Clauswitz at the End of Chapter One,

Clauswitz

At the end of Chapter One, Book One of On War, Carl von Clausewitz famously gives his "paradoxical trinity" in regard to the nature of the forces arrayed against each other in war. He tells us war is a "total phenomenon" in which there are three "dominant tendencies" that characterize the nature of warfare, and that any theory of war which neglects or ignores any of these tendencies would both "conflict with reality" and thus be "totally useless."[footnoteRef:1] These three tendencies are so intertwined that they act like "three different codes of law, deep rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship with one another;" that is, each of the three tendencies is variable in its operative force, and the strength of each strand dominates or is diminished in any given particular case, but nevertheless, each magnet is still intimately involved in a given war or engagement.[footnoteRef:2] Clausewitz's formulation may in fact be useful when analyzing a particular conflict, as his framework for understanding can shed light on why certain strategies and tactics seem to be consistently successful (or consistently tragic, as the case may be) and can be improved upon or understood by succeeding generations. With this in mind, this paper will use Clausewitz's rubric in considering the factors that contributed to Admiral Lord Nelson's victory at the Battle of Trafalgar. The analysis of the battle of Trafalgar will be placed in the discussion of Clausewitz's three "magnets," with the emphasis on what I believe to be the dominant strand in this battle. [1: Carl von Clausewitz, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, trans., On War, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.] [2: Ibid.]

At the end of the first chapter of the first book of On War, Clausewitz gives the reader what he believes are the three main theoretical tendencies found in warfare. The first tendency concerns the various peoples involved in any given conflict. He calls the emotions found on the part of the warring polities a "blind natural force," in which the dominant passions are characterized by "primordial violence, hatred and enmity." The emotions of the citizens in the engaged polities are "kindled" by passions -- or a lack thereof -- that are already inherent in the people; and since the armies are of the people, they too, should share the strength and conviction of their nation.[footnoteRef:3] In the case of Trafalgar, both the British and French polities had gone through significant revolutions over the last century and a half (the Spanish had yet to undergo a significant political transformation). Though the British revolution was over a century old, its polity emerged from the nonviolent "Glorious Revolution" with a government that was more republican than monarchical, and in which it was defined by more democratic practice and freedom than the nation had previously seen. The freedom of action that Nelson displayed at Trafalgar is indicative of the political freedom (i.e. decision making) found by citizens in republican polities. Furthermore, the British people were on the defensive against a possible French invasion and they were additionally supported in their "passions" by their historical enmity with France. In the case of the recent French Revolution, the French people emerged from a revolution that was violent and exhausting, and by the time of the Battle of Trafalgar, the spirit of the French polity, though excited by their two-year-old war for empire, found its fleet's sailors tired and diminished from engagements during and following the revolution. The French people, despite the Revolution, had a history of servitude under a monarchy (and now under Napoleon Bonaparte) and were more used to being "directed" by the government rather than "directing" the government as in a republic, so the motion of the French polity could be considered as "directed" by the government -- here we have the example of two peoples engaged in war where each social body was animated by two different "spirits." [3: Ibid.]

It is in Clausewitz's next principle where we find the dominant strand operative at the Battle of Trafalgar. Of this strand, Clausewitz writes that after the people, it is the battlefield officer corps who have agency in determining the various potential outcomes of conflict. He writes that on the field of battle it is "the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam" where leadership can make its mark felt, for better or for ill. What Clausewitz means is that in any given battle chance will play its part, and that an experienced and skilled officer corps can use its experience and skill to limit the effects of chance and increase the probability of a victory. The use (or lack thereof) of the "creative spirit" when surveying the battlefield and acting accordingly can help commanders dramatically shape tactical and strategic outcomes by giving officers both the "vision" to see various attainable objectives and the freedom to act in accordance with their vision. This is what Clausewitz means when he states the second principle involves the "play of courage and talent [which depends upon] the particular character of the commander and army."[footnoteRef:4] The "correct" use of "vision" coupled with the will and freedom to act can greatly aid commanders in the field, whereas a lack of vision, or vision without will or freedom can harm the military effort. And of course, in attaining victory, this principle can add to the first if the officer corps and army are infused with the "spirit" of its people; take for example, the Spartan army embodying the spirit of Lacedaemon. [4: Ibid.]

At Trafalgar, Admiral Nelson broke then-contemporary naval tactics and innovated in his attack on a more numerous fleet w/larger ships-of-the-line. Instead of attacking in a parallel line in conformance with current practice, Nelson chose to use two columns and attack the French and Spanish fleet at right-angles in three places, thus sewing confusion among their opponent's ranks. The British Navy's strategy also chose to break the line just ahead of the French flagship, thus obscuring French Admiral Pierre-Charles Villeneuve's signaling ability and degrading his command and control capability. Nelson not only planned his tactic days in advance, he understood and used the fact that his sailors were more experienced and skilled at naval warfare, and he risked the dangers of a perpendicular attack for the potential benefit of scattering the French and Spanish column into the open water and then use his navy's superior skill in the ensuing melee. To add to Nelson's victory, Villeneuve was reported to have his heart half-into the battle due to his losing naval duels with the British at the Battle of the Nile and the Battle of Finisterre.