

More than half of Guatemalans are descendants of the indigenous Mayans, and Westernized Mayans and mestizos, those of mixed European and indigenous ancestry, are known as Ladinos (Guatemala1 pp). Although urbanization is accelerating, most of Guatemala's population is rural and predominately Roman Catholic, while Protestantism is practiced by an estimated forty percent and traditional Mayan religions by about one percent (Guatemala1 pp). Although indigenous Guatemalans outnumber the westernized Ladino community, historically they have been dominated by the Ladinos and excluded from the mainstream of social, economic, and political activity (Guatemala1 pp). The Mayans are regarded with disdain by the Ladino community and reports of discrimination against their religious practices must be seen in the context of the widespread Ladino rejection of indigenous culture (Guatemala1 pp). Thus, the Maya have been caught in the middle of one of the bloodiest revolutions recorded in Central American history and have been at the very center of revolutionary action from the beginning of the conflict (Guatemala pp).

The Guatemalan Civil war broke out after a military coup overthrew the democratic reign of president Arbenz in 1954, and military leaders, backed by the United States government, took control of the country (Guatemala pp). Initially, in opposition to this change, a revolutionary guerrilla group formed in the eastern part of the country that was composed of young army officers and proletarian Ladinos (Guatemala pp). The Guatemalan military, aided by the United States, suppressed this reaction, which resulted in approximately 10,000 deaths, including students, union leaders, and peasants (Guatemala pp). By the late 1970's, guerrilla movements began reemerging, the two most important were the Army of the Poor, EDP, and the Organization of the People in Arms, ORPA (Guatemala pp). The stronghold for guerrilla activity was in the remote wilderness of the Maya heartland, and as a result, the Guatemalan army targeted many of these areas, adopting a program of genocidal tactics against the Indian communities (Guatemala pp). Thus, the Maya were subjected to the army's "scorched-earth policy" in which hundreds of people were massacred an their houses burned (Guatemala pp). From 1978 to 1985, over 75,000 people were killed, many of them women and children, and more than 400 villages were destroyed (Guatemala pp). Over one million people fled to other regions of Guatemala and to countries such as Mexico, the United States, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica (Guatemala pp). Today, human rights organizations estimate conservatively that more than 100,000 people were murdered, 40,000 disappeared, and over 440 rural villages destroyed (Guatemala pp).

Rampant human rights abuses by the Guatemalan army and government, supported by powerful business and landholding interests, caused communist-led guerrillas to begin an active political war of terror in 1961, blocking social, agrarian, and economic reforms (Guerrilla pp). During the late 1960's, rightist groups were using the same terrorist tactics as the communists to attack the government, which slowly began to implement programs to improve the lives of the Indian peasants (Guerrilla pp). In 1968, communist guerrillas killed two U.S. embassy military attaches and the U.S. ambassador (Guerrilla pp). By 1970, leftist dissidents, abetted by rightist dissidents, were creating widespread fear and turmoil though violence and murder (Guerrilla pp). In 1970, leftist terrorists kidnapped and killed the West German ambassador when the government rejected their demands of $700,000 ransom and the release of twenty-five political prisoners (Guerrilla pp).

In 1978, General Romeo Lucas Garcia became president and, according to reports, ordered the deaths of approximately 5,000 persons, including 76 political leaders of the opposition (Guerrilla pp). Garcia's brutal corrupt regime resulted in the United States cutting off military aid, and by 1982, dissident army officers seized power and Garcia's regime ended (Guerrilla pp). Two military coup d'etats occurred in 1983 and in 1984 a constituent assembly was elected to draft a new constitution (Guerrilla pp). In 1986, civilian rule returned to Guatemala with the election of President Marco Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo, followed five years later by President Jorge Serrano Elias (Guerrilla pp). In 1993, Serrano's attempt to suspend constitutional rights led to his ouster by military, business and political leaders (Guerrilla pp). Later a temporary cease-fire with guerrillas restored some sense of democracy and led to a peace agreement on December 29, 1996 that was signed by four top leftist rebel leaders and government representatives (Guerrilla pp).

Although the peace accord was signed, debate over land issues continues, the focal point being for both sides, the Mayas and the Ladino plantation owners agrarian reform (Pando pp). Plantation owners, however, are often better equipped academically and financially, and also have access to more sophisticated legal tactics to acquire land, often with governmental support, while the majority of Mayans do not speak Spanish and are often illiterate which often complicates their attempts to keep their land (Pando pp).

Since the 1990's, solidarity among Maya tribes has increased and resulted in an expansion of political activity among native peoples, and although they have not been able to gain much ground on political issues, they have increased their ability to negotiate with the government over cultural matters such as language, education, tradition, and religion (Pando pp). In fact, Mayanidad, which has been practiced for hundreds of years among the Maya, began as an officially recognized political movement in 1991 in conjunction with President Vinicio Cerezo's leave of office (Pando pp). Perhaps the greatest threat to the movement concerns the power struggle among the native leaders (Pando pp). There is much that needs to be done to resolve the socially-based conflict, however, Mayan solidarity and political activism continues to grow and foster the hope that one day they will be allowed to live according to the rules of their ancestors (Pando pp).

The Truth Commission, or Commission for Historical Clarification, CEH, sponsored by the United Nations, presented its finding in March 1999 (Guatemala2 pp). The Commission revealed that the Guatemalan army had committed some 93% of the total war crimes, and had carried out over 600 massacres (Guatemala2 pp). Furthermore, the army's counterinsurgency campaign had legally constituted genocide against the Mayan people, and the URNG forces were charged with 3% of the violations (Guatemala2 pp).

A key finding of the report was the conclusion that the United States government had "directly contributed to this thirty year genocidal campaign," including the 1954 CIA coup against President Arbenz, the training of known human rights violators at the School of the Americas and other military centers, the financing of such human rights violators, and the close collaboration with military intelligence units that carried out the death squad activities (Guatemala2 pp).

On the other side of the globe is Tajikistan, with a population of 6 million, of which 65% is Tajik, 25% Uzbek, and 3.5% Russian, including Russian-speaking nationalities, however, during the last decade, the Slavic population has declined by almost 10% (Tajikistan pp). Tajikistan is the least urban of the former Soviet republics, with approximately 70% of the population living in the rural areas (Tajikistan pp). The official language of Tajikistan is Tajik, a dialect of Persian similar to Farsi and Dari, however, roughly 36% of the population and the majority of business persons and government officials speak Russian (Tajikistan pp).

In 1992, armed Muslim rebels began battling the neo-communist dominated government in Tajikistan, seeking to make the country an Islamic state (Tajikistan1 pp). Initially, the Tajik rebels centered their fighting in the south, around Kulyab and Kurgan Tyube, but it threatened to move to Dushanbe, the capital, and by 1996, the rebels were operating from northern Afghanistan and began regularly clashing with the 25,000 Russian troops stationed there to support President Imomali Rakhmanov who had won office in 1994 (Tajikistan1 pp). Rakhmanov's political stronghold, the town of Kulyab, became a major military re-supply base for Afghan forces opposed to the Taliban, a fundamentalist Islamic group that took control of Afghanistan in 1997 (Tajikistan1 pp). On December 23,1996, after extensive negotiations under United Nations auspices, Rakhmanov signed a cease-fire agreement with his leading opponent, Sayed Abdullah Nuri, and although both sides agreed to complete peace talks, clashes continued between Islamic rebels and the hard-line government (Tajikistan1 pp). Since the war began, it was estimated that about 100,000 people had died in Tajikistan by this time (Tajikistan1 pp).

During 1992, opponents of reform tried hard to overturn the coalition and block implementation of measures, such as a new legislature that would give the opposition a voice, resulting in vicious battles with many casualties among both civilians and combatants (Tajikistan1 pp). When demonstrators in Dushanbe seized Nabiyev and forced him to resign, the speaker of the Supreme Soviet, Akbarsho Iskandarov, became acting president, and although he advocated a negotiated resolution, he had little influence over either side (Tajikistan1 pp).

In November 1992, Iskandarov resigned, and Rahmonov became de facto dead of government, with Abdumalik Abdullojanov as prime minister (Tajikistan1 pp).

Once in possession Dushanbe, the neo-Soviets stepped up repression, resulting in mass arrests, assassinations, and executions, while fighting continued between the forces of the old guard and the opposition into the mid-1990's (Tajikistan1 pp).

Western news reports portrayed the conflict as occurring mainly among clans or regional cliques, however, many different lines of affiliation shaped the configuration of conflict forces, and both sides were divided over substantive political issues (Tajikistan1 pp). The old guard had never reconciled itself to the reforms of the Gorbachev era, 1985-1991, or to the subsequent demise of the regime, thus, there were many who wanted to continue a monopoly of the types of benefits enjoyed by the ruling elite under the Soviet system (Tajikistan1 pp).

Factions of the opposition coalition were divided over what form the new regime should take, whether secular parliamentary democracy, nationalist reformism, or Islamicization (Tajikistan1 pp).

Between 1994 and 1996, there were six major rounds of talks held, producing few positive results (Tajikistan1 pp). The most significant was a cease-fire agreement that took effect in October 1994 and was renewed repeatedly into 1996, "albeit with numerous violations by both sides" (Tajikistan1 pp).

Tajikistan had no army of its own prior to the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, and efforts by the Nabiyev government to organize a national guard were met with strong opposition from factions that feared an anti-reformist president would use to the guard as a tool of repression (Tajikistan1 pp). Thus, in 1992, Nabiyev turned to private armies of his political supporters to intimidate or assassinate political opponents (Tajikistan1 pp). Moreover, additional armed bands were organized throughout the country, some associated with political opposition groups, while others were simply reflecting the breakdown of central authority rather than loyalty to a political faction (Tajikistan1 pp).

In 1993, many positions in the Tajikistani high command were assumed by Russians, including minister of defense by Colonel Aleksandr Shishlyannikov, who held the post until 1995, when he was replaced by Major General Sherali Khayrulloyev, a Tajik (Tajikistan1 pp). That same year, the join CIS peacekeeping force was created, which remained the largest armed presence in the country through 1995, and included elements of the 201st Division, unites of Russian border troops, and some Kazakstani, Kyrgyzstani, and Uzbekistani units (Tajikistan1 pp). By this time, the official stated mission of the 201st Division included artillery and rocket support for the border troops, as well as 180 M-72 main battle tanks and 185 pieces of artillery, including sixty-five pieces of towed artillery; fifty self-propelled guns; fifteen rocket launchers; and fifty-five mortars (Tajikistan1 pp).