How coercive airpower shapes strategies

In spite of the considerable headway achieved in the African continent, a large number of states continue to experience political instability and turbulence, spilling into other areas. Numerous countries have been witnessing brutal extremism and jihadist terrorism. Such factions’ attacks are becoming increasingly more lethal, with recent attacks targeting America’s interests and its people, and expanding into new regions. The National Security Strategy continually collaborates with partners for defeating terror groups and other entities threatening the U.S. and its people (U.S. Embassy & Consulate in Nigeria para &8). The most important of all discussions on airpower application and theory, especially for non- uniformed individuals, are linked to airpower’s employment in coercing enemies. A majority of notable classical airpower theorists concur that the best solution was strategic bombing: directly striking at opponents’ national power center, leading to swift victories and early reduction or elimination of the need for defeating opponents’ surface forces; however, this isn’t the sole coercive airpower approach at one’s disposal (Muller 7).

Strategic bombing, akin to war itself, is typically coercive in nature, attempting (generally together with other attack methods) at forcing the enemy to fulfill deterrent or compellent demands instead of merely destroying its capability of resisting or misbehaving altogether. Success might eventually necessitate destruction in the event coercive tactics prove unsuccessful. However, a majority of conflicts come to an end prior to the loser completely being deprived of their fighting capability. Nevertheless, coercive and strategic air power tactics aren’t totally congruent. Further, airlift, reconnaissance, interdiction, close on- the- field air support and other air power approaches may facilitate opponent behaviour modification (Muller 8). Air power’s flexibility and fluidity, in addition to its long range of operation and the lack of need for occupying terrain the way ground forces do, renders airpower application dynamics strategically and tactically unique (Muller 6). Airpower has the potential to deliver measured responses capable of being withdrawn when opponents opt for modifying behaviors through compliance with the demands of the coercer, or even, where necessary, increased response for improving coercive leverage. At all points, before escalation, the opponent may choose capitulation, thereby ending the punishment inflicted and avoiding additional forceful retribution. According to Fryar, this is a ‘surrender either now or later’ choice; early surrender is apparently the ‘better deal’ in the eyes of the enemy. Should the enemy refuse to surrender, it implies that they are accepting the risk of more large- scale air power employment to the extent of even military defeat. Apart from scalability, one major airpower aspect is the capability of restricting enemy escalatory options, through preventing their military utilization or disturbing their control and command capabilities (Fryar 53).